PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION IN INDOCHINA THROUGH 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION IN INDOCHINA THROUGH 1954
THE PROBLEM'
To estimate the probable reactions of Communist China and the USSR to:
a. The commitment in Indochina, before the end of 1954, of US ground, air, and
naval forces on a scale sufficient to defeat decisively the field forces of the Viet Minh.
b. The commitment in Indochina, before the end of 1954, of US ground, air, and
naval forces on a scale sufficient to hold the Viet Minh in check until such time as
US-developed Vietnamese forces could decisively defeat the field forces of the Viet
Minh.
ASSUMPTIONS'
For both a. and b. above :
1. No Chinese Communist intervention
in force in Indochina had taken
place.
2. Commitment of US forces had been
publicly requested by the French
and Vietnamese governments.
3. At the time of the US commitment
French Union forces still retained
essentially their present position in
the Tonkin Delta.
ESTIMATE
1. We believe that the Communists would
assume that the purpose of committing US
forces in Indochina was the decisive defeat of
the Viet Minh. Consequently, we believe that
Communist reactions to such a US commit-
ment would be substantially the same whether
The Problem and the Assumptions have been
provided to the intelligence community as a basis
for the estimate.
2 For the purposes of this estimate, open interven-
tion is defined as the commitment of substantial
Chinese Communist combat forces, under any
guise.
4. Communist China and the USSR
would have prior knowledge of the
US intent to commit its forces in
Indochina.
5. Following the US commitment, there
would be a phased withdrawal of
French forces from Indochina.
6. The US will warn the Chinese Com-
munists that if they openly inter-
venes in the fighting in Indochina,
the US will not limit its military
action to Indochina.
it were designed to defeat the Viet Minh with
US forces (Problem a.) or eventually with US-
trained Vietnam forces (Problem b.).
In the Event of a Pending US Commitment
2. We do not believe that Communist China,
upon learning of a forthcoming commitment
by the US, would immediately intervene open-
ly with substantial forces in Indochina. The
acceptance by Communist China of an armi-
stice in Korea, its policies to date with respect
to Indochina, and its present emphasis on
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domestic problems seem to indicate a desire
at this time to avoid open intervention in the
Indochina war or expansion of the conflict to
Communist China. US warnings against Chi-
nese Communist intervention in force 3 proba-
bly would have a strong deterrent effect.
Moreover, the political advantage to be gained
by portraying the US as an "aggressor" would
probably appear both to Communist China
and the USSR to outweigh the military advan-
tage of moving large Chinese Communist
forces into Indochina before the arrival of US
forces.
3. In addition, Communist leadership would
probably estimate that they would have time
to take a number of steps which, without a
serious risk of expanding the war to China,
might deter a US military commitment or seri-
ously impair its effectiveness. Such steps
might include:
a. Increasing logistic and rear area support
to the Viet Minh.
b. Covertly committing Chinese troops to
operate as "Viet Minh guerrillas."
c. Encouraging intensified Viet Minh guer-
rilla and sabotage operations in Indochina,
particularly in and around the Tonkin Delta,
designed to inflict such damage on the French
Union position as to increase the difficulties
of the US operation.
d. Building up Chinese Communist strength
in south China, including Hainan.
e. Seeking by diplomatic and propaganda
means in the UN and elsewhere to forestall US
action, to gain the support of non-Communist
countries, and to exploit differences between
the US and its allies over preparations for this
operation.
'Such warnings would reinforce the .warning al-
ready given by Secretary of State Dulles, in his
American Legion Speech at St. Louis, 2 Septem-
ber 1953:
"Communist China has been and now is train-
ing, equipping and supplying the Communist
forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as
in Korea, Red China might send its own army
into Indochina. The Chinese Communist re-
gime should realize that such a second aggres-
sion could not occur without grave conse-
quences which might not be confined in Indo-
china. I say this soberly in the interest of
peace and in the hope of preventing another
aggressor miscalculation."
f. Concluding a defense pact with the Viet
Minh.
Although, in response to a US military com-
mitment in Indochina, the Communists might
threaten to renew hostilities in Korea, we be-
lieve that they would not actually take such
action as they probably estimate that re-
newed aggression in Korea would result in ex-
panding the conflict to Communist China itself.
Actual US Commitment
4. In the initial stages of an actual US mili-
tary commitment, the Communists might not
feel compelled to intervene openly in force
immediately. They would recognize the diffi-
culties which the US forces would face in oper-
ating in the Indochina climate and terrain.
