THE KWANGTUNG EXODUS OF 1962 ONE OF A SERIES OF STUDIES ON DISSIDENCE AND CONTROL IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000300020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1965
• Content Type: IS

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23 February 1965
OCI No. 0343/65
Copy No. N2
INTELLIGENCE STUDY
THE KWANGTUNG EXODUS OF 1962
One of a Series of Studies on Dissidence
And Control in Communist China
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
110
GROUP 1
EMI~oded from ooromorc
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS........... ????????.
Page
e ? . . . . 1
1. The Setting ....................`
........... 5
II. The Exodus ........e.???....
9
III. The Nature of the Dissidence..........
IV. Analysis of Control Measures.......... 13
Annex
A. Personnel Shifts in Kwangtung Province 17
in 1962 .............................
Map
Illegal Immigration into Hong Kong: 17
1961-62 ...................following page
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The massive exodus from Kwangtung Province to
Hong Kong in May 1962 (see map) stands out as in-
disputable evidence that dissident sentiment in
that populous area of South China was both wide-
spread and easily surfaced. The dissidence is
traceable mainly to the grim economic conditions
that existed in Kwangtung, but the exodus itself
was brought on by one of the few instances in which
tight controls were deliberately lifted. That the
exodus grew to the proportions it did is due to the
comparatively loose supervision Peiping was exer-
cising over local authorities at the time.,
Beginning in late April, the controlled move-
ment of approved emigrants from a particularly
overcrowded section of urban and rural Kwangtung
became a surge of more than 100,000 people toward
Hong Kong after border controls were lifted on the
Communist side. In spite of barriers thrown up by
Hong Kong police, more than 50,000people fmanaged
to get through by the end of May, w
controls were reimposed by the Communists.
The decision by Kwangtung officials to risk
an uncontrolled exodus was taken shortly after
receiving Peiping's order to reduce urban popula-
tion in the province by some 30 percent--without
resorting to force. Officials tried to meet this
insoluble problem in part by encouraging further
emigration, mainly of unemployed relatives of
Overseas Chinese. A jam-up developed at the bor-
der after unexpectedly large numbers of exit per-
mits had been issued, whereupon controls were
dropped entirely. Almost immediately, people that
the regime presumably wanted to retain, such as
young industrial and farm workers, began to take
advantage of the lapsed border controls and
made up most of the emigrant group.
officials had badly underestimated the amount
oo
f
popular disaffection among young people.
theless, several weeks elapsed before controls
were reimposed.
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There was no resultant purge of responsible
regional and local officials. Subsequent national
policy decisions, however, indicated that the
Kwangtung exodus had helped to show Peiping the
nature and extent of popular dissidence in China
and the deterioration in the over-all control
mechanism that had occurred since the collapse of
the Leap Forward.
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1. THE SETTING
A, The Pattern of Migration from Communist China
o orn
Normally, both Communist China and the over-
crowded British colony of Hong Kong have recognized
a mutual interest in controlling the flow of "ref-
ugees" from the mainland into Hong Kong, and long
ago both governments worked out a set of informal
rules covering this delicate issue. Except for the
extraordinary month of May 1962, Peiping has fol-
lowed these rules in practice,
The existence of a flow of legal and illegal im-
migrants to Hong Kong does not necessarily mean that
Communist China is substantially more lax than other
police states. With few exceptions, exit permits are
given only to unemployable people having relatives in
Hong Kong and other Overseas Chinese communities. The
steady flow of illegal escapees, leaving mostly in
hired fishing junks, would be extremely difficult to
stop, short of shutting down the South China fishing
industry. Effective guarding of the land border usu-
ally keeps the illegal flow overland down to a trickle.
