CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01060A000100220001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1951
• Content Type: CIAPER

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VOL. I No. 15
21 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
DOCUMENT NO. .
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: it-24 74217;iii
DATE. ..1_1r111.? orTREVIEWER: _
73
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE SOVIET WORLD . . Page
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TIBET .. . . Page
1
Chinese Communist control over Tibet, now being consolidated,
threatens the territories on India's northern frontier. The
Chinese Communists are in a position to maneuver for the eventual
extension of influence and possibly for jurisdiction over the bor-
der territories of Nepal, BhutapliSikkim and Kashmir, and the In-
dian Provinces of Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab. (SEE MAP)
3
5
IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER FACES NEW DIFFICULTIES . . . . Page 9
Prime Minister Mossadeq faces mounting pressure on his re-
turn to Iran as the financial and economic situation continues
to deteriorate. Increased political oppositione.aggravated by
a rise in Communist activity, threatens National'Front,control of
the government. This opposition, however, is unorganized and prob-
ably cannot successfully thallege Mossadeq's contra in the immediate
future
OUTLOOK FOR EUROPEAN' DEFENSE FORCES UNCERTAIN ..... ,Page 11
Despite the very considerable work already accomplished by
the European Defense Forces Conference, a number of basic prob-
lems remain unsolved and new difficulties are appearing. Politi-
cal and economic questions involving Germany's relationship to
the West must be faced before the European defense community can
begin to function.
THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE SOVIET MIG-15 FIGHTER . . page 14
Standardization by the Soviet Union on the MIG-15 fighter
aircraft in 1949, despite the calculated risk of Obsolescence
prior to the outbreak of a major war, probably indicates that
the USSR is depending primarily on large numbers to counter West-
ern superiority in strategic weapons and to cancel out any immediate
improvements in Western fighter types. The MIG-15, in Korean opera
tion, has proved effective in interceTting Western bombers and at
least equal in performance to Western fighters.
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THE PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS Page 16
The Philippine elections of 13 November resulted in a genu-
ine public repudiation of the Quirino'regime. The opposition
Nacionalista Party won all mine of the contested-Senate seats and
approximately half the governorships and other provincial posts.
It is in marked contrast to previous Philippine elections that a
strongly entrenched political machme permitted this to occur..
The precedent set thereby is at least equal in importance to the
shift in party fortunes.,
SPECIAL ARTICLE. WORLD COMMUNISM: THE COMMUNIST SITUATION IN
tOUTH AMERICA
South American Communists, while not a strong or immediate
threat to US security, nevertheless possess a considerable poten-
tial for interference with economic activities. During the past
years they strengthened their ties with European Communists, in-
tensified their efforts in behalf of Soviet propaganda objectives,
and helped stimulate isolationist, nationalist, and anti-US
sentiment. (SEE MAP)
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THE SOVIET WORLD
It is not yet clear whether the Soviet Union's new four-point pro-
posal for disarmament has any purpose other than to improve the Soviet
propaganda position, which had suffered from the aftereffects of
Vyshinsky's initial speech before the UN General Assembly in Paris. The
proposal could, however, be a forerunner of further Russian concessions
on disarmament, as part of a serious effort to reach some form of agree-
ment with the Western powers.
In an effort to draw closer to the tripartite position on arms
limitation, Russia is now willing, according to Foreign Minister
Vyshinsky, to agree to a census of armed forces, armaments (including
conventional and atomic weapons) and foreign military bases, subject to
verification by the UN Security Council. The censO would take place
within one month after agreement on the plan, but presumably a Soviet
veto could be applied in the Security Council on questions of implemen-
tation.
Important points of East-West disagreement on the disarmament issue
remain to be settled. For example, the Soviet Union has not modified
Its unacceptable demands for an outright one-third reduction in the
armaments of the Big Five and absolute prohibition of atomic weapons.
In view of the Soviet preponderance of power in conventional military
strength and the Western superiority in atomic weapons, agreement to this
proposal would tend to leave Russia with a still greater edge in over-
all armed strength.
The chances for serious big power negotiations remain poor. Moscowts
reaction to Auriol's suggestion for a Big Four conference was lukewarm.
