CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01060A000100210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1951
• Content Type: CIAPER

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TUE) SEUKE"I'
VOL. I No. 14
14 November 1951
? Copy No.
73
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . 600000000
COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN KOREA . 000000000 6 0 0 0 0 . Page 4
There are no firm indications of ultimate Communist inten-
tions regarding conclusion of a Korean cease-fire. In contrast
with their assertions of a year ago which claimed that UN forces
would be driven from the peninsula, the Communist conduct of
negotiations and their propaganda in the past few days have struck
a balance between conciliation and belligerency, suggesting 'an
expectation of some form of cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile,
there has been a continuing improvement in the enemy's military
position, particularly in the development of his air potential.
BURMESE GOVERNMENT WEAKENING UNDER COMMUNIST PRESSURE . . . Page 7
Recent events in urma reveal that the stability of the
Burmese Government continues to deteriorate a a result of milia
tary weakness and increa ing political subversion. Thi e progressive
disintegration of the Rangoon regime's position is leading to
Communist control of Burma. The Government's hypersensitivity to
leftist criticism forestalls any effort to dbtain aid and advice
from the Western democracies.
WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO CHURCaILL'S VICTORY . 000 0 0 0 , Page 9
0000 0 0 . Page 2
The importance of the Conservative Party victory in the
British elections and of.Churchill'a return to power lies for
western Europe in the impetus given to the rightist trend on the
Continent. On balance, the effects of ChurchiWs vittolty will
probably be more psychological than tangible. The initialenthusi-
astic reaction in Western Europe will undoubtedly be dulled as the
?
Conservatives ? polidies are' handicapped by their narrow maj rity and
tempered. by their growing economic and fina cial problems.
SPECIAL ARTICLE. WORLD COMMUNISMg THE SOVIET HOLD ON COMMUNIST
CHINA. 0 0................... 0 0 0 0 Page 11
The Soviet hold on Communist China may already be, or may soon
become, o strong as to preclude a successfUloaaaertion of indePend-
ence by the Peiping regime. The USSR has 'been steadily developing a'
system of controls in Communist China to reduce Peiping's capabili-
ties for independent action. Even if Peiping chooses to reject the
Soviet demand for subordination of national interests to Moscow's
global ? objectives, it is gtestionable whether the Chine e could re-
tain control of their entire territory, expel Soviet personnel and
eradicate Soviet influence.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
In the course of functions commemorating the 34th Anniversary of
the October Revolution, Moscow,s spokesmen placed unusually strong em-
phasis on Soviet strength and warned the West against an attack on the
USSR. Although claims of Communist strength are customary in comment
on this anniversary, the tone of this year's output was more militant
and the emphasis on capitalist encirclement was more pronounced.
Politburo member L. P. Beriya, in his keynote address at the Bol-
shoi Theater, cautioned Western leaders not to construe the USSRgs de-
sire for peace as a sign of weakness and repeatedly recalled the Nazi
invaders' defeat by the Soviet Union at a time when it was much less
prepared than et present. Another world war, he said, would result in
the destruction of capitalism. Marshal Malinovsky echoed Beriyags re-
marks the next day at the parade in Red Square when he declared that
Soviet forces were prepared to meet any attack fully armed."
The sole hint in Beriya,s speech that the Soviet Government might
be prepared for negotiations with the West came in an assertion that a
"basis for agreement" with the West continues to exist. Beriya cited
the mutual benefits to be obtained from unrestricted East-West trade,
non-aggression pacts and a disarmament treaty.
Probably because of the Kremlin's increasing concern over Western
rearmament the USSR, through various channels, has revealed an ostensible
interest in great power negotiations. However, feelers from certain
quarters in the West have so far elicited no favorable response from
Moscow.
French President Auriolle suggestion for a big four conference is the
only one of such feelers to receive any attention in the Soviet press
and this in the form of criticism that it was not "specific" enough. The
Kremlin's propaganda organs charged that Auriol had by-passed such vital
questions as the North Atlantic Treaty, American bases encircling the
Soviet Union, US rearmament and the remilitarization of Germany and
Japan. Implicit in these Soviet press comments was a lack of interest
in big-power talks that do not provide for outright negotiations on the
rearmament issue and all related questions.