The Hong Kong Government's willingness to accept
immigrants from China goes back to the Treaty of Nan-
king in 1842, but the pressure of refugees from Com-
munist rule in 1950-51 caused the British to restrict
the legal flow to 50 Chinese per day, These have
usually entered Hong Kong across the land border by
train. This numerical restriction is easily circum-
vented, however, for the Chinese Communists have only
to make the exit permits valid for Macao. From this
nearby Portuguese colony long-established smugglers
will take the Chinese emigrants to Hong Kong by devious
water routes. 11K. $t,.1`50 minimum ::tee in early 1962 wars k re,
po r t e d. t y '.. some 1~1K: ~$ , 5;}O (US ?' $ 2 5) .
The policy of the Macao Government has continued
to be one of allowing free access to Chinese having
no more than adequate identification papers, Those
illegal immigrants who make their way successfully
into Hong Kong, or are apprehended on one of the
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water routes, are generally allowed to remain in the
British colony. They are,.in fact, encouraged to in-
tegrate by simple registration procedures and to be-
come self-sustaining through regular employment,
The flow of illegal immigrants to Hong Kong in-
creased steadily beginning in mid-1961, as the Chi-
nese Communists issued exit permits somewhat more
freely, and the official Communist China Travel Serv-
ice facilitated the emigrants' contact with smug-
gling rings in Macao. The resultant total of some
40,000 to 50,000 i1+legal.1mmigrants for the year 1961
probably exceeded substantially the flow of previous
years. These additional people traveled. mostly by
water, since the land border remained under close
Communist guard. In line with the relatively lenient
policies being followed throughout China in 1961 and
early 19629 however, those caught trying to escape
over the land border in those years were given less
severe penalties than earlier, with some being merely
warned against another attempt and sent back to their
homes. As a result, the number trying to
land rose, and by early 1962 Hong Kong pol
arresting several hundred illegal entratts per month,
as compared with ,a pre-1961 monthly average well be-
low 1000
B. National Policies in Farly'1962
The spring of 1962 marked a low point in the Com-
munist regime's confidence in its domestic policies.
Natural disasters had strung out over three years,
the collapse of the Great Leap Forward had brought
large-scale unemployment, popular disaffection was
widespread, and the prestige of the party had dropped
alarmingly, even among rank-and-file party members.
Confronted with widespread apathy and popular re-
sentment in 1961 and early 1962, the regime ordered
a general relaxation of policies. it reduced penal-
ties for petty crime, eased travel restrictions, frag-
mented the communes into collective units of 20 to
30 households called production teams, restored pri-
vate farm plots and permitted some free market activity
in food and other consumer
Chinese.
tion ofunemployedrelatgivessof a?verseas encouraged
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One of the most pressing tasks of the period was
to reduce to manageable proportions the approximately
30 million unemployed people in the cities, who had
been brought in from the countryside since 1957 for
industrial employment. Efforts to persuade them to
return home proved to be largely ineffective, Rural
conditions were worse than in the cities and vil-
lagers were reluctant to spread their already tight
rations. Many urban residents refused to leave, or
returned to the cities after going to the countryside.
The problem of reducing urban population was
still being dealt with only half-heartedly at the end
of 1961, Then, in April 1962, Premier Chou En-lai
frankly told the National People's Congress that the
Great Leap was dead, and that he did not expect early
economic recovery, He called for further industrial
retrenchment, and told the Congress that transfer of
redundant urban workers back to their villages to aug-
ment the agricultural labor force had become the na-
tion's foremost task. The problems of insufficient
food and of urban unemployment had combined to raise
the potential seriousness of the security situation
in urban areas, The regime's previous concern over
dissidence in rural areas had been increased by the
open resistance, which had developed in Honan and
other parts of central and eastern China from 1960 to
1961.
C. The Situation in Kwangtung
The people who left Kwangtung in May 1962 had
good reason to be discontented with conditions there.
