CUBAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00428A000200010041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 26, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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I. The Castro regime is well along in the process of re-
organizing its political, economic, military, and police
systems in the Soviet pattern.
A. in Communist terminology, Cuba is in the stage of
"building socialism," and differences in the develop-
ing Cuban institutions from those of the Soviet Bloc
are either transitory or relatively minor expressions
of national individuality.
B. Cuba?s main difference from the Soviet satellites
lies in the absence of an explicit Soviet commitment
to defend Cuba militarily.
1. Soviet statements in this sense have thus far
been vague and general,
II. A single political, machine, avowedly based on Marxist-
Leninist principles and interlocking in its functions
and leadership with the organs of the state, is being
formed at local, provincial.,, and national levels,
A. Called the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations .'(ORI),
it is to become the United Party of the Socialist
Revolution at such time as the leaders determine that
it has become sufficiently well organized and entrenched
to perform the role of the single party in a Com-
munist state.
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B. It is governed by a 24-man National Directorate. The
Directorate in turn is dominated by a six-man secretar-
iat headed by Fidel and Raul Castro as first and second
secretaries.
1. Raul Castro is also Deputy Premier, making him
second to Fidel in both the party and government
hierarchies.
C. Since last August, major government decrees have been
issued in the names of both the Council of Ministers
(Cabinet) and the national leadership of the ORI.
III. The split in the ORI leadership between Fidel Castro and
a group of veteran Communists led by Anibal Escalante,
which came into the open with Castro's bitter public blast
against Escalante on 26 March, appears to have been not
over ideological issues, but over the means and tactics
for reaching agreed goals.
A. The Escalante group had been moving rapidly to secure
control of the country?s political and governmental
institutions to the exclusion *,f Castro followers
Castro's 26 March speech and the maneuvering which
preceeded it leave no doubt as to his position of
primacy in the leadership of the revolution.
1. Escalante was expelled from the ORI National
Directorate, the membership of which had been
announced less than three weeks earlier, and
left for Czechoslovakia.
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B. Castro in his 26 March and subsequent speeches on the
issue charged Escalante with "sectarianism" and with
attempting to build his own power machine "divorced
from the masses." These machinations, he charged,
had alienated the "masses" and threatened, by under-
mining public confidence in the revolution, to destroy
it.
1. Escalante has subsequently become, along with
"imperialism," one of the chief whipping boys for
the regime's difficulties.
C. Other veteran Cuban Communists have dutifully followed
Castro's lead in condemning Escalante, but try to imply
that Escalante's "harmful activities" were the result
of personal faults. They are now dutifully praising
Castro as "our great Marxist-Leninist leader."
D. Castro himself has left no doubt that his objective
is the construction of a Communist society in Cuba
and has frequently appealed for an end"to any differ-
ences between the "old" and the "new" Communists.
E. Veteran Communists hold nine of the 24 seats on the
ORI National Directorate, as well as numerous key
administrative jobs such as President of the Agrarian
Reform Institute and Minister of Domestic Trade.
1. Blas Roca, the ranking Cuban Communist for more
than 25 years, is a member of the key six-man
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Secretariat of the CR:I National Directorate,
and director of the GRI newspaper Hoy.
F. Blas Roca, in an article in Pravda on 13 June, said
Escalante's "harmful activities" had done such damage
to the construction of a Marxist-Leninist party in
Cuba, that "now we have to rebuild ...and begin again
from scratch."
G. Whether or not the rivalries between the "old" and the
"new" Communists will result in new top-level purges
and crises cannot be clearly predicted.
1. Moscow, while probably sympathetic to the veteran
Communists and distrustful of Castro's emotionalism
and his unpredictabii.lity, has publicly supported
him and condemned Escalante's tactics. It has also
granted Cuba important new economic support since
Escalante's ouster.
2. Communist veterans such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
President of the Agrarian Reform Institute, probably
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recognize that they have no substitute for Castro
in his unique ability to rouse the people.
IV. A plethora of "mass organizations" have been organized
during the past year to foster popular identification
with the objectives of the regime, to transmit political
indoctrination, and to exercise control and surveillance
over the membership.
A. The Union of Young Communists, formed last April from
the former Association of Rebel Youth, is described
as "the political. organization of all Cuban youth."
1. It claims a membership of more than 100,000 and
is charged, among other things, with "helping"
the Union of Cuban Pioneers,
an organization for
children between six and 13 years old.