They would also realize that the xenophobia
of the indigenous population of Indochina
might be effectively exploited to the disadvan-
tage of US forces by Communist propaganda;
the Chinese Communists would therefore pre-
fer that the US rather than themselves be con-
fronted with this antiforeign attitude. They
might estimate that, with increased aid from
Communist China, the Viet Minh forces, by
employing harassing and infiltrating tactics
and avoiding major engagements, could make
any US advance at the least slow and difficult.
It is probable, therefore, that the Chinese
Communists would initially follow a cautious
military policy while they assessed the scale,
nature, and probable success of the US action,
the effect of such action on Vietnamese na-
tional morale and military capabilities, the
subsequent military and political moves of the
French, the temper of US opinion, the reac-
tions of US allies and the neutralist states,
and the position of the UN. Even at this early
stage, however, the Chinese Communists
would probably take strong actions short of
open intervention in an effort to prevent the
US from destroying the Viet Minh armed
forces.'
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the timing of the Com-
munist reaction to the commitment of US forces
in Indochina cannot be estimated with any de-
gree of assurance. He therefore believes that a
decision by the Communists to follow a cautious
policy in the initial stages of the US action
should be presented as a possibility, rather than
as a probability.
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5. In addition to the steps outlined in para-
graph 3 above, the Chinese Communists, at
this early stage of US commitment, would
probably provide an increased number of mili-
tary advisors, possibly including commanders
for major Viet Minh units. Moreover, Peiping
might covertly furnish limited air support for
Viet Minh ground forces, but would be unlike-
ly to undertake air operations which it esti-
mated would provoke US retaliation against
Communist China itself other, than retaliation
against those airfields from which such air
attacks were launched.
6. If the leaders of Communist China and the
USSR came to believe that a protracted stale-
mate in Indochina was likely, they would
probably not openly commit Chinese Commu-
nist ground, naval, or air forces to an inter-
vention in force in Indochina, nor would they
renew hostilities in Korea or commit new acts
of armed aggression elsewhere in the Far East.
Peiping and Moscow would probably believe
that a long and indecisive war in Indochina
could be exploited politically and that, in time,
US and Vietnamese will to fight might be worn
down.
7. If at any time, however, the leaders of Com-
munist China and the USSR came to believe
that a decisive defeat of the Viet Minh armed
forces was likely, they would be faced with
the decision whether Communist China
should intervene openly in force in order to
avert this development.
8. The following considerations might induce
the Communists to decide in favor of open in-
tervention in force:
a. Decisive defeat of the Viet Minh armed
forces would be a grave blow to Communist
prestige throughout the world and would seri-
ously diminish prospects for the expansion of
Communism in Asia.
b. A US military commitment in Indochina
might form part of a larger plan, possibly in-
volving, in the minds of the Communists, the
resurgence of Chinese Nationalist strength,
aimed at the destruction of the Chinese Com-
munist regime. In any case, decisive defeat
of the Viet Minh armed forces would bring US
power to the borders of China.
c. Whatever the initial intention, success-
ful US military action in Indochina might en-
courage the US to increase pressure on other
points of the Communist periphery.
d. Many observers, particularly in the Asian
neutralist states, would consider the US in the
wrong in Indochina and would condone Chi-
nese Communist intervention as a move to
"liberate Indochina from American imperial-
ism." These sentiments could be effectively
exploited by Communist propaganda.
e. The US, despite its warnings, might not
retaliate strongly against Communist China,
because it would fear that such retaliation
would alienate its NATO allies, result in wider
military deployment of US forces, cause Pei-
ping to invoke the Sino-Soviet treaty, and
thereby increase the danger of general war.
f. By intervening openly in force the Chi-
nese Communists might be able to prevent in-
definitely both the successful accomplishment
of the US mission and the disengagement of
substantial US forces from Indochina.
9. On the other hand, the following considera-
tions might deter the Communists from decid-
ing to intervene openly in force :
a. It would be more important to concen-
trate upon domestic problems including
strengthening of Communist China's econ-
omy.
b. There would be a grave risk of US re-
prisals against Communist China and possibly
of general war.
c. Indochina is remote from the USSR and
the centers of power in Communist China.
Accordingly, the establishment of a strong US
position in Indochina would not constitute, to
the same degree as in Korea, a threat to Chi-
nese Communist and Soviet power in the Far
East.
d. Short of actual intervention, the Chinese
Communists could acquire a position of
strength by reinforcing and rehabilitating the
military facilities on Hainan. This position
would dominate the Gulf of Tonkin, and pose
a distinct threat to sea-air lines of communi-
cations of US forces in Indochina and to rear
bases.
