THE STATUS OF MILOVAN DJILAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 17, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved Fo
r Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
ii October 19b3
Me Status of Milovan Djilas
I. 'i'ome cnange can be expected shortly in the
tatus of Milovan Djilas, author of The New Class and
Conversations with Stalin,
25X1 !Moors have been circulating in
he Yugoslav capital for two weeks that Djilas has al-
ready been exiled to a remote 3oenian village, but
25X1 IDjilas as yet remains in prison.
.ecentcumment by the Yugoslav cabinet's press secretary
that he knew 'thing official ? about a change in Djilas'
.Tituation has added fuel to the fire.
. _,4ilas has roughly seven years yet to serve
at_ 'ear, month sentence imposed on 1 April 1962
a direct consequence of his having allowed publica-
ion of Conversations with Stalin. The regime has ap-
arently denied him such special privileges as writing
,aterials, which he had been allowed during his previous
eroy).te have received no reports, however, that Djilas
Lo ;;uffering from ill health, although he was frequently
clported to be suffering during his previous incarceration.
-. once tae number two man in the Tito regime,
jilas is one of those rare political figures who chose
,artyrdom as a matter of conscience. The personification
unrequited Montenegrin rebelliousness, he threw away
,eetive and position when Communism became intellectual!,
Inpalatable to him. Ale political philosophy has by now
voived to the ,aoint that he is a democrat in the Western
sense. during his last period of freedom--20 January lt)ol
to 1 April l962--he indicated that he fully expects some-
tiny to resume an active political role in Yugoslavia. qo
aveh told Westerners that he was considering establishing
:a opposition party and publishing an opposition periodical.
Approve
d For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
25X1
161
25XI
25X1
25X1
Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A00130
Approved For
0050014-6
4. Vjil current imprisonment is largely the
suit of his own deliberate acts. When paroled in
1962, he signed an agreement to refrain from all
ijolitical activities. He could have had no doubts
that Belgrade would regard the publication of Con-
versations with Stalin, a telling anti-Communiii?
tract, as a rjaiticiT-act. He was given five years
or failing to stop its release; the remainder of his
current sentence represents the uneppired portion of
:Us previous sentence. Prior to his reimprisonment
jilas told Western newsmen that he would not mind
doing back to jail because he was a bigger threat to
e regime in jail than out.
The regime has never known how to handle
tji as, but it has stopped short of any unusual ha h
.kess. The first time he got in trouble (1953), he was
removed from his party posts; the second time (1954),
e was given an 18-month suspended sentence; the third
time (1956), he received a 3-year jail sentence; the
fourth time (1957), he was given an additional seven
year, but was paroled. Throughout this period, Djilas
steadfastly refused to recant or to emigrate which the
Iegime has hinted it would oermit.
b. The regime's treatment of Djilas has been
verned in part yby its reluctrinto to incur a bad
12ress in the West, where Djilas' status is broadly
regarded as a gauge of the regime's liberalism. It
olso appears that Yugoslavia's top leaders have felt--
t least until recently--a good measure of friendship,
1,uilt, or pity toward their former comrade.
4. Djilas claimed that he wrote five books during
s previous incarceration. When the authorities re-
1.urned them to him after his parole, he intended having
Monter' ro and one about the 19th century Montenegrin
gince3tahopNjegos, published in the West. Djilas has
ribed the latter as something like the controversial
ussian book, Doctor Daly o, and it cold conceivably
cause him additional troubles with the regime. Of the
uther three books, one is a collection of short storieR.
. Djilas' wife and son live in Belgrade. Although
y are subject to a degree of social ostracism,
las is allowed to receive some of the royalties from
Approve
For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
25X1
25X1
Approved For Re
lease 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
d's books and to talk to Westerners.
The only Yugoslav leader to go into disgrace
with DJ las, Vladimir DediJer, was allowed to go into
oxile in Great Britain in November 1959. Although
i)ediJer and his family suffered gr*evously before their
Jeparture, he was allowed to return to Yugoslavia for
a visit last summer.
Approve
d For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Aisop's receul articles on China ar
cult to coiment on in a constructive way. They ca
as serious contributions to our knosleOge
Lyi the current scene in China; one can even question
if they sere meant to be. Alsop's approach is to
_smatise any development through emotion charged
language and exaggeration, the tone of all his articles
Is arrogant and categorical, Pis constant feud with
unnamed "straw men", is intended to give him the air
a courageous and searching reporter, bringing the
-racts before the public despite the opposition of the
-7)ureaucrats," the "fashionable twaddlers," the "striped
nts cookie-pushers." Unfortunately, where Alsop
,serts the pretentiously portentious generalization
--7sx the facts, the facts are usually wrong or distorted
to the framework of a structure they can not sustain.
ne cannot quarrel with his general thesis: that
.ostilunist China is in serious economic difficulty,
tust its armed fore s are deteriorating, that the
1,no-8oviet conflict is a major historical develop-
t. The difficulty is that Alsop is not satisfied
with this; this is dramatic, but not dramatic enough.
