NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT TO THE VIET CONG VIA LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100010023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 23, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
23 January 1963
SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Support to the Viet Cong
via Laos
1.. Summary: Infiltration from North Vietnam
through Laos and into South Vietnam almost certainly
continues, although possibly at a lower rate than
last spring and summer. An accurate and. detailed
assessment of this infiltration is severely handi-
capped by the lack of reliable intelligence.
2. Discussion: Two recent Viet Cong defectors
(6 and 8 January) state that they entered. South Viet-
nam through Laos last summer. One of these defectors
enterea . ou vietnam
company-sized units (approximately 300-450 men total);
the other defector entered South Vietnam in August
in one of two groups with a combined strength of 500.
The additional infiltration of a 400-man unit on
30 September has been reported. by several sources
and, is accepted by US military intelligence officers
in Saigon. These are the only substantive infiltra-
tion reports received since July 1962.
3. This paucity of information may reflect a
decline in the use of the trails. In the past, there
has been a rough correlation between the number of
reports and. the level of infiltration subsequently
indicated by prisoners and defectors. The South Viet-
namese., however, have been the only source of infil-
tration reporting and have had. a tendency to exagger-
ate. US military officers in Saigon now are applying
ARMY review(s) completed.
25X1
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much more severe templates against South Vietnamese
reporting and this effort to rule out exaggeration
may also be a factor in the dearth of reports on in-
filtration. Furthermore, a certain amount of infil-
tration reporting is never processed beyond South
Vietnamese tactical commands.
ra wa c teams
are being trained on a priority oasis and the first
such team should be operational within thirty days
assuming US policy considerations permit its activa-
tion in Laos.
4. Background: Communist sensitivity over
the Laotian corr3cdor has been demonstrated by the
refusal of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese to
permit any non-Communist observation in the area
which generally extends through the eastern half of
Laos from Route 8 to the Cambodian border. In 1961,
the North Vietnamese built an 80-mile stretch of
motorable road. through east-central Laos between
Routes 12 and 9. In dry weather, trucks can drive
through on this road from North Vietnam to Tchepone.
The interrogation of Viet Cong defectors over the
past year has indicated this is now the preferred
route as far as Tchepone
5. Aside from this road., virtually all the
trails are limited to foot traffic. The greatest
disadvantage to the trail system is the lack of
food. The North Vietnamese, however, have sought
to remedy this problem by establishing depots at
various places along the trails in lower Laos and
in South Vietnam.
6. Some detail on these way stations and on
the routes they serve has been gleaned from inter-
rogations. The stations are generally separated by
a day's march and. are expected to raise or acquire
locally the provisions they issue. Aside from bil-
leting and feeding the infiltrators, the stations
also provide guides and limited, medical care. Most
reports indicate these stations are commanded by a
North Vietnamese noncommissioned officer and are serv-
iced by fifteen or twenty other personnel, often re-
cruited locally.
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7. The web-like complexity of interlinking
and. paralleling trails in Vietnam and lower Laos,
the rugged terrain and, dense jungle, make exact
definition of infiltration routes impossible and
observation extremely difficult. However, five
general trail systems have been identified. Two
of these cross the demilitarized zone (DMZ) from
North to South Vietnam directly and there is little
evidence that they are still being used to any ex-
tent. The third and fourth both parallel the DMZ
into Laos, then turn south toward the South Viet-
namese border. The fifth system includes the road,
constructed by the North Vietnamese in central Laos
and merges with the other trail systems south of
Tchepone. All recent prisoners and defectors who
infiltrated have reported. traveling over this fifth
route. The length of the trip south varies depend-
ing on route and, weather, but 30 to 45 days is
average, for example, between Ha Tinh, North Vietnam
and the area near Da Nang, South Vietnam.
8. Numerical estimates on infiltration are
tenuous at best but documents taken from captured.
infiltrators and their interrogations provide some
basis for assessing movement along the trails.. Be-
tween 1 June and. 1 December 1961, the monthly infil-
tration rate was estimated to be 500 to 1,000 men
per month; from December 1961 until late April 1962,
it was estimated. at a reduced level, 100 to 200 each
month. The rate picked, up sharply in May 1962 and
it was estimated that 2,000 to 2,200 infiltrators en-
tered South Vietnam between 1 May and 30 June. The
two most recent defectors provided what seems to be
clear evidence that infiltration of sizeable groups
was continuing through the summer (an estimated 1,000
for July and. August) and, based on what evidence is
available, it would appear that a rate of at least
500 per month was possible through September. Des-
pite the lack of present reporting, it is the consen-
sus of most US intelligence officers that infiltration
is continuing, although possibly at a lower rate than
in mid-1962.
9. Many infiltrators apparently remain in north-
ern South Vietnam to develop and. fill out units in
that region. Some, however, do make their way to the
southern provinces and. there are well-established Viet
Cong routes linking both regions. Some idea of the
extent of traffic moving on these internal routes was
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provided. by a document recently captured at a way
station in the central highlands. `Almost 4,000 men
had passed through this station in the first half of
1962.
10. The infiltrators who have been captured or
have defected in South Vietnam are usually members of
North Vietnamese regular army divisions--the 305th
and. the 324th are most often represented. These in-
filtrators are not ethnic Northerners, but natives of
central or southern Vietnam who joined the Viet Minh
and who regrouped. in the north at the end of the war
with the French. In almost every case so far recorded,
the infiltrator has returned to serve in the area
where he was first recruited by the Communists ten to
fifteen years before. North Vietnam has a stockpile
of 60,000 to 70,000 regrouped. Southerners most of whom
have had military training and. many of whom are still
on active duty in the North Vietnamese army.
11. The Communists do not attempt to replace
Viet Cong battle casualties through infiltration. In-
stead., the infiltrators are considered an investment
in military growth and are intended to provide command-
ers, technicians, and. professional cadre for Viet Cong
military development. For instance, defectors or pris-
oners who have infiltrated have generally held the rank
of sergeant or above in the North Vietnamese army and.
a major general apparently commands Viet Cong units in
northern South Vietnam. The Viet Cong are expected, to
recruit the bulk of their own manpower within South
Vietnam. They also are expected. to produce or acquire
their foodstuffs locally and to get the majority of
their weapons by capturing them from South Vietnamese
government troops.
12. Infiltrators do not come empty-handed, how-
ever. They carry with them some high-priority materi-
el such as communications equipment and. light weapons.
There were reports last summer of infiltrating groups
transporting heavy 120-mm mortars and light antiaircraft
weapons. These reports have not been confirmed, but
there is a significant increase in the number of Chinese
Communist-made weapons taken from the Viet Cong.over the
past few months. Among the items of Chinese equipment
found in Viet Cong hands are recoilless rifles, sub-
machine guns, ammunition and demolition charges.
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le
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VIETNAM
SELECTED VIET CONG
INFILTRATION ROUTES
Song Cau
Dalat?
25
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