OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD WASHINGTON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01057A000500020006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 13, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79SO1057A000500020006-0
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP,SECRET COPY NO.
November 13, 1x53
NSC REVIEW COMPLETED
O I P E R A T I O N S C O O R D I N A T I N G B O A R D
NATIONAL OPERATIO1 S PLAN - USSR AND E'UROPEAl' SATELLITES
(Superseding D-40 and D-45)
References: NSC 162/2 and NSC 158
SECURITY INFORMATION
(OCB-16) TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79SO1057A000500020006-0
 SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For. Re.lease O2 0i z E IMM kDP79S01057 ,}00500006-0
SECTION I
THE PROBLEM
1. To examine the structure of Soviet power with particular em-
phasis on the USSR and its European satellites, to identify its major
vulnerabilities, to estimate United States capabilities for exploiting
these vulnerabilities, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated
operations to further United States and Free World objectives.
SECTION II
POLICY
2. The points listed below set forth United States policy toward
the USSR and European satellites, as reflected in NSC 162/2 and NSC 15.8i
which is pertinent for the purposes of this paper.
?a. To prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domination of
other nations.
b. To discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective
instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of Communist
parties and other pro-Soviet elements.
C, To take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert
measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR,
complicate control in the satellites and retard the growth of the mili?-
tary and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.
d. To nourish resistance to Communist oppression throughout
satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion in areas under Soviet military
control, and without compromising its spontaneous nature.
e. To undermine satellite puppet authority.
"f. To'exploit satellite unrest as demonstrable proof that the
Soviet empire is beginning to crumble..
?g. To take into account the desirability of creating conditions
which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to accept-
able negotiated settlements.
LJ
(OCBAI*yoved For Release 4/24fN D S01057A0005000200Q6-0
TOP SECRET of 19 pages
 Approved ForIRR 1easg Q4/$ 9SO105740005OOO20006-0
45
SECTION III
SITUATION
3. The survival of the fundamental values and institutions of
the United States is threatened by the formidable power and aggressive
policy of the Communist world, led by the USSR, and the prospect of
a serious weakening of our economy which may result from the cost of
opposing this threat over a sustained period.
Li.. The international Communist movement is dedicated to a policy
,f +"liberation", calling for:the Qverthrnw If all non-Communist goT-
ernments throughout the world and replacing them with Communist diota-
torships responsive to the will of the Kremlin. There is no likeli-
h"od that this basic policy will be modified in the forseeable future.
5. There are characteristics in the Communist system which
permit it to act without the restrictions and inhibitions that apply
to a democratic system. Utilizing these advantages the Communist
empire has, since 1939, expanded by 25 million square miles and en-
slaved an. additional 600 million people. This expansions if continued,
will place more than one-half of the world behind the Iron Curtain
within-a decade.
6. The enemy has the purpose and capability to pursue his goal
of world domination. The record of the Communist offensive clearly
demonstrates that aggressive movements-of this type do not leni
themselves to mere than temporary or tactical ace-OTModations} Actually
there is no force in being capable of preventing cintinuance of the
SECURITY INFORMATION 2
(0C p braved For Release 200 8 -RDP79S01057A000500e 0d6 9es
 Approved For Reje 20 4 0 $ 79S01057 0500020006-0
Csmmiuniat offensive., in almost any direction. W.Lrh the prospect if
parity in nuclear weapons and the growing industrial might .f the
Communist empire military deterrents to further expansion of the
Communist empire will soon cease to be effective.
7. While there is evidence of widespread dissatisfaction through-
out the Communist empire which, as in East Germany, occasionally erupt"?
in demonstratians against the authorities, this unrest at the present
time is nst.on a scale which constitutes a serious threat to the party
leadership or presents problems which are beyond the capabilities Pf
the party control apparatus.
