SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300030014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 16, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Rel a 2003/08/19: CIA-RDP79T00429AO013 0030014-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
16 April 1963
CIA-DIA-NSA MEMORANDUM FOR USIB
SUBJECT: SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA
1. The purpose of this paper is to review
judgments previously made about the number of So-
viet military personnel in Cuba, to provide a cur-
rent evaluation of the number of Soviets withdrawn,
and to render some conclusions concerning the strength,
status, and capabilities of the Soviet forces which
remain.
2. The figure of 17,500 Soviet military person-
nel estimated to have been in Cuba prior to the Feb-
ruary-April withdrawals was derived from a series of
judgments about the probable strength of each of the
Soviet manned weapons systems present in Cuba. The
figures assigned to the different elements were held
with varying degrees of confidence depending upon
our previous knowledge of the type of military unit
concerned. Thus the total. of 17,500 was never re-
garded as a completely firm figure and it was always
allowed that the actual figure could vary. either way
by as much as several thousand.
3. Since mid-February a minimum of 4 600 Sovie
personnel have been withdrawn
from Cuba L
25X1
and only a
very ew are known to have arrived. Most of those
departing can be inferred to have been military rather
than civilian. We cannot determine with any degree
of certainty,, however, the specific units to which
these troops belonged and consequently we cannot es-
timate reductions on a unit basis. Also, unless en-
tire units are seen to depart with their equipment,
or unless entire weapons systems are turned over to
the Cubans, we are unable to conclude that particular
Soviet units are no longer present. Further, since
the total of 17,500 was conceded to be only approxi-
mate, we are unable to give a net current figure with
any exactness. Our best judgment is that total Soviet
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T00429A091300030014-8
 25X1
Approved Foc,R lease 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T0042 001300030014-8
military strength in Cuba has probably been reduced
by about 20 to 30 percent.
5. Indications observed to date are discussed
as they relate to the surface-to-air missile (SAM)
system, MIG-21 aircraft, the four major Soviet camps,
the cruise missile system, and the Komar boats.
6. SAM System: Because the turn-over of the
SAM system to Cuban control might lead to a confronta-
tion of the USSR and the US in Cuba, it can be argued
that it would be the last system which would be-turned
over to the Cubans prior to the departure of tactical
Soviet units from Cuba.
7. Our previous estimate assigned some 5,000
Soviet personnel to the SAM system. We believe that
the bulk of these personnel remain in place. Prob-
ably only some support personnel or less critical
personnel have been replaced by Cubans. The system
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T0042gA001300030014-8
 Approved Forge
efficiency of the SAM units has probably remained
about the same and it is unlikely that there will
be any loss of capability unless a large number of
Cubans are brought into the system. Even then the
rate of transition would determine the extent to
which loss of effectiveness occurred.
25X1
8. Major Soviet Camps: Although there has
been no signs icant change in the equipment at the
four Soviet armored camps during the period of re-
cent Soviet withdrawal there are indications that
some personnel at these camps may have departed
Cuba. The primary mission of the armored camps
was probably to protect the strategic missiles.
Since these missiles have been withdrawn and the
armored units are not used to assist Cuban forces
in anti-insurgent operations there is less justifica-
tion for their continued presence unless their mis-
sion has been changed. If these units now have a
training mission, there is no reason to maintain them
at full T/0 strength.
9. The personnel figure previously estimated
for the four Soviet armored camps was about 5,000.
This figure assumed that these units were fully
manned. However, there was no firm evidence that
the full T/0 strength was achieved, and in any case
the full strength could have been as much as a
thousand more or a thousand less than 5,000.
10. We conclude that withdrawals have probably
taken place, but we have insufficient evidence to
be able to state the number of these troops either
withdrawn or remaining. If the camps are to have
a training mission it may be that only a small train-
ing cadre and maintenance groups will be needed to
effect a turnover of the equipment to the Cubans.
The units are not large enough to intervene effec-
tively in any major crisis of the regime in which
the main body of Cuban forces was involved.
Approved Fo
 25X1
Approved Fa.. lease 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T0042 001300030014-8
12. The turnover to the Cubans of the 42 MIG-21
aircraft would increase the total number of jet fighters
in Cuban hands by nearly 50%. Furthermore it would
provide a greater intercept capability, particularly
if the Soviets also supplied the air-to-air missiles
used with the MIG-21. However, the total effective-
ness of the MIG-21 fighters might be reduced by lack
of qualified pilots, controllers, and maintenance
personnel.
13. Komar' boats: There is relatively less evi-
dence on the operations of theXomar boats than on
some other Soviet weapons systems. We infer that the
Soviets remain in control of these vessels
We believe that the Soviets wou see no
serious o s acle to turning over Komar boats to Cu-
bans; they have been given to Egypt and Indone(?ia.
14. The acquisition of the 12 Komar boats by
the Cuban naval forces would improve Cuban defensive
capabilities against an invasion force. It would
also increase the number of boats available for pa-
trol duties.
15. Coastal Defense System (Cruise Missiles):
The four cruise missile sites two launchers per site)
are believed to be still under Soviet control.
16. Cuban capability to repel an invasion force
would be significantly increased if the four opera-
tional cruise missile sites and the estimated 115
crated cruise missiles stored in Cuba were turned
over to Cuban control. The 115 cruise missiles in
crates are sufficient to establish at least 15 more
sites which would be enough to protect most impor-
tant landing beaches and ports.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01300030014-8
 Approved Fot3 lease 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79TO04 001300030014-8
Conclusion
17. The recent Soviet withdrawals may have re-
duced the number of personnel involved in the opera-
tion of the major Soviet weapons systems in Cuba.
However, there is no ground for a conclusion at this
time that the overall operational effectiveness of
these systems has been significantly reduced. 1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Rolease 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T0042PA001300030014-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01300030014-8
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01300030014-8