In both quantity and quality, food supplies in Kwang-
tung were approaching seriously low levels in the
spring of 1962? Several months' drought, which was
broken only toward the end of May,1962 (and then by
floods), had erased the prospect of much if any im-
provement in the food situation for another year, Ra-
tions in Canton were better than in rural Kwangtung,
but they-were still insufficient to provide energy
for normal work and to maintain health. Cholera had
taken thousands of lives in Kwangtung the previous
summer, and it was expected to recur in 19620
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Reduced job and educational opportunities
contributed to the grim situation in and around
Canton. As in the rest of China, Canton had shut
down many factories and was operating others at
reduced rates, Many lower level schools had closed
in 1961, and by early 1962 it was clear in Canton
that the closing of many higher schools would soon
increase the number of unemployed.
It was also clear to the authorities that the
1961 plan to reduce Canton's population by only
200,000 people was inadequate. A new target of
600,000 was adopted (the population of Canton was
205 million); but, as elsewhere in China, enforce-
ment of the policy was difficult and there was
continued reluctance to use force on noncooperative
urban residents.
In Canton, police stations and street Commit-
tees made certain that those people registered in
the city after 1958 fully understood the retrench-
ment regulations. Given one month to leave Canton
for their native villages, many chose to remain;
and, forfeiting their urban ration cards, became
"drifters" living off relatives or fending for
themselves. Many became involved in black market
activities. Regular employment was of course
denied them,
Many who were willing to leave Canton had
difficulty getting accepted back in their villages,
Endlessly stalled off when applying for new regis-
tration certificates and ration cards, they re-
turned to Canton. There, the returnees entered a
limbo in which urban officials shunned responsibility
for their presence.
Under these circumstances, Peiping's decision
in April 1962 to relax emigration rules further was
welcomed by both urban and rural officials, who
lost little time in taking favorable action on past
applications for exit permits and even invited new
ones. Relaxing controls is not the same thing as
dropping them, however, and the dramatic change in
May was still apparently unanticipated by the Chi-
nese officials concerned.
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IL, THE EXODUS
The abrupt dropping of border controls and the
subsequent surge of more than 100,000 Chinese in
Kwangtung. Province toward Hong Kong during May 1962
at the time. but
baffled outside observers
con i en s a em?nts about the events themselves and
the causal factors at work.
in April 1962 Kwangtung officials received
permission from Peiping to increase ofrtherurbanflow
s
n
K
g,
o
of emigration to Hong
trenchment effort. Detailed planning and execution
were left in the hands of the Kwangtung authorities
security situationagainst the
on the assumption ~riousthey
serious
development of a
Many new exit permits were quickly issued, far
in excess of Hong Kong's quota of 50 perTdaday, and a
transportation problem soon developed,
holders had been at first shunted to Macao, but the
smuggling rings that would normally take them were
unable to handle the increased flow, especially since
Hong Kong water police were bc becoming igilant,
Many would-be emigrants became
turned to Canton,
At this point, about 1 May 1962, Kwangtung
officials made the decision to lift rlsoalong
the land border with Hong Kong, apparently
lieve congestion on the Macao route and in Canton
itself. Further opening of the valve controlling
emigration flow from Kwangtung had beeennupreeddiicttablle,
but not the complete waiving of any
an exit permit to leave the Kwangtung side,
Though unannounced by Communist officials, word
of these policy changes was surely expteditoth,
spread, There were still factors implicit
situation, however, that might have been expected to
keep the flow of people within safe bounds. Commu-
nist border guards remained at their posts, though
few of them made any effort to hinder
the crossers.
Some of the guards even showed people
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but the rugged hills posed a formidable ' barrier
In additions Hong Kong Government efforts to stop
expected to on
teracould immigrants
water the
water could
flow of people0 Finally, Chore was the general at?