8. The Central Cormunist-Diotatbrship has always engaged in a
continuous process of consolidation of position and powerras during
the Stalin regime the process was characterized lry large and bloody
purges and the progressive liquidation of possible rivals for the
dictators power, and this process is likely to continue..
9. Notwithstanding the formidable nature of the SWviet system
and the advantages it possesses,, there are certain weaknesses in its
armor which invite vigorous exploitation by the United States..
ENEMY STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
10. The Communist Central Authority has demonstrated the ability
to accommodate itself to setbacks, internal disasters, invasion and to
survive and grew as a world menace.
(OCB-16)
SECURITY INFORMATION 3
TOP SECRET I#f l' pages
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79SO1057A000500020006-0
 Approved For eleate 20UNO RI RDP79SO1057AP005500020006-0
WIMP i"Ir
11. The Communist offensive prtvceeds by covert means; it is,
therefore, difficult to estimate the extent of Communist control over
nominally free countries until an overt takeover is attempted, The
Communists have infiltrated key activities within the United States
and other free countries with disastrous results to the national secur-
ity of these countries.
12. Ideas and concepts favorable to Communist purposes have crept
into and have been popularized in the mass media of free nations in
ways which have promoted confusion and misunderstanding concerning the
true nature of the Communist system and the enormity of the threat
which it poses to the non-Communist world. Moreover, international
Communism has established elaborate propaganda machinery which floods
the Free World with material much of which influences or is unwittingly
utilized by mass media t4 give free publicity to developments and argu-,
ments which advance Communist objectives. Publicity of this kind tends
to sustain both the widely held but erroneous impression that the Com-
munist Central Authority commands substantial pssular support in the
non-?Comr=ist world and the myth that Communism represents the +Twa 'e
of the future."
13. The Communists systematically and skillfully, with varying
degrees of success, exploit neutralist sentiment and local fears in
countries of the Free World to befog issues, minimize the Communist
peril, and weaken the national will to survive.
14. The Communist Orbit has insufficiencies in certain key
SECURITY INFORMATION 4
(OCBA4~oved For Release 26 -TeIA-RDP79SO1057AedO500E e6-0 --,
 Approved Forglea 20 79501057 005000 0006-0
t.f 'tea . C
strategic items, such as n'onferrius metals, precision instruments,,
electronic 4etrices., and certain' machine tools. Although the Free
Worldts trade control program has had an effeCt'in .mpedir the'Cemmun-
ist war potential in such categories that program has not and could not,
even if perfectl~r effective, be expected to have a decisive impact an
their military potential.,
15* The Communist Central Authority has largely failed in its
efforts to sublimate the historical national aspirations in the non-
Russian.' Republics of the USSR and in the satellite states,
16. Past actions and current developments to which the Beria.
purge may I?e at least in part related,, indicate majrr tensions both
within the multirnational structure of the USSR and in the satellite
states which require a continuous offort'by the regime to control
the nationalist aspirations of these peoples. Both in the satellite
states and in the 15 nonTRussiin tepuklics of the USSR, Russian person-
nel to a considerable extent control and sometimes direct the airiinis-
trative functions of government,
17. The Communist military establishment partakes rrf the multi-
national character outlined in paragraph 16. above And is subject to
similar stresses and strains, requiring tight Communist control. This
control is exercised by political officers who are not subordinate
to military commanders and whose activities are a constant source of
friction within the military establishment. Soviet army personnel
actually command the armed. forces of some of the satellites.
Appp oved For Relea M4T-NX2tWW79S01057A0005. 0020006-0
(0CE--I6) TCP SZCE T of 19 pages
 Approved For leas 20 A P79S010574090J000 0006-0
Top MET
18. The Communist regime has. found it prudent to promise improve-
ments in the living standard of the population in an attempt to dispel
passive resistance and #ssatisfactipn, It appears that greater efforts
are to be made to increase production of consumers' goods.. Any increase
in consumer goods production will entail the diversion of material and
manpower from war production and will therefore result in some reduct-
ion in the previously planned rate of production.
