A CHECKLIST FOR THE SINO - SOVIET TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001400030003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DD/I RESEARCH STAFF
INTELL IGENCE MEMORANDUM
CIA/ RS IM 63-14 1 July 1963
OCI No. 2133/63
SUBJECT: A Checklist For the Sino-Soviet Talks
High-level Sino-Soviet talks (without Khrushchev
and Mao) are to begin in Moscow on 5 July. The two
parties speak of composing their differepces sufficiently
to make worth while a conference of all the parties,
similar to the l357 and 1960 Moscow conferences, perhaps
before the end of the year.
The attached checklist of Soviet and Chinese posi-
tions in the dispute ? is arranged under the headings of:
The State of the Dispute, The Next Step (Bilateral Talks),
The Backdrop (The 1957 and 1960 Declarations), Questions
of World Communist Strategy (in five parts), State Rela-
tions, and The 'Unity' of the Movement (in six parts).
The positions, taken from Soviet and Chinese statements
of the past `few months, are given in the words of the
parties themselves, although most of the statements have
been tidied a bit. Not all of the positions in the dis-
pute are given--those relating to aspects of strategy
could run on for many pages; but the more important are.
The checklist shows how difficult it will be for
the two parties to reach an agreement, even an agreement
on a stable truce. It is designed to help the interested
spectator in his reading of whatever pronouncements, in
one voice or two, may emerge from the Moscow talks.
The DDI/RS has had useful contributions to this
memorandum from several colleagues in OCI and ONE.
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17
The differences between us
are of long standing. They
are not to be explained by
the different conditions
in which we work, but are
serious differences on
questions of principle.
Differences between us have
arisen recently. They can
be expo#ined by the differ-
ent conditions in which the
parties are working, and
they need not turn into a
sharp conflict.
There is underway a "third
great debate" (the first
two being Lenin versus
Kautsky and Bernstein, and
Stalin versus Trotsky and
Bukharin), between the
Marxist-Leninists and the
"modern revisionists," be-
tween revolutionary Marx-
ism-Leninism and "bour-
geois ideology." Our op-
ponents are afraid to pub-
licize our case against
them.
A polemic on fundamental
problems has indeed arisen,
a polemic in which our op-
ponents have attacked the
common line of the world
Communist movement. These
polemics damage our common
interests, giving aid and
comfort to the enemy.
The persistent errors of We cannot agree that the
our opponents have exposed movement is "on the brink
the bloc and movement to of an abyss," but it is
increasing "danger of a true that a "highly import-
split." ant moment" has arrived.
Comment: Only in recent months have the Chi-
nese admitted publicly that the dispute is
serious; they now are more willing than the
Russians to describe it as that. The Russians
take the same view of it privately, however,
and they are no longer contending, as in
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their February 1963 letter to the Chinese
party, that the cohesive factors in their
relationship are of greater importance than
the divisive factors.
The Chinese all along have seemed eager to
debate, confident that they have the better
case (as indeed they do, by the book), The
Russians in two periods (winter 1961-62 and
winter 1962-63) have contended that a public
debate is necessary (a view they take when
they think they are
winning
the
debate),
and in two periods
(spring
1962
and spring
1963) have contended that such debate is a
bad thing (their view when they think they
are losing). The Russians currently assert
that the Chinese are breaking an agreement
to halt polemics; the Chinese deny that
they agreed. This question in itself--whether
to halt polemics, and how to define a halt--
will be hard to handle.
The
Chinese have recently become more
will-
ing
also to describe the movement as
being
on
the verge of a split; the Russians
have
put
this possibility less sharply, in
terms
of
"mutual alienation," or "subversion of
(our) unity." If the parties were choosing
their words carefully, the difference in
the terms would suggest a Chinese willing-
ness to initiate a formal. break, and a Rus-
siar unwillingno.s, to do ::;o; however, the
Russians might be, glad to see the Chinese
take the ;initiative, while the Chinese might
really be unwilling to do so.
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Soviet
We have always advocated
comradely discussion; we
proposed bilateral talks
more than a year ago, and
others have recently agreed.
We have always advocated
comradely discussion, and
we welcome the recent Chi-
nese agreement to have
bilateral talks.
The questions that need to
be discussed, in order of
importance, are:
(1)
the
strategy and tactics
of
revolution today;
(2)
op-
posing imperialism and de-
fending peace; (3) the lib-
erat ion struggle; (4)
strengthening the might
and unity of the bloc; and
(5) strengthening the unity
of the movement. The move-
ment needs a new definition
of its general line.
We want to discuss the full
range of questions in dis-
pute, and:we are willing to
have as many talks as neces-
sary.