Pravda's and amtia's comments on other Western suggestions for a
conference are typical of Moscow's attitude. Both newspapers noted that
French Foreign Minister Schuman made "very hazy references" to the de-
sirability of "personal contacts," and that Secretary General Lie pro-
posed "in a very indefinite form" that the Foreign Ministers of disagree-
ing countries enter into immediate negotiations. The Kremlin apparently
wants to tie negotiations to the West's entire rearmament program rather
than discuss the causes of tensions which created the need for the pro-
gram.
Continuing the Russian war of diplomatic notes, Deputy Foreign
Minister Gromyko delivered a new protest to representatives of the United
States, Great Britain and France in Moscow. The latest charges con-
cerned Trieste, and were largely a rehash of old complaints that the three
Western powers have violated the Italian Peace Treaty in order to set up
a military and naval base there. The note further stated that the three
powers are planning illegally to divide the territory between Italy and
Yugoslavia. Earlier in the week, Russia sought to have the last word
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in the exchange with Norway by delivering still another note reiterating
accusations of Norwegian 'aggressive aims."
Despite their efforts to deny strategic materials to the Orbit,
Norway and Denmark found it necessary in their 1952 trade agreements
with Czechoslovakia and Poland to agree to the delivery of certain
Western embargoed goods. Czechoslovakia will receive 500 tons of alu-
minum from Norway in exchange for 500 tons of ship plates. Poland will
receive almost a million dollars? worth of automobile and truck parts
from Denmark in exchange for 1.63 million tons of coal.
The Swedish Government also has bowed to Polish demands for stra-
tegic ball bearings in exchange for Polish coal. Sweden plans to offer
$193,000 worth of bearings and.hopes to reach an agreement on an amount
not substantially greater.
There is evidence that Polish authorities, in their efforts to ex-
pand Poland?s overburdened merchant shipping facilities, are attempting
to establish and may already have succeeded in setting up, a dummy
corporation in Panama for the purchase of Western vessels.
It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 dead weignt
tons of British cargb ships le$s than ten years old are available for
purchase by such a company, which in turn would transfer them to Poland.
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IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TIBET
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Chinese Communist control over Tibet, now being consolidated, threatens
the territories on Indians northern frontier. The Chinese Communists are in
a position to maneuver for the eventual extension of influence and possibly
for jurisdiction over the border territories Of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and
Kashmir, and the Indian Provinces of Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab. (SEE MAP)
If the Chinese Communists should acquire control over all these areas, their
strategic position vis-a-vis the Indian sub-continent would be greatly
strengthened.
The Dalai Lama, temporal and spiritual ruler of Tibet, cabled Mao Tse-
tung on 24 October announcing his government's ratification of the Since-
Tibetan agreement of May 19511 which provided for the Communist takeover of
Tibet. Lhasa's ratification of this agreement, which had been signed by a
Tibetan delegation in Peiping last spring, is proof of the extension of ef-
fective Communist control over Tibet's central ruling circle, and thus pre-
sages complete domination.
The Communists are now proceeding to exploit the popularity of the Dalai
Lamas The Dalai Lama will almo t certainly be supplanted by the Panchen Lama,
a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communists. In late 1949 the Chinese Communists
captured the Young Panchen Latta at his retreat in west China, and they have
made effective use of this valuable puppet to rally Tibetans to the Communist
cause. The ,Sino-Tibetan agreement stipulated that the Panchen Lama is to have
'equal status with the Dalai Lama. end provided that he shall assume a degree
of authority which would make him in fact superior to.the Dalai Lama,
The Dalai Lama's cable of ratification formalizes a military capitulation
which had already taken place. Chinese Communist troops have been occupying
Lhasa for some weeks, and a detachment is said to have been dispatched from
Lhasa west to Shigatse, the ancient seat of the Panchen Lama, Other Commu-
nist forces have recently been reported to be in control of the main Indo
Tibetan reed from Lhasa to the border of Sikkim, and of the towns of Rudok.
and Gartok in the extreme west of Tibet.