19. In the satellite countries of Eastern Europe widespread oppo-
sition to Communist control has found expression in passive resistance
to the economic programs of the regime, particularly in the field. of
agricultural collectivization and in spontaneous demonstrations against
Communist oppression. The most striking manifestations of this unrest
since the death of Stalin have been the June 17 uprising in East Gar,
many, acts of sabotage in Communist controlled enterprises,, and personal
violence against Communist officials. In the USSR the recognition by
the new regime of extensive dissatisfaction is reflected in the shift-
ing of key control personnel in most of the noh-.Russian Republics and
the official admission of failures in production programs in the field
of agriculture and consumers' goods, with concurrent promises of steps
to improve living standards.
20. Communist doctrine calls for the extirpation of religion.
In practice, however, religious groups have been tolerated insofar
as they have subordinated themselves to complete Communist eontro7.
and have been prepared to land themselves to the accomplishment of
SECURITY INFORMATION 6
(t!CB. lroved For Release 20 3 ? . - A-R1jP79S0105770E 06-0
 Approved ForApleas
,wz: '_JO 0 F P79SO10574005 0006-0
SECRET
TbT
Communist objectives. The Communists have not been able to stamp out
religion and it continues, particularly in the satellites, to be a
major force in opposition to the consolidating efforts of the Central
Authority.
21. The vast majority of the people of the satellite states
are anti-Communist and, in large measure, anti-Russian as well, These
feelings have been intensified by the oppressive tactics of the control
mechanisms which they associate with the Russians. The peoples of the
USSR are similarly dissatisfied with and opposed to the system imposed
by Communist rule, while the programs of russification have substan-
tially increased anti-Russian feeling in the non-Russian Republics,
22. The majority of the people in the Communist empire long for
relief from the all-prevailing police terror and controls, especially
the informer system. The whole system of political oppression is at-
tributed by the people to Communist domination and they long for an
upheaval, whether by war or by some other means, that will result in
its destruction.
23. There are estimated to be between 10 million and 15 million
people in slave and corrective labor camps in the USSR. In case-of
civil disturbance or any situation which might result-in breakouts,
they constitute a vital threat to all Communist authority wherever
they are. In addition, the mass forced transfer of populations, carried
out over the years within the USSR by the Communist authority,.consti'-
tutes a vulnerability and provides a field for exploitation by the
Free World.
Ao roved For ReI ~; ( RWAZP79S01057A000501p20006-0
(OCB=16) TOP SECRET of 19 pages
 Approved ForZelease 20, - 79So105W00500020006-0
2L. Communism in practice has created and supports a small
elite class whose privileges, rewards, and standard of living are in
extreme contrast to the life of the rest of the peoples causing resent-
ment and antagonisms of a major character.
25. The ideological straight-jacket imposed upon Soviet intel-
lectuals, together with their isolation from foreign contact and the
requirement that Western culture and scientific achievement be ridir
culed and attacked) has undoubtedly caused resentment which could be
exploited,
26. Forced collectivization together with subordination of con-
sumerst goods production to rapid expansion of heavy industry has
substantially disorganized and weakened the agriculture of the captive
European peoples with the result that many of the Eastern European
economies which earlier exported foodstuffs are,now compelled to import
agricultural products.
27. Soviet economic policies toward the satellites seek the com-
plete integration of their economies into that cf the Soviet Union,
the channeling of foreign trade away from traditional western markets,
and the attainment for the orbit of the greatest possible measure of
economic self-sufficiency. The result of these policies is the sev+
erance of trade ties between the satellites and the West and a sharp
decline of the standard of living in the satellites which is gradually
sinking to that of the population of the Soviet Union itself,
SECURITY INFORMATION 8
(OC$ eved For Release 20dW R 4-RDP79S01057AO9t5ggUPQPQf-0
 Approved For-please @@ 1J4 bJMT3RS01057 0QO500020006-0
TOP ~iEMT
UNITED STATES ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES
28. Current military capabilities of the United States backed
up by its immense industrial potential are thought to be a deterrent
to enemy aggression on a global scale. Therefore, the United States
can undertake a vigorous diplomatic offensive and other supporting
actions short of war in pursuit of national objectives.