We have always been opposed
to public exposure of our
differences. Lately the CCP
has been subject to "pre-
posterous attacks," by So-
viet leaders and spokesmen
among others. We have re-
plied to some attacks, but,
The questions that need to
be discussed, in order of
importance, are: (1)
strengthening the might of
the bloc, e.g. for peace-
ful economic competition;
(2) the fight for peace
and peaceful coexistence;
(3) the struggle against
imperialism; (4) support
of the national liberation
movement; and (5) strengthen-
ing the unity and cohesion
of the bloc and movement.
We are ready to discuss
whatever questions the Chi-
nese want to discuss.
Since February 1962 we
have urged an end to pub-
lic polemics; thus, while
we could answer the "ground-
less attacks" in the Chi-
nese press, we will not.
The most recent Chinese
letter /14 June7 also
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Chinese
despite the CPSU's com-
plaint of "groundless at-
tacks" on it, we have not
yet replied directly to the
Soviet attacks, If our
charges are groundless,
why is the CPSU afraid to
print them? No one has
the right to order an "end
to open polemics" in order
to keep the other side from
replying.
All who care about the
unity of the camp and the
movement hope that our
talks will help to elimin-
ate differences, strengthen
unity, and create favorable
conditions for holding a
meeting of all the parties.
Soviet
contains "gt^ undless and
^less attacks"'.on, the
CPSU and other parties. We
will not print it, because
it would cail..for a. public
reply which would provoke
fresh polemics--contrary to
our understanding,. the 'wishes
of other parties,' and the
spirit of our imminent meet-
ing.
"We should like.to ,hope"
that a meeting will improve
the atmosphere, and that
after a meeting we can
carry out a series of
measures to overcome the
existing difficulties.
Comment: In the second set of positions above,
the question of first importance to the Chi-
nese--"the strategy and tactics of revolu-
tion"--in the sense that they have made it
the center of their criticism of the Soviet
party, does not appear at all on the Russian
list; the Chinese usually combine their
first question with part of their second,
as in their 14 June letter, in which they
speak of the bloc's "general line" as "di-
rented again~,-t!.the counterrevolutionary
global strategy of U.S. imperialism." In
that 14 June letter, the Chinese presented
their views on "questions that need to be
discussed in the talks" in the form of 25
points occupying 35 pages and then added
that there were "other questions of common
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concern" such as deStalinization and the
theses of the 20th and 22nd CPSU congresses
that should be discussed.
Note that the Russians do not commit them-
selves to talking as long as necessary
(i.e., as long as the Chinese think neces-
sary). The Russians have implied privately
that they know they cannot resolve the dis-
pute, no matter how long they talk.
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THE BACKDROP - THE 1957 and 1960 DECLARATIONS
Chinese
The crux of the dispute is
the interpretation of the
1957 and 1960 declarations
of the Communist parties.
All of the fundamental con-
clusions expressed in the
1957 and 1960 declarations
are still valid.
We have been absolutely
faithful to the 1957 and
1960 declarations, whereas
others have not been.
The general line expressed
in the declarations is one
of resolute revolutionary
struggle, which cannot be
"one-sidedly reduced to
'peaceful coexistence,'
'Peaceful competition,' and
'peaceful transition' ... 11
We have been faithful to,
and we are determined to
defend, the 1957 and 1960
declarations.
"We
are deeply convinced
that
there are no grounds
for
a re-examination"
of
that
line. The most
recent
CCP
letter /14 June7
again
makes an "arbitrary inter-
pretation" of the declara-
tions and "distorts their
major theses."
Comment: The most recent (1960) of the state-
me nt and declarations issued after a multi-
party conference was a mishmash of Soviet
and Chinese positions which satisfied neither
party. Within a few weeks, both parties
had reaffirmed all of their former positions.
The Soviet statements given above do not
make apparent the degree of Soviet dissatis-
faction with the 1960 declaration. While
both parties have departed from some of
the "joint" positions taken in that declara-
tion, the Russian departures have been more
obvious; for example, that declaration spoke
of revisionism as the "main danger" and was
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hard on Yugoslavia, whereas the Russians (as
the Chinese say) are themselves revisionists
and are conciliatory to Yugoslavia. For
this reason--the obvious Russian 'departures--
and because the 1960 declaration supported
the Chinese on issues of authority and dis-
cipline (e.g. the principle of unanimity)
and provided for further multiparty confer-
ences, the declaration has been of more use
to the Chinese in the dispute than to the
Russians.
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(1) Strategy versus Tactics
It is necessary to have a
strategy as well as tactics.
We always distinguish be-
tween'strategic and tacti-
cal questions.
Our opponents pretend to
have both strategy and
tactics,:: but they subor-
dinate strategy to tac-
tics, and in specific strug-
gles they swing between
"adventurism" and "capitu-
lationism," as witness
their conduct of the mis-
sile base venture in Cuba.