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Communist control of Tibet has special significance for India. The im-
mediate effect is expected to be a perceptible diminution of Indian influence
in Tibetan affairs, for the Sino-Tibetan agreement required that Tibetan troops
be absorbed by the People's Liberation Army, and that Peiping have absolute
authority over "ell external affairs" of Tibet. Thus, as more Communist troops
move in, Peiping will probably put pressure on India for the withdrawal of the
small Indian detachments which have long been stationed on the Lhasa-Sikkim
road for protection of the telegraph line and of travelling merchants. I4ew
Delhi reportedly will accede to any Chinese demand for the abolition of this
patrol.
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The northern borderlandsof India are vulnerable to Communist politi-
cal eXploitationeutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Kashmir are very mountainous,
thinly settled and undeveloped. Many of their boundaries are in dispute.
Historical Chineee claims to suzerainty could be advanced in support of the
anticipated effort to extend Communist jurisdiction beyond the unmarked bor-
ders,
The customary local tactical moves for "softening up" an area will be
facilitated by Peiping's proconsuls in Tibet. Infiltration of Communist
agents into India's northern border areas,will now be easier, and promises
greater success in subverting peoplenot easily reached before. Though no
military invasion from Tibet is anticipated in the near future, it remains
.a distant possibility. There is terrain suitable for airfields in western
,Tibet near the Nepal border, with easy access to the Indian plain. There
have been persistent reports of Soviet espionage in this area.
Nepal has had close economic relations with Tibet, and in the past had
close politiCal ie withChina's Central Government. Nepal may continue to
be influenced by a need for good economic relations with Tibet and despite
India's commitment to Nepal's defenee, there May be pressure on Nepal to
Orient iteelf politically toward Piping. The majority of Nepalese, moreover,
have much in common ethnically and culturally with. the Tibetans. Internal in-
stability of the Nepal Government, the wildness of the frontiers, and the pass-
age through Nepal of a number of traditional trade routes from Tibet to India,
will all work to the advantage of the Communists.
Severe factional clashes have occurred in Nepal over the past year, and
on 12 November thercentury-old Rana dynaety of Prime Ministers Was finally un-
seated. The Chinese Communists can exploit the political disorder which has
been developing in Nepal even as Communist forces expand their hold on Tibet.
Peiping'is expected to identify itself with anti-government elements and may
attempt to obtain de facto control of the frontiers; it will be very diffi-
cult in any event to prevent Communist infiltration.
In recent months, with the advance of Communist forces tcwards Lhasa,
there have been signs of an increased Chinese interest in Nepal and of ore
ganizatiOnal progress on the part *f the Nepal Communist Party. Nepal pre-
sents an attractive target to international Communism, for the extension of
control over Nepal would put Communist forces on the edge of the Indian plain.
Bhutan has had close connections with Tibets the Bhutanese population
is largely Tibetan by both race and religion, and the various governments of
China, despite Bhutan's treaty relations with India, have never abandoned the
claim of suzerainty over Bhutan. In addition to ethnological and religious
considerations which tend tp draw Bhutan to China by way of Tibet, the domestic
political situation in Bhutan can be exploited by Communist China, and the
frontier is vague and difficult to protect. There is almost no contact between
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India and Bhutan, and much of the area could conceivably come under Commu-
nist control without knowledge of non-Communist governments. Control of
Bhutan would place Communist forces within a few miles of major commercial
routes from Assam to the rest of India.
The Indian dependency of Sikkim differs from Nepal and Bhutan in that
various Chinese governments for many years have recognized it as part of the
Indian sphere, and thus there are no Chinese claims to be revived. Sikkim is
also the easiest to protect against Chinese infiltration. Peiping neverthe-
less can undertake subversive activity in Sikkim, where Tibetan influence is
very marked. Control of Sikkim would mean control of the two main trade
routes from Tibet to the plains of India.
Tibet's western frontier, with Utta Pradesh, the Punjab and Kashmir is
probably less attractive and less vulnerable to Communist exploitation than
the southern frontier with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. The population in gen
oral is concentrated along the long Brahmaputra valley in southern Tibet.
On both sides of the northwest border the difficult topography, the vastness
of the land and the sparseness of the population render travel so arduous that
intercourse and trade with the adjacent Indian states is insignificant. In
consequence, the repercussions of Communist rule over Tibet will probably be
small.
No Chinese government appears ever to have claimed authority over, or
to have had direct relations with, Kashmir. Tibet, however, has had a
limited border trade which offers a possible channel for infiltration. In
addition there are certain problems of definition of Tibet's northwest
boundary which remain unsettled and are susceptible to Communist manipula-
tion.