29. President Eisenhower, both as an individual leader and as
the symbol of Americats enormous power in the service of the cause of
human freedom which most of the inhabitants of the Communist empire
still regard as their own, constitutes by his prestige and leadership
a diplomatic, political, and psychological asset of first importance.
30. United States psychological assets:
a. The United States heritage of the most exciting and
attractive political doctrine in history, given concrete application
in the development of the American system, has for a century and a
half been a source of inspiration to untold millions of people through.
out the world*
b. The United States enjoys in general the reputation of
having pursued a relatively unselfish foreign policy and of advocating
the rights of small nations. In its international efforts to uphold
moral principles the United Statesp despite considerable criticism,
is nevertheless recognized generally as a world power which does not
abuse its position. A reservoir of goodwill among foreign peoples
still exists despite deteriorations which have taken place since 1946.
SECURITY INFORMATION 9
JqQQ1Fdi4d For Release 3 Y 'f-DP79SO1057A06D5D9 -0
 Approved For_Refeas(e ___ $4 DP79S0105740005000,20006-0
C. The United States tradition as a haven f*r tho +ppP+sosibd
and persecuted has in past generations st nulated emigration P "m
every nation sf the world tb our shores, These immigrants have made
their centrihutien to the building of America and, in turn, have trans-
lated their experiences and success 1.ok to the Old World.
31. The highly developed facilities of the mass crrmmuricaatieri
media of the Free World lend themselves to extensive utilization i*
support of policies and programs which wIll advance Unites States
sbjectives. Csnperation between the United States and allied countries
which engage in propaganda activities directed against the Soviet ?oloc
woulat improve the quality, consistency and effectiveness of such pro-
grams,
32. The United Stateeg nccnemic power if directed toward the dis-
ruption of the Corrmunist economy, in conjunction with other United
States capabilities, could cause seri_tus rrob7.eirs affecting-the pta1'i]i-
ity of the empire,
33. The United States can furnish certain support to resistance
activities. This current capability could be increased vatrstantially.
34, Many nations of the Free World are associated with the
United States in defense arrangements which were mrtiv&ted.pztmari1y
by the threat of Cnrrmur,.ist aggression. These nations are prepar .
to cocperate to varying degrees with the United States in activities
directed against the Soviet xegime. Other countries, although not
participating in those arrangaments, are located can the fringes of
SECUT.ITY INFCRMATI*N if,
(on.16 tof 19 pages
Approved For Release 2003,014,224 . CIA-RDP79S01057A000500020006-0
 Approved For Le s_ 20 3/4 p I DP79S01057-AO QW20006-0
TOP 4 ?
the Communist Orbit and realize that their future independence is in
large measure dependent on the military power of the western alliance.
35. Through the skillful, judicious and full employment of
United States economics political, military and psychological potential.
the United States can make substantial advances toward its national
objectives short of general hostilities.
SECTION IV
U. S. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
36. To disrupt the Communist Central Authority.
37. To render the control apparatus of the regime ineffective
in its control over the people.
38. To foster conditions and create situations which will have
the effect of weakening the discipline and will to fight of the Com-
munist armed forces and lead to substantial desertions and disaffect-
ions.
39. To reduce the Communist war potential.
LSO. To exploit every vulnerability of the multi-national structure
of the USSR.
Ltl. To undertake and support actions calculated to reestablish
the political independence of the Communist subject nations.
112. To subject the puppet regimes of the Communist subject
nations to pressures and situations requiring them to make critical
decisions which would tend to discredit and undermine their authority.