Our "paper tiger" thesis
calls for despising the
enemy strategically, in
the long term, while re-
specting the enemy tacti-
cally and seriously study-
ing him; therefore, it is
neither capitulationist
nor adventurist.
Our strategy, the strategy
of the world Communist move-
ment, is set forth in the
1957 and 1960 declarations.
Whereas agreement is neces-
sary on questions of stra-
tegy, opinions may differ
on tactics, although we
should seek unity on these
too.
The "paper tiger" thesis
as usually presented en-
courages an underestima-
tion of the enemy. The
thesis when spelled out is
a platitude: of course we
believe that in the long
run we will win; of course
we adapt our tactics to
particular situations.
Comment: Until recently, Khrushchev has
preferred to blur the distinction between
strategy and tactics in order to give him-
self maximum maneuverability; the Chinese
have not let him get away with it.
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The Chinese recognize that Khrushchev has
a strategy (of sorts), but they dislike
its points of emphasis to such a degree
that they dismiss it as improvisation, as
no strategy at all. The Chinese letter
of 14 June in effect called for a new
world Communist strategy along Mao's old
lines.
Similarly, the Russians recognize that Mao
shows flexibility in some respects and
from time to time, but they see Mao's
strategy as simple-minded, so confined
as it is to an obsessive hatred of the
United States and an obsessive vision of
revolutionary opportunities.
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(2) The Balance of Power
The balance of power in
the world has already
changed in favor of social-
ism.
Soviet
The balance of power in the
world arena "is changing"
steadily in favor of social-
ism.
We recognize that imperial-
ism has powerful military
weapons, and our "paper
tiger" thesis has always in-
cluded the admonition to
respect the enemy tactically
(i.e. militarily).
However, the bloc and its
friends are superior in
other respects, so that they
need not submit to "nuclear
blackmail" and can conduct
a much more aggressive
struggle.
Leftwing Communists repeat
old slogans, think it is
"easy" to deal with imperi-
alism, and "recklessly un-
derestimate" the strength
of imperialism, especially
its military strength.
Leftwing Communists have
always urged a course which
would risk the defeat of
Soviet power--a counsel
which is really a "cry of
desperation, an attitude
of capitulationism."
Comment: It is uncertain whether either
Moscow or Peiping ever really believed, as
both pretended to believe for some years,
that the bloc enjoyed military superiority
over the West; in any case, the Chinese
believed that the Soviet deterrent was such
that the USSR could pursue a much more mili-
tant program.
The USSR's retreat from its missile base
venture in Cuba last fall--a venture aimed
at the achievement of a situation in which
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a much more militant program could be pur-
sued--should have made clear o ze Chi-
nese (who criticized the venture after the
fact as "adventurist") that the Soviet
deterrent was not what they believed it to
be. However, the failure of the venture
has not affected the abiding Chinese thesis
that political (moral and ideological) fac-
tors are of greater importance, so that
Communist parties need not be deterred from
armed struggle and other forms of violence
by their opponents' superiority in arms.
Thus the Chinese thesis in practice calls
for the Chinese to respect the enemy tac-
tically, utfor other parties to plunge
into action despite the odds,
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(3) "Peaceful Coexistence"
It is "wrong" to make peace-
ful coexistence the general
line of bloc foreign policy.
Peaceful coexistence with
those who are not ill-dis-
posed toward us is possible,
but maximum pressure must
be maintained against the
United States at all points.
Peaceful coexistence, which
is the "general line" of
bloc foreign policy, is the
only correct principle for
relations between states
with different social sys-
tems, as Lenin taught us
and as the Chinese them-
selves profess to believe.
A certain leader /Khrushchev7
does not struggle; his soft
interpretation of peaceful
coexistence extends even
to the relations between op-
pressors and oppressed, and
negates the struggle against
imperialism and for liberation,
Peaceful competition will
not establish socialism,
and the building of a so-
cialist state cannot re-
place the liberation strug-
gle.
A certain leader /Khrushchev7
who believes in the good
will of Western leaders,
pins his hopes on agreements
between great powers.
Peaceful coexistence per-
mits a vigorous struggle
between systems by all
means short of war, and be-
tween classes by all means
including armed struggle
when necessary, and it con-
tributes to the steady de-
velopment of the liberation
movement.
We will be victorious in
peaceful economic competi-
tion; and the victory of
socialism in the world is
advanced "first of all" by
building the blocs economy.
It is not necessary to
believe in the good will
of Western leaders in order
to believe that negotiations
are worth while; and they
are.
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We do not reject all com-
promise, only "unprinci-
pled" compromise; some com-
promises advance the people's
cause, others (as in Cuba)
are "treacherous."
