STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDWIN M. MARTIN BEFORE THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE HEMISPHERE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 19, 1963
• Content Type: STATEMENT

A} ~ ase.. 2001/08109 :-CIA-k DP79T-00 9AQOQ;40AQ-2,( 1
DRAFT
STAATEYMNT BY AS SI TMT &r P.C.57:-:2ARY 74IN ?I. VP,7, IN
3LX'OYE THE LATIN 1I 1111C say C.::T IVITME OF `'I'i E f C nE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS CC"2,11TT:E 011 THE SUBJECT OF COs UAIST
S R 11 1N a rn IS1 ;
IP1TJiCtI?t .'ION
I welcome this opportunity to appear before this Sub-
Committee to testify on the irnpo tant problem of communist
subversion in the hemisphere. In recent months public
attention has focused to such a coerce on the Soviets' arms
buildup in Cuba that it has tendd to overshadow the serious
dancer of subversive activities throughout Latin America? aided'
In many ways by Cuba and other bloc countries.
The problem of extra-conntin ntal totalitarian powers try.
ing to subvert established COvern entr in this he risphere is
not now. During World liar 11 the American Republics faced the
challonce of fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis powers.
Through individual and collective action they successfully
dealt with this threat. Since 19118, in the aftermath of the
cormunist seizure of power In Czechoslovakia, the inter-American
c? mariunit;y has been dealing with the problem of co:- munict sub-
version promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now
aided by Cuba.
I mention this at the outset to point out that the American
Governments have been confrontin this issue loz before tbore
t o the leadi:
- , unist parties
ortaa -: s ~ '?: it pry n countrlos,,
?~Mii'w'p_ &. k _ ;arl .!. ,'. "3 ~ ~. an iniwl.i+CS yJc am
thew' pill-.
By the
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1953
m. kka w;lca Sias improving. The swollen,
These parties
 the lose of 1953, th
11
nit parties and tho it z
1 rely con 'ined to ;heir continued hold in labor
organizations and anion intellectual. and
common a t parties co i ndinl a m4ass iollowing an they generally
exc epttonally were they able to make common caauua
remained on the detengthe..
czar period before the C as t~
period 1950- 54* whore
reached ,,.nail high levels in the late l95O's, the eomn unist leader-
The outstandin success of the post
0 takeover was in Guatemala in the
he ccirmurlists came to dominate the Arbcnz
Goverrt"ner t and entabli h eft fwt:iv'e control over the country's
labor and peasant orjani%ations. As the Soviets # peer and status
ship, however, gained new confidence, but Latin America was
till isolated from tho ccnt;ero off` international c o m.unism and
the local p, rttes were unable to translate this srovwth of Soviet
po er. into greater capabilities for influence and penetration in
the national societies of LatIn Arncrlca,
entering- a period of c.ypansion.n the aftermath t World War 11,
Soviet relations with Latin America,. which seemed to be
lod 1947-52 as o country after
another suspended` relations with talheA same time that they were
beginning 1953 with overtures to the Perlin Government 'or in-
operations in the area entered on the present period of expansion
creaaeda @d Fo ale o ce aOP v o b o oat as was
par t
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part of a vorldwide operation keyed to the underdeveloped
countries,, and spearheaded by trade and aid proprama As of
December 31, 19580 the European bloc countries had 20-odd trade
and payments agreement: v-1th five Latin American countries
(Arsentina, Brazil,, Oolom'bia,* UTru uay and Mexico..) One or more
of the bloc, governments at this time had resident diplomatic
missions in these same tin American countries and also in
trade. ? burins the period 1955-57, fourteen Latin American countries
were visited by bloc trade missions, and seven of these countries
world, to x''75 million in lt' ~ ..7 of Latin American trade.
The peak was reached in 1955, reflecting trade with Argentina
under the Perlin regime - $340 million or 2.5% of Latin American
Bolivia. Soviet bloc trade w.1th Latin America rose from
70
million In 1953,E only Q. of Latin America's trade with the
sent mirsicns to the bloc.
between Latin America and
and bloc radio broadcasts
American audiences,
In addition,, during the l95O's travel
e bloe reached a fairly high level,
cttod more and more time to Latin
During the peri 1953--58, the Soviets failed to gain any
secure foothold throe h tholr diplomatic and economic offensive.