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IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER FACES GROWING DIFFICULTIES
Prime Minister Mossadeq, upon his return to Iran, faces heavy
criticism and increasing pressure for his removal. Iran's serious
financial position, resulting from the loss of oil revenues, is ag-
gravated by the necessity of continuing to support the oil workers,
the largest segment of Iranian labor, and the economic restrictions
imposed by Great Britain.
The government's budget deficit is four times what it was before
oil nationalization and, since approximately 80 percent of the budget is
used for salaries, there is little prospect of significant reduction
because it would be politically dangerous. The country's free foreign
exchange balances are decreasing at the rate of four to five million
dollars a month, Wile Iran's predominantly agricultural economy is in
a less critical position, deterioration is also visible there with
tight money, slow business, mounting unemployment, and unpaid govern-
ment obligations.
Government efforts to stem this decline have been unsuccessful.
Increased taxes have brought little revenue and, in fact, contributed
to the business decline, A national loan, now being floated internally,
is not expected to relieve the situation. Although Mossadeq has urged
the United States to implement the Export-Import Bank loan and has asked
for allotment of the money earmarked for Iran under the Military Security
Program, these sums are not intended for current operating expenses but
for long range projects.
At the present rate of expenditure, and without outside aid, Iran
could continue to meet essential expenses for three to four months.
Abandonment of the Seven Year Development Plan might enable the govern-
ment to continue for some months longer. Other devices such as utiliza-
tion of the gold note cover reserve or the printing of more money might
also be employed. Such moves would depend on Mossadeq's ability to ob-
tain parliamentary support for the use of liquid assets on expenditures
and on the government's willingness to embark on a dangerous course of
inflation.
Mossadeq's long absence and the government's unwillingness to take
strong action against the Communists has stimulated the opposition. The
moderates in Parliament, including many of the wealthy and traditional
leaders, spurred by their fear of defeat in the coming elections, have
seized upon the rise in Tudeh-inspired disorders to intensify their
criticism of the government. Veteran politician and ex-Prime Minister
Ahmad Qavam, currently the moderate choice to replace Mossadeq, appears
to have strengthened his position considerably, but has little chance
of being called to power. The more opportunistic and ambitious men,
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leftist and rightist, who operate under the banners of the National
Front are maneuvering for position and preparing for the eventuality
of Mossadeqls fall. At this time the several elements of the opposi-
tion lack organization and leadership.
The Communists have been given increased opportunities by Mossadeq's
refusal to adopt a tough attitude toward them. They have not only loudly
opposed any compromise on the oil issue, but have attacked Mossadeq and
the government for temporizing. The recent rash of disorders may be a
probing test of strength.
Although one unit in the Abadan refinery is now operating, the
Iranians themselves recognize that they will not be able significantly
to expand operations without foreign technicians. Despite various nego-
tiations, Iran has not delivered oil to any foreign purchaser.. Foreign
aid can only be a temporary alleviation 3 without substantial oil revenues
the present Iranian economy and government faces an impossible situation.
In the current crisis, Mossadeq has little choice but to keep
nationalist sentiment focused on the oil issue and to remain unyielding
and intransigent. By so doing, he will increase the already strong chance
of a National Front victory in the mid-December elections. Barring active
intervention by the Shah, which at present seems unlikely in view of his
refusal to take a firm hand in the present situation, Mossadeq will con-
tinue in office and Iran will face further deterioration.
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OUTLOOK FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCES UNCERTAIN
There has been a surprisingly large area of agreement attained in
recent months by the Paris Conference on the European Defense Forces.
A number of basic problems remain unsolved, nevertheless, and new
difficulties are appearing.
Political and economic questions involving Germany's relationship
to the West must be faced before the *European Defense Community cah
begin to function. The Benelux countries seem to be uniting in
opposition to the all-embracing scope of the plan as France, and to a
lessor extent Germany and Italy, conceive it. Meanwhile, West Germany's
contribution is blocked by lack of agreement on basic principles governing
its relations to both EDF and NATO, and no decision on these points* is
likely at the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Council in Rome.