Soviet
A negotiated settlement
even on bad terms, such as
the Brest-Litousk tre?aty-..
/-or the October 1962. agree-
rment on Cuba7, may be ac-
ceptable in-the short run,
if it preserves us for our
ultimate victory.
Comment: The Russians view the balance of
power as making peaceful coexistence neces-
sary, notably with the United States. The
Chinese emphasize that Khrushchev's version
of it dilutes the orthodox Communist hos-
tility to the West, discourages and inhibits
revolutionary forces everywhere, and pre-
vents Peiping (lacking Russian support) from
"liberating" Taiwan. The Chinese letter of
14 June is again scornful of Khrushchev's
emphasis on 'peaceful coexistence.'
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(4) Wars
A world without wars is
impossible so long as cap-
italism exists, and the
imperialists incessantly
foment local wars (pages
of illustrations).
There is a possibility of
banishing world war before
capitalism has been wiped
out.
The hope of preventing
world war depends on pro-
gress in the struggle
against imperialism and in
support of oppressed na-
tions. The modern revi-
sionists beg imperialism
for peace, instead of
struggling.
The modern revisionists,
who exaggerate the import-
ance of technology, also
exaggerate the consequences
of world war, which would be
serious but would destroy
only imperialism, not the
people.
The modern revisionists,
fearing the expansion of
local wars, are insincere
about supporting "just" wars
in this category.
The prevention of a new
world war is a thoroughly
realistic task, in part be-
cause the imperialists fear
our military might. The
Chinese themselves claim
to be striving to prevent
a world war and to bel ieve
this possible.
The movement must take into
account the "basic qualita-
tive change of military
technical means of conduct-
ing war"; the world looks
to us to prevent the "ulti-
mate catastrophe" of world
war.
Local wars in general should
be avoided, but there are
"just" wars, and these we
firmly support.
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The revisionists' interest
in disarmament is a good
example of seeking an agree-
ment which would be disadvan-
tageous to the bloc and to
the liberation movement;
even the interest is disad-
vantageous.
Disarmament may or may not
be a realistic goal, and
progress toward it will in
any case be slow, but at
the least it is an effective
issue.
Comment: The Russians tend to imply an in-
creasing ability to deter-:wars of all kinds,
although they no longer assert expressly
that the West is increasingly deterred from
local wars; the Chinese complain bitterly
when Moscow blurs this question.
The Russians emphasize the importance of
Soviet military power (as compared with
Chinese rhetoric) as a deterrent, emphasize
also the fearful consequences of a world
war (and imply that the Chinese are indif-
ferent to the consequences and may even
desire such a war), and avoid a commitment
to give material support in local wars to
anti-Western forces (colonial peoples, newly-
independent countries, "liberation" forces
in underdeveloped countries, rebellious
elements in developed Western countries).
The Chinese have a strong concern about dis-
armament, as they want the very weapons
which a disarmament agreement would abolish
or restrict. The Chinese accuse the Russians
of obtuseness, cowardice, and treachery on
these matters, and call for "sacrifices."
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY
(5) Tactics in Underdeveloped and Developed Countries
Chinese
No revolutionary party will
struggle if it has abandoned
the goal of overthrowing
the old system and no longer
believes that it can wino
As Lenin taught, leftism
overestimates the possi-
bility of movement and
flourishes revolutionary
phrases. Revolutions occur
when conditions are ripe.
"Export of revolution" is
a meaningless concept: only
counter-revolution is ex-
ported.
Modern revisionists exag-
gerate the possibility of
gaining power by political
means; peaceful means may
sometimes be used to the
point of the transition to
socialism, but then the
state must be smashed.
The underdeveloped areas
are the "focus of world
contradictions"; the Com-
munist movement must vigor-
ously support this struggle,
for it is "decisive" for
our cause.
We are against the export
of both revolution and
counter-revolution.
There are good possibilities
for gaining power by peace-
ful means; the Chinese them-
selves admit such a possi-
bility. Of course, if the
exploiting classes use vio-
lence, the working class
must also
The national liberation
movement is an integral part
of the world revolutionary
process, but the fate of
the world will not be de-
cided in the underdeveloped
areas
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Modern revisionists sub-
ordinate the liberation
struggle to peace, and
even help the imperialists
to suppress it.
The Chinese program, with
its emphasis on a rural
base, armed struggle, and
the early hegemony of the
Communist party, is the
model for people of the un-
derdeveloped areas.
Peaceful coexistence serves
to advance the liberation
struggle, which increasingly
deals defeats to imperialism.
No party /except ours7, re-
gardless of its size,, experi-
ence, and prestige, can
define the tactics of revo-
lutionary struggle in other
countries.