What apparent suceessek3 they achieved were based on the need of
various Latin American countries to sell surplus raw materials
and. their willingness Go take Soviet goods in exchange.
Argentina, and Uruguay, the main theaters of Soyiet operation
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during; this period, 'C12"'01 Cove ri :do no lac tin,; gains . .
general, the first ph.-;-,se
YFiet operations in the area
was one of probing for oppor tunities.
AM-NY O CAS1110
Since 1959 the metal pattern of communist subversion.
in the hemisphere sho,?ts a continuation of the tactics of
i.nfiltration, popular front action and insurgency,. 'with a
marked shift tosward z:oore v ic>1 erce . r101 is has coincided with
the advent of Castro . d tE zl-arpenin of differences between
Moscow and. Pelting on w c? t : t tc to be followed in pressing
forward the communist ca+ p ni,A of =:orld domination, The
Soviets undoubtedly ro and Latin America as an area offering
unusual possibilities, but they have been cautious in their
tactics, except where special opportunities have developed,
as in the Ouse of Cuba. On the other hand, there is no evidence
that they have in any u-ay ioat ?ained Cuba or local communist
parties from violence of many f+c rnma,
The Strategy and Taet;too or-the Castro fe i e
The strategy of the C o* tro re irie from the beginning,
pite all the disci
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tiyi.ti.es to Weaken and MsoreUit the Castro Per
lJhile subversion has bay;
as we have seen, a lon -'term
efforts, its strength Ss unquestionably af'f'ected by the position,
prest ge and stability of Castr
and his regima in Cuba.
We
have had a considerable raea ure or success from our efforts to
isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro Government. In this
card, the missile 0r-isia proved to be of i,nosti i$a'ble value
:.: unmasking the Castro re-Imo, previously regarded as a model
for new Latin American type revolution, as Just one more tool
of 11,oscOW.. The inepittde of Cuban leaders, coupled with our
efforts to increase isolation of Cuba from access to the industri-
alized zed markets of the froc world, has brow ht about Serious economic
uateriorat .on in the ir:land. In the political field ;we have
achieved a major reduction in the influence of tide3.ismo. The,
stro Goverment has been ausponded from participation in: the
OAS. 'f fteon American Republics no loner have diplomatic . rela-
tions with Cuba. Last October during the missile crisis
achieved complete hemiapherio solidarity on OAS action to protect
the peac a and. security of the continent. he a result of economic
deterioration, Soviet d o: ination and political ostracirim, the
Cuban example has becone increasingly less attractive. to Latin
.merica,.
in quite a diffcr:nt arena, USIA Is taaging a 1battle for
men's minds in tolling the s tort' of the betrayal of the Cuban
revolution .
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revolution and ' hab conditions in Cuba and other cc,mmuniat
countries are like today. sThroti-II radio, procs, books, tole-
vision and films a this rossa ;;o it being carried daily to the
Latin Anori.can public. 'T'oo 4+ a few cxa Ales i (a) 4,500
OUT- of ' -f ni hed cl r cd radio pro ;rams- aria boin broad..
cast over some 1400 Latin American stations par tjeckk; (b) Bone
10,000 v"ords of nevis and co wentary are being sent, daily via
.;eiet e to all Latin Atiori,cz n pouts for placement in the local
veaax and (c) a ileekly 'iftoen-minute video taped show in boin
televised rcaularly in forty-tuo oities of o. ,ht en Latin American
countries, with an estimated 10 million viewers.