In contrast to all other Eastern European Satellites tho Rumanian
Government has announced that its over-all industrial production goals
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for the third quarter of 1951 have been fulfilled. According to the
Rumanian announcement all major production'categdvies2 except build-
ing construction and food and timber products, exceeded their goals.
Coal and petroleum goals were fulfilled by 102.9 percent, electric power
by 105.1 percent and transport by 118.7 percent. The announced Rumanian
industrial successes are in line with Voroshilov's Liberation Day speech
in August which lauded Rumanian advancements under the guidance of the
Soviet Union.
According to a Bulgarian press announcement, Politburo member Titko
Chernokolev, who was dismissed from his post as Minister of Agriculture
in June, has been expelled from the party. It was also made known that
Chernokolev, as well as three deputies of the Bulgarian National Assemb1y2
had been removed from their parliamentary posts. Since these officials
have lost their legislative immunity by this actions it is possible that
they may soon be involved in a political trial in Sofia. Bulgaria thus
becomes the third European Satellite where current evidence suggests
that important trials may soon be held -- Poland and Czechoslovakia
being the other two.
The Czechoslovak Government has enacted a Defense Training bill
which will require that premilitary and civil defense training be in-
troduced into mass organizations. A Union for Cooperation with the Army2
corresponding in name and functions to the USS1Ps DOSAAF, has been es-
tablished to implement the mass defense training program through
affiliated organizationsp such as the Red Cross, the Peoples Mi1itia2
amateur flying groups, and SOKOL (the national sports organization).
The army is to furnish the Union and its affiliates with instructors2
training cadres, and materials.
There is evidence that the Rumanian port of Constanta is being de-
veloped as an alternate to the Polish port of Gdynia for Satellite ship-
ments to China. Exports from Eastern Europe to China, which have in-
creased sharply in the past year, have apparently overtaxed Polish
shipping and port facilities.
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COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN KOREA
Current intelligence offers no firm indications of ultimate
Communist intentions regarding a cease-fire in Korea. Although the
enemy's conduct of cease-fire negotiations and his propaganda have
recently suggested an expectation that an agreement on the cessation
of hostilities will eventually be reached, his pronouncements continue
to strike a balance between conciliatory and belligerent themes. Mean-
while, a continuing improvement of the enemy's military position in
Korea and contiguous areas has been observed.
From the date of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea until
the Spring of 1951 the stated objective of Communist forces was the
forcible expulsion of UN troops from all of Korea. This position had
ceased to be made explicit some weeks prior to Maliks cease-fire pro-
posal of late June 1951, and has not been stated categorically since,
although it presumably remains the Communist long-range objective.
The most nearly reliable gauge of Communist intentions in Korea has
been the prevailing tenor of their propaganda which has attempted alter-
nately to prepare for either successful negotiations and a cessation of
military operations or failure of negotiations and a prolonged conflict*
For most of the past month, enemy propaganda has emphasized the first
possibility, attempting to prove that Communist forces haye attained
their objectives in Korea, that the US has suffered an unprecedented
defeat, that the battle-lines are in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel,
and that there are no insuperable obstacles to successful negotiations*
At the same time, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai have asserted that
Feipingts offer to settle the Korean question by peaceful means "still
holds. good," but have cautioned that support for the "long-term struggle"
is still the "central tasks" Thus, even if the complex problem of a
cease-fire is resolved, subsequent negotiations may see the reaffirma-
tion of the enemy's original objectives.
Ranking Chinese Communist leaders have recently stated that Chinese
"volunteers" mould not have been dispatched to Korea if the US had not
"occupied" Formosa, "invaded" Korea, and pushed toward Manchuria, and
that Peiping's objective in Korea remains that of defending the terri-
torial integrity of China* More ominously, Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyshinsky at the Paris UN meeting has again put forth unacceptable pro-
posals regarding the 38th Parallel and withdrawal of foreign troops as
,part of a Korean peace plan* These statements clearly permit renewal
?of the earlier explicit demand for abandonment by the US of its policy
Of "neutralization" of Formosa and for withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Korea.