The European Army concept developed out of France's strong desire
to reconcile its fears over a German military contribution and its
realization that German participatiou was essential to Western defense.
The Paris Conference, which has been in more or less constant session
since February, has reached agreement on practically all the technical
military issues. The major military obstacle facing the conference
was overcome when France agreed to accept SHAPE's opinion on the size
of the maximum national unit. Each combat unit will have a peace-time
strength of 13,000 men combined with support elements of the same
nationality to form a divisional slice of 30,000.
The tonference also reached tentative agreement on an elaborate
supranational machinery to administer the proposed army. Four
political Institutions are proposed to weld together the members of the
European Defense Community: a European Authority embodied in a
commissioner ora commission analagous to a national defense ministry;
a Council of Ministers of the member governments to harmonize the
actions of the Authority with the policies of the participating nations;
an Assembly to provide representation for the peoples of the
participating countries; and a Court of Justice to pass on the legality
of the actions of the three other organs. Insofar ad practicable, the
organs of the coal-steel pool will be utilized.
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The Most troublesome issues, however, are yet to be solved. They
are largely political And 'financial, and it is in these fields that
national prerogative's may nullify the European Defense Community
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Strong opposition to the rigid framework evolving in Paris comes
from the Benelux countries, which have traditionally fought .domination
by their powerful neighbors. They fear that the EDF is being expanded
into political and economic areas far beyond the military plan first
proposed, and grave doubts are now apparent on the eventual adherence
of the three Benelux countries to the EDC. The Low Countries want an
organization that can be controlled by the Ministers of the
participating states, rather than a European Defense Ministry. The
Belgians want the commissioner to work through the national governments,
and are also in opposition to the proposed supranational assembly.
Even if the idea of a European Authority is acceptable, its
composition will involve considerable discussion. The French have a
strong preference for a single commissioner, but the Germans, supported
by the Italians and the Dutch, prefer a cabinet-like group.
On the question of a common budget the Dutch and the Belgians are
again arrayed against the French. The Belgians prefer a "defense fund"
composed of contributions volunteered by member states to cover certain
common expenditures. The Dutch insist that their constitution rules
out acceptance of the proposed common budget. Since the Italiana
believe that the national parliaments will not vote funds for an over-
all international military organization, they are willing to accept a
compromise plan. Further exploration of this point and of the cilestion
of a German contribution may determine whether the EDF is praeticable
or not.
From thle French point of view the EDO must control Germanys
military potential, and at this stage of the negotiations the relation-
ship of Germany to NATO is the pivotal factor in the French attitude.
While France is aware that NATO must eventually include Germany, the
attitude of the National Assembly has not yet evolved to the point
where the EDO would be accepted with that provision.
Despite the favorable impression created by the cooperative
attitude of the German delegation, participation of West Germany in
the EDF is not assured, While Chancellor Adenauer appears amenable
to German adherence to the EDF on the assurance of subsequent NATO
membership, it is not certain that the Bundestag would back him on
this issue. The German position in the EDO depends also on NATO
decisions giving the Federal Republic security guarantees.
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Another stumbling-block which had seemingly been surmounted may
yet appear from the purely military viewpoint. The French had
proposed that the EDF replace entirely the national military establish-
ments of the member states, excluding forces needed to maintain overseas
commitments, internal security police and some naval forces. Here again
Benelux opposition is strengthening. The Belgians consider the EDF as
a special force to be added to,but not to replace,the national armies.
While the German attitude on this point is not yet determined, France
can be expected to reject this concept as establishing a basis for a
German national army.
At the time of the September
was hoped that all details of the
24 November NATO meeting in Rome0
merely receive a progress report,
next January0
tripartite meetings in Washington it
EDF could be worked out before the
As it is, the Rome meeting will
with final action postponed until
The French still hope to push a draft treaty through by the end of
1951, with ratification by the summer of 1952. Planning for German
contingents will be possible in the interim, although the French are
still adamant that German ratification must precede recruitment. This
timetable makes no provision for new objections or for consideration of
such questions as the position of a united Germany in the EDC. Further-
more, the outlook for French Assembly ratification of the Treaty is
highly uncertain.
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THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE SOVIET MIG-15 FIGHTER
All the principal fighter aircraft factories in the Soviet Union have
been converted to mass production of the MIG-15 fighter. The decision to
standardize on this model, which was first shown to the public in 1948,
was probably taken sometime in 1949; and the conversion process began
shortly thereafter.