SECURITY INFORMATION 11
(OCB- 6) TO SECRET 9~p es
Approved For Release IA-RDP79S01057A0005D0U220006-0
 Approved For lease 21gg?/( i&IJ- DP79S01057400005005 20006-0
W, ()ftmfe
b3. To stimulate and support nationalism as an anti-Soviet fortt
in the non-fussian Republics of the USSR and in the Eastern Eur"ean
satellites, attempting to channel these forces against the Communist
Central Authority.
44. To fester and maintain throughout the Communist empire a firm
devotion to the principles of human freedrnn, individual liberty and
faith in the inevitable triumph ref freedom over tyranny.
45. To encourage the development of and to support movements
and organizations opposed to.Cemnunism which can assist in bringing
about the removal of the Communist peril and its replacement by govern-
ments which will act in conformity with principles set forth by the
United Nations.
b6. To obtain the msxinum possible cooperation from states out?
side the Soviet Crbit, particularly those on the periphery, in United
States supported activities directed against the Soviet power.
SECTION- V
CFERATICNAL FACILITIES
14.7. The accomplishment of the operational objectives set forth
in 5ecti4n TV requires the creation of an inter-agency Working Group
for the fcllciaing purposes:
a. To assure that the necessary detailed operational plan-
ring is done ley the apprc,Xriate agencies*
b. To facilitate coordination cf'the inter-agency aspects
of such detailed plans,
Approved For Relea&SC iJ '14d~T79S01057A0005000,006-0
(Or,-L6) TOP S QrZET pf 19 pages
 Approved For ,p eaLQ3DP79S01057*OWQ20006-0
TrC RET}
c. To bring about the phased implementation' of the opera-
tional plans in such manner as to avoid duplication of effort, avoid
cancellation of effects; to provide mutual support by discrete elements
in various operational plans and to insure that all elements contribute
most effectively to the desired total cumulative impact.
I8. All departments and agencies of the United States Government
will contribute to the procurement and assembly of information and
the provision of operational facilities required for the implementation
of projects approved by the Operations Coordinating Board in support
of operational objectives stated in Section IV,
SECTION VI
PHASING
49. To have any cumulative impact a plan directed against the
Communist empire must operate over a period of years.. Because of the
transient nature of some enemy vulnerabilities the exploitation of
such vulnerabilities should be undertaken as speedily as capabilities,
time and budget permit.
50. To take maximum advantage of variations in Snviet vulner-
abilities and to assure flexibility in exploitation, cperational plan-
ning will be phased on a six-month basis, subject to such modification
as may be dictated by changing situations.
51. Such shifts of emphasis as may, from time to time, be required
to make this plan and others with which it may be integrated contribute
most effectively to the desired total effect,. will be determined by the
operations Coordinating Board..
(OCBh" roved For ReIgg /4k&&DP79S01057A0001( 0020006-0
7P TEMST '' arf 19 pages
 Approved For ease / DP79SO1057 D 20006-0
TOP 5EGRET
SECTION VII
GENERAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
S2. All agencies now charged with operational responsibilities
under PSB D-1O and PSB D-I5 will continue the implementation of tasks
assigned under those papers until the tasks are completed or the
Operations Coordinating Board otherwise directs.
53? Upon approval of this paper and allocation of responsibili.-
ties within the Working Group, each member agency of the Operations
Coordinating Board will proceed to develop operational plans and imple-
ment them to the extent of its capabilities. Such plans and implement-
ing actions will be integrated with those of other agencies through
the mechanism outlined in Section V.
(OCB-16)
SECURITY INFORMATION 14
TOP SECRET of 19 pages
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79S01057A000500020006-0
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79S01057 000500020006-0
I rY INFORMATION ~
TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL ANNEX
(For first six month phasing peridd)
Plans of member agencies of the operations Coordinating Board,
developed in accordance with provisions of paragraph 53, will include
among other undertakings and tasks the following:
1. Undertake negotiations with non-Communist states on the Soviet
periphery in an effort to develop a cooperative attitude on their part
toward United States supported activities directed against the Soviet
bloc.