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Ambguous political indications of a desire for an armistice have
not been reflected in Communist military activity, with their air and
ground forces continuing to improve their capabilities.
The major--and possibly the most decisive--improvament in the
Communist strength has been in their air potential. Enemy air activity
over North Korea expanded during 1951 and has now reached a point where
effective UN superiority over northwestern Korea has been denied. There
has also been a decided improvement in pilot ability. Chinese pilots
have been noticed supplementing Soviet personnel who previously carried
the main burden of enemy air combat, An effective air defense system
now exists in northwestern Korea including daylight jet interceptors,
night interceptors, probably utilizing radar, radar directed antiaircraft
artillery, and an integrated early warning ground-controlled intercept
radar net, Communist air strength in Manchuria is at an all-time high
with about 500 MIG-15 jet aircraft, and enemy jets have recently begun
operations from a Korean border airfield. Active preparations to base
aircraft at other operational Korean airfields continue.
Communist troop strength has been maintained at about the maximum
which can be logistically supported, and new units have :appeared since
the cease-fire talks began. The enemy has attempted to overcome his
decided inferiority in weapons and firepower by introducing heavier
equipment. At the time of the Chinese intervention, he had no effective
armored force, but three armored divisidn4--partia1ly equipped with tanks
heavier than the familiar T-34--are now accepted in Korea. Firepower
has also been increased by the addition of a Chinese Communist anti-tank
division, and by a considerable increase in organic North Korean divie.
sional artillery. Four, or possible five, Chinese Communist artillery
divisions, possessing some conventional rocket Weapons, are presently in
support of front line troops. Antiaircraft strength, estimated to exceed
six Soviet-style antiaircraft divisions, is disposed at strategic points
throughout CoMMunist held territory.
All evidence points to a continuing adequate supply situation to
support current military operations. Morale among the enemy forces
varies from good to excellent, with certain exceptions among units that
have been heavily engaged during the past month.
Nhile the problem of logistical support probably prevents the intro-
duction of additional Chinese Communist elements, individual replacements
continue to maintain existing units at or near strength. Major units
that have lost their combat effectiveness have been replaced by fresh
units from China and Manchuria, Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria
has been maintained at a fairly constant level and presumably is available
for commitment in Korea in the event of need,
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Although the Soviet Union has avoided publicly associating itself
with the Communist cause in the Korean war?other than by giving limited
diplomatic and propaganda support?Soviet covert participation has in-
creased considerably during the summer and fall of 19510 It has included
the continuous supplying of war material and of large numbers of Soviet
military personnel, tentatively estimated by FECOM at 200000, serving in
both technical and combat capacities in rear areas. The effect has been
to bolster Communist technical capabilities.
There continues to be no evidence, however, that the Soviet Union
plans to employ its considerable Far Eastern military forces openly in
Korea. In the event of such intervention, the Russians could commit up
to 15 infantry divisions and sufficient air power to ensure Communist
air supremacy. The USSR is increasing its offensive capability in the
Far East by the conversion of conventional fighter air regiments to high
performance jet fighters.
All current indications point to a continued strong enemy defense
in depth. The Communists are believed to be preparing a series of defen-
sive positions extending as far north as the Wonsan-Pyongyang line. In
western Korea, theTretain a considerable offensive potential, supported
by armor and artillerY; hoWver, recent UN interdiction of supply lines
has restated in some deterioration of this potential. There are no indi-
cations, however, that offensive action, other than limited defensive
counter and spoiling attacks, will be launched in the near future.
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BURMESE reliERITMEZIT rvIHArciaTTTIG UNDER C OT2UNTST PR7SSURE
7.ecent event' in Perna reveal that the stability of th6 Purme,e Govern-
ment continues to deteriorate as a result of military weaknese and inereav-
ing political subversion. This progressive disintegration or the Rangoon
regimes position is leading to Communist control of Burma.
The Burma Communist Party has progressed substantially toward its im-
mediate objectives. Communiet military forces have successfully eluded the
Burmese Army- in moving toward the Chinese frontiers, and have been able to
accelerate their operations. In addition, Communist efforts to reach an
understanding with other insurgents are apparently beginning to bear fruitj
moat significant in this respect is a reported agreement with the Karene in
3outhern Parma to cooperate in military campaigns.