B. The Federation of Cuban Women, headed by Raul Castro's
wife, claims a membership of more than 160,000 members.
C. The Central Organization of Workers of Revolutionary
Cuba, built on the foundations of the powerful pre-
Castro labor confederation, is an instrument of the
state for control of organized labor.
D. The militia and the Re-o.?o.tionary Defense Committees
(block warden of rar., o sysLLemj are also effective as
mass organizations.
E. Other groups, such as the National Institute for Sports
and Recreation, the Institute for Friendship with
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Peoples, and the National Tourist Industry (which
arranges vacations for "superior" Cuban workers)
also serve the standard purposes of Communist mass
organizations.
V. There is widespread discontent in Cuba, particularly over
consumer goods shortages, and resentment over the regime's
regimentation of the people and its authoritarianism.
Active resistance is, however, confined to a few small
groups and the most common attitude is hopelessness and
apathy. The regime is in no danger of being toppled at
this time.
A. Perhaps only a quarter of the population remains
positive in its support for the regime.
1. Many of Castro's original followers have become
disillusioned and are now in exile or in prison;
some have been executed.
B. The regime's large and pervasive security machinery
has intimidated most of the people.
D. In Matanzas province on 13 June food shortages "touched
off public demonstrations which led the regime on
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16 June to stage an unusual show of military force
in the city of Cardenas. Troops, tanks, artillery
and MIG jet fighters participated in the show of
force, following which President Dorticos addressed
a rally.
1. These events were broadcast and televised through-
out Cuba and were apparently designed to make an
example of Cardenas for the rest of the country.
VI. Cuba now faces an economic crisis attributable to the
confusions and dislocations caused by the drastic and
rapid changeover of the economy to state control, to poor
management in many enterprises, and to the sudden shift
in foreign trade, formerly almost exclusively with the West,
but now almost exclusively with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
A. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, writing in a Soviet publica-
tion late last year, claimed that 80 percent of
agricultural production in Cuba is now accounted for
by farms operated by or under the close control of
the state and that a similar percentage of industrial
production comes from state--owned plants.
B. This year's just completed sugar harvest, the keystone
of the Cuban economy, is not quite 5 million tons--the
lowest in many years.
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3. The poor sugar prospects highlight what has been
one of the most immediate economic problems--the
shortage of foreign exchange to finance needed
imports from the Free World of foodstuffs and
replacement parts for Western-made machinery.
C lba's main source of foreign;-,exchange is now the
20% of the value of sugar sold to the USSR which
is paid for in convertible currency, amounting to
about $50 million per year.
C. The Soviet Bloc has demonstrated its willingness to
extend itself considerably to help the Cuban govern-
ment ease its more pressing problems.
1. On 14 May a supplementary protocol to the Cuban-
Soviet trade agreement was signed, increasing total
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trade between the two countries for this year to
$750 million--about $50 million above the level
called for in the protocol signed in January.
2. Since Cuba has reduced export capabilities, the
increase probably involves mainly an increase in
Soviet shipments of needed consumer goods to Cuba,
probably financed by commodity credits.
D. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is also giving considerable support
to Cuba's long-term economic development plans.
1. Sino-Soviet Bloc long-term credits to Cuba for
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3. Except for light industrial plants set up by
Czechoslovakia, most of the bloc projects in Cuba
are not expected to become operational before 1963
or 1964 and have thus far had little impact on the
economy.
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E. In recent weeks Cuban leaders have repeatedly warned
the Cuban people that they face a long period of
austerity and hard work in the drive to "build
socialism"; they note their gratitude for "the
generous assistance" provided by the Soviet Bloc,
but emphasize that the future depends on the Cubans
themselves.
1. Castro announced on 31 May that it will take ten
years to solve Cuba's housing problems.
2. Numerous sessions of "criticism and self-criticism"
have resulted in frank admissions by Cuban leaders
for past shortcomings in economic management and
in assurances to the people that these "errors"
are being overcome "on all fronts."
VII. For the past three and a half years, the Castro regime
has been engaged in a massive military buildup, supported
by more than 30 major shipments of bloc military equipment
bringing in some 70,000 tons of material for the ground and
air forces.
A. The ground forces now total about 75,000.
1. The regular ground forces are supported by a large
ready-reserve force of about 100,000.
