SE-51:: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT *

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100040010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 14, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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SEC RIT'Y INFOMMION
CR'NTRAL INTELLXGENC E AGENCY
14 September 1953
SUBJECT: SE-51:: THE SIGNIYICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GS 1MWIT*
THE PRMLFM
To estimate the significance of the newly established govern-
rent in Indonesia with particular reference to indications of
probable future trends.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Indonesian cabinet which took office on 1. Aug t 1953
is more leftist than any preceding Indonesian government. Eight
important ministries of a total of 20 are held by individuals who
will probably respond on many issues to Co naa:isst influence. Hower,,
there is no evidence to indicate that any of the ministers are subject
to direct Communist discipline and control.
This esstin to addresses itself solely to the significance of the
Indonuesian. cabinet which took office on 1 August 1953 For an
estimate of the general course of Indonesian developments, see
N4IE77, "Probable Developments in Indonesia,,," which was published
on ll June 1953.
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2. T e n e w cabinet's program fc3i t closqr,,.~y fo;a t=ai: nest peXt
prOgiims Previousl.y supported by more con s rv ?tiv 1e* a fs in parlia-
ment. We believe that the cabinet wi3_1 proceed c .ut.iouIS) r with its
moderate program and will avoid the c option of r d.ical io3icfes.
3. We believe that the present cabin twil-1. x nsan in office
for at least six months. fiver, ti passes, the tee of the
cabinet will bicome considerably more uncertain beer, sea
a. The pro-Communist 3ucliratiou of ce :at in mexdbers of the
cabinet and the tendency they will have to place their
supporters in key positions in the b cracy, the
armed forces, and the police vill probably it the enti-
Oo nist opposition in its present efforts to aoUdify
and nay cause conserwwtiv i i berg of groups now repro-
sented in the gooveiaent to er V ize re eieaar1 r the
Communist danger.
b. The present cabinet mimi, sooner or later cope with
controversial issues such as econo Wc problez ,, internal
security, foreign policy;, and amy reorgmizatior-. In
view of its slim majority in Parliament, the gove nt
viil run the risk of iYaeux7i an adv *: e vote which
would cause Its Bull ti ma at seekck to deaf with
these issues.
o~AP: Iill..
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e. Either through inexperience or leftist, pr?essure, the
present govrni ent might not deal effectively with
developing economic problems. Failure to halt adverse
economic trends could cause the fall of the goner; t.
4. As long as the present cabinet remains in pov r, the Com wtisste
will be Ina position gradua[aa11y to increase their influence. Although
the Coma vista may be able over an extended period, of time to achieve
a dominating position in Indonesia through a grad. : itr-,,rea a of
strength, ire do not believe, on the basis of present x tuicati ons, tbat
the Communists will, achieve this position,, either through armed force
or -olitical. action, during the ne< tveive months.
Formation and Position of the New Cabinet
On 2 June 1953, the Indonesian cabinet resi red. Ttia action
was largely the result of an intensification of the poittioaal cd 1ict
between the two major Indonesian political parties, the Nationalist
Party a the Mae jumi, both of whom were represented in the cabinet.
To help counter the popular strength of the A aas jumi, the Nation list
Party had for sons time cooperated with the Commist Party. On the
other hand, the MSS jUm?, alarmed by this growing cooperation, sought
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to relegate the Nationalist Party to a less dominant position in the
ne c cabinet. This struggle for power delayed the formation of a nev
Indonesian cabinet for nearly eight weeks, during which time the
Nationalist Party sought to achieve a dominant role in the now govern-
ment in order to enhance its Sol ticel. position before national elections
ware held.
6. The Nationalist Party won the struggle on 1 A+ gust vben
the President accepted a cabinet list beaded by the Nationalist Party.
More leftist than any preceding government, the cabinet is dependant
on Co__ r i.sst votes for a Parliamentary majority. Eight important
ministries of b total of 20 are held by individuals i tto vill probably
respond on moray issues to Ccm w isst influence. H ver, there is no
evidence to indicate that any of the ministers are subject to direct
Conic u ist discipline and control, and there are no kncwa Cc m must
Party nembers in the present cabinet. For the first tiuse, an
Indonesian cabinet does not include the k jumi., the ' ,?ty Vith'the
most Parli utery strength and, the greatest public su -port.
7. The Prim Minister an& the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Economic Affairs, ez, Finance are mmbera of the Nationalist Party.