The major parties of North The experienced parties of
America and Western Europe North America and Western
are all led by cowardly Europe are working well in
revisionists. difficult conditions.
Comment: The Russians and Chinese agree that
Neatest opportunities lie in the under-
developed countries, but disagree as to the
weight of these countries in the struggle,
and disagree also about the prospects for
military action and about the speed with which
the Communists can move for control (the
Russians are more cautious).
The Chinese now appear to be directly urging
to militancy the receptive parties or factions
of parties in these countries, rather than
genuinely urging the Russians to urge them,
as the Chinese want the gospel to come from
Peiping. The Chinese do not, however, urge a
militant course on all of the Communist parties
of the underdeveloped countries; they do not
urge it, for example, on the Indonesian party,
because they do not want to disturb their
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good relationship with the Indonesian party
and with Sukarno.
As for the developed countries, the Russians
may or may not really believe that some of
the parties (e.g. Italy's) can come to power
by parliamentary means, but they seem at
least to believe that a militant course for
these parties at this time would alienate
them from their societies and thus make them
useless for more positive action later; more-
over, Moscow has useful relationships now
with those governments. The Chinese, lacking
such relationships with most of the developed
countries, complain about the European orien-
tation of Soviet policy and profess to see
revolutionary opportunities there as elsewhere,
to be exploited by large-scale strikes and
violence.
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Chinese
After summer 1959, another
party /the CPSU7, which
wants Its own program to
be the universal model, at-
tacked our general line
and our "leap forward" and
commune programs, and said
that we were carrying out
an "advent'urist" policy in
directing the work of the
state.
There may be different in-
terpretations of concrete
problems of socialist con-
struction; e.g. we expect
innovations as underdeveloped
countries move toward social-
ism. However, the exaggera-
tion of "national peculiar-
ities" is a mistake.
Every socialist country
must rely mainly on itself
for its construction.
Those who favor "division
of labor" and "specializa-
tion" seek to impose their
will, and put economic pres-
sure on us, They speak of
not letting ideological is-
sues intrude, and then "per-
fidiously tear up" hundreds
of contracts.
The Cuban comrades have
discovered what the as-
surances of a certain fra-
ternal country /:the USSR7
are worth. -' -
A certain Communist country
/the USSR7 has not on'.y
failed to support us in
our clashes with a non-Com-
munist state /India7, but
has actually supported our
enemies.
Each socialist country can
solve its national tasks
"only in the closest colla-
boration" with other bloc
states. Differences may
arise on the forms and methods
of our cooperation. Stable
and dependable economic re-
lations are necessary, so
ideological differences
should not be "mechanically"
transferred to state rela-
tions.
The might of the bloc "reli-
ably defends the victories
of socialism."
As is well known, we always
give strong support to our
friends.
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In state relations with
us, a certain country has
consistently been guilty
of great-nation chauvinism.
As for the CPSU's claim
not to sow hostility, we
will not recapitulate the
"many unpleasant events,"
but will ask the CPSU to
abide by this statement in
the future.
Ideological and tactical
differences must not be
used to fan nationalistic
prejudices, distrust, or
discord among socialist
people. We have never done
anything to encourage hos-
tility toward the Chinese
people among our people.
Comment: The Russians in recent years have
been emphasizing China's economic and mili-
tary backwardness, and the great reduction
of Soviet aid since 1960 has of course made
it even more difficult for Peiping to solve
its problems. The Russians have also under-
scored China?s dependence on the USSR for
military protection against the West: this
is a very sore point, as the USSR does not
provide to China or help the Chinese to make
the modern weapons which would reduce that
dependence.
The Soviet support of India, which is to
increase, has been painful, and the Russians,
knowing themselves vulnerable on this issue,
have not really replied to Chinese statements
on the matter.
The Russians have often implied that an im-
provement in Chinese behavior would be mater-
ially rewarded; the Chinese have scorned
these overtures, and have implied that the
USSR will have much to worry about when China,
without substantial Soviet help, becomes a
great power.
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(1) The Need for Unity
Chinese
What is necessary first
of all is to strengthen
the unity of the movement
--one of the conditions
for the victory of our
cause.
No matter how serious our
differences,. we should be
patient and find ways to
eliminate them, in order to
unite our forces against
the common enemy.
However, the touchstone of
proletarian international-
ism is no longer whether each
Communist party defends the
USSR, but whether it defends
the entire camp, the unity
of the camp on the basis of
Marxism-Leninism.
Moreover: those who claim
to be trying to break down
the barriers of nationality,
color, and geographical lo-
cation are really trying
to efface the difference
between oppressors and op-
pressed and to hold back
revolutionary struggles.