each of the points is expanded, the picture is
epee a number of tones, the history is over-
lified, earlier questionable predictions which have
not come to pass are explained with even more question-
;le hypothesis, and the result is a picture of doom
which almost no one else, either out of base motives
or basic ignorance, has been able to discern. Alsop
reminds one of the early Wbr.w prophets whose fulmina-
tions contained valid elements, but whose arrogant
-loner-than-thou language and dramatic distortions
t off noir more intelligent listeners.
c,00ments on the individual articles IDliow.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
_ ssie
article of 30 September contrastIng the
,Atvelopment of 'ozL*uniat Ch Kong since Worie
r II is misleading chiefly because it fans to take
count o'if either the extreme differences in size of
At two areas or the dissimilar character of the two
'nomies. Aong Kong's all size has been in several
.,vaya an asset to its development,
application of a given small amount
nical skill and energy to the situation in
nets produced spectacular results. A similar intut
the vast economy of mainland China would hardly be
-ceable.
size has permitted rapid training of skilled
rs. and the development of other requisites to
Kong's industrialization. Small size has also
nude for more effective use of refugee know-how,
-}articularly the know-how of refugee Shanghai indus-
rialists. Similarly, the impact of capital investhent
e miniscule Hong Kong economy was greater than
have been the case had the same sums been Invete
la China.
4sreover the drive and skills of refuee bus ess
ineustrialiets, and technicians have been channeled
?j an established, British-trained SXtd led civil service
-,p-o4ble for its honesty an ability.
ally, Hong Kong as an established trading port
t:soyecL establishee banking facilities and ready trans-
,Jet on services. As a member of the British Conoi-
itt. It round no necessity for autarki or deXense
o
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
ts
43; October Articles
legatton that no questions were expresses,
the suture stability of China during 1961 or
by "expert China-wateeers" is another Alsop
W san- thesis. 7;.ote intelligence and scholarly
on China written in ltAii was heavily weighted
rd the severe economic difficulties facing the
low. The evidence v.nr cisar that the stability
31
the economy had 1-;A_-:1 disrupted by the poor harvest,
withdrawal of Sc,47Let technical aid, and the
lies of the leap fesstes. This 111 turn raiseC
the question of haw tse economy could recover from
sses sroblems,
_sop is correct in stating that life is now 'It
little better," largely because the food 'satiate has
rieen. The reason he gives for this improvement--
sere freedom for the peasant to grow food on his awn
private plot--are also reflected in information
evailable here. His figures for caloric intake per
Say are roughly acceptable although present day
level is somewhat higher than he indicates. We
timate that food intake during the first holt of
196.1
25X1 I isms around 1900 calories per day, /note
eT the I00 to 1700 estimated by Alsop.
.4e agree with Aleop's statement that this year's
sa vest will be about the same as last year's; in
fact, we believe it will be slightly less than lest
Tear's harvest, but the lack of good information makes
imeossIble to be very precise on this point.
'though we would agree that the margin for
iuvestment in growth is now severely limited, it
14 difficult to accept the further statement that
there are 'almost no prospects of such a margin
-oils:, created in the future.' Alsop adds that the
soople can not continue at this level of wretched-
ness and that the bottom is therefore not yet in
sight. If the regime had persisted in the idiocies
the leap forward, Alsop 's assumption would have
some *writ. Rut given the retreat from these ex-
cesses and the tacit acknowledgement that communi
eon was adding to the agricultural problems, one
lart also assume more rational procedures for the
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
;frAlnomy and thereby hypothesize at least the prospect
? future growth, oven though this growth will neces-
? rily be very slow, and vulnerable to any radical
? posais that the leadership may put forth in the
torei
_Kn the article of 4 October, Alsop stresses the
thesis of a 'Iso exit situation." Contrary to what
:appears to be Alsop's assumption, the Chinese leader-
? ro has a number of ways to get out of the present
difficult economic situation. Most of these paths
A'r saving the economy require sacrificing some goals,
viiiich the leadership will hesitate to do. Judging
by past performances, however, they are more liVely
to jettison some of these vague goals rather thaa
blunder on into self-destruction, as Alsop seems to
nrmume they will.
Alsop's references to population are not too
,tlear but he seems to be implying that the Chinese
iiave all but solved their population problem and are
Lso longer faced with the prospect of a further in-
crease. de argues that the population--at least
pvised on his limited sample--fell during the worst
years and is now approximately stable. We believe
taat the rate of population growth fell to 14% during
the worst period of the food shortages--from a level
that probably reached 20 around 1958. With the
ioprovement in the food situation and the resultant
gull in morbidity rates, it can be assumed that
iortality will also fall, leading to a rising rate of
population growth. If one accepted Alsop 'a population
estimates then it follows that the *umber of deaths
tg 1961 would have been no less than 30 million and
possibly a great deal more. Needless to say, there
4dS no evidence that mortality reached this level,
eveu though it obviously increased furing the period
1r good "shortages.