Except for Prime Minister All, all these ministers belong to the
Party's left-wing. The ministers of Defense, Finance, Labor,, and
Agriculture will probably be willing to work t dth the Coe mmists on
SSCI
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:ray issues. The ministers of Foreign Afs 1iz, Justice? Co cations,
and. Education vill proba.Wy work with the Ccr; .mmists from tim to time
However,, the pro- ist tendencies of these 6 cabinet m . rs vill
be held s t in check by the Prime Minister and the other 1U. ors
of the cabinet, who can exercise considerable influcraze by threatening
to resign. Such resignations would probably cause the fa:U of the
cabinet. Under these circumstances, there ippars to be no irsdiate
possibility that the Comets will attempt to use this cabinet to
force adoption of radical policies.
8. The parties represented in the cabinet have a total of 92
votes out of 210 active Pariienent members. Votes of the opposition
parties -- MasJumi., Socialist, Christian, Catholic, and Democratic --
total BO. Eight out of 15 independent votes will probably o to the
gvverument, giving the government parties 100 votes,. 6 votes short of
a majority. The Com xuiot Party of Indonesia and the Coaranmist-,
dominat labor feration (SOBSI) have already indicated that they
will support the go-v earnment with their 19 votes. Thus, the cabinet
mint rely on Communist support to win Parliamentary appro*r , of any
controversial measure. rMe Com uni sts, while unable to insist on all
measures which they may desire, probably viU press for policies and
conditions conducive to expanding their influence while avoiding any
radical policy rorhich might split the cabinet end cat e - It to fall..
Parliamentary support for the cabinet is uncertain due to the lack
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of party discipline, although political o 7portuni.am anc.. a, desire to
ren in in control of the govern nt may tend to tighten party obedience.
It is quite possible that the opposition might Wn su icient votes
to cause the gc-rernment to fall.
Policies of the New Cabinet
9. The program announced by the new cabinet is similar to the
program of its predecessors. The Pro9mm stresses do atic security
the importance of holding general elections, an economic policy based
on the welfare of the common people, an. Independent foreign Policy,
and a revision of the relationship between Indonesia end the Nether-
10. First place in the governments progrem, given to a pledge
to settle the internal security problem along lity a -. ;Utical
lines. The government ' a statement conA d all e.. di s1dn t groups
and promised quick action so long as it had the support of the people.
However,, it is likaly that only limited action bill be taken, a i n .t
any aid dissident groups became-. (a) an all-out capa;1.ga Mould
cause further strain on the government's economic reso`. c rs; (b) the
question of whether or not to take drastic military action against
the principal ar d. dissident group, Dana.-:l Is!=,, is an e,.trem ly con-
troversial political W. religious issue.
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il. - The program calls for the holding of general elections for
Parli nt asl fora co tits nt assembly in accordance with the election
isv passed by Parliament in early ,1953, end the gov rnment presented a
timetable to enable the elections to be held by May 1955. In the mean-
time., attempts are likely to be made by various political parties to
establish control of election mehineryo
12. The cabinet's announced economic program provides little
defiftite indication of the go rnment ?a intentions. Little change is
expected in agricu3:tu policies. No definite statnt, was made
reg .ing fo igs i n stieent or nationalization of estate or other
foreign holdiu , but the n m, government will. probably follow a policy
less favo bie to foreign in story, particul rly with respect to labor
legislation. Certain government announce nts indicate the possibility
that the pre ,i.ous cabi nx t l a stringent import regulations, designed to
conserve foreign exchange.. y be abandoned and that further privileges
and further credi,.t facilities ,y be made available to Indonesian
businessmen. T.ese policies coald lead to a larger balance of payments
deficit and to inflationary pressures.
13. The nev govern -nt b indicated that it vi.U in gsrreral
follow the existing foreiga policy but will given even greater *Mpba sis
to Indonesia's "i a ad=V position. Stress bas already been laid
on the i:? ortaxce of estab.L skiing closer relations with the Soviet
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Bloc in order to counterbalance those now existing with the West
Arrangements will probable be made soon to open an en basssy in Moscow, an
action, approved by the Parliament under the previous cabinet. Attempts
win probably be made to increase trade with the Soviet Bloc, but signi-
ficant results are not likely. Concerning US aid., the foreign minister
has announced that the agreement to receive teebnical assistance will
be continued but will be reviewed in order to determine how advantageous
it is to Indonesia. Other foreign policy objectives are likely to b :
(a) the negotiation of a bilateral treaty with Japan to supplant the
San Francisco treaty which the Indonesians signed but did not ratify;
(b) a revision of the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia,
dissolving the Netherlands Indonesian Union and replacing the existing
Round Table Agreements of 1949 with normal international treaties; and
(c) a renewal of demos that Western Nev Guinea become part of Indonesia.
Probable Developm nts
14. The new cabinet's program fo..ows cl ooel, ' for the most part
other progrr previously supported by more conservative elemntss in
Parliament. We believe that the cabinet will proded ceantioaWly with
its moderate program and vil.l avoid the 9doptior of raa .ical policies.
Its Paarliaxatary support is too uncertain to risk quick or decisive
action on long-standing controversial issues;, such as action against
dissident` groups, armed forces reorganization,, and implementation of
the election law.
aa. An all-out attack on the Darul Islam, vould probably
have some support from the public, the armed forces,
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and those political groups reprosesn e . by the Nation&-
liests and the Communists - Hoer, such action vould
probably came the Moslem representatives in the cabinet
and their panties in Parliament to v ithdrawn their support
of the government, thus precipitating its overthrow. It
is probable therefore that only limited military action
will be talke against the dissident- groups in general
while attempts to negotiate an agmemeat with the
Daxu L Islam may be made in order to mollify the Mas3ucmi
opposition.
b. The present government will avoid taking decisive steps
to resolve the controversial issue of reorganisation and
modernisation of the armed forces. Any sweeping dhanges
in the armed forces cond., particularly if they involved
appointing Communists or Communist sympathizerep would
probably be strongly opposed by the bulk of the armed forces
and the National Police Mobile Brig. It is probable,
however, that the goer nt will attempt to zze gradual
cbau a in the leadership of the armed forces and will
probably successful in v eakening opposition elements
therein.
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c. Although implementation of the election law is promised
by the cabinet, we believe that mid-19955 is the earliest
date that the election could be held. Atteptta will
probably be made during the tenure of this government to
establish control of the election machinery to enhance
the prospects of government pasties its the elections.
15. We believe that the present cabinet vi,.31 remain in office
for at least six months. The opposition in Pasrliement dares not have
sufficient strength to defeat the cabinet, particularly so long as the
Ccmmzn#.sts continue to support the cabinet. The opposition is in a
particularly difficult position because it bas supported a similar program
and where it does disagree with the cabinet, it is advocating policies
which have little popaualar' support, 1.e.,9 measures to attract foreign
investment and increase econeie austerity.
i6. However, as tine passes, the ten of the cabinet will be-
come considerably more uncertain became:
a. The pro-Ca mint inclination of certain members of the
cabinet ... and the tea ncy they Will have to place their
supporters in key positions in the bureancracy,, the
armed forces, and the police -- will probably aid the
anti-Communist opposition in its present efforts to
solidify end may cause conservative members of groups
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now represented in the goveznmernt to r econgn .. more
clearly the Consmu ist Saner. Internal dissension in
the cabinet , a split in a ern nt party, or an adverse
vote in the Parliament might then cause the government to
fall. 'It is also possible that a coup might be under-
taken by opposition elements in the bureaucracy an& in
the armed forces.
b. The present cabinet rust sooner or later cope with contzo -
versias1 issues such as economic problems,, internel security,
foreign policy, and reorganization. In view of
its slim majority in Parli nt, the govern erwwnt will
run the risk of incur"riug an adverse vote which could
cause its fall any time, it seeks to deal with these issues.
Moreover, .prolonged inaction in handling these issues would
probably also lead to the fall of the cabinet.
a. Inds eie s economy is in precarious condition at present.
Either through inexperience or leftist pressure, the
present gcxvexnt might not deal effectively with
dee1oping economic problew-. Failure to halt adverse
economic trey could cause the fall of the ga rer nt.
17. . long as the present cabinet remains in t2ower., the Communists
will be in a position gradually to increase their 1nflLiance. May will.
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continue their attempts to strengthen their position by (a) increasing
their influence in the Nationalist and other sties represented in the
cabinet: (b) placing Com;nunists anti Communist elrmpathizers in i rtent
positians in the various ministries end in the armed forces; and (c) im-
provi-jg their chances for popular support in the forthcoming elections.
The ."o mists will be able to exert considerable influence over the
cabinet because of the latter's dependence on Comte et support in
Parliament a However, we do not believe that through such measures the
Cass tmm mists will be able to in control over the government during the
expected life of this cabinet. On the other hand, if this cabinet re-
mains in power for an extended period of time, the Comm.eta may
ultimately be in a position to dominate Indonesia.
18. It is impossible to estimate with confidence the probable
future trends in Indonesian political developments. On balance, how-
ever, we believe, on the basis of present indications, that the
Con uniets will increase their influence but will net achieve a
domi.m&ting position in Indonesia, either through ad force or
political action, during the next twelve mouths.'
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