The Government seems helpless to prevent the Communists from eoneolidat-
.
eing control over large areas of northern Burma., from which a southward drive
may be launched with materiel support from. the Chinese Communiete0
An equally eerious danger to the Government is the increasing strength
and altivity of overt leftewing political elements. The Burma Werk ere and
Peasants Party? which aetaally repreeente the Communist, Party eeevageoands,
is constantly and effectively attacking the Gevernments domestie and foreign
policies. Not only is this group eteadily gaining adherente, but it has late-
ly formed a ntriple alliance with two other influential leftist political
parties. Because of it superior erganieation, popular program and support
from the Chinese and Soviet Embaosiee, this party wills, in all likelihoods,
dominate the coalition and seek to tranaferm it into aa overt counterpart of
the underground ?Pecplee.Demoeratic Front.," into which the Burma Communist
Party is attempting to attract the several insurgent factions
&noeer pnlitical threat lies in the activities of U Ba Sue, Secretary
Oeneral of the Parma Socialist Party ani ]eader of that partygs large proe
Communist element. He is said to be dissatiLfied with the moderate Socialist
leadership in the Government and is maneuvering for the Premiership. In order
to aehieve his ambition it is entirely possible that he will effeet a rapproche-
ment between his left--ng Socialist followers ald the reams., ':ionkere and Deaeante
Party.
Should Pa Swe become Premiers, the Burmese Governmentve drift, to the right
would be abruptly reversed, British and American influence would-be reduted to
a minimum, closer relations with Communist China muld be developed -- as has
been repeatedly recommended by the Purmeee Ambassador to Peiping -- and the
prospects of early Communist domination of Burma would be greatly improved.
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Burmese leaders, despite the clearly apparent deterioration of their
regime, continue to maintain a complacent attitude toward the Communist
threat and to concentrate their energies on personal rivalries or the
attainment of wealth and prestige, Burmese into:I erance and racial prej?
udices prevent a settlement with the Karen s and cooperation with other
ethnic groups against the Communists, Finally, the Government 78 hyper?
sensitivity to leftist criticism forestalls any effort to obtain aid and
advice from the Western democracies?
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WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO CHURCHILL'S VICTORY
The Conservative victory in the United Kingdom is generally accepted
on the Continent as another step in the general Western European trend to
the right. Most non-Communists, with the exception of the Socialists,
hailed Churchill's return. Although no great change in British policy is
envisaged, the general expectation is that closer ties with the other
Western European countries and a firmer stand on foreign policy matters
will result.
While most Continental commentators agree that Churchill's domestic
policy will follow that of the Atlee Government fairly closely, Socialist
spokesmen have expressed considerable dismay over the effects of the
Labor Party's defeat on the international Socialist movement. Even if
the Labor program is not radically altered, Socialism's prestige is
considered to be endangered by this setback to its outstanding experiment.
The relatively close vote has led some commentators to question
the real force of the Conservative victory, and 3ocialist regret has
been somewhat tempered by the thought that BritiSh Labor's policy has
not been defeated. This attitude may help to prevent the adoption by
the Socialists of more extreme measures which might widen the breach
between them and their more moderate partners in the Continental govern-
ments. There is no immediate prospect of an increased strain on
governmental stability in any Western European country because of this
factor.
Continental observers are again enthusiastic over the possibility
of British support of, or even participation in, such plans as the
coal-steel pool and the European Defense Forces. Nevertheless, despite
Churchill's record in favor of closer European cooperation, there is
scepticism over the extent to which the Prime Minister will attempt to
follow the views he expressed as leader of the opposition.
Most Europeans will be satisfied to see Great Britain more closely
aligned with the Continent, even if political and economic ties are not
formalieedin a more rigid framework. On the other hand, the most
commonly expressed fear in regard to British foreign policy is that
closer Anglo-American solidarity will develop. Such a trend is viewed
as a danger to British ties with the Continent and hence to the
European unity goal.
The most optimistic European supporters of Churchill look to him
for immediate efforts to ease East-West tension. Some expect feurpower
talks, or even an American-British,Soviet conference, although it has
also been pointed out that past meetings involving Churchill and Stalin
gained little for the West in comparison with what was given..
