PRESIDENT BOSCH AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300030031-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 14, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PRESIDENT BOSCH AND INTERNAL SECURITY
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
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e m automatic downgrading
Tp
and declassification
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: A T(i RIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
TONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
CSC. SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
U REVEI.,ATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW..
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OCI No, 1564/63
14 June 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM
President Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic rightly
considers that he has a popular mandate to bring about a
radical transformation of political, economic, and social
conditions in the Dominican Republic. He hopes to accom-
plish this purpose by such measures as agrarian and tax re-
form, economic development primarily through private for-
eign investment, and a more equitable distribution of earnings
than has been the case hitherto.
There is currently under way a concerted campaign to
discredit Bosch by charging that he is himself a crypto-
Communist engaged in establishing a Communist dictator-
ship, or else that his ineptitude will lead to a Communist
takeover in the Dominican Republic. Manifestly, this cam-
paign represents the reaction of vested interests who see
their privileged position threatened by Bosch's revolutionary
purposes. It also reflects genuine concern regarding
Bosch's remarkably tolerant attitude toward Communist ac-
tivities.
With reason, Bosch believes that the principal immedi-
ate threat to the accomplishment of his mission is the pos-
sibility of a reactionary coup. In this context, he has not
hindered Communist organizational and agitational activities,
so long as the Communists have avoided direct interference
with him. He argues that to crack down on these activities
would only precipitate a campaign of urban terrorism and
guerrilla resistance like that in Venezuela, which would hin-
der the accomplishment of his constructive purposes.
Bosch understands that the security of his regime de-
pends ultimately upon continued US support, particularly
as a restraint upon the Dominican military. At the same
time, he is nationalistic, egotistic, and aware of the politi-
cal inexpediency of appearing to be a US puppet. Conse-
quently, he is not readily amenable to US advice regarding
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his policy with respect to Communist activities.
The Communist danger in the Dominican Republic is not
immediate, but potential. It is none the less serious. Given
present freedom to organize and agitate, the Communists
will become better prepared to exploit some future opportu-
nity. If Bosch should fail to satisfy the expectations of the
Dominican masses, or if he should be overthrown by a re-
actionary coup, the Communists would have an opportunity
to seize the leadership of the popular revolutionary move -
ment. This does not mean that they would directly come to
power--the Dominican military have the will and ability to
prevent that for the foreseeable future. It does mean that
the Communists would have gained the advantage of identifi-
cation with the popular side in a continuing class struggle.
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BASIC FACTS ON DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Capital City:
Santo Domingo (pop: 350,847)
Area:
18,815 square miles
Population:
3,100,000 (1961)
Racial Composition:
White 13%
Mulatto 67%
Negro 20%
Rural to Urban Ratio:
76 to 24 per cent
Illiteracy:
36 per cent
Budget:
$174,371,498
(1963)
Percent of Budget for Military:
Total Value of Exports:
18 per cent
$172,500,000
(1962)
Total Value of Imports:
$123,300,000
(1962)
Chief Exports:
Sugar 56% of Total Value (1962)
Coffee 11.6% of Total Value (1962)
Cacao 7% of Total Value (1962)
U.S. Investment:
Per Capita GNP:
$105,000,000
'$234.00
(1961)
,
Distribution of GNP. Agriculture 41%; trade, 17%;
manufacturing, 15%; government, 7%;
other, 20%.
8 per cent
(1958 AID estimate)
Armed Forces:
28,250
280
12
"Army
,
100
3
Navy
,
700
3
Air
Police
,
9,170
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President Bosch and Internal Security
in the Dominican Republic
1. Release from the repressive stability of
the 30-year Trujillo dictatorship suddenly confronted
the Dominican government and people with accumulated
political, economic, and social problems with which
they were ill-prepared to cope. To survive, and
to conduct the first free election in Dominican his-
tory, absorbed the energies of the interim Council
of State. The more fundamental problems were left
for President Bosch to solve when he took office in
February 1963. They include: (1) how to make demo-
cratic processes work in a country which has had no
experience of civil liberty or representative govern-
ment; (2) how to use efficiently or distribute equi-
tably the vast properties accumulated by the Trujillo
family; (3) how to obtain the capital required for
economic development while at the same time denying
economic special privilege and ensuring a more equi-
table distribution of earnings; (4) how to prepare
the largely illiterate and unskilled Dominican peo-
ple to participate efficiently and gainfully in a
modernized economy; (5) how to transform a traditional
society without precipitating either social disorder
or a reactionary coup. In dealing with such formid-
able problems, popular impatience for results, two
years after the demise of the dictator, must also
be taken into account.
