G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO SE-51 (FORMERLY NIE-77/1): THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100040005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REQ

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DEFARTMERT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, IHTJ LLIGENCE
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*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions (3nAppFile*
G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO SE-51 (Formerly NIB-77/1): THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF TEE NSW INDONESIAN GOV.ERZIN T
A. 1. What caused the former (Wilo
theFos1tions of the major parties regarding the formation of a new overnment
after the fall of the Wilopo cabinet? What were the important factors, in the
failure of the formateurs prior to Wo one ro and why was he able to succeed?
The resignation of the Wilopo Cabinet on 2/3 June 1953 was brought
about by the failure of one of the two principal government parties--the
Rationalist (PNI)--to support the government's program for Land Distribution
in North Sumatra.
The positions of the major parties on the formation of a new
Cabinet were essentially:
a. PHI (Nationalist Party): Generally opposed to any Cabinet
in which either the Masjumi (Moslem Party) or Socialists (PSI) took a
leading part; disposed to ,.the formation of a Cabinet in which Communists
or Communist front groups were Lncluded.
b. Masjumi (Moslem Party)/PSI (Socialists): Generally opposed to
participating in any Cabinet in which the Nationalist Party and the Communist
Party were included--so long as certain issues between the Masjumi/PSI on one
aide and the PNI on the other were left unsettled.
c. PEI (Communist Party): Disclaimed any desire to participate
directly in any Cabinet, but offered to support any Cabinet which did not'
include In its program activities detrimental to the M. PEI was enthu-
siastic in its support of PNI attempts to form a Cabinet.
d. G-2 has insufficient information to determine factors In the
failure of the formateurs prior to Wongsonegoro, and why he wae,..aj to succeed.
Documsnt Its.
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de[~i.;A ...,t r:s c etEon to declass
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Reproduction of this document In whole
or in part is prohibited except for
inclusion in SE-51.
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2. What role President Sukarno laved during the Cabinet crisis?
Whx" was the Present government accepted by Sutmr..-js" Does his acceptance
Of this leftist government indicate a change in his political orientation?
Rave his actions affected his position in Indonesia?
President Sukarno, probably as a result of personal attacks by
Moslem leaders, appeared reluctant to call on the Masjumi to form a
Cabinet, is spite of the fact that Masjumi threats to withdraw from the
Wilopo Cabinet over Pill opposition to the Government's Land Distribution
Program in Sumatra, seemingly brought about that Cabinet's fall.
The Government formed by Wongeonegoro was the first and possibly
the only one which could achieve Parliamentary support unless both Meajimmi
and PEI could be persuaded to participate in and support the same Cabinet
Program. Sukarno's acoaptence of this Cabinet does not represent any
notable change in his political orientation, but rather a continuation of
the part he has been playing for the past year or more. Responsibility for.
the new Cabinet appears to lie solely with Sukarno.
G-2 has insufficient information as to whether President Sukarno 's
action has affected his position in Indonesia.
3. What has been the role of Vice President E.atta?
Vice President Hatta apparently remained aloof throughout most of
the Cabinet crisis. There appears to be an open breach between Batta and
Sukarno. The development of this gulf can be traced back at least to July
1952 when a dispute over the control of the Armed Forces first came into
the open. At that time Sukarno maintained that the 1950 Constitution
carried over in intent the provisions of the 1945 Constitution which made
the President the de facto Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. On the
other hand, Hatta and the Sultan of Djogjakarta, who was Minister of Defense
at the time the dispute arose, maintained that the 1950 Constitution provided
that the President was only ex officio Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
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B. WHAT RAVE BEEP THE POLITICAL TRH IN INDONESIA SINC11948,. IN-
1. the Parliament; and
The Parliament, reflecting trends in the political orientation of
the political parties, has moved increasingly to the left. Leftist leanings
are not reflected in the legislation but rather in an increasing willingness
on the part of parties and individual members to participate in Cormtunist-
sponsored or pro-Soviet activities. Their participation, while not in
itself evidence of Communist sympathy, has been accompanied by an official
parliamentary reaction favoring the balancing of ties between the West and
the Soviet Bloc which, in effect, lessens Western influence.
2. the political parties and labor organizations
Since 1950 when the Soviet Union recognized the Indonesian
Government, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) has been making a
considerable effort to develop an effective "united front" of political
parties and to influence other Party leaders sympathetic to various Communist
causes. The most notable success the PKI has bad in this effort is among
the left-wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI) which between 1950 and the
present appears to have gained control of that party. Furthermore, during
the same period, other .parties, notably the United Islamic Party (P811)
Labor Party (Par-tai Burah), Indonesian Peasants Group (BTI), Indonesian
Peoples Union, (MI), as well as non-affiliated individuals, have increas-
ingly favored policies subscribed to by the Communists. This has provided
for a leftist trend, not only in these parties but also in the Parliament,
as described above. There has been no balancing swing in.the more con-
servative parties to oppose these leftist trends favoring closer relations
with the Soviet Bloc countries or to favor expanded relations with the West.