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Nevertheless, any British attempt which might lessen the defense burden
will be regarded hopefully on the Continent.
Particular national problems are reflected in the varying facets
of European opinion on Churchill's return to power. The probability
that the Conservatives will follow a stiffer policy toward the Moslem
states appeals to the French, who have recently sought closer
collaboration with Great Britain on Near East and African matters.
Churchill's pro-French sympathies have also colored French estimates of
his potentialities for advancing their Coreign policy objectives.
Much speculation in West Germany revolves around the possibility of
a change in British policy, particularly towards Germany. Underlying
this speculation is the old German fear that an East-West rapprochement
might be accomplished at the expense of German unity and independence.
The Austrian Foreign Office is optimistic over the possibility of
renewed four-power negotiations which it associates with Churchill's
policies. The Austrian Foreign Minister believes that the Austrian
question can be resolved only through such a meeting.
Portugal finds specific grounds for welcoming a Conservative victory
in the expectation that a stiffer British colonial policy will weaken
the rising tide of nationalism in Africa. The Portuguese also look to
a softer British attitude toward Spain. This hope is also found in the
controlled Spanish press. The Spanish Government presumably looks for
a less hostile attitude among its European neighbors if Great Britain
develops a policy favorable to Spain.
Only in Scandinavia has non-Communist comment been apprehensive of
the international effects of Churchill's return. Both Sweden and
Norway foresee a possible loosening of the close relations they had
maintained with the British Labor Government, The Norwegians particularly
fear increased British activity in Asia and the Near East. In Denmark,
on the other hand, greater governmental stability can be expected since
the Social Democrats will now be disinclined to challenge the ineumbent
conservative Moderate-Liberal government.
On balance, the effects of Churchill's victory will probably be
more psychological than tangible. The initial enthusiastic reaction in
Western Europe will undoubtedly be dulled as the Conservatives' policies
are handicapped by their narrow majority and tempered by their growing
economic and financial problems.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
WORLD C0MMUNISM2 THE SOVIET HOLD ON COMMUNIST CHINA
The Soviet hold on Communist China may already be, or may soon become,
so strong as to preclude a successful assertion of independence by the
Peiping regime if the desire to do so should ever arise? The Chinese Com-
munist leadership may eventually reject, as did the Yugoslav, the Soviet
demand for subordination of national interests to the objective of world
domination by Moscow? If current trends continue, however, it is doubtful
that the Chinese could ever, like the Yugoslave, retain control of their
entire territory, expel Soviet personnel, and eradicate Soviet influence?
To date, far from showing any inclination to break or even to loosen
its ties with the USSR, the Peiping regime has consistently followed poli-
cies which have the effect of binding China ever more tightly to the Soviet
bloc? Even before the regime's founding in October 1949, the Chinese Com-
munist movement was deeply penetrated by the USSR, and in the past two
years Peiping has sought and obtained extensive Soviet assistance?political,
economic and military?in consolidating its position and developing its capa-
bilities? The USSR has thus been able to develop a system of controls in
Cbmmunist China which steadily reduces Peiping's capabilities for independent
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Although the CCP owes its attainment of national power primarily to its
own efforts and is bound by a strong sense of nationalism, it has been aggres-
sively pro-Soviet and consistently Stalinist in behavior. Because the die-
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tinction between a Soviet order and an adopted Soviet suggestion is not
readily apparent to the outer world, it is not known to what degree the USSR
may compel Peiping to adopt policies which the Party regards as disadvanta-
geous to its national interests. Thus it is not known whether Mao Tse-tung
and his lieutenants, like Tito and his, envisage or will discover a point
beyond which they cannot or will not go in sacrificing national interests to
the cause of "proletarian internationa1ism0"
Even if the CCP Politburo were to split en bloc from that of the USSR,
it is questionable whether the entire party would follow? The USSR may al-
ready have a sufficiently strong hold over the political, economic and
military apparatus of the border regions?Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and
Sinkiang--to secure control of those areas in the event of a Sino-Soviet
split without having to take direct military action?
Soviet economic interests are particularly strong in the border regions?