In addition to this mar,
r
its efforts to make contact,,
voach, USIA has greatly expandod
b half of the . free world, In
,perial groups auk ,es labour,', student bodies* and intellectual
and cultural elite who ?re the priority targets of the eommuntst
'or is
A _gs
of the succo
our effo to to discredit and
isolate the Castro re Giro politically and ocoho ically is' to
be found in the inability of the extreme left to cr ize anti,-
ri.can public del ns.trationa or any si nificant proportions
during the critical days of therfamias to crisis. One is reminded
of the oft-repeated boast of the Caitro re2imrme of how the hemi-
sphere would rise In dofense of Cuba if measures u ere taken against
it. 'the 'record shows Otherwise. Only in Argentina, Bolivia and
Uruguay" were popular der= nstratttons of any size mounted and only
in Venezuela
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.n Venezuela were there any cftectivc sabota e effort
Minor protest r etinws, student parches, and bombings vicr'e
reported from other countries, but ware regarded as failures
in terms of generating popular opposition to the action of
the United '8t.atoe
in Colombia itaeppeered that the immediate reaction of
the communist party and other ex4remists was dcfiensive,, and,
rather than attempting to o t;;,anize demonstrations, they avoided
hostile action. In Chile there were only small, limited demon-
tions, despite much propaganda and planninS action by the
extreme left during the preccdin+? months calling for dements
strationa and strikes if the united States were to
Cuba,
against
Pro-Cuban ele r s in !cuador made a n Jor o, though so wwhat
uncoordinated, effort to protest United States and OAS actions,
Those efforts were 1nIoat totally unsuccessful. Despite vitriolie
attacks by extreme leftist; publications and the exhortations
f party loaders, there were only minor dernone trationa in Guaya4uil
and Quito. It Peru,, front organizations organized anti-United
States rallies * Other than one at the University of lea, which
degenerated into a bloody b cavil, these rallice were . notable for
the small attendance,
In Montevideo, 'Vru uay, a oor nuiist-Organized demonstration
was attended by some 7,000, students and workers,' ..The demonstration
Was peaceful
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was peaceful and broke up aft;wr a few anti-4t 4tcd States
spceches. The organizers eo ;-ldore+ .tie demonstration dit -
as )ointin . The Central of Uru uayan Workers twice failed
in efforts tc stage der onstr at .+ n3 f
Do ,ivie1 the pro-cant: + c1-monatration ware mats by
an equal number or pro-United States demonstrations. The pro..
U33 dormstr'ators did not hesitate to clash with the extreme
loft damor strators ?
In Chi e, exi00 an
d thho Dominican Republic there were
only minor demonstrations. In Brazil, Haiti Costa Rica,
El Salvador# Guatemala, NNcaraGua, Panama araguay
9 # o ura l and P
there were no dwohs franc , This was all tha comnur s to were
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United StC es in.tornal Sncur it. Pro a s
Whereas the problem for the United States in,
strengthening Latin American cooperation; towards
hemispheric security had, until the advent of the Castro
movement been largely One of maintaining its influence
in the area and developing the capability of the
Latin American countries to make at least a token
contribution for collective defense, the problem
has now become one requiring a United States contribution
to the capability of the Latin ' Americs police and
military elements to maintain internal law and
order against communist inspired violence. This task
is by no means confined to providing arms for the
suppression of the CastroOcommuniat movement. If the
Latin American military and public safety forces are to
win'popular support for the measures that may be
necessary to-curb-such violence, they must establish
themselves in the public mind, as a constructive,,
economically responsible element in the national life.
In this connection I would like to touch briefly'
on what we are doing in this field.
From Its inception in 1952 until the Castro..
communist takeover in Cuba, our grant military assistance
program was limited to improving the capability of specific
military units which ten Latin =-merican countries had
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agreed
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agrec4 in bilateral military. agrees ents, to maintain
for collective dcfenee, under the Rio Treaty, against
external aggression.
However, two major dovelopments required us to
reorient our military policies aid programs t (a) the
growing reliance of Latin Ariierioa on the United States
for defense against external attack brought about by
technological advances in warfare and (b) the Growth
of the Castro-cormmuni st subversive movements.