SOBSI, the largest federation of Indonesian trade unions, is
Communist-controlled.. Encouraged by the United States and the ICFTU (Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions), an effort was made in 1952
by non-Communist unions to unite in order to strengthen their opposition to
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SOBSI. The result of this effort was the eventual establishment of the
All Indonesia Congress of Workers ($BBI). The XWI'probably will not be
effective in opposing SOBSI. Among the several indications of its
limitations is the fact that Dr. $usnan, who heads the BHSI, is a member
of the PNI and is expected to attempt to run the EBSI for the benefit of tho
FBI, which, as stated above, is collaborating more and more with the PLI.
In addition, Rusnan's Union, now affiliated with BBSI, has in the past cooper-
ated with SOBSI and three of his best union leaders were sent to Peking in
1953 for the May Day celebration despite the refusal of other non-Communist
union leaders to attend. Thus, the trend in labor appears to be stronger
than ever toward the left.
C. WHAT IS THE POLITIC AT. CGl3POc TIOD AND S'!' iGTH Q' THE NEW GOIt' 'ixzy14Tt
1. What is Composition of the new government? What are the relation-
ship,s of the Cabin _ e_ one another and what are their individual relation-
ships with Sukarno and Hatta?
G-2 has some biographic information, although not in sufficient
detail to establish past relationships.
2. What is the extent of the su rt for the new government in the:
e. Parliament
In spite of statements by lot Deputy Prime Minister Wongeoneeoro
that the Cabinet can count on 114 votes plus all 15 Non-party votes in the
Parliament not including the 23 Communist votes, it is estimated that the
new government can count on only 92 votes of the participating Cabinet parties
p.un 8 or 9 Non-party votes. The new government can be opposed by 80
votes of the non-participating parties plus 6 or 7 non-party votes. The
balance of power lies in the 23 Communist votes.
C. A~r~oed Farces and National Police
The Armed Forces and Police have adopted a policy of watch-
ful waiting concerning the new Cabinet. We estimate, however, that approxi-
mately seventy-nine of the eighty-five combat battalions in North Sumatra,
West Java, and Central Java, along with about fifty percent of the National
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Police Brigade (about 96,000 men) probably would oppose any Cabinet troves
to remove present Army leadership.
Fifty-six combat battalions (about 57,000 man) in East Java and
East Indonesia and to a far lesser extent the seven combat battalions
(about 10,000 men) in South Sumatra probably would support any PI I -PKI
sponsored moves within the new government to remove or weaken the Army
leadership.
d. General public
The general public seems to be largely apathetic.
3. To what extent does the newjpvernment enhance the ability of
the Communists to influence policy?
The Communist position to influence policy has been enhanced.
The Communists will continue to exert pressure for policy decisions and
actions which will (1) undermine the strength and prestige of the Masjumi
and the Socialists, and (2) lessen Western influence either by balancing
it with increasing ties with the Communist Bloc or by denouncing it as
imperialistic. Efforts to undermine the strength of the Maejumi will be
supported by both the PII and weaker political elements now forming the
Government. Many of the parties already subscribe to efforts directed
toward balancing Western and Communist Bloc Influence.
What is t h e Communist etrenth or ability to influence lic
and action in the follow1 :
a. Parliament. The Communist role in Parliament is to further
their program toward domination of Indonesia. Through their voting strength,
which represents the balance of power in Parliament, the Communists can
by intimidation exert considerable influence.
b. the Cabinet. The Communists will influence many of the
Cabinet members on a variety of subjects. Communist strength, however,
in the Cabinet is limited to fellow travelers, since the PSI is not
actively participating. Prime Minister Sastroadmidjojo has announced
that all issues on which the Cabinet cannot agree will be referred to
the Parliament. In this event the PSI balance of power probably would
mean a decision in- their favor.
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o, the leadership of the Armed Forces and the National Police
Nearly all the principal leaders in the Armed Forces and
Police are non-Communist. No firm figures are available, but there have
been numerous reports of Communists or fellow travelers in the lower
echelons of command. The Communists presumably have carried on subvercive
activity at all levels of the Armed Forces and Police. Although the new
Minister of Defense, Iva $usummsaaummantri, has a leftist background, opposi-
tion to Communist-line policies probably will be resisted successfully
by the non-Communist Armed Forces leaders. For the most part Communist
influence probably will be applied in Parliament in order to promote Armed
Forces regulations aimed at weakening the military structure. Increased
efforts to subvert individual members of the Armed Forces and Police pro-
bably will continue.
d. tLe permanent staffs in the ministries and governmental
departments?
