DEVELOPMENTS IN COUNTRIES ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY LIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200060018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 17, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Rely 2004/10/OSAuR&I9T00429A000060018-2 ; ;,
25X1
OCI No. 3453/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
17 December 1963
SUBJECT: Developments in Countries on the Counter-
insurgency List
1. Laos
Right-wing forces are maintaining posi-
tions gained following recent military initiatives
in northern and central Laos. There are some in-
dications, however, that Pathet Lao forces sup-
ported by North Vietnamese units are preparing
countermoves, particularly in the area to the east
of Lak Sao where rightist forces pushed to within
20 miles of the North Vietnamese border, Souphan-
nouvong's prolonged absence from Khang Khay and the
relative mildness of the Pathet Lao response to the
military moves suggest that the North Vietnamese
may be reassessing their tactics in Laos,
2. South Vietnam
The Viet Cong are continuing to increase
their military capabilities by infiltrating person-
nel from North Vietnam. Although the entry of only
about 950 cadres and specialists has been confirmed
this year, there is evidence that at least another
1,000 probably have entered South Vietnam. This
evidence is confined largely to groups destined for
Military Region V in the central part of the coun-
try, but it is likely that similar numbers have also
been sent to the southern areas. Data on infiltra-
tion to the latter have been consistently fragmentary
and incomplete.
25X1
Approved For Release 200411 0141M,
A001200060018-2
 Approved For Rele 2004/10/01SET00429A000060018-2
The flow of infiltrators does not appear
to be significantly greater than that of the past
two years, and the character appears generally the
same. Infiltrators comprise mostly cadre groups
for infantry battalions and specialists for heavy
weapons and other support units, with perhaps some
new emphasis on, antiaircraft weapons specialists.
Arrival of these elements will permit "fleshing
out" of the support elements for the regiments being
formed in various parts of the country, and will
enhance Viet Cong capabilities for supporting larger
scale attacks.
3. Dominican Republic
Government mop-up operations against re_.
maining bands of guerrillas are proceeding slowly
but with apparent success.
The existence of six guerrilla fronts as
claimed by the pro-Castro 14th of June Political
Group (APCJ) has now been confirmed by official
sources. Three of these have been neutralized and
the others are the object of concentrated pressure
from government troops. As of 13 December, 47 in-
surgents had been reported captured, including three
of the APCJ's twelve field commanders and political
advisers. Ten other guerrillas have been killed.
With the guerrilla threat at least temporar-
ily under control, there are increasing reports that
a series of isolated bombings in Santo Domingo soon
will be replaced by a coordinated campaign of murder
and sabotage. APCJ militants are said to be dis-
couraged by the apparent failure of their guerrilla
efforts and are demanding that their political lead-
ers show more Willingness to undertake violence.
Reports that Cuban assistance to Dominican Castro.
Communists will be forthcoming, while still uncon-
firmed, are increasing..
Approved For Release
9A001200060018-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Relekwi 2004/10/085. IGf T00429A001200060018-2
25X1
5. Venezuela
Thirty-three terrorist incidents were re-
ported during the week 5-11 December, about half of
the previous week's record 65. The major foreign
targets were British firms, attacked in retaliation
from the extradition from Trinidad of the hijackers
of a Venezuelan airliner. The leaders of the Com-
munist-directed Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) held Britain to blame for Tkinidad's decision
to extradite the criminals, but impartially attacked
both embassies.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 29A001200060018-2