Manchuria and Sinkiang are traditional spheres of Russian influence, and the
,USSR on several occasions, as when it invaded Manchuria in 1929 to protect
Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, has asserted its position
in these regions by force? The USSR dominstes civil air and land transport
in these areas, has a controlling position in the exploitation of oil and
certain mineral resources, and commands physical access to the border re-
gions equal or superior to that from China proper? This dominance continues
dsspite signs of a strengthened Chinese administrative position in these
arease
In China proper, Soviet economic penetration does not generally extend
to the point of controls The railroads, the important textile industry,
and other segments of the economy are typically Chinese-operated and Chinese-
owned? Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet agreements concluded sincs 1950 in the
field of communications, transportation and trade reflect considerable
progress in aligning China with the Soviet economy? Traditionally unimport-
ant in China's foreign commerce, the Soviet bloc accounted for one fourth
of China's trade in 71950, and, according to Peiping, fully three fourth's in
1951? Peiping's frequent commentaries on the activities of Soviet advisers
also reveal the influence they have on many sectors of the Chinese economy?
The structure of Russian economic interests in China indicates that
China could not be withdrawn intact--that is, China proper plus the bor-
der areas-from the Soviet bloc. China proper might be withdrawn without
critical economic dislocations the principal disruption would be caused by
the necessity of once again reorienting China's foreign commerce, but the
experience of the past two years shows that the redirection of China's trade=
flow could be effected in short order if Peiping and the West were willing?
A Sino-Soviet split would threaten Peiping with loss of all effective
authority in the border regions? The loss of Manchuria's industries and
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resources in particular would be a crippling blow to Peiping's industrializa-
tion plans. This consideration alone would strongly discourage possible
Chinese separatist tendencies*
On the military side, the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950 formally
commits the Peiping regime to the Soviet bloc in the event of war, and per-
mits the USSR to retain control of the Port Arthur naval base area until the
end of 1952* Unpublished agreements are believed to provide for the assign-
ment of Soviet advisory-technical personnel to every part of the Chinese
military organization, for the supply of Soviet materiel, and possibly for
the joint development and operation of Chinese naval and air bases.
An estimated 10,000 Soviet military advisers, instructors and technicians
are attached to the Chinese Communist ground forces at every level from the
Revolutionary Military Council in Peiping to the regiment in the field. While
these Soviet officers do not have command of Chinese foroes, their power is.
reported to be as great as that of the Chinese commanders. The USSR is re-
ported to be training and equipping elite formations of the CCF in Manchuria
and to be operating specialist schools of various types. The supply of Soviet
materiel to Chinese armored and artillery forces, and possibly to the infantry
as well, has been substantial. Although the CCP could dispense with Soviet
aid without jeopardizing Peiping's control of China, the regime's capabilities
for either offensive or defensive operations, and for achieving_status as a
world powers, would be greatly reduced, r
The Soviet position is especially strong in the Chinese Communist Air
Force?with an available strength of 1220 combat planes--which is almost en-
tirely a Soviet creation g the USSR has provided planes, equipment, training
and combat pilots. Since maintenance and supply of the air force will con-
tinue to depend on the Soviet Union, a Sino-Soviet split would probably mean
deterioration, or possibly even defection of the air force to the USSR.
The Soviet Union is undertaking development of the small--I29000 men
ChineseCommunist Navy, and Soviet penetration, particularly in the more
technical fields, extends to the lowest levels of the Chinese naval training
organization. Realization of the Navy's missions of invading Formosa and
defending the coast clearly depends upon continued Soviet assistance.
Many of the Peiping regime2s military leaders have studied in the USSR,
thousands Of Chinese officers have been Soviet trained, all of the top com-
manders have indicated a Stalinist orientation, and indoctrination on Stalin-
ist lines is pervasive throughout the armed forces. Moreover, the political
apparatus in the military establishment is Stalinist in character and has pre-
sumably been penetrated by Soviet agents. In the event of a Sino-Soviet split
at the Politburo level, it is likely that the Chinese Communist armed forces
would also be split seriously enough to prevent the anti-Stalinist forces from
achieving control over all of China.
13
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP79501060A000100210001-1