After World War II, the Soviet Union, like the United States and
Great Britain, inaugurated a program of intensive experimentation with
jet aircraft. In Soviet air shows held between 1946 and 1951; 24 distinct
jet models were displayed, of which 18 were fighter types, 5 bomber types,
and one research aircraft. One result of this development program was
the selection of a basic fighter type for large-scale production. '
Normally, a nation does not standardize on the production of a par-
ticular aircraft until it either is at war or fears that war is imminent*
Reluctance to do so in peacetime derives from the danger that premature
standardization will give a potential enemy the opportunity to develop a
model which renders the standardized aircraft obsolete. In taking the
calculated risk of a premature standardization, the Soviet leaders must
have considered the time period, estimated to be no more than five years,
within which the MIG-15, with improvements, will remain an effective weapon
against Western airpower. In Korean operations, however, the MIG-15 has
proved effective in intercepting Western bombers and at least equal in per-
formance. to Western fighters.
While standardization on a fighter aircraft is not in itself positive
evidence of Aggressive intent, it would at least appear to signify a cal-
culation of involvement in hostilities, either offensively or defensively.
Standardization at this time probably indicates that the USSR, cognizant
of American emphasis on strategic bombing, is planning to depend primarily
on large numbers both to counter Western superiority in strategic air
weapons and to cancel out a y immediate improvements in Western fighter
types. It is also possible that the Soviet leaders considered a strengthen-
ing of military power necessary if they were to risk an increase in inter-
national tension by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy involving ad-
ventures like the war in Korea which was planned at least as early as
1949.
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THE PHILIPPINE ELELITIONS
The Philippine elections of 13 November resulted in a genuine repudi-
ation of the Quirino regime. The opposition Nacionalista Party won all
nine of the contested Senate seats and approximately half the governor-
ships and other arovineial rasts. In the naw alars+a it will bald 11 out
of 21. sante. The fact that a strongly entrenched political machine psr-
mitted such a victory is in marked contrast to previous Philippine elActions.
The precedent set thereby is at least equal in importance to the shift
in party fortunes.
The unique honesty of these elections resulted from a widespread pub-
lic demand which had the expressed support of American officials, and which
was engendered by. revulsion at the scandals which accompanied the elections
of two year: ago, This demand became effective with Defense Secretary Mag-
saysayas decision that the armed forces should be used to ensure orderly
polling, rather than to guarantee the results. Public support for Magsaysay
was such that Liberal Party leaders could not overrule him without inviting
political di$aster, In a free election, the Nacionalistasf astuteness in
selecting an exceptionally strong list of candidates was rewarded.
Important sidelights of the campaign were the failure of the Huksf ef-
forts to boycott and disrupt the elections and the emergence of Secretary
Magsaysay as potentially the most powerful man in the nation.
Thsre is no clear evidence that the elections will result in any marked
shift in Philippine policies. Virtually all leaders of both parties are
closely connected with the dominant landlord class, which is aware that there
is no satisfactory alternative to the Philippines' present international ori-
entation. The Liberal Party retains nominal control of the Senate, but de
facto control will probably pass to a coalition of Nacionalistas and anti
-
Quirinal Liberals. The Naoionalistasf party machine will be strengthened by
the acgaisition of provincial posts, greatly enhancing their prospects fcar
winning the presidency in 1953, The wartime puppet president, Jose Laurel,
who headed the Nacionalista senatorial list and mho has marked anti-American
proclivities, will exercise considerable influence. However, his views on
the United States, although they may find expression in a more critical ex-
amination of the US-Philippine relationship, are not widely shared.
Should they so choose, the Nacionalistas will be able to block ratifi-
cation of the Japanese Peace Treaty in the new Senate. Although they re-
fused to permit a representative of their party to join the Philippine del-
egation to the San Francisco Conference and criticized Philippine acceptance
of the treaty, it may be significant that speeches condemning Philippine sub-
servience to the United States, as exemplified by the treaty, were kept to
a minimum toward the close of the campaign.