President Bosch and His Program
2. Juan Bosch, now almost 54, is a native
Dominican of humble origin, though white. In his
youth he worked as a clerk in a tobacco warehouse.
His formal education was limited, but he was a
part-time student at the University of Santo Domingo,
where he led an anti-Trujillo student organization.
This activity led to 25 years of exile, chiefly in
Cuba--his wife is Cuban--but including sojourns in
the US, Puerto Rico, Venezuela and Costa Rica. On
a visit to Israel, he was much impressed by Israeli
agricultural cooperatives.
3. During his years of exile, Bosch occupied
himself as a teacher and writer, but was also an
active participant in various revolutionary con-
spiracies against the several Caribbean dictators
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of that period. He thus be-
came closely associated with.
the leaders of the "Democrat-
is Left" in the Caribbean,
notably with Jose Figueres,
the former President of Costa
Rica, Romulo Betancourt, now
President of Venezuela, and
Governor Munoz Marin of
Puerto Rico.
4. Bosch's political
attitudes are conditioned by
this background of experience.
It has prepared him to func-
tion as an eloquent protago-
nist, but not as an efficient
administrator of public af-
fairs or as a politician
adept in the accommodation of various political
interests. Bosch is a professed revolutionist
against the traditional order in Caribbean society.
He is also a professed democrat--but, as is the case
with many new rulers in countries which have never
known representative government, his concept of demo-
cracy is mass support for his one-man leadership.
In the light of his own experience of Caribbean
intrigue, he is not only deeply suspicious of any
manifestation of political opposition, but even
indisposed to share power with colleagues of any
stature.
5. Bosch rightly considers that he has a
popular mandate to bring about a radical transfor-
mation of political, economic, and social condi-
tions in the Dominican Republic. In a free election
held in December, 1962, he won 58 percent of the
presidential vote, gaining a two-to-one advantage
over his principal opponent, the relatively con-
servative Viriato Fiallo. His party, the Partido
Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), won overwhelming
control of the legislature (22 of 27 seats in the
upper house and 49 of 74 seats in the lower house).
Insofar as the electoral process confers authority,
Bosch has a free hand to accomplish his purposes.
6. The principal accomplishment of Bosch's
"hundred days" has been the formulation and promul-
gation of a new constitution. In keeping with
-2-
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Bosch's reformist purposes, the tenor of this docu-
ment has been very disturbing to the traditionally
privileged elements in Dominican society. The
Church, for example, has been offended by omissions
and provisions affecting the traditional relations
of Church and State. Provisions of the original
draft regarding proprietary rights and worker-
management relations have been modified in such a
way as to leave the specifics to future legislation,
but the implication of an impending "syndicalist"
development remains.
7. Bosch's most immediate socio-economic prob-
lem.s.. are agrarian reform and urban unemployment.
With respect to the former, Bosch is fortunate in
that he does not have to expropriate any present pri-
vate landholdings in order to obtain lands for dis-
tribution to landless peasants. The already con-
fiscated Trujillo properties include 60 percent of
the country's arable land, as well as a large pro-
portion of its industrial capacity. So far, however,
very little of this land has been distributed. One
reason is probably bureaucratic unpreparedness for
the task. Another consideration may be that, with
present high sugar prices, these national properties
are making good profits, useful for financing other
government undertakings; it may seem inexpedient
to disrupt a going and profitable concern. A more
impressive distribution of land will soon be neces-
sary, however, in order to allay peasant impatience.
8. Bosch plans to relieve unemployment by
means of a program of public works to be financed
by a new line of credit ($150 million) recently
obtained from a consortium of US and European inter-
ests. These public works--chiefly highways and
hydroelectric dams--are also intended to provide
a base for further economic development.
9. In the longer view, Bosch hopes to accom-
plish social amelioration through economic develop-
ment and a more equitable distribution of earnings.