With. respect to the latter development # it became
apparent in 1960 with the avowed intention of the Castro
regime, to promote the overthrow of Latin American
governments by indirect aggression and subversion, that
the security of nearly every government in the hemisphere
would be jeopardized, in varying degrees
In anticipation that many countries would be
confronted with Com nunist inspired disorders, terrorism,
sabotage, and possibly guerrilla operations,, a careful
and intensive assess:ont was made by the United States
in 1961 of the potential security threat to each
country with the view to the immediate development
and implementation of the United States military
assistance and training; programs reoriented to this new
danger.: Where critical deficiencies in the capability
of local security forces. wore found, we moved rapidly
in 1961 Aproved 2r6 a ease, 5 6 0 R 3 'p0( ti~t~fdA~b~1020018-5
training,
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training, and servieos undor our military assistance
and public safety pro rnxi to make up such deficiencies.
While those measures served as ui immediate response
to the threat, we rer li'.r_,d that over the long term the
ultim8.te solution to tie Comnsulast violence problem
would require nothing le rs that.the establishment of
political, economic and social stability through joint
United States-Latin Amcric-nSL endeavors winder the Alliance
for Progress.. However, we could not disregard the
intention, of the Castro-coy m nist movement to utilize
subversion and force, wthcn fiver necessary to retard or
prevent economic and social development through
democratic processes. Conoequontly, our objectives have
been reused nd our pr o;rxs reshaped to provide
Latin 'American countries with the training and equipment
required to frustrate such efforts.
The # adamental objective of our internal security
programs in Latin America, is the establishment of
Latin American military leadership and security forces
dedicated to the tanks oft (1) preserving democratic
constitutional oxrder; (2) contributing' to collective
defense on A. scale coin :ensura to vrit - Latin American
rzi ,ita7r and economic capabilities and (3) promoting
social and econonsie development through civic action
programs,
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To these ends, we are providing the type of materiel,
training and services required for the control of
Communist inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance
and control-of movements of subversion and arms inside
those countries aaid across their borders, and for the
maintenance of observation and patrol of rural areas
for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements.
Resolutions 1 cm 2 of the Punta del l ste meeting,
which. define the present threat and collective measures
that may be taken, are the multilateral keystones on
which. our present bilateral programs are based to improve
the internal defense capabilities of the satin American
countries.
Closely related to the task of providing Latin
American security forces with appropriate materiel, is
the,-Indoctrination and training of Latin American
military personnel with the ooraplete portfolio of Communist
techniques and counter-measures throu;h. training in the
United States and Canal :Joie Schools.
During the pst two years Increased emphasis h been
placed on training the Latin American. 'mill t pry ortot
control, oountor-.guerrilla operations and tactics,
intelligence and counter-intelligence,, public 'information,
psychological warfare, and other subjects which will
contribute to they maintenance of public order and the
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upport
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support of cons tit;uticr?=::a F-,ovorn onto. These courses
are . given at United t n1lit-cry r schools at Fort
Gulick, -Canal ,aao e?nd at Port Brag, north Carolina,
Moreover, for&i n officorr attending the longer term,
career comm nd courses, in the United States, receive
formal instruction t h.ich,. in part, treats with the
rights of government v
constitution, ersip"r
of the land, and
rte ~ >
ind iuiciual. under the
v> pro ?or regard for laws
t' a application of legal
procedures under c er;;oora c systoms,
in October of '062, tl- r l ,ter-American Defense
College was established un6or the auspices of the
Inter-AAmcriea. Defense i o4rc at Fort 1c air and began
its first course for senior officers tram' the armed
forces of the various An=nie. Republics The purpose
of the College is to con duct courses of study on the
In.ter..Americt a. system = id the military, economic
political and social f : ctors that constitute essential
components of defense of our free societies.
In our military as l t mce end training programs,
we are emphasizing to tie L tin American countries the
need for participation luz the economie development of
the country through civic action programs,- ate are
including in our oc tzip'pcrt
equipment.