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WORLD COMMUNISM g THE COMMUNIST SITUATION IN SOUTH AMERICA
South American Communists, while not a strong or immediate threat to
US security, nevertheless possess a considerable potential for interference
with economic activities* During the past year, they strengthened their
ties with European Communistesintensified their efforts in behalf of Soviet
propaganda objectives, and helped to stimulate isolationist, nationalist,
and anti-US sentiment. Although they have received little or no coopera-
tion from the various governments, neither have they been subjected to
widespread or complete suppression.
In Chiles and to some extent in other countries, their political
strength is sufficient to insure their continued overt activity and to make
their political position a factor affecting administration policy. They
have albstantial influence within certain labor unions in Chile, Uruguay,
and Ecuador, and to a lesser extent in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru; and
they have some support among agricultural labor and Slav ethnic groups in
the rural areas of Brazil and in the Rio de la Plata region. Throughout
South America, Communist elements provide a constant stimulus to labor
unrest and a potential threat to strategic industries -- particularly those
operated by US interests*
Argentinaa The nucleus of Communist Party memberships estimated at
35,060, is providedby certain labor elements, intellectuals, students,
and various foreign groups, primarily Slay. The partygs strength is con-
centrated in the major industrial and port areas. Its greatest potential
is for extension of influence within the government-domtnated General
Confederation of Labor (CGT)? which controls all but a few unimportant
unions, and for infiltration of unions in strategic industries. None of
these unions is known to be Communist-dominated, but in a few instances
Communists, disguised as Peronistas, may hold secondary influential po-
aitions.
The Communists can easily identify themselves with Perones "third
position" propaganda which concentrates on "US imperialism" and non-in-
volNement in the East-West struggle, His program of "social justice"
includes many of the measures proposed in the Communist platform. As
early as 1946-47, Communist labor leaders helped the Peronistas merge both
Communist and independent unions into the CGT on the theory that labor
unification was a step forward for Communism and that the party could main-
tain influence with labor only if it operated within the CGT, Since the
OCT is the mainstay of the Peronista Party and of Perongs support, this
influence is also an extension of Communist political influence.
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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AMERICA
UADOR
ED MODERATE
M SLIGHT
MB NEGLIGIBLE
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Boliviaa The membership, estimated at 190007 of the small Bolivian
CommliErirWitys organized in March 19509 is composed largely of students,
youth leaderss teachers, and some minor labor leaders* The independent
capabilities of the party and associated front groups are limited, but it
tends to cooperate with other groups in any anti-government activities?
Brazils The Communist Party in Brazils outlawed since 19479 retains
a mem&nap estimated at 559000 to 75s000 k'ommunist influence is greatest
among maritimes p rts and dockworkers, utilities workers, and employees
of some railroads. In the past year, the Communists have been unable to
initiate strikes or to prolong those called by others. Their attempts to
iniiitrate the armed forces have met with little success. There has,
however, been some infiltration of the munitions industryn
There has also been a growing number of reports of the build-ups
especially in the interiors of a Communist "Army of Liberation."' Such a
force, if well trained and armed, could tie dawn Brazilian army units
which might otherwise be used for defense or for service under the United
Nations. In some are Communists have infiltrated legal political parties
and have bon elected to state and local offices. The Vargas administra-
tions which has recently been taking stronger measures against the Commu-
nists, is are of such infiltration and takes protective measures as
emergencies arise.
In event of an East-West war, Brazilian Communists will seek to sa-
botage the railroadss the docks, and the utilities of major cities* Their
strength near the important air bases of the northeast would facilitate
attempts to sabotage strategic air installations* In generals however,
Brazilian security forces are capable of containlng such activity and pre-
venting protracted delays in the shipment of strategic materials,
Chiles The Communist Party of Chiles outlawed since 1948s it an
actives relatively overt organization generally subjected to a minimum of
interference from the anti-Communist government. Communists have been able
this year to intensify national controversies particularly through public
demonstrations on issues where Communist interests have paralleled those
of non-Consuaists. Anti-US propaganda apparently has not been very
effeetive. The peace campaigns not an overwhelming success in terms of
signatures, has to some extent nurtured I'third position" thinking in
Chile. Communist influence has been evident in much of the serious labor
unrest of the past year, especially within the strategic copper industry,
and also in the coals nitrates and public utilities industries.