2,6 Develop new and augment present facilities for employing a
substantial portion of the mass media of the Free World against the
Communist Central Authority.
3.. Undertake research and development directed toward devising
new cold war techniques and improving the effectiveness and efficiency
of those.now available.
14. To confront the Communist Central Authority and satellite
governments with difficult choices on issues likely to create friction.
25X1
6. Develop a program to decrease, through skillful flexibility
in applying East-West trade controls, the political and economic unity
of the Soviet bloc.
25X1
(OCB -bff roved For Rel
of l9 pages
 Approved For,Release 2QO3IQq&f%RDP79S01057A000500020006-0
:rw " `n 'M
TOP ET
25X1
10. For trading purposes,, in connection with negotiations con-
cerning access to West Berlin, undertake to obtain cession of a land
corridor with United States controlled air space above, on the ad caelum
theory.
11. Take the necessary steps to make the United Nations Slave
Labor Report available for publication.
12.. Take the. necessary steps to make the record of the United
Nations Genocide hearings available for publication.
13. Continue to exploit in the United Nations any opportunity to
discredit the Soviet leadership and to marshall support for United
States policies and objectives.
14. Introduce into the language courses and other programs carried
by United States military broadcasting networks, material which will
have psychological warfare effect because of the large Communist listen-
ing audience this network reaches.
15. Foster in the minds of the individuals in control of the Com-
munist World, as well as the people within the Communist Orbit, the
SECURITY INFORMATION ~g16
(OCB-lfA} Approved For Release TCIA-RDP79S0105TA00O58 8006-0
 Approved For eas 2 .3 -DP79S01057 005000 0006-0
TOP nEOMT
idea of United States military and economic power under a firm,' intel-
ligent leadership.
25X1
19. With a view to systematic propaganda exploitation, continue
to advocate tree elections in the satellites and their future associ-
ation with the Western European community with emphasis on economic
cooperation and rehabilitation after liberation occurs,
20. Subject Soviet intellectuals through all available media,
to appeals and arguments and to such pressures as can be exerted,
seeking to orient their loyalties toward the Free World.
22. Stimulate and exploit division within the Communist ruling
groups in each satellite.
23. Make available the surplus food stocks in the United States
to the hungry populations of the satellite states in such a way as to
SECURITY INFORMATION- 17
(0CB- lproved For Release 2 3 ___-V CIA-RDP79SO1057A?$a6 6-0
 Approved For.Releasp2/ 1 ? PJ DP79SO1057&000055000g0006-0
ierive maxims benefit to the interests of the Unite. States.
25. Build up ebockpil.oe of necessary supplies and equipment to
poxmtt the rapid launching of balloon operations when opportunity
offers,
25X1
28. Create and take full advantage of situations permitting the
timely demonstration of United States and allied military power as the
defenier of freedom and peace.
29. Take steps to intensify national tensions within the Cenmun-
ist empire,., seeking to direct their force against the CQmrrurist Central
Authority,, and associate appropriate segments of the Free World with
the national aspirations of the enslaved reople,,
30. Exploit the multi-national character of the Communist mili-
tary establishment, the friction between political officers and mili-
tary ct.mmanders in such manner as to weaken disci7line and the will
to fight and to cause substantial desertions and disaffect3.9no
31. Undertake projects directed toward.impeding scientific pro-
gress in the USSR.
SECURITY INFSRM.ATIdN 18
(D0-l4proved For Release`, : CIARDP79SO10571 0q 06-0
 Approved For Rele 2003/0 /24 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000 002000 -0
32. Formulate a program specifically dedicated to devel'4ping
a solidarity of interests and purposes between resistance elements
in the satellites and those in the USSR.
SECURITY INFORMATION 19
(0CB-16) TOP -'SECRET of 19 pages
0.L430
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79S01057A000500020006-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79SO1057A000500020006-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79SO1057A000500020006-0