As regards production estimates, Alsop estimates
that current industrial output is between 30 and 40%
o:r, capacity. We estimate that in 1963 industrial
.output was around 50% of its previously achieved pear&
level. In agriculture, Alsop cites "scieutific inter-
rogatioe which showed that post-collectivization de-
creases in per acre production were between 50 and
70%. While it is possible that such decreases took
oiace in isolated areas, the implicit assumption that
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
all of China is absurd. We would ai
r, that ollectively organized
nofficient," This is
tivity of the private
be apparent to the
is obviously correct to emphas ze
ic problems facing China, his con-
situation can only worsen is poorly
the facts. Rather than following -A
al," as Aleop earlier insisted, the
be leveling off with no immediate
any significant upturn or further down-
the currently sluggish economy goes from
largely on planning decisions now being
ping. Alsop seems to assume that future
economic planning will be as unrealistic an it was
during the leap forward. If this is the came then
it is true that one should look for futher economic
difficulties. But as yet there is no clear indica-
tion from Peiping about the direction of future eco-
oomic planning. Alsop's dramatic conclusions therefore
pear somewhat premature to say the least.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
7 October Article
thesis of this articl, by Alsop is
VAat the exchanges between the Soviet niou and Coia-
mast concerning the "violations" of the border
are intended on the Soviet side as a threat to deter
the Chinese from attacking the Indies border. It
vhould be recalled that Alsop was one of the most
active journalists in blowing up the now-existent
Chinese buildup on the Indian border this summer and
im insisting that the Chinese were *bout to attack
in force. This, of course, has been shown to be
virithout foundation and Alsop is now constrained to
nd an explanation for why the Chinese have not at
tacked when the Indians have left a vacuum and they
have such overwhelming strength in opposition, It
wauld be too much to expect Alsop to admit that he
was wrong, or even to review the material he originally
$yresented. Instead, we have another flight of fancy,
distortion of historical viewpoint, screwed up to the
st dramatic point possible.
This article has a few, very few, correct facts
tu it. The Soviets have accused the Chinese of "5000
(Irder violations." These probably were, in the main,
unauthorised border crossings in remote areas of the
1!rontier by nomadic herdsmen. It is true, as Alsop
_7mys, that thousands of Chinese made their way across
the 8oviet front., in Sinkiang. We have no evidence,
'wever, that the Soviets are "publishing horror
i.e in Sinkiang." 14 doubt that Alsop has any
5uch evidence, either. The Soviets have published a
letters from some of the refugees in the Soviet
and broadcast them abroad. This may be what
sop is referring to. At any rate these few facts
t what Alsop builds his article from. The
minder is pure speculation, with a bias.
%e would assess the Chinese and Soviet exchanges
-4a border violations and border problems as part of
the polemics of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev
n this a year or more ago when be twitted the
Ahinese for not taking Macao and Hong Kong in retalia-
for their accusations that he had "capitulated"
km Cuba. The Chinese responded with a veiled threat
ViAt someda they 'would rectify" all unequal treaties,
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
luding those of Tsarist Russia. When the two sides
July 1983 vent all out in attempting to b1acken
theta* before the international Communist world,
ations of border violations and other border
ems were publicised. There is truth in the fact
the Sino-Soviet border is a difficult problem for
countries...there is exagerration in an assump-
tion that it will lead to fighting, that the Soviet
are threatening to come over the border in Sinkiang to
olyter the Chinese from attacking on the Indian border.
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
9 October Article
siope prediction that it will be very rem* k-
mble if bad trouble does not come in the end" is typi-
al of his disingenuous apocalyptic view of the world.
As a professional Cassandra Algol) is forever prophesying
eiisanter?at some unspecified future time.
There is no hazard in a prediction of serious
trcth1e in China, or on China's frontiers, during
t1,0_1 next three or four years. Explaining it in terms
1; group paranoia at the top of the Chinese CD2nuflist
an,
however, is as misleading as it is sensational.
The lenders in Peiping are convinced and doctrinaire
'tImmunists. Their ideology is overlayed on a monstrous
-zulturalirecial arrogance which makes them in effect
ore Catholic than the Pope." They have been etrug-
ling with economic and political problems of staggering
lime and have attempted to solve them by the most dras.
remedies?with disastious result.
this dose not prove that Mao and the men around
y, but rather that they have been operating on
2 Eqis aken theory of social organization, th errors
31 which have been compounded by faulty information
aN7,ut the situation in their own country and in the
world outside.
Tho central argument in Alsop se that lunacy
command concerns the "leap forward" and sr
d Chinese attempt to trigger nuclear war in
o salvage something from the catastrophe
ollowed the ensuing catastrophe.
this argument he has taken liberties with
the chronology of events and with the facts. The
leap was undertaken when the Chinese felt?not
without some justification?that things were going
or them across the board. Encouraged by achieve-
its at home, and by an overly optimistic estimate
7)f the overall Bloc position vis a vie the West, the
7Knt in Peiping took a calculated risk in hope of
scoring a dramatic breakthrough on both politicl
economic fronts.
They were, in fact warned again this gamble
o Russians. Perhaps Peng Te-husi became involv
s argument but all the evidence we have points
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79T00429A001300050014-6
reasons for this dfi11-Sp.CifiCI1ZY hie
nt in the problem of when ad under what cir