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e. The loss in prestige involved in the de-
feat of the Viet Minh armed forces could in
part be offset by depicting the Viet Minh as an
indigenous liberation movement. Moreover,
the Viet Minh Government and its armed
forces could be preserved on Chinese soil
where they could exercise constant military
and political pressure on the forces of the US
and the Associated States.
f. The military and political nature of the
Indochina war is such that even if the US
defeated the Viet Minh field forces, guerrilla
action could probably be continued indefinite-
ly and preclude the establishment of complete
non-Communist control over that area.
g. Under such circumstances, the US might
have to maintain a military commitment in
Indochina for years to come. Heavy US com-
mitments in Indochina over the long run
might cause concern to US allies and might
create divergences between the US and neu-
tralist states.
10. The Director of Central Intelligence and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believe that the Communist reaction to
commitment of US forces in Indochina would
largely depend upon US posture prior to, and
at the same time of, such commitment. If the
US posture made manifest to the Communists
that US naval and air retaliatory power would
be fully applied to Communist China, then
Peiping and Moscow would seek to avoid
courses of action which would bring about
such retaliation. In such circumstances, the
chances are better than even that the Chinese
Communists would not openly intervene in
Indochina, even if they believed that failure to
intervene would mean the defeat at that time
of the Viet Minh field forces in Indochina.
Therefore the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff, believe that in weighing the argu-
ments set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 Chinese
Communist leaders, in such circumstances,
would estimate that it was more advantageous
to them to support a guerrilla action in Indo-
china and tie down large US forces in such a
war, than to risk US retaliatory action against
China itself which open intervention would in-
volve. However, the Communists would al-
most certainly continue to support the rem-
nants of the Viet Minh, including re-equipping
these remnant forces on the Chinese side of
the border and possibly augmenting them
with Chinese "volunteers" so that Viet Minh
resistance could be continued indefinitely.
Moreover, they would pursue their objectives
in the rest of Southeast Asia by all means
short of open military intervention.
11. The Special Assistant, Intelligence, De-
partment of State, the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the
Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that
the condition of "decisive defeat of the field
forces of the Viet Minh" prescribed for con-
sidering this problem would necessarily result
in such a serious setback to Communist pres-
tige, security, and expansionism as to lead to
the following conclusions. In weighing the
arguments presented in paragraphs 8 and 9,
the Communist leaders in both Peiping and
Moscow would probably give greatest con-
sideration to: (a) the loss of prestige, the
threat to Bloc security, and the setback
to Communist expansionism in Southeast
Asia involved in a decisive defeat of the
Viet Minh armed forces and, (b) the risk of
direct US action against Communist China.
To the Communists, the consequences of the
decisive defeat of the Viet Minh armed forces
would be both certain and far reaching. In
appraising the possible nature and scale of
direct US action against the China mainland,
the Communists would weigh any US warn-
ings of probable consequences of intervention,
the temper of US and free world opinion, and
the probable US desire not to expand a local
action. It is unlikely that the Communists'
appraisal would lead them to the conviction
that the US reaction to their intervention in
Indochina would take the form of extensive
and intense warfare against Communist
China. In any case, their overriding sus-
picion of the ultimate motive of US forces in
strength on or near the borders of Communist
China would strongly influence their courses
of action. Thus, the thought foremost in
their minds would most probably be that fail-
ure to dislodge US military forces from the
Chinese border would lead to increasing chal-
lenges to Communist power elsewhere. We
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therefore believe that the chances are prob- Chinese Communists would intervene openly
ably better than even that the Communists and in force in an effort to save the Commu-
would accept the risk involved and that the nist position in Indochina.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23. DeemmbW 1953
LO Mm 2 O.E-2
1. This estimate relates to the draft 1MC Special
Annex an S.E.A. faavarded to you an 16 Deoenber ana ahou]d
be hurdled on the seas restriatesd basis.
2. A limited ntunber of edditiona3 oopt+ss of S..53 hens
been sent to the mmmbare of the IAC for use solely of thom
waarking an this problem.
Dew Assistant Direotar
National. Estimates
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
031382
PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION IN
INDOCHINA THROUGH 1954
SE-53
Approved 15 December 1953
Published 18 December 1953
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 15 December 1953. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LOS ff #4 49 /1
-49P
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