The current pre-election period favors an increase in Communist
activities since the Communist vote is recognized as important by many of
Chile os numerous and somewhat unstable political parties*
Colombia The Colombian Communist Party has no influence whatsoever
with 1.56-MI;Mbian Government. It ha e direct connections with European
Communists although assistance from abroad is apparently limited to
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ocasional instructions and the transmittal of funds to permit Colombian
attendance at international meetings. The Soviet Embassy in Venezuela
has reportedly interested itself in the present guerrilla opposition to
the Colombian administration, a movement in which individual Communists
are now involved although the Communist Party as such is not.
The sabotage potential of the Colombian Communists, who number
about 29000, is relatively slight. They are currently incapable of effec-
tively disrupting the internal economy,
Ecuadors The Ecuadoran Communist Party has a certain influence on
the governMb'nt because perpetual instability makes each vocal element im-
portant in Ecuadoran politico, The Communists, numbering about 3,0000
currently favor the continuance of the democratic regime of Gab o Plaza,
since they realize that a government set up by either of the two poten-
tial revolutionary leaders would severely repress all Communist activity.
The Communists have conelderable influence with labor through their
dominance of the most important labor confederation.
The party has relatively strong international connections. It re-
ceives a.emall amount of outeid direction and financial assistance, How-
ever, it is not in a position to create difficulties for the United States
since Ecuador does not produce strategic commodities of great importance
to the US.
Paraguaz Communist strength in Paraguay-appears to be negligible
despirriridleations of SOW penetration in the government, armed forces
and the country's labor confederation.
Perus Peruvian Communists have a certain influence with the governments
not 0T because of the administration's great hatred and fear of the
outlawed Aprista Party, but also because the Communists agree with the re-
actionary Peruvian oligarchy in favoring nationalization of the petroleum
industry and opposing the dispatch of troops to Korea. In addition the
administration prefers Communist to Aprista control of organized labor.
Through their control of the most important ening federation and
their influence among transportation workers, the Peruvian Communists
numbering about 15,000, are in a position to hinder US procurement of
antimony, bi osth, cooper, vanadium, and zinc.
UrIvNxt The Communist Party aiE Uruguayi despite its legal status
and freedom of action, is declining in importance and exerts little poli-
tical influenne, However, the Communist-dominated labor federation is
still the major labor organization in Uruguayi though it has suffered
large-ocale defections chiefly due to Communist insistence upon inter-
jecting political issues into union activities. Communists still
retain control of the important wool workers g union, and efforts are
being made to organize farm workers.
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The Slavic Union has been bery successful in its efforts to preserve
the sense of ethnic unity of the local Slav colony and to support Commu-
nist policies. Reputedly, leaders of the Slavic Union receive their
operating instructions directly from the Soviet legation in Montevideo.
There are indications that Uruguay may be a distribution center for Soviet
propaganda to neighboring countries.
Venezuela t Although Venezuela is the center of Soviet and Czecho-
sJovaTranaties in northern South America/ the two local Communist
parties -- the larger of which is outlawed --have virtually no political
influence and have had only minor success in propaganda activities. Their
lack of popular support is attributable to a variety of factors: govern-
ment repression, stiff competition from other left--wing parties, and their
failure to bid for the support of social or economic groups other than the
intellectuals and the labor "elite" -- the petroleum, industrial and utility
workers.
Although only a minority force even among the petroleum workers, the
Communists keep up a steady stream of "anti-imperialist" propaganda in the
oilfields, and reiterate their intention of preventing the delivery of "one
drop of oil" to the United States in the event of an East-'est war. While
it is unlikely tat they can even approach this objeotive, they are capable
of sufficient interference and sabotage to cause a considerable loss of
oil and equipment.
Euro ean * ssessionsa Of the European possessions, only British
Guiana s an organize* ommunist-oriented group. The People's Progressive
Party has gained Strength steadily since its formation in early 1950, and
has become the only party ever established in the colony to command any
significant following. Party-influenced labor groups have also Made
im-
portant gains during the past year, and now control large groups among the
bauxite and sugar workers. Since the colony is without self7government?
the party cannot yet influence government policy, but it does have the
capacity to interfere with production through strike activity and sabotage
both in the bauxite industry and on the sugar estates.
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