As the Chinese note, the
guarantee of all our suc-
cesses lies in strengthen-
ing the unity of the move-
ment.
Future generations will
not forgive us if we fail
to find the strength in
ourselves to overcome our
existing differences.
In working out its own line,
each Communist party must
bear in mind the interests,
aims and tasks of the move-
ment as a whole, its "gen-
eral line" at any given
period.
The unity of the world pro-
letariat means class anti-
imperialist solidarity,:.-not
organization along national,
racial or geographical lines;
organization on the latter
lines would do harm to our
struggle.
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Finally: the parties must
unite on the basis of our
interpretation--the Marxist-
Leninist interpretation--of
the 1957 and 1960 declara-
tions. Those who defend the
"erroneous opportunist line"
of a "certain socialist coun-
try" /he USSR7 are not de-
fending unity-
Soviet
The basis for our unity al-
ready exists--the 1957 and
1960 declarations, all of
the fundamental conclusions
of which have been confirmed
by life itself. What is
needed now is the concerted
observance by all parties
of these jointly-formulated
appraisals and conclusions.
Comment: In asking all parties to consider
the interests of the entire camp or movement,
each of course means its conception of the
overall interest, in -wl hh its own interest
is. placed first.
The Chinese see unity as one of the conditions
of victory, the other being a Marxist-Lenin-
ist program, as they define it, on which the
parties can unite. The Russians want the Chi-
nese to stop criticizing them, to stop prosely-
tizing among the other parties, and to stop
threatening to set up a separate movement.
As a part of their cultivation of anti-Soviet
Communists both inside and outside the bloc,
the Chinese, who pose as spokesmen for all
colored peoples, have already begun to split
the fronts on geographical lines, and are try-
ing to set up their own organizations without
Soviet participation.
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(2) The 'Equality' of the Parties
Chinese
In interparty relations,
we stand for independence
and equality, and we wel-
come the Soviet party's
recognition of the equality
of the parties.
We support the principles
of the "complete equality
of rights" of all parties
and of "equal demands" upon
all parties, large or small,
without exception.
If, as the CPSU says, there
are no superiors or infer-
iors in the movement, then
it is impermissible to im-
pose the program or line of
one party on other parties
as the "common program" of
the movement.
In working out common posi-
tions, we stand for the "at-
tainment of unanimity through
consultation." We cannot
have the "wielding of batons";
that kind of unity means
"split."
There are no.superior or
inferior parties. We never
impose our line; but other
parties may freely adopt--
and sometimes do adopt--our
positions as their common
line.
Socialist equality means
both the "right to parti-
cipate equally" in working
out the general line, and
the "equal responsibility"
of the parties for the im-
plementation of that line.
Comment: Both parties believe that some parties
are more equal than others. The Russians
even. agree that the Chinese as well as the Rus-
sian party has special status; a less import-
ant party could not have got the same conces-
sions from the Russians that the Chinese party
has. But the Russians will not give the Chi-
nese a status as special--amounting to an ex-
change of roles--as they would like.
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With regard to multiparty conferences, for..
Peiping Chinese equality means Chinese veto
power (which Peiping in effect had, at the
last conference), while for Moscow Chinese.
equality means--or should mean--Chinese sub-
mission to the Soviet-dominated majority.
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(3) The Source of the Danger
Our opponents, who once All of us agreed that re-
agreed that revisionism is visionism was the main
the main danger, now claim danger at the time, but
that dogmatism and sectar- that dogmatism and sectar-
iankdm are the main dangers. ianism could become the
main danger to individual
parties.
Modern revisionism is still "Leftwing opportunism" is
the main danger, now "no less dangerous than
rev is ion ism. "
Comment: The Chinese 'legal' case is good,
in that the 1960 declaration of the 81 par-
ties asserted that revisionism was the main
danger, and there has been no subsequent
multiparty conference with the authority to
change that formulation.
The Russians in recent months have more often
described the Chinese and their supporters
as "leftwing opportunists" than as dogmatists,
in part because this turns against the Chinese
the charge of "opportunism" that Peiping has
made against Moscow. The Chinese have con-
trived an evasive answer to the charge of
dogmatism--namely, that dogmatism is expressed
as mechanically copying the policies of another
or submitting blindly to his will. They seem
to believe that there is no such thing as left
opportunism, although they have defended them-
selves against charges of left adventurism.
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(4) Friends and Enemies
The modern revisionists
treat enemies as friends
and friends as enemies.
We are the friends of all
"peoples," but not of cer-
tain leaders.
Our opponents have tried
to ruin Albania for not
obeying their baton, while
they have tried to "reverse
the verdict" of the 1960
conference on the "trai=
torous Yugoslav clique"
and have since wooed the
Yugoslavs.
