SE:-51: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (DRAFT FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100040018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 8, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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CENTRAL I N T E b b l d 9 N C E A C E I C T
8 September 195)
SUBJECT; 8E-51; THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE W : uDON SINN COVE i T
(Draft for Board Con siderz .tio n )
To estimate the . ignifieazove of the n aly established goveniment
in Indonesia with part.iou-UZ refe;^ere to indications of probable
future trends.
(UJrEa This estia ate adc -asses itself solely to the aignifioance
of the Indonesian cabinet which took office on 1 Auvist 1953c It does
not supersede NIE-77, '?Probable Developments in Indonesia," which was
published on U June 19530 We belitr,e that NIE-77 still contains our
beat estimate concerning the goneral vouarec of Indonesia deaelopmeents,
CONCLUSIONS
L, The Indonesian cabinet which took office on 1 August 1953 is
more leftist than any preceding Indonesian govarnxiento Eight important
ministries are held by individuals who will probably .r e$pond on many
issues to Communist influence,, Hewover;, none of these ministers is
believed to be subject to direct Communist discipline and oontx?ol,
and there are no known Communist Party members in the present cabinet.
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dial riot ratify; (b) a revision of the relationship between the
Natherlanda and Iadmneaia, ropla23rag the existing Round Table Agree-
ments of 1949 with normal international treaties; and (fi) a r4newa1
of desande that Western Now G-ainea become part of Indonesia,
Prci tUlte Dev~14 atss
17, We believe that the cabinet will move slow in carrying out
ive< program. Its Parliamentary support is too meager to risk quick
or decisive action on long-,standing controversial, issues. The gvverra
went will, find it particularly difficult to initiate an all-out csmpaig
to eliminate the t aru1 Islam or to effect a radical reorganization of
the maned foreee command,.
a~ An all-out, attack on the DarifL Islam,, waalA probably
have scm a Support from the public 9 the armed f ca,ff es,, and those
pol :tie al groups repro se.nta:d by the Nationalists and the Commu-
nists. Roweverp such action would probably muse the Moslem
re;x a-sentatives in the cabinet and their parties in Parliament
toithdraw their support of the government., thus preoipitati
V,s overthrow.
b. The prevent: goverr.:-n nt will almost certainly nit take
isive steps to resolve the aorxll- ov+ersial issue of reo gsnt
ation and modernization of ttaO armed for :es ~ l o:reovt r g it is
Probable that the cabinet wiU not attempt a W(MiPIA19 change in
the armed fo.r, cec oormnand. Any eweeping moves in thin dir tioi
CONFD 00 IAL
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2i.. Over the l ge~r^ a s it is 1,mpassible to estimate with
eanfideate the pr abab1e future trends in Indonesian poli.tioal develop-
Monte. However,, we believep on the baeis of present i.ndicaationsj, that
the Gists will not achieve a dominating position in Inddonesiaa
either through cried force or palitical actiona On balance, we believe
that the moderate nationalist aiements which have been predominant in
pr.vi,aua Indonesian governments will return to aaoendanvy and will be
able to maintain their position for the indefinite future
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