THE SUCCESSION TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300020005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 8, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE SUCCESSION
TO
CHIANG KAI-SHEK
8 March 1963
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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MEMORANDUM: The Succession to Chiang Kai-shek
SUMMARY
1. Chiang Kai-shek's advancing years add urgency
to the question of who will inherit the close control
he has maintained through the years over Nationalist
affairs. The succession problem is a delicate one for
the US since one of the two chief contenders for power,
Vice President Chen Cheng, is the constitutional succes-
sor, whereas the other, Lt. General Chiang Ching-kuo,
the President's son, wields growing power which is at
least as great as, and perhaps more than, that of Chen.
2. The transfer of authority seems likely to be
orderly, but the US attitude, if too forcefully pro-
Chen or pro-Chiang Ching-kuo, could increase the chances
of open struggle. We believe that both contenders would
be most responsive to a US position which clearly backed
constitutional succession while at the same time allow-
ing Chiang Ching-kuo a continuing important role in Na-
tionalist affairs.
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OCI No. 1026/63
MEMORANDUM: The Succession to Chiang Kai-shek
1. A stable government on Taiwan capable of
providing forces toward its own defense, and of pro-
moting economic growth with decreasing outside aid,
is an essential interest of the United States. Presi-
dent Chiang Kai-shek has provided the requisite lead-
ership for stable government and is in good health,
but in view of his advanced age (he is 75) a transfer
of power could occur at any time. The attitude of
the US will be important in ensuring that the trans-
fer of authority is orderly. The succession problem
is a delicate one since one of the two chief contend-
ers for power, Vice President Chen Cheng, is the con-
stitutional successor, whereas the other, Lt. General
Chiang Ching--kuo, the President's son, wields grow-
ing power which is at least as great as, and perhaps
more than, that of Chen.
2. President Chiang Kai-shek, believing he is
indispensable for the return to the mainland, has
jealously retained his authority and dominates the
leadership on Taiwan. He has delegated some powers
to Chen Cheng and Chiang Ching-kuo, though he per-
sonally monitors the activities of both. His con-
trol of the Kuomintang, from which the ruling elite
is drawn, is unchallenged. The president guards his
power by extensive intervention in routine govern-
ment matters. He is also a father figure of enormous
prestige.
3. Chen Cheng, vice president and premier, the
constitutional successor, is in charge of the civil
government and makes decisions on routine economic
and civil matters. He is a lifelong follower and
willing subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek. He has a
loyal following among Kuomintang "elder statesmen,"
old-line military leaders, economic specialists, and
members of the Legislative Yuan, and he enjoys con-
siderable support among Taiwanese. His re-election
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to the vice-presidency in 1960 indicated that he re-
tained Chiang Kai-shek's approval. On several oc-
casions Chen had become embroiled with recalcitrant
National Assemblymen bent on reducing the power of
the executive. This defiance of Chen indicates that
he lacks Chiang Kai-shek's authority. Chen also is
handicapped by poor health, which forced him to be
absent from his office during late 1961 and early
1962.
4. Chiang Ching-kuo's potential as an eventual
successor to the leadership stems from a combination
of his intelligence, vigor, political astuteness,
and his father's support. These have enabled him to
gain control of many key centers of power. Chiang,
however, has long shown a tendency to exercise his
power from behind the scenes. Nominally, Chiang Ching-
kuo is a cabinet minister without portfolio, an honor-
ific post with few duties. He is, however, the deputy
secretary general of the National Defense Council
whose chief is inactive; this gives him control over
internal security, intelligence activities, and stra-
tegic planning for the mainland attack. He is also
one of the 15 members of Kuomintang Central Standing
Committee, the policy-making organ of the party.
5. Chiang Ching-kuo's followers are a more co-
hesive group than Chen?s. They occupy governmental
positions important for political control which can
be used to develop mass support among veterans and
youth. These ambitious young men are conservative
and unsympathetic to abstract concepts of popular
government and parliamentary procedures. They staff
the Youth Corps, the veterans program, the security
apparatus and the Kuomintang's political department
which permeates all levels of the armed forces. In
November 1962, the positions of governor of Taiwan
and chief of the Taiwan Garrison security forces
were filled by men considered responsive to Chiang
Ching-kuo. He is reported to be gaining more sup-
port among combat commanders in the armed forces and
in the party. He also appears to be the dominant in-
fluence in the provincial party organs.