For such development he relies primarily on foreign
private investment, considering US governmental aid
too slow and ineffective. He hopes to attract pri-
vate investment, not only by providing the necessary
infrastructure through public works, but also by
restoring the financial credit of the Dominican
Republic. To the latter end, he has paid off existing
foreign obligations and is seeking to balance the
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budget by the reduction of unessential expenditures
and by the imposition of more effective and pro-
gressive taxation. However, his antagonistic atti-
tude toward foreign corporations already estab-
lished in the Dominican Republic (which he tends
to identify with the old regime and with his pre-
sent political opposition) and the measures he
has adopted to secure for the workers greater bene-
fits from the present high price for sugar may repel
the new foreign private investment which he desires
to attract.
10. Bosch's organized political support
comes from the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano.
The PRD was organized by Angel Miolan before Bosch-Is
return from exile, at a time when political activity
in the Dominican Republic was still a risky venture.
Miolan is still the effective head of the party
organization. His relations with Bosch are political,
not personal. He is presently disgruntled by Bosch's
denial of anticipated patronage. This denial is the
result of Bosch's penchant for personal leadership,
his distrust of any potential alternative leader,
and his disinclination to accept political dependence
on Miolan. The organizational development of the
PRA is hindered by this attitude. The possibility
of a disruptive clash between Bosch and Miolan is
evident. Such a clash may occur at the party con-
vention to be held in July.
Opposition on the Right
11. Bosch came late to the Dominican political
scene. While he was safe in exile, other men, at
the risk of their lives, endured the Trujillo tyranny,
overthrew it, and made possible the free election
which brought Bosch to power. Notable among them
are Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama, the only sur-
vivors of the group which assassinated Trujillo,
and Viriato Fiallo, leader of the Union Civica
Nacional (UCN), a liberal organization (conserva-
tive by comparison with Bosch) whose persistent pres-
sure was instrumental in bringing about a democratic
solution of the succession crisis. Such men nat-
urally resent their own displacement and Bosch's
authoritarian tendencies. Moreover, many of them
are sincerely concerned about the political trend
in the Dominican Republic.
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12. The more conservative elements in the
Dominican Republic cannot effectively oppose Bosch
by political means. Fiallo and the UCN were soundly
defeated in the 1962 election. The grounds on
which they criticize Bosch are not likely to en-
hance their popular appeal. Indeed, the UCN itself
is apparently breaking up as the result of a policy
dispute between its liberal and conservative wings
which Fiallo has been unable to resolve. The only
alternative focus of political opposition is the
Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC).
It is bitterly opposed to Bosch, but there is little
to distinguish its program from his except its
Catholic rather than secular inspiration. The PRSC
got only 5 percent of the vote in the 1962 election,
but might serve as a rallying point for popular
as well as conservative opposition if Bosch should
fail to satisfy popular demands for effective change.
13. The present danger to Bosch from the right
resides in the fact that he does not have effective
personal control over the armed forces and the
national police. A military move to depose him
might be instigated by disaffected civilians who
see their vested interest threatened by his reform-
ist. programs, or by the personal ambition of a
military leader. The principal deterrent to such
a move is the well-known attitude of the US in sup-
port of the Bosch administration as the duly elected
constitutional government.
14. For the present, Bosch appears to have an
effective understanding with the military high com-
mand. He has pledged himself to respect their con-
trol of the armed forces (and their perquisites),
and they in turn have engaged themselves to respect
his constitutional position. However, neither
party to this agreement can be fully confident of
the other; the relationship is a wary and uneasy
one. Bosch's tentative approach toward the develop-
ment of a peasant militia (through the organization
of unarmed "vigilantes" to prevent the burning of
canefields) has stirred some military resentment
and suspicion.
15. The national police are controlled by
General Antonio Imbert, a national figure in his
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own right, but one who is mistrusted by most of the
military. Before Bosch's inauguration, Imbert
several times moved tentatively toward seizing
power for himself and was dissuaded only by stren-
uous US representations. Bosch greatly fears
Imbert's ambition, but dares not attempt to remove
him.