B. Bloc military deliveries have included field and anti-
aircraft artillery, heavy and medium tanks, rocket
launchers, and thousands of modern small arms as well
as military vehicles.
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C. Aircraft delivered have included at least 40 MIG jet
fighters, at least 20 helicopters, 12 prop trainers,
and 12 transports.
D. This year the Cuban navy has received its first bloc
equipment in the form of six Khronstadt-class submarine
chasers and 12 motor torpedo boats.
Introduction of bloc equipment has made it necessary
to send numerous Cubans to the bloc for training, and
to bring Soviet and Czech military personnel to Cuba
to supervise assembly and instruction.
F. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces have increased
steadily, and now probably surpass those of any other
Latin American country.
1. During 1961, the armed forces were subjected to a
thorough reorganization, as units of the former
civilian militia merged with regular army units
to form a more centralized body.
2. The Cuban armed forces, however, still have little
offensive capability outside Cuba, and the equip-
ment sent them by the bloc has not included some
items, such as bombers, required for offensive
capability.
G. The Soviet Union is not believed to have sent to Cuba
any guided missiles or nuclear weapons; it is possible
that some surface-to-air missiles are to be delivered
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to Cuba, but none are believed to have arrived
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VIII.( (reorganization
of the Cuban government's police machinery.
A. The Department of State Security within the Ministry
of Interior is now the instrument for domestic control.
B. The most pervasive arm of the security apparatus is
the network of Revolutionary Defense Committees. Accord-
ing to regime leaders, more than 100,000 of these informr-
ant groups have been organized throughout the country.
IX. Cuban foreign policies are dictated by the government's
dependence on:-'the Soviet Union.
A. Wherever possible, the Cubans have sought to avoid
confronting the issue of Sino-Soviet rivalry; when
presses however, they have adopted the Soviet position.
B. Cuba's voting record in the UN General Assembly clearly
demonstrates its adherence to the Soviet positions.
1. On 37 roll-call votes during the first half of the
16th session of the General Assembly, Cuba voted
with the Soviet Bloc 33 times; in the other four
cases, one or the other abstained. On five import-
ant issues, including the vote appealing to the
Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megat6X bomb, Cuba
was the only country voting with the ten formal
members of the Soviet Bloc.
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C. Cuba maintains diplomatic relations at the embassy
level with all Sino-Soviet Bloc countries except East
Germany; it exchanges "missions" not designated as
embassies with the latter to avoid a complete rupture
with Bonn.
2. Polish *oreign Minister Rapacki has just concluded
a six-day visit to Cuba.
X. Cuba is still attempting to maintain good relations with
"non-aligned" governments.
A. Cuba is to attend the Cairo meeting in July of "non-
aligned" nations; its conduct at previous meetings
of this group in Belgrade and in Cairo was so violent-
ly anti-US and so clearly pro-Soviet as to annoy Tito,
Nasser, and Nehru.
XI. The Cuban leaders have repeatedly stated that the US holds
the naval base at Guantanamo Bay illegally, and that the
base will at some time revert to Cuban control.
A. The Cubans maintain that they will never use force
against the base but will "at the appropriate time"
demand that an "international body" rule that the base
be returned to Cuba.
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B. The Cuban government still obtains about $10 million
annually in foreign exchange from the wages and salaries
of Cubans working on the base.
C. These workers are systematically harassed by the
authorities, and the area around the Base has been
converted into a~military defense zone.
XII. The Castro regime considers that Cuba is setting the
"example" which other Latin American peoples will eventual-
ly follow in destroying the "imperialist-controlled regimes"
which now "oppress" them.
A. The Castro regime has provided covert financial assist-
ance and perhaps other types of material aid to Com-
munist or pro-Communist opposition-groups in other Latin
American countries.
B. It has also provided hundreds of "scholarships':' annually
to Latin American students for study in Cuba, and has
become a leading transit point for Latin American travel
to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, frequent inter-
national gatherings in Havana bring delegates from
Latin America and other parts of the world to Cuba.
C. Castro's influence in other Latin American countries
has declined steadily since he came to power.
1. The Eighth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers
in Punta del Este last January effectively excluded
the Castro regime from participating in the Organiza-
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tion of American States and subsidiary organs of
the inter-American system.
2. Only five Latin American countries still maintain
diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. These
are: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia.
Bolivia does not have any mission in Havana, but
there is a Cuban mission in La Paz.
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