6. Among Chiang Ching-kuo's political liabili-
ties are considerable suspicion and distrust of his
Soviet training, his Russian wife, and some fear of
his methods for political indoctrination and social
control.
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7. The constitution provides that if the presi-
dent dies before the end of his term, which expires
in 1966, the vice president succeeds him. The Kuomin-
tang party constitution is less explicit. It pre-
scribes that the deputy director general, now Chen
Cheng, shall assist the director general, Chiang Kai-
shek, in administering the party, but makes no provi-
sion for passing on Chiang's powers as head of the
party. A national party congress would have to be
called to elect a new director general. In the mean-
time, the central standing committee, the highest
authority below the director general, would presum-
ably meet and decide policy. Party rules provide
that Chen will become chairman of the standing com-
mittee.
8. It seems likely that a constitutional course
will be followed in the succession to Chiang Kai-shek,
with Chen Cheng assuming the leadership of the govern-
ment and the party. Both Chen and Chiang Ching-kuo
probably would desire time in which to consolidate
their support.
9. The role Chen Cheng and Chiang Ching-kuo
have played in the past strongly suggest that Chen
is capable of sharing political control of Taiwan.
Chiang for his part would be likely to use force in
a bid for complete power only if Chen moved to under-
cut his base.
10, Chiang Ching-kuo's tendency to exercise con-
trol from behind the scenes probably would incline
him not to seek a public mandate quickly. He almost
certainly would prefer to leave Chen Cheng the prob-
lems of dealing with the irascible elements of the
Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Chiang
Ching-kuo probably would move quietly to consolidate
his internal power and look to eventual acquisition
of supreme power, either through de facto acquisition
of such power from behind the scenes, or through even-
tual election as president of the GRC by the National
Assembly--possibly in 1972, when Chen, if still living,
will have reached the Generalissimo's present age, A
coup attempt by Chiang Ching-kuo might occur, though
we consider this less likely than the above.
11. Other factors such as the "return to the main-
land" rationale of the present government, Communist
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China's influence, economic conditions of Taiwan,
the possible loss of offshore islands, or a local
war in the Pacific area which adversely affected
the Taiwan regime, appear unlikely to influence
significantly the succession problem. "Return"
will continue, after Chiang Kai-shek, to have con-
siderable and at times troublesome significance for
US-GRC relations and for politics and sense of pur-
pose on Taiwan, even though neither Chen nor Chiang
Ching-kuo shares the Generalissimo's passion on
this subjects The Vice President may see continued
stressing of "Return" a political necessity but he
most assuredly does not believe it tactically within
reach. Chiang Ching-kuo's views appear to be simi-
lar, his interest in mainland matters reflecting
his father's preoccupation rather than his own; more-
over, he has indicated over the past ten years that
he is genuinely concerned with local matters o4 Tai-
wan,
12. Communist China has failed to extend its in-
fluence into local Taiwan affairs, either among the
Chinese or the Taiwanese. All experienced observers
agree that the overwhelming majority of both the main-
land Chinese and the Taiwanese reject Communism and
seek no rapprochement with the Communist Government.
This precludes any significant role for Communist
China in the succession,
13. The Nationalists' awareness of the US de-
sire for an orderly succession will be important in
achieving such a transfer of power. The chances of
an open struggle for power would increase if Chiang
Ching-kuo, the holder of superior strength, were to
suspect that the US was seeking to freeze him out of
ultimate control. The same would be true if Chen
Cheng were to suspect the US sought to rob him of his
authority by backing Chiang Ching-kuo, We believe
that both Chen and Chiang would be most responsive to
a US attitude which clearly backed constitutional suc-
cession, while at the same time acknowledging the need
for a continuing important role for Chiang Ching-kuo
in Nationalist affairs.
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