The CPSU letter says that
the CPSU hopes that Soviet-
Albanian relations may be
improved. But everyone
knows that the CPSU is re-
sponsible for the deteriora-
tion in Soviet-Albanian rela-
tions. We continue to be-
lieve that the CPSU must
take the initiative to im-
prove relations.
The question of attitude
toward Tito's clique is
a "major question of prin-
ciple," because they are
"traitors to the Communist
cause."
We have been very patient
with the Albanian party,
which has been very rude
to us; and we are trying
to improve relations with
Yugoslavia, a socialist
country building socialism,
while trying to help the
Yugoslavs correct their
mistakes.
Our proposal last February
for bilateral talks with
the Albanian party was re-
jected; we are still pre-
pared to hold a meeting,
and we "do not reject the
thought" that relations
can be improved.
The Albanian and Yugoslav
issues are both matters of
principle, but they must
not be allowed to overshadow
the main problems of our
times,
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Chinese
The Chinese Communist party
will "never" allow traitors
to be brought into Communist
ranks.
Spokesmen for the Soviet
party have attacked the
glorious parties of China,
Albania, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma,
Malaya, Thailand, Japan, and
New Zealand.
Under the slogan of combat-
ting the "cult of the indi-
vidual,"' certain persons
are interfering in ? the in-
ternal affairs of other par-
ties and are trying to force
them to change their leader-
ships. "What is this if not
subversion?" But they them-
selves are cowardly, fear
the truth, lack popular sup-
port, and will be brought
down.
Communist parties cannot
"unilaterally expel" other
Communist parties from the
movement.
The Soviet party highly re-
gards the struggles of the
parties of Western Europe
and North America attacked
by the Chinese, and also
the struggles of Asian,
African, and Latin American
parties.
The CPSU has liquidated the
effects of Stalin's person-
ality cult and has completely
restored Leninist principles
in relations among fraternal
parties and states, includ-
ing the principle of non-
intervention in their inter-
nal affairs. The CPSU cen-
tral committee "unanimously
approves" Khrushchev's con-
duct of relations with the
CCP.
Comment: While the Chinese no doubt detest
Tito and the Russians no doubt detest Hoxha,
Tito is useful to Peiping as a surrogate for
Khrushchev, and Hoxha serves Moscow as a
surrogate for Mao.
The Russians have recently seemed more willing
than the Chinese to compromise by treating both
the Yugoslav and the Albanian parties as com-
ponents of the movement. Talks about a conference
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might break down simply on the issue of whether
to invite Yugoslavia; although the Chinese
might prove willing to have the Yugoslav party
at end, in order to put Khrushchev and the
Yugoslavs on trial together there, in recent
weeks Peiping has seemed intransigent on this
point.
The Albanians much resent the Soviet descrip-
tion of their case as a secondary matter.
They have sometimes seems to fear the possi-
bility of a Sino-Soviet deal at their expense,
but this seems unlikely, because Chinese
prestige with Peiping's actual and potential
supporters would decline greatly if Peiping
were to abandon Albania.
The nine parties (in addition to China's)
specified as attacked by Soviet spokesmen
comprise the Chinese camp in the dispute;
they range from all-out supporters (the
Albanians) to on-balance supporters (the
North Vietnamese). Although most of the
parties of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America (in addition to the Western parties
attacked by Peiping) support the Soviet
party in the dispute, the Chinese do not
attack the parties of the underdeveloped
areas, because they believe they can compete
successfully with Moscow for influence over
them, and there are in fact pro-Chinese
factions in many of them; a few of them
would probably support the Chinese on some
issues at a multiparty conference.
The most recent Chinese letter tends to con-
firm that Peiping's fulminations last fall
about "subversion" in the Chinese party re-
flected some overture from the Russians to
their known or suspected supporters in the
Chinese leadership; the conciliators of the
USSR do not seem to be Mao's likely successors.
Whether there are conciliators of the Chinese
among Russian leaders is uncertain; the Soviet
leader (Kozlov) who has had the best treatment
in the Chinese press now seems to be out of the
running.
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(5) Prospects for a Multiparty Conference
Since April 1962, we have
been urging a conference
of all /now about 907 of
the Communist parties, of
the type held in November
1957 and November 1960.
Necessary conditions for
such a conference are the
cessation of polemics and
the cessation of attacks
on the Chinese camp. The
USSR should also take the
initiative to improve re-
lations with Albania, but
we will not cease to expose
and condemn Yugoslavia.
The questions to be discussed
at a multiparty conference
are mainly those of strategy
and tactics, and intrabloc
and interparty relations.
The discussions of these
questions at a conference
must be in accordance
with the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and the
statements of the 1957
and 1960 conferences.
