REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000100020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 19, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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19 September 1963
SUBJECT: Review of Intelligence Reporting on the Situation
in South Vietnam
In accordance with the Director's instruction at
the USIB meeting on 18 September, I am sending to each
USIB principal the attached review of the Intelligence
Community's record of reporting on the situation in South
Vietnam.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
SECRET downgrading and
declassification
,00'X-4 3
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17 September 1963
ANNEX: Intelligence Reporting on the Political Situa-
tion in South Vietnam, 1 June 62 - 21 August 63
1. For several years prior to the outbreak of.
the Buddhist crisis an May:1?963,~the ".intelligence commu-
nity had. believed, and regularly reported to the high-
est levels of government, that the Diem regime in South
Vietnam had serious political liabilities, that it was
autocratic, inefficient, and increasingly unpopular, and
that the potential for its overthrow existed.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence, return-
ing from a visit to Southeast Asia in June 1962, re-
ported to the Special Group as follows:
Apparently, dissatisfaction with the Diem
regime continues as evidenced by Diem's
own serious concern over a coup. Diem
family rule, his recent restrictive legis-
lation,and concern over security, all are
creating dissatisfaction and are contribut-
ing factors. A coup attempt, whether suc-
cessful or not, would probably adversely
affect the anti-Viet Cong effort.
3. Since June 1962, the basic judgment that
military success was being seriously hampered, if
not precluded, by counterproductive GVN political
practices has been repeatedly spelled out in many
intelligence assessments of South Vietnam. The
following paragraphs present the key judgments of
the principal such assessments.
National Intelligence Estimates
4. NIE 53-63:
a. The question of GVN (Government of Viet-
nam) political problems was a key issue in debate
last winter and spring in the intelligence communi-
ty's production of NIE 53-63 ("Prospects in South
Vietnam"). As part of a special procedure employed
at that time to solicit the views of the chief in-
terested US officials, a senior CIA officer was sent
to Saigon to review the draft estimate on the scene.
His team concluded (in a report disseminated to White
House Staff) that-.
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We alsq are concerned over the longer-
run prospect for Vietnamese self-depend-
ence. However, we also believe that the
difficulties imposed by the Diem regime
are over-stressed when considered in
the context of the current situation and
we doubt that these problems can be re-
dressed at this time without risking a
possibly fatal setback to the entire ef-
fort in South Vietnam. ...
The present government has increased its
efficiency and, in any case, is probably
no worse and may be better than most of
our counter-insurgency list. This is not
to say. that it's a good government by our
standards--it is to say that if we expect
to get involved in counter-insurgency
situations in fact as well as theory, we
must learn how to win with the type of
governments likely to be found 1m these
countries with such improvements as we
can gradually provide.
b. The final NIE, approved by USIB on 17
April--prior to tho outbreak of the Buddhist con-
troversy--stressed that the situation was "fragile":
...It can, of course, be argued that only a
highly centralized regime, single-mindedly dedi-
cated to independence, and placing a heavy
emphasis on personal loyalty, can cope with
the problems of guerrilla warfare. However,
we believe that a greater willingness on the
part of the regime to enlist the active sup-
port of those who have become disaffected or
discouraged in the face of Diem's techniques
of government would considerably speed the
reduction of the Viet Cong insurgency...
But the government must be both willing and
able to expand its efforts to bring social,
political, and economic improvements to the
countryside If the peasant is to recognize
a stake in the survival of the government
and to be fortified against Communist blandish-
ments. Effective action in this and other
fields, particularly with the removal of a
substantial US presence at all levels of the
government, would almost certainly require
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a wider participation in the development
and implementation of policy and a con-
siderable reduction in the tight, per-
sonal control of the bureaucracy.
On the basis of its past performance,
the ability of the Diem regime to move
willingly and effectively in these direc-
tions is questionable, and may become
even more so should military victory come
within sight,..
5. SNIE 53-2-63 ("The Situation in South Viet-
nam," 10 July 1963) focused explicitly on the questions
of the GVN's political stabi..ity and viability, and
of US-GVN relationships. The USIB-agreed SNIE warned
in particular that GVN handling of the Buddhist is-
sue to date had already provided a focal point for
public discontent, and that the GVN would probably
proceed to handle the Buddhist issue in a manner
which would produce a major political crisis.
6. Additionally, O/NE Memoranda for the Director
(of 4 October 1962 and of 17-May 1963) were dissemi-
nated to the White House Staff.
a. The October memo concluded that "until
the GVN enlists much more active public support of
its cause than now exists, we believe that the VC
threat cannot be reduced to a point which will per-
mit the bulk of US personnel now committed in South
Vietnam to be withdrawn."
b. The May memorandum signaled the sharp
rise in GVN sensitivity concerning the growing US
presence throughout South Vietnam, stated that Nhu
had gained key influence in GVN affairs and was
the chief source of hostility to the US, and con-
cluded that the prospects were not bright for re-
storing close US-GVN relationships at all levels.