l
c
m
which
in
mosphere of control thtoughout
China ~one
sought to develop
people would be reluctant to get out of line and
head for the border without first trying to get a
permit
it was soon clear, however, that Peipinggeandhe
Kwangtung officials had grossly und
u seize this o or unit
ld
number of eo le who wo
to le ay
~u %,1Yae ---- ---- - t!]11g east sprea~, y word of mouth thwhathhad beeneintended as
Ma
id
-
a ithin days o BY m
w
p exodus
an i uncontrolledf _
of a y, controlled emigrants e had t become limited
proved
made up largely of able-bodied young industrial and
farm workers
Continued increase in still brought
the border in this third week of May
no reimposition of Communist controls at the border
On 21 May, however, regular Chinese troops rep
some border guards, and there were indications of
travel restriction farther inland. Rumors spread
that the rwould close ains withinthea rem
24?2~i May heavy
side
the C
t e
o
inese
h
imposition of controls on
of
ream
st
land border with Hong Kong
emigrant flow was successfully shunted back through
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Macao, and it quickly returned in size to a level
that posed no serious security threat in Kwangtungo
The makeup of the emigrant group was controlled
again by the requirement of exit permits.
In mid-July Hong Kong authorities warned that
the colony still faced a major crisis in this con-
tinuing flow of illegal immigrants over water routes
emanating from Macao. The successful penetration of
water patrols by some 20,000 people in the two months
after the closing of the land border caused the Hong
Kong Government to form a special joint force of
augmented sea and land forces to patrol the colony's
waters and shores. A new temporary police policy of
firing on fleeing junks and destroying those captured
brought rapid increase in smugglers' fees and caused
some to lie low, Finally, in September, the flow of
illegal immigrants fell off sharply as a result of
tightening controls in China.
By the end of 1962 Hong Kong's statistics on
registration of new residents revealed that more than
50,000 people had entered the colony illegally via
the land route in May. It is probable that at least
an equal number reached the border, but failed to get
through the augmented Hong Kong border guards, or
turned back en route upon hearing discouraging rumors
prior to the border's closing. Adding to these fig-
ures the continuing flow of perhaps 3,000 emigrants
over the water route during the period of the exodus,
it may be concluded that more than 100,000 residents
of Kwangtung showed their disaffection by heading
for the border in May 19620
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Ill. THE 11 TURE OF THE DISSIDENCE
There are some inconsistencies in the exodus
story. For many who turned their backs on home and
family, the trek to Hong Kong was a rigorous one;
yet, they were submissive when turned back across
the border and ultimately sent back whence they
came. Also, the massiveness of the exodus and the
rapidity of its build-up stand in sharp contrast
to the collapse of the movement upon the reimposi-
tion of controls. But a. closer look at the nature
of the dissidence expressed in the exodus makes it
clear that these inconsistencies are only apparent.
Popular discontent with the grim economic and
social conditions in Kwangtung was undoubtedly
heightened somewhat by the obvious contrast with
Hong Kong, but the positive attraction of the al-
ready overcrowded colony was limited. Employment
prospects in Hong Kong were falling off in the
spring of 1962. The projected loss of "imperial
preference P9 with Britain's anticipated entry into
the Common Market and the cutback in production
for the United States market had cast a dark shadow
over the colony's industry and led to a layoff of
thousands of workers in early 1962.
By the end of 1961 some 440,000 squatters had
been resettled in government-built housing, but
520,000 others had taken their places in the hill-
side shacks and rooftop tenements of the colony.
Medical facilities, which proved capable of pre-
venting the threatened cholera epidemic of 1961,
were strained to capacity. The Hong Kong Govern-
ment's goal of universal primary education had
come within reach by 1961, but of the 90,000 chil-
dren entering primary school only one fifth would
find places in secondary schools. Of those only
one twentieth could look forward to some kind of
post-secondary educations Hong Kong's relative
freedom of thought and action for the individual
was a recognizable goal for the people of Kwangtung
but a vague one.
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Due to the constant large-scale movement of
Hong Kong residents to and from Kwangtung, and the
large amount of letter writing back and forth, these
conditions in Hong Kong were probably well.-known
in general terms to the people in Kwangtung. The
discontent of many had deepened into disaffection
strong enough to make them leave Kwangtung in May.
They were not desperate, however, and the attrac-
tion of Hong Kong was not sufficient to make them
resist being sent back to Kwangtung. Their disaf-
fection found its expression in noncooperation with
local Kwangtung authorities, but even this form of
passive resistance was ea