16. There is currently under way a campaign
to discredit Bosch by charging that he is himself
a crypto-Communist engaged in establishing a Commu-
nist dictatorship, or else that his ineptitude will
lead to a Communist seizure of power in the Domini-
can Republic. The recent concerted propagation of
this theme suggests a deliberate effort to win US
sanction for a military coup against Bosch. There
is in fact no evidence that Bosch is a Communist--
that charge is actually a matter of tenuous infer-
ence from the alternative charge that he is too
tolerant, to which Bosch is indeed vulnerable. In
the circumstances to be reviewed below, concern
on this score is reasonable.
17. Present Communist strength in the Domini-
can Republic is not formidable. For the present
at least, it is Bosch who holds the leadership of
the popular revolutionary movement.
18. There are four Communist or quasi-Commu-
nist political organizations now operating in the
Republic. They are: (1) the Partido Socialist.
Popular Dominicano (PSPD), the orthodox Communist
party; (2) the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario
(PNR), a heterodox Communist party; (3) the Movi-
miento Popular Dominicano (MPD), a Communist-dom.-
inated pro-Castro party; and (4) the Agrupacion
Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ, or 14th of June),
a Communist-infiltrated pro-Castro party. Of these,
only the 14th of June group has legal status as a
political party. All told, the four groups have
about 4,000 active members concentrated chiefly in
urban areas and among youth and student elements.
19. Since taking office, Bosch has permitted
the return of about 100 Communist leaders and agitators
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expelled from the Dominican Republic by the interim
Council of State--but it should be noted that even
Fallo was committed to permit this, as a restoration
of civil liberties to all Dominicans. Notable among
these returnees are Juan and Felix Ducoudray Mansfield,
leaders of the orthodox Communist PSPD, and Maximo
Lopez Molina, Communist chief of the pro-Castro
MPD. Bosch has allowed these well-trained and dan-
gerous men complete freedom of organizational and
agitational activity--so long as their attacks are
directed against the traditional social order and
not against him.
20. Given this freedom of action, the Commu-
nists have been busily engaged in infiltrating
labor organizations and (to a lesser extent) the
bureaucracy, in stimulating popular demands for
a prompter realization of anticipated benefits, and
in recruiting, indoctrinating, and organizing new
members. There is no effective government surveillance
of these activities, but current rumors on the sub-
ject are almost certainly exaggerated.
21. Efforts to form a united front of all
four Communist elements have so far been frustrated
by the refusal of the 14th of June group to merge
itself with the others. This refusal reflects
the personal ambition of the 14th of June leader,
Manuel Tavarez Justo, and the advantage which the
group enjoys as a legal party with a larger member-
ship than the other three combined and no public
commitment to communism.
22. Confident of his own popular strength,
Bosch sees no threat to his regime in Communist
activity. He may consider that his tolerance demon-
strates this strength and the democratic character
of his rule. He probably welcomes any assistance
in discrediting the traditional society and any
potential support in resisting a possible military
coup. His own explanation of his remarkable
tolerance is that to crack down on present Commu-
nist activities would only precipitate urban
terrorism and guerrilla resistance like that in
Venezuela, to the great hindrance of his constructive
program, the success of which will defeat the
Communists. However, when some Communists recently
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ventured to call an illegal strike of government
workers, Bosch's reaction was immediate and ef-
fective.
23. President Bosch understands that the
security of his regime depends ultimately upon US
support, particularly as a restraint upon the Domin-
ican military--and that his tolerance of Communist
activities is a sensitive issue. At the same time,
he is nationalistic, egotistic, and aware of the
political inexpediency of appearing to be a US
puppet. Consequently, he is not readily amenable
to US advice regarding his policy with respect to
the Communists. Although he may accommodate to
US demands in incidental matters, he is not likely
to proscribe all Communist activities unless and
until convinced that they are a direct and immediate
threat to his regime.
24. The Communist danger in the Dominican
Republic is not immediate, but potential. It is
none the less serious. Given present freedom to
organize and agitate, the Communists will become
better prepared to exploit some future opportunity.
There is at present no effective non-Communist
political alternative to Bosch's personal leader-
ship. If Bosch should fail to satisfy the expec-
tations of the Dominican masses, or if he should
be overthrown by a reactionary coup, the Commu-
nists would have an opportunity to seize the
leadership of the popular revolutionary movement.
This does not mean that they would directly come
to power--the Dominican military have the will
and ability to prevent that for the foreseeable
future. It does mean that the Communists would
have gained the advantage of identification with
the popular side in a continuing class struggle.
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