In our May 1962 letter to
the CCP, we advocated col-
lective discussion /6y a
smaller group7. There are
now "sufficiiint grounds"
for a conference of all the
parties.
Preparation for such a con-
ference should include a
bilateral Sino-Soviet meet-
ing, the cessation of polemics
in the open press, and the
cessation of criticism of
another party within one's
own party and in communica-
tions to third parties.
The conference should center
on the common tasks of strug-
gle, the advance of the lib-
eration movement, the soli-
darity of the bloc and the
unity of the movement.
In preparing for a confer-
ence, parties should thor-
oughly analyze "new occur-
rences in international
life" and their own imple-
mentation of earlier "col-
lective decisions" of the
movement.
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If the principle of reach-
ing unanimity through con-
sultation is accepted--as
provided in the 1960 declara-
tion of the parties--then
one should not speak of a
"majority" or "minority,"
or rely on a "so-called
majority in order to force
through one's own erroneous
line and carry out sectarian
and splitting policies."
Soviet
Previous conferences have
shown that a common line
can be worked out only when
the "all-around experience
of all...detachments" is
properly taken into consid-
eration.
Comment: The Russians have dragged their
feet on a conference of all the parties,
believing on the ' basis of their 1960 ex-
perience that their authority would be
further diminished.
Whether an agreement on ceasing polemics,
and an agenda and an invitation list for
a conference, can be worked out is prob-
lematical. If a conference is held, the
Chinese will stand on orthodoxy, while
the Russians will contend that new devel-
opments in the world require new approaches.
The final set of positions shows the Chinese
declaring clearly that they will not submit
to the principle of majority rule, and the
Russians declaring indirectly their continued
favor for majority rule. Looked at another
way, the Russians do not have a majority: as
Peiping may contend, the parties of the Chi-
nese camp have at least half of the Communist
party members inlhe world.
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(6) Prospects for a Compromise
Chinese
We are for unity--genuine
unity, not sham unity:
unity on the basis of
Marxism-Leninism and the
1957 and 1960 declarations,
not on the basis of the
Yugoslav program or any
other such revisionist
basis.
Soviet
We are striving for cohes-
sion, to prevent the "sev-
erance of some detachments"
of our movement. Of course,
Communists cannot tolerate
concessions on basic ques-
tions of theory.
On matters of principle,
Marxist-Leninists must
"differentiate between
right and wrong and
straighten things out."
The question is: will dif-
ferences be straightened
out on the above basis, or
will there be a split?
While remaining "implacable"
on principles, we will try
to "clear the path of all
superficial things prevent-
ing our cohesion."
The question is: will we
advance in one rank, or
engage in a harmful strug-
gle?
Comment: Chinese statements here as elsewhere
are less flexible than Russian statements:
the Chinese are thanking along straight lines,
want things "straightened out" on these lines,
and speak of a "split" as the alternative;
the Russians suggest a willingness to live with
a great variety of differences among the parties,
provided that those who differ with Moscow
(from the Yugoslavs to the Chinese) refrain from
polemics, obstructionism, and evangelism. Even
in the best case, which would be the holding of
another conference of all the parties and the
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issuance of another "unanimous" declaration,
it is hard to see how the reconciliation could
be anything but unstable and temporary. As-
suming that the Chinese would again insist on
and get veto power in the working out of a dec-
laration, the Russians would have to compromise
heavily to get a "unanimous" statement, and even
then the Chinese would refuse to be bound later
by any position in the declaration which was
not actually their own; and assuming that the
Chinese would again refrain from using their
veto power absolutely, but would use it to
eliminate the most offensive Russian positions
and to qualify the others, the Russians too
would have a declaration-within a declaration
which they could present as a justification
for their program. (On any other assumptions,
there would be no declaration at all: lack of
a Chinese veto would mean a 100 percent Russian
declaration, absolute use of the Chinese veto
would mean a 100 percent Chinese declaration;
each party would prefer no declaration to a
declaration dictated by its opponent.) The
Chinese know that they cannot succeed, in a
.conference of all the parties, in attracting
the majority to their side, they can at best
use the conference to "expose" Khrushchev and to
enlarge their camp. And the Russians know that
they cannot solve their Chinese problem through
a conference, they can at best use the confer-
ence to display their domination of the majority
of the parties and to placate those parties
which think of a conference as a serious effort
to repair the damage to the movement. In the
second-best case, there will be no declaration,
but simply a truce, an agreement to cease public
polemics--which would almost certainly be unstable
and temporary. In the worst case (for the move-
ment) there will be no conference, or the Chinese
camp will walk out; either way, the Chinese might
sponsor a conference of their own, issuing a new
Communist (Real Communist) Manifesto.
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