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The interest of th1- L.tin Armoric , military in
contributing to ~rvti~ projects 1-ras exemplified
by their' eridorscr:}ent of ra Inter-American Defense Board
Resolution of December 1960, which recommends, in port:
"That the Governrmmcxnt,s of the American States take
into consideration the advisability ofemploying organs
of their Armed r arcos , oferably in regions considered
be underdeveloooed, in order tot (a) undertake highway
and settlement work,. a:, { prro;ride end establish technical
services; (b) broaden the economic bases directed
towards raising the -tr.ne +rds of living of their people; end
(6) educate the native pop7.Alati.ens In their own surroundings
and create roservec . of special labor for specific types
of Work,
In assessing the intexual security situation in
the region, we found that the civil polite forces in
many of the countries need assistance In the matter
of police administrat1on, training and operational
techniques and partieul;,riy required greater mobility
and more adequate syste n.s of communications
Consequently,
we developed.. a ptaalic safety program; as an integral part
of the AID 'rogr z in effort to. increase the
effectiveness of civil police end to seek elimination
of any duplication and coif 1lct between civil police
and military forces hh e a~ r a~ u efforts are based on
the Unite4 Stater: public i-,-! vices coca ept . stemming from
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the philosophy that in r democratic society are
sal-imposed it s trumont; of control ?nd therefore should
be responsive to the E}:, ~.{;:~:~y#s economic, political and
social needs. This thln!,J_:.7 is compatible with other
AID objectives clealin. ~ 7ith the?dovolopment of free
political institut iorr #`.?:"id also those which deal with
prtecting the inc iviCAu., .l from clcxaloitaticn or abuse.
The Program at the sr-:,,e
of a strong internal
In this connection
r, supports establishment
ty base.
,kro *tonal Inter-American Police
Academy was establish :d l.n F;t ; Year in the Canal Zone
to which we Invite selector; me ergs of Latin American
civil police torcas for= training in organization,
administration, riot records, and investigations,
all based on the r,ublii
rvi.ce concept.`
fealizing that pro of internal security can
only be resolved by the Joint efforts of the civil
G dlmilitary sec ':_rs of society, our programs are being
designed so that to will ;T: ?nort of non-Communist
civilian element:, and the icca.l military and are
being carefully tailor< rd to meet the` individual
requirements of the Lr -~, iun ,, erican. countries.
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STEPS BEING TAKEN IN THE OAS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST SU 3'JE ?STQN-
As I noted at the outset, thest'ruggle against
extra-continental subversion is not a now experience for
the inter-American system. The' problem arose during
World War II with the activities of Axis agents. To
help the governments deal with it, the Third Meeting of
Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 19k2) established the
"Emergenvy.,Advisory Committee for Political Defense".
This Committee functioned until the end of the war,
rendering a most useful service to the inter-American
community by assisting the member governments to identify
centers of Axis propaganda, espionage and subversive
activities and to develop suitable control measures,
The danger of international communism has been: a
topic of discussion and action in major inter-American
forums from the outset of the Cold War. .Beginning with
the Ninth 'Inter-American Conference in '1948 to the
present,.the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing
preocupation over this threat and readiness to assist
the governments to deal with it.
I shall not attempt in this presentation to trace
the history of OAS action against the subversive activ..
ities of international cor raunism. A good resume is
coast&ined in the Initial General Report of the SCCS to
whit pr v r '[ 1o O o `.eg rPP9T00429A000400020018-5
At
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At Punta del Este last year the Foreign Ministers
verified, to use the wording of Resolution I. "that
the subversive offensive of communists governments,
their agents and the organizations which they control
has increased in Intensity."
Concerning this offensive they said%
"The purpose of this offensive is the destruct..
ion of democratic institutions and the estab.
lishnent of totalitarian dictatorships at
the service of e titracontinental powers. The
outrstandin ; facts in this intensified offen.
sure are the declarations set forth in official
documents of the directing bodies of the
international communist movement, that one
of its principal objectives is the establish.
ment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped
countries and in Latin America; and the existence
of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which
is publicly aligned ti :ith the doctrine and
foreign policy of the communist powers."
