FRANCE AND VIETNAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00429A001200030013-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 6, 2004
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 11, 1963
Content Type: 
IM
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00429A001200030013-0.pdf135.24 KB
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Approved For Release AOQ 00030013-0 OCI No. 2349/63 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 11 September 1963 1, President De Gaulle?s comments on Vietnam late last month seem to be based on the judgment that the US efforts to maintain an independent, Western- oriented South Vietnam cannot succeed. He apparently believes that eventually a return must be made to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements which call for the unification of the country and the with- drawal of foreign military forces. The French, mindful of the opportunity to exercise once again some initiative in Indochina, may be presently en- gaged in clandestine or diplomatic activity designed to sponsor a rapppoachement between the two halves of the country, although evidence on this point is con- flicting. There is also the possibility that De Gaulle may call for an international conference on Vietnam in which he would expect to play a major role. 20 In his remarks, De Gaulle intimated that he favored a reunited Vietnam free from outside influ- ences, He also asserted that France was prepared to lend a helping hand to such a country. 3e On the face of it, this statement is merely a reiteration of Paris? basic goals, and French of- ficials have gone out of their way to make this point. Specifically, they have been unanimous in denying that it presaged French moves to undermine the US position'in South Vietnam, or that France was sup- porting elements in South Vietnam which might be more favorable to Paris' point of view. 4. Despite its ostensible hands off position, Paris has never gotten over its hostility toward the Diem regime, and has disapproved of large-scale US military intervention in South Vietnam. It has, instead, pointed to the neutral regimes in Laos and Approved For Release 2004/07/1,6'R479T00429A001200030013-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2^^4'^""6`s'"1190049991 ^^1200030013-0 Cambodia as the best guarantee of keeping Southeast Asia peaceful and non-Communist. 5. Paris, however, has held its peace as long as the military effort against the Viet Cong appeared to be making progress and the Diem regime remained firmly in control. In fact, there was.some evidence that, prior to the outbreak of that government's trouble with the Buddhists, France was increasingly inclined to support the USi.in South Vietnam. 6. The recent evidence of the Diem regime's latent brittleness, coupled with reports that Hanoi is in trouble agriculturally, may have encouraged the French to think the time is propitious to take more active measures toward a North-South rapproach- ment. However, Hanoi has repeatedly stated that all US troops must be withdrawn from South Vietnam prior to meaningful negotiations. Out of the appare t n conflict between French denials that they are Pushing for the neutraliza- tion for Vietnam and reports to the contrary, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) France regards the eventual unifica- tion and neutralization of Vietnam as inevitable. (2) Any time the South Vietnamese war ef- fort appears to be facing a setback, the French can 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/0Y/ Ci?!lliMP79T00429A001200030013-0 Approved For Release 299447M 6 41001200030013-0 be expected to do what they can to win broader support for their position. (3) France does not have a candidate wait- ing in the wings to take power in Saigon as it did with Souvanna Phouma in Laos, although ex-premier Tran Van Huu, now in exile in Paris, has apparently been receiv- ing support from some French officials, (4) Given the continuation of the Diem government in power and the limited nature of French resources, France is unlikely to call for the removal of the US presence at this timed with or no warning France could request Hthevreconveningttle of the 1954 Geneva conference, 25X1 Approved For Release 200410ECiM, 9RDP79T00429AO01200030013-0