Current Intelligence Reporting
7. These views of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment were also implicit in CIA's current intelligence
reporting. Until the Buddhist crisis, however, polit-
ical vulnerabilities of the regime remained largely
potential, new developments were few, and changes in
the political atmosphere were amorphous. Under these
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circumstances, the volume of current reporting on
Vietnamese domestic politics was relatively small.
(Military aspects of the situation were fully re-
ported throughout this period). Once events began
to move rapidly as a result of the regime's mishan-
dling of the incidents in Hud, there was a large volume
of current reporting.
8. CIA current publications were stating in
strong terms the seriousness of the Buddhist crisis,
and the threat it posed to the Diem regime by early
June. They continued through the summer to report
on this subject. Between 10 May and 21 August,
the following themes:
and its mplica ons. CIA publications stressed
a. Diem's unwillingness to come to terms
with the Buddhists.
policy.
b. Increasing popular opposition to this
c. Growing political orientation of the
Buddhists.
d. The disruptive influence of the Nhu's.
e. Military plotting against the regime.
9. Excerpts from this reporting are attached
as an appendix.
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APPENDIX 17 September 1963
Excerpts from Current Intelligence Reporting
1. Before the incidents in Hue, 8 May 1963.
a. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review
(CIWR), 22 June 62: ppos on s s in Saigon a
in Paris are plotting Diem's overthrow. While such
maneuvering, without South Vietnamese army backing,
poses little direct threat to. Diem, military offi-
cers remain dissatisfied with the President."
b. Current Intelligence Memorandum, 19
July 62: "While individual Vietnamese officials
are strongly pro-American, the government is nation-
alistic and feels little kinship with democratic
practices. A vocal intellectual group has scored
Diem's autocratic and highly centralized rule, and
even government officials have voiced concern that
interference in military command and inadequate ad-
ministration have contributed to growing Viet Cong
success. A constant possibility is the assassina-
tion or overthrow of Diem by non-Communist opponents
or by such groups in cooperation with the Viet Cong.
To be successful a coup probably requires military
backing. There is, however no apparent popular or
strong alternative leader to Diem on the horizon."
c. The Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB),
3 November 62: number o op Sou a namese
military figures apparently still believe that the
security situation requires drastic political changes.
One of the country's three area commanders, General
Dinh, stated that the public had lost confidence
in President Diem and his brother Nhu because of
their continued toleration of corruption in high
circles."
d. CIWR, 25 January 63: "The overall ef-
fectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort contin-
ues to be blunted by the government's political
methods. Control measures designed to guard against
disloyalty have hobbled the combat effectiveness
of the military forces. In some areas inept admin-
istration of counterinsurgency programs has antago-
nized the peasantry. The regime's internal image
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has also been damaged by its insensitivity to real
or fancied popular grievances or to issues of pub-
lic concern such as corruption."
e. CIB, 11 March 63: "The anti-American
feelings of Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother
and chief political adviser, appear to be sharpen-
ing."
f. Briefing of the House Armed Services
Committee, 2 arch "With help, SVN prob-
ably stands a good chance to contain the Communists
militarily. However, the Diem government's methods
of operating have reduced its effectiveness, politi-
cally and militarily. The Diem government has
alienated many educated Vietnamese, and failed to
win positive loyalty from its people. It is unlike-
ly that US involvement can be substantially cur-
tailed or a lasting reduction in the Communist
threat achieved so long as present political con-
ditions persist."
2. After 8 May
b. CIB2 11 May 63: "An outbreak of govern-
ment sentimentamong Buddhists in the major northern
city of Hui' on 8 May could have serious repercus-
sions."
c. CIB, 21 May 63: The Diem government's
handling of t e Buddhist problem so far has been
inept, and there is danger of disaffection within
the security forces."
d. CIWR, 24 May 630 "The Diem government
has aroused tie liiostility of Buddhists, who comprise
the bulk of the population...."
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g. CIB, 10 Jun 63: "There are signs that
the Diem government intends to follow a firm policy
toward Buddhist agitators despite a tentative agree-
ment of both sides to end provocations...."
i. CIB, 1 Jul 63: "Dissension appears to
be spreading whin the South Vietnamese government.
An American observer who recently talked with Nhu
received the impression that he would move against
Diem if he feels that the regime has become 'servile'
to the US."
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