OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01060A000100030001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1951
• Content Type: CIAPER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF =RENT INTELLIGENCE
WEE= REVIEW
CIA No. 49247
Copy No. 3i
5 July 1951
The WEEKLY REVIEW of selected intelligence articles
has been prepared for the internal use of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The opinions expressed in this publication
represent the yields of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SUNNARY OF CONTENTS
Satellites Tighten Security of their Western Borders Page 3
New border security measures are -being enforced along the Satellite
borders with Western Europe. These controls seem designed to eliminate
chances of escape to the West, to make infiltration of hostile agents
more difficult, and, possibly, to conceal military activities.
p2prity of Chinese Communists Declininjuzongrrseaa Chinese
Page 5
Losses in Korea, broken promises, and repressive measures at home
have combined to turn support oe the Communist regime by the overseas
Chinese of Ana into distrust,, despair and fear. This new attitude could
have important effects on any Communist plans for expansion into South-
east Asia.
All Mid-East Oil Companies Face Pressure for R1g12Eltvalties -- Page 6
The crisis in 'ran has added impetus to efforts by Bahrein KUweit
and 'raq. to make Western oil companiec pay higher royalties. Even Saudi
Arabia ennts upward revision of a contract only six months old.
The Problem of OrganizinuLlerman Defense Force Page 8
Creation of a German defenae force depends primarily on Germaay's
willingeess to subordinate its troops to a European Army, not NATO, and,
secoadaeily on how much political independence the Germans can win in
return for contributing to common defense.
iMarty2iscord over Consolidation of Collective Farms in the USSR
Page 9
High-level disagreement within the Soviet Communist Party over the
policy of coMbining collective farms has retarded the program but will not
prevent it from being carried out in the long run. While the program's
realization weuld have the significant advantage of making manpower avail-
able for use elsewhere, under wartime conditions it would have the distinct
disadvantage of requiring 'scarce machinery and petroleum.
The Vaticae and World Communism Page 11
The Vatican, despite its strong stand against persecution of Catholic
hierarchies in the Satellite states, has been forced to avoid identifi-
cation veth US policy to maintain its position as a supra-national in-
stitution.
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Satellites Tighten Security of their Western Borders
Numerous measures for strengthening border security, varying in intensity
with immediate needs, are being enforced along the Satellite borders with
Western Europe.
These tighter border controls seem to be aimed at lessening the chances
for escape to the West, making the infiltration of hostile agents more dif-
ficult, and, possibly, concealing military activity.
Mare drastic measures have so far been ordered in Rumania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Albania than in Eastern Germany or Poland. This
preoccupation with the security of frontiers has long been characteristic
of the USSR, which has resorted to mass deportations of "unreliable" minori-
ties from border areas and to extensive physical security precautions.
Rumania
The most spectacular current evidence of this Staellite preoccupation
vith border security comes from Rsumania, which has forced large-scale evacu-
ation from a 30 to 40 mile strip along the Yugoslav border. Those being evacu-
ated are peasants hostile to.thesegime and non-Rumanian nationals, chiefly
Seem. Several thousand persons are estimated to have been moved from the
region into the interior of Rumania. Special passes are now required for
entry into a security zone approximately 15 miles wide along the Yugoslav
border and the Black Sea coast.
Bulgaria
Evacuations of "unrelidbles" have recently occurred from the 'region
along Bulgaria's border with Yugoslavia, as well as from areas adjacent to
the Bulgarian frontier? with Greece and Turkey. The drastic strengthening
of border security along the Yugoslav frontier during the past six months
has doubtless been aimed at stemming the continuous flov of defectors from
Bulgaria, who have nuMbered at least several hundred since last winter. Ethnic
Turks and Bulgarian Moslems were removed from the Turkish and Greek border
areas as early as 1947. At least 100,000 of the Turkish minority of 750,000
in Bulgaria have been deported to Turkey during the past year. Extremely
rigid residence and travel restrictions are now in effect in a two kilometer
wide zone along the Bulgarian border with Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey
and along the entire Black Sea coast. Somewhat less stringent restrictione
apply in a secondary zone thirty kilometers wide.
Hungary
Concerted measures by Hungary to seal its borders with Yugoslavia were
first reported during the spring and summer of 1950. They involved the de-
portation of "unreliable" elements fres the border zones, more extensive
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physical security installations, and the establishment of a fifteen kilo-
meter restricted area requiring special passes for entry. Since last fall
there has been a decline in reports of further border security measures under-
taken by the Hungarian Government.
Czechoslovakia
A zone of extreme security now exists along Czechoslovakia's frontier
with the US Zone of Germany. The evacuation of "unreliable" members of the
population from the area has been proceeding systematically since 1948, with
the largest deportations occurring during 1950. As a result, many areas
along the frontier are completely uninhabited. Only two or three passable
roads enter the area, strips of land have been cleared Immediately along
the border, numerous strong patrols are evident, and special passes are re-
quired for entry into an area 15 to 30 kilometers wide along the entire bor-
der. Although the Czechs have been engaged in efforts to improve the pre-
war border fortifications, their first concern has been with security.
Albania
Particular attention has been given by the Albanian Government to the
security of its border with Yugoslavia. Army troops in the northern border
regions were strengthened by 2,000 in March 1951. An apparent increase has
also occurred in the strength of the border security forces in northern Al-
bania. During the past year dissident elements have been exchanged between
the northern and Southern border regions. They have not been resettled, how-
ever, but have been placed in labor camps. To discourage clandestine traffic
across its long, exposed frontiers, the Albanian Government has resorted to
a widespread use of land mines.
East Germany and Poland
East Germany and Poland have instituted less extensive security measures
than the other Satellites because of particular local conditions. The East
German Communists apparently do not desire to emphasize by too obvious border
controls the lack of German unity. Poland, on the other hands is concerned
only with its Baltic coast, since its land frontiers all border on those of
other Satellites. Polish control measures along the Baltic have included
the evacuation of "unreliable" elements of the population, increased numbers
of frontier guards and new restrictive regulations on travel.
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famlstILA211/TTLe_Clminists Declinim_TaEs_2=9.2s Chinese
The once favorable attitude of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia
toward the Communist regime of China appears to be giving way to one of
distrust, despair and fear.
The growing antagonism toward the Communist regime could significantly
alter Communist tactics for expansion in Southeast Asia, for there is con-
siderable evidence that the overseas Chinese communities were counted upon
as an easily available and important instrument for the drive to extend Com-
munist control.
The spectacle of Chinese turning away from a Chinese Government would
not only cost the Communists valuable support and loss of prestige, but
would also tend to cause the governments in the area, which heretofore have
tended to take refuge in neutrality, to adopt a more realistic policy toward
the threat of Communist China.
The squandering of Chinese manpower in the Korean adventure has appalled
many overseas Chinese. They are also disgruntled over broken Chinese promises
that properties belonging to them or to their relatives in China would re-
ceive preferential consideration in the implementation of land reforms. The
indiscriminate liquidation of fellow Chinese accused of counter-revolutionary
and espionage activities has been a source of growing disgust.
The increasing restrictions on travel to China, contrary to propaganda
that the Communists welcomea the return of overseas Chinese, seem to imply
that all are suspected of disloyalty. Chinese Communist diplomats, at
first warmly received by resident Chinese, have alienated many of the latter
because of their participation in subversive activities and their propensity
for placing party interests above those of the local Chinese communttY. Final-
ly, Chinese Communist popularity has undoubtedly suffered as a result of an
extortion compaign directed from China whereby "contributions" are extracted
from the local Chinese in the form of ransom for imprisoned relatives or
"back taxes" paid to prevent confiscation of property in China.
The accumulation of evidence revealing the nature of the Chinese Com-
munist Government may Yell undermine, if not shatter, the illusions held by
the overseas Chinese that the Communists are bringing a new era of peace
and prosperity to the homeland, winning power and prestige for China in inter-
national affair') and protecting what they, as Chinese, consider to be their
legitimate rights in the countries of residence.
The development of anti-Communism among the Chinese in Southeast-Asia
into an effective force, however, is severely handicapped by the absence of
a popular alternative political movement capable of providing protection from
the tightly organized and highly disciplined Communists, and by the vulner-
ability of Southeast Asia to Communist aggression.
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.A.13. Mid-East Oil Comaniee Face Pressure, S'or ll'esher Boyelties
Negotiations by the interested companies with. Iraq, Bahrein, and Kuweit
for revision of e rate of royalty psymento are adding to the confUsion in
the Middle East oil crisis provoked by the deadlock in Iran.
All of these states are interested in increasing their oil revenues along
the lines of the 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement egreed upon by the Arabian-
American Oil Company (AAO) with Saudi Arabia at the close of 1950. The
companies are prepared to increase their naymertn but at to go slowly,
realizing that tie desire of these goverumento for more money is probably
limitless.
At the same time the plight of the Senslo-Iranian Oil Company (ICC) in
Iran, which stems directly from the company's past, unwillingness to meet
Iranian requests for 'increased peymentn, cannot help but affect the attitude
of the other oil compaeles. With the noseible exception of Iraq, there are
no indications at the moment that extreme nationalistic elements in these
states are interesting themeelves ia the oil question.
The Irani negotiations were receseed in early June, but it is expected
that they will be resumed either in Londoa or B14 during July. The inter-
national structure of the Iraq Petrelenm. Compaey IPC) has complicated the
negotiations by raising taxation technicalitiee. The chief point of dis-
agreement betweer. 1PC and Iraq coaceren the extension of the new contract
to all three of the company's prenent concessions--Kirkuk, Basra, and Mosul.
The Iraqis, dissatisfied by the slew rate of develesmeet in the latter two
fields, would like to exempt them trum ccverage, probatly anticipating that
they then could be re-leased un dee mero favorable terms, poseibly to some
other company. UC is unlikely to accept such a proposal.
In the case of Kuweit? dincueeions between a representative of the Sheikh
And the Gulf Oil Company and Aacc (the two partners in the KUveit Oil Company)
are about to begin. For the past three months the two oil companies have been
engaged in extensive corporate reorganization as the first step toward offer-
ing. an increase in revenees.
The Bahrein Oil Company, an American-controlled corporation, has decided
to offer the Sheikh of Bahrein a'eump cum payment of aheut $100,000 a month,
hoping to postpone any cimmitmentn on oil royalties until the pattern of Middle
East paylwnte becomes clearer. ? The possibility that production will be ex-
pended if the Iranian output is That prObably will cauze the Sheikh to de-
mand pasments geared to actual flow of oil.
The deduction of foreign income taxes before division of profits, which
is permitted under the ABAMCO agreement, is not included in the IPC offer to
Iraq. Consequently this new arrangement will undoubtedly be followed in future
contracts with Bahrein and Kuveit and forshadows a revision of the Saudi
Arabian agreement. There have been indications that Saudi Arabia has indicated
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its dissatisfaction with the size of its payments from ARAMCO, and its wish
to adjust the six month-old contract to compensate for higher US corporation
taxes.
Although the Saudi Arabian contract was the direct cause of the revision
move by the Near East states, the Iranian crisis gave it real impetus. Re-
gardless of the final outcome in Iran, all Western oil Companies operating
in the Middle East will be forced to meet pressure for upward scaling of
royalties.
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The Problem of Organizing a German Defense Force,
The creation of a German defense force appears to hinge, most immedi-
ately, on the willingness of the Federal Republic to put its troops under
e. European /truer rather than directly under NATO. Behind this question is
the even more delicate one of the degree of political independence to be
granted the Federal Republic in return for a defense contribution. The
next few months should clarify the issue.
Last September, when the US proposed the rearmament of the Germans, the
French reacted negatively. At the Brussels conference in December, therefore,
the US net the objections by agreeing that the Allies would join the Germans
in examining the nature of a German contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. These German-Allied discussions began in January of this year
at the Petersberg, headuarters of the Allied High Commission near Bonn.
The French, however, did not feel easy about creating a separate Ger-
man force, even if it were to come under the control of NATO. They preferred
to mingle German forces with those of other nations in such a way that the
Germans could never take unilateral military action. Therefore, they con- '
cieved the scheme of a European Army, in which the divisions would be com-
posed of several 6,000-man regimental combat teams, each of a different
nationality. The Germans would not be allowed a national unit larger than
a combat team.
Although the initial reception of the French proposal, known as the
Pleven Plan, was cool in most countries concerned, the French were permitted
to go ahead with a conference on the plan. This conference began in Perils
in March.
Interim reports on both the Petereberg and Paris talks are about to be
issued. The Petersberg paper will reveal several German proposals repugnant
to France: combat teams of not 6,000 men each, but 12,000--really a small
division; a defense ministry; and an inspectorate general, which the French
regard as a general staff. To Paris, the whole German approach smacks of
recreating a national German army, something the French still fear. The
Germans, however, will be slow to give up their organizational ideas.
The Paris report, due about 10 July, will show that the Germans have
not yet agreed to the French plan of mixed divisions. Instead, they prefer
divisions of a single nationality, with international integration coming at
the corps level. There are also differences on other details.
The French have insisted that the Petersberg report, though it will be
the newt ready, should be withheld from NATO until the Paris report is
issued. By having the two reports connidered simultaneously, the French hope
to smother the German plan of a direct contribution to NATO. Their determina-
tion in this matter has caused even the chief of the German delegation in Paris
to tell US officials that he believes the European Army is perhaps the only
means of obtaining a modification of the French position on the size of Ger-
man units, a German general staff, and a German defense ministry.
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Party Discord over Consolidation of Collective Farms in the USSR
Top-level disagreement over the official Soviet policy of "consolidating"
collective farms: announced. on 18 January by N. S. Ebruschev of the Polit-
buro, appears to be slowing the program.
Tlee intra-party discord, according to the evidence on hand, concerns
chiefly the speed with which the program is to be carried out. Peasant
antagcniam to resettlement in larger, "consolidated" kolkhozes maybe a
factce behind public attacks on the policy by other Soviet officials.
Despite this apparent disagreement on the policy-making level, the new
proammm will probably be realized in the long run without many important
changes. While the program's realization would have the significant advan-
taae of making menpower available for use elsewhere, under wartime conditions
it would have the distinct disadvantage of requiring scarce machinery and
petroleum.
The first evidence of discord in the 'highest echelons of the party over
the collectivization program instituted in early 1950 appeared on 5 March,
the day after the publication of Khrushchev's January speech in Pravda, when
three leading Soviet newspapers published a statement to the effect that
Khrushchev's remarks were "open to discussion."
On 20 March, a speech of Armenian Party boss Arutiunov was published
which further supports the belief that intra-party differences have occurred
in connection with the farm consolidation program. Arutiunov stated (with-
out mentioning Khrushchev's name) that certain "comrades" havetended to
disorient" the party on the main task confronting the consolidation program,
welch is to consolidate farm work, not villages
Arutiunov may well have been referring to an earlier Khrushchev speech
of 28 June 1950, in which the latter said that it was impossible to wait for
the collective ferns to build houses for all the farmers in the new villages
Khrushchev expressed his opinion that the solution was to transfer the popu-
lation of small villages to larger ones, and then to await the gradual build-
ing of new homes for the collective farmers.
Unenthusiastic peasant response to Khrushchev's accelerated tempo may
have caused a reaction in favor of the more gradual farm consolidation plan
that appears to be in effect at the present time. Peasant resentment against
leaving individual homes for larger villages or completely strange "agrogorods"
probably accentuated their resentment toward the entire program.
Finally, in a speech of 26 May 1951, M. D. Bagirov, Azerbaijan Party
Secretary, demanded the eradication of the "incorrect" idea that the most
Important task in Kolkhoz construction is the fussing of small villages into
single kolkhoz settlements. Bagirov described as "harmful" and "intolerable"
the existing system of cutting down the size of Garden plots immediately ad-
jacent to the collective farmer's home by moving part of them beyond the
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village limits. This may have been a contributing factor which helped to
turn the rural population against Khrushchev's ambitious scheme to speed up
the consolidation of small farms.
Despite intra-party disagreement as to the speed of consolidation, there
seems to be no serious conflict over its aims, which at present appear to be
twofold. Party representation in the rural areas of the USSR has evidently
been too thin, and present consolidation moves will probably make more ef-
ficient use of the limited number of party members available for agriculture.
Secondly, it is quite possible that the desired increase in agricultural
output may be accomplished through wider use of mechanical equipment, resulting,
in turn, in the release to industry of thousands of unneeded farm workers.
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The Vatican and World Communism
A more vigorous counterattack by the Vatican, traditionally diseosed
to compromise with its enaaies throughout the world, may result from the
persecution of Catholic leaders in the Soviet Satellite states.
The official Osservatore Romano, conforming to the view; of neutrality-
minded Catholic circles, states that Communism, as an idea, can not be con-
quered by force. Recent utterances of the Pope, however, suggest thet despite
the Vatican's traditional desire for peace, and despite the draWbaers of an
ideological var in which it would suffer, other leaders hold such aver to
be inevitable if the long-term survival of the Church 13 to be imemmed
The Vatican has taken a strong stand against Communist persecutice of
its local hierarchies, but it has been forced to avoid close identifice:ion
with US policy in order' to maintain its position as a supra-national inetitu-
ion.
The Vatican feels that its anti-Communism must be demonstrated only ol
religious and moral bases. This attitude cannot take the form of an overt
political offensive which would identity the Churci completely with the Wes?
because such a couree would alienate many Roman Cetholics in Communist areae
and would associate it with the remnants of colonialism in Asia and Africa.
Therefore, it has attempted when dbsolutely forced, albeit with little suc-
cess, to arrive at a modus vivendi with Communist-controlled states around
the Soviet perimeter.
The Vatican, as a center of a world religion, has been seeking to avoid
expression of national partisanship or even of preference for any particular
form of government. As the oldest diplomatic institution in Europe it is
prone to follow a course which will further its long-term religious interests.
This course of action may not at times coincide with the national interests
of any particular group.
Today, nevertheless, the greatest challenge to the Church is Soviet Com-
munism, which has attacked it as a foreign power, an enemy of the Communist
State, an instrument of US foreign policy, and a vehicle of 'western colonialism
In Africa and the Orient. The Communists have sought to neutralize or enrol-,
nate Roman Catholicism in their areas by severing the connections of the local
hierarchy and communicants; with Rome, by persecuting priests, by creating
national churches, by placing the Eastern Rite Catholice under the Russian
Orthodox Church, and by preventing the Church from undertaking its traditional
educational and charitable activities.
The Vatican has countered this persecution with its traditional policy
of doctrinal intransigence, reluctant compromise in purely temporal matters,
and excommunication. It has been forced in several instences, however, to as-
sent at least tacitly to arrangements between the local hierarchies and the
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Communist states in the hope of preserving remnants of church organization
in those areas. Conscious of the threat ofCommunismto western civilization,
it has fought Communism though Catholic parties, which are particularly in-
fluential in Western Europe, and through support of resistance movements by
its hierarchies in Eastern Europe.
The Pope is aware, however, that the Church cannot influence many
millions of Catholics who, in protest against their wretched economic status,
continue to vote Communist. To counter the economic appeal of Communism,
the present Pope has increasingly stressed the importance of dealing with
social questions on the basis of Pope Leo XIII 's famous encyclical of 1891,
"Rerum Novarum," the Church's program for solving the social prdblems of
modern society. As a result, the progressive faction at the Vatican, led
by Monsignor Montini, appears to be gaining in strength in relation to the
conservative elements, led by Monsignor Tardini.
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