"In order to achieve their subversive purposes
and hide their true intentions, the communist
governments and their agents exploit thelegit.r
imate needs of the less-favored sectors of the
population and the just national aspirations
of the various peoples. VWtth the pretext of
defending popular intoreste, freedom is sup.
pressed, democratic institutions are destroyed,
human rights are villated and the individual
is subjected to materialistic ways of life
imposed by the dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they
try to. establish an oppressive, aggressive
imperialism which subordinates the subjugated
nations to the mi iitraristic and aggresive in.,
terests of extracontinental powers. By
maliciously utilizing the very principles of
the inter-American system, they attempt to
undermine democratic institutions and to
strengthen and protect political penetration
and aggression. The subversive methods of
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x.46-
communist governments and their agents con-
stitute one of the most subtle and dangerous
forms of intervention in the internal affairs
of other countries."
I want to note that this assessment was unanimously
approved, with the sole exception of the Cuban delegation.
Based on this finding the foreign Ministers
established OAS procedures for assisting the governments
to meet the challenge. They directed the Council of
the CASs
To maintain all necessary vigilance, for the
purpose of warning against any acts of aggres--
sionI subversion, or other dangers to peace
and security, or the preparation of such acts,
resulting from the continued intervention of
Sino..Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to
make-recommendations to the governments of the
member" states with regard thereto,"
At the c same time they, made provision for ,the establish-
ment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS),
Council and the member governments, upon request, on
composed of experts on security matters,. ' to advise the
The SCCS was organized last spring and has met on
three occasions since that time: to prepare an initial
general report on communist subversive activities to
advise the Dominican Government, and to assist in the
preparation of studies on subversion for the Council.
The Council meanwhile has established a special committee
of its own,.- composed of ovornmental representation, to
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technical problems in this field.
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carry out its vigilance responsibilities. Both groups
in recent weeks have been working together on special
studies requested by the Foreign Ministers at their in.
formal meeting in Washington last October 2.3.
At the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers,
considerable time was devoted to the problem of sub.
version, as is reflected in the communique issued at the
end of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers found that
at the present juncture the most urgent of the problems
confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-Soviet inter-
vention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into
an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas
and subversion of democratic Institutions". They
expressed the desire that in the idlogical struggle
against communism "the resources and methods inherent
in the democratic system should be mobilized to bring
the peoples to realize fully the differences between
totalitarianism and democracy". They also agreed "that
is necessary for the countries, in accordance with their
laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures
to prevent-agents and ;roues of international communism
from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature."
In this connection they rsked that studies be made in the
three areas where Castro-Communise appeared to be con-
centrating its effort: the transfer of funds to other
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American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow
of subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propa-
Banda, ,and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training
in subversive activities. The SCCS has just completed a
preliminary study of these three topics setting forth
its conclusions and specific recommendations for indiv-
idual, and. cooperative action by governments.
The @ouneilts Special Committee received the report
in Spanish last Monday. After it has been translated
and circulated among all the members of the Council, I
hope it will be made public, The Special Committee is
meeting this afternoon to consider this point.
I should add that the SCCS report is ,a technic,
study prepared by experts acting in their individual
capacity. It is to be used by the Special Committee
composed of governmental representatives in the pro-
paration of a report to the Council setting forth recom-
mendations for measures which governments may wish to
adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter subversive
activities in these three fields,
1eahwhi.le the Special Committee maintains a close
watch over the incidence and pattern of Cabtro-Communist
subversive activities for the purpose of warning the
governments and recommending appropriate action
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5
 Approved.For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429A000400020018-5
confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over
the missiles in Cuba, tho Finance Ministers of the 2
member countries of the Alliance for Progress met in
Mexico City, President Kennedy sent a message to that
conference, which rovie.rcd the progress of the Alliance
during its first year of operations, which established
the clear and direct relationship of t1fir pro ram to
our and the heir isphere''s security, He said to the
Alliance conferees : "Your meeting is a vital reminder
that the central task of this generation Of Americans
is not merely the avoid pence of conflict. It is the
construction of anew cog=t unity of American nations in
which all ,our citizens c