G-2 can cite no figures regarding Communist strength
except a few estimates of SOBSI-controlled unions in some elements of the
government staffs. However, it is believed that there is no large-scale,
well-organized opposition to the .F or to many of the policies which it
proposes. It is further believed that, in the event that the government
does not attempt to take security action against Communists, a strong
effort will be made to insert Communists or Communist sympathizers into
key positions of control and influence.
e. The Nationalist Party; other parties?
There are indications that leaders of various parties have
been participating in Communist activities such as the peace movement and
various contacts with the PST and support of policies favored by the Com-
munists. There is no evidence of the extent of infiltration or the firmness
with which any party will remain committed to its present course. It is
estimated, however, that unless the Commmvnieta.make a blatant mistake
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possibly in connection with their position vis-a-vis the Armed Forces,
most of the parties now participating in or supporting the government
will continue to follow their present course., This course will increase
Communist strength and the PKI's ability to influence policies subscribed
to and actions undertaken by these groups,
f. the labor movement?
What is the potential for Communists to increase their
influence in these various vernmentel or and political groupa?
The potential for extension of Communist influence is
such that there will be-continuing increases until the Communists eventually
participate in the control of the government.
4. What are the ca Ilities of the o sition to affect the sition
of the new government with respect to program and longevity? What tactics
are they likely to adopt?
In Parliament, the opposition parties can do little more than
talk, for they lack the voting strength to defeat the Cabinet supporters.
As in the case of the Wilopo Cabinet, from which the PKI succeeded in
splitting the PHI support, the opposition parties must probe for weaknesses
in both the Pill and the PIR (The Greater Indonesian Party - 15 seats in
Parliament). The opposition *111 probably attempt to split the PHI, in
which case the conservative members in Parliament might be able to persuade
conservatives in the other nationalist parties to defect. Feiling?this,
the opposition might support a "Holy War" or a coup d! a tat organized by
portions of the Armed Forces.
D. WHAT PaI8IC]ES WILL PROBABLY BE ADO?= BY THE NEW GOVEI HMENT?
1. With respect to domestic issues and problems;
a. Development of national defense lio and laws and the
reorganization of the milita forces ineludi the solution to the
"17 October affair."
The new Cabinet probably will avoid decisions relating to
national defense policies, laws and reorganization of the Armed Forces
while attempting to conduct their announced program of anti-dissident
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operations in Java and the Celebes. However, the Defense Minister is known
to favor the development of a strong Indonesian Navy. Probably no legal
action will be taken against officers involved in the 17 October affair.
Personnel shifts within the Armed Forces will probably take place gradually,
placing officers. loyal to the new government in strategic positions.
b. Su preseioa of dissident u aci 1 the Darul Islam
and the insurgents in the South Celebes.
The present Cabinet has promised to launch strenuous anti-
dissident operations, although no clear plan of attack has been enunciated.
This portion of the Cebinet program will receive widespread popular support
for various reasons. The PEI and Coaauniet labor and front organizations
have been increasingly vociferous in their demands for the Government to
take decisive measures against the dissident elements, particularly in Java.
The military and police forces, non-Communist groups, and, recently, even
Moslem organizations also have called for Governmentraction. Communist
an
support of/anti-dissident program, however, is in line with their desire
to weaken the Indonesian Armed Forces, thereby reducing effective opposition
to Communist efforts in Indonesia. Because Indonesian Communists do not
control directly any sizeable military force, no greater advantage could
come to then than a further weakening of the Indonesian Armed Forces through
the attrition and decimation brought about by a long and costly internal war.
c. the holding of national elections.
Immediate national elections have been promised by the new
C-Abinet, but the same difficulties anticipated in NIB-77,, par 51,, In
implementing the election law will be encountered, and actual elections
probably will not be hold for an additional six.to twelve months (1955)
at best.
E DOES THE NEW COVERT R3PFdMM A SIGNIFICANT CRAMS IA_TBS POLITICAL
TREND IN INDONESIA?
No change is represented in Indonesia's political trend by the new
Cabinet, although the greatly enhanced position of the Indonesian Communists
represents the highest point achieved since the transfer of sovereignty.
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F. WHAT WOULD BE THE PROBABLE COURSE OF DE a1O ?4ENTS IN IXUDOJWSIA OVER
THE NEXT SIX MONTHS IF THE NEW GOVER1 ' WