CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000600040023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: December 5, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN A 1I RICA
5 December 1963
1. To Fidel Castro and his lieutenants, the future of the Cuban revolution
is indissoluably linked to the "anti-imperialist struggle" in the rest of i*W
Latin America, The Cuban revolution, in their view, is simply the first victory
in the wider revolution that is "inevitably" to sweep the hemisphere. Moreover$
Cuban influence and assistance, they believe, can speed up the Latin American
revolutionary process. And it is one of the basic policies of the regime to
do everything that can be done without undue risk to speed up this process.
it has also become apparent in reeent months that the greater the enternal and
internal pressures on the Castro regime, the higher the degree of urgency
that is assigned to this Cuban effort. Castro, in short,. appears convinced
of titer the undesirability of attempting to build "soafal.i:A in one country"
of the hemisphere; in his view revolutionary outbreaks elsewhere in tae
hemisphere are needed in order to reduce "imperialist" pressures on him and
to restore the lagging momentum of his revolution at home. He probably also
hopes that ultimately this course will serve to lessen his dependence on the
Soviet Union.
2. Th4 , 4I &s ' 50 ffi8~ M- 7 TB ~~00 6000400 5 number of
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.e part of our daily preoccupation."
3. After the failure of the Cuba-mounted invasions of aevera? Middle American
countries during Castro's first months in power In 1959, Castro turned to more
subtle and less risky methods of achieving his aims. flany 'hundreds of Latin
Americans have been brought to Cuba for ideological tzsg Indoctrination and
training in the peatical arts of guerrilla warfare. It is estimated that in 1962
alone at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 1,500 Latin Americans received such
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public pro
by Castro, Che Guevara, and other Cuban leadersF--] 2 X1
In his speech of 28 September, for instance, Castro
referred to the US-Cuban relationship as "a battle between the past and the
ttlv against time," because while the "imperialists" believe they
can destroy the Cuban revolution, the Cuban revolutionaries believe that before
that was xp could take place "many other revolutio like ouua will appear
on the continent.." In the most recent of a number of similar statements, Che
Guevara., speaking on 24 November, stated that "our victory': in consolidating and
defending the Cu?-an revolution will be the victory of all Latin America; the
Latin American revolutionary struggle, he said, "is also oi& our responsibility
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training in Cuba. More than that have probably come to Cuba for
this year. In sd.it ioh,
h training
Cuban fi-rancial assistance has been channeled to
various leftist-e trenist groups in the hemisphere. Cuban political and
tactical guidance has been transmitted to them and Cuban propaganda has offered
su ort. Until recently, however, the Cubanus have avoided
actions that risked implicating the Castro regime in direct support for Latin
American revolutionaries. Leftist extremists were told that they would be
buy or steal their own weapome and not to expect outside assistance.
involving the shipment of a large quantity
The recent, 6 ion to this policy=
ncy that has in recent months pervaded the Cuban subversive drive in Latin
weapons to Venezuela, appears to demonstrate the increased sense of
Aeries.
4, The incontrovertible evidence that the large cache of arms found buried
on'a Venezuelan beach early last month had come from Cuba constitutes the most
since LnkY
solid proof /of major Cuban complicity in Latin American subversive activit
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The approximately three tons of weapons include light automatic rifles and
hineuns xf. definitely identified as among those shipped to Cuba from
in 1959 and 1960. There were also ortaxs, bazookas, recoilless rifles, 25 1
and arnmition of US manufacture.
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The weapons were found in Falcon State, scene
of the most active F. guerrilla effort, The Venezuelan gc'vermnertt assumes
that the weapons had been shipped from Cuba by sea..
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Castro is subversive assets in Latin America vary greatly from country
to country in organization, strength, and effectiveness. OnI in Venezuela
does he seem to have the capability to call, on significant elements within an
revolutionary movement to step up terrorist activity when he so chooses.
In addition, there are serious divisions ar.ng extreme leftist and Communist
fps in
;tin. American countries. The Cubans have thus far met with
little appmat apparent success in their attempts to bring about the unity of
theleftist extremists in "national liberation fronts" under their control or
strong influence. Their failure to accomplish this in such strategic countries
as Argentina and Co othia is a serious mss, in Cuban subversive capabilities.
Nevertheless, the alumni of Cuban training schools are a growing band in marW
countries and a significant proportion of these people can probably be considered
under Cuban control.
10. InA 1 in inaxg
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Latin American countries, c would seem that Castrofs insistence that they be
committed to action in the near future risks the loss of ma.s yllof these assets.
This appears to be recognized by the Cuban leaders. Che Guevara has explained
publicly that may "good revvolutionaries" will be lost in the initial stages of
the struggle. But that, in his view,, is not important. What is important is
that the struggle-which he grants will be lengthy--be initiated soon. In
an article in the regime's major ideological jourm., Cuba Social31ta. in
explained that "it is not always necessary to wait for
all the conditions for revolution to exist; the insurrection ry focal point
can "create the necessary conditions." Here Guevara seems to be saying
that even if the conditions in a particular country are not ripe for revolution,
these conditions can be created by a determined revolutionary leadership.
Guevara also stressed the importance of forcing a "bourgeois government"
toward progressively more oppressive actions and violence against the people,
Then,, he said, the masses of the people will side with the revolutionaries and
"the straggle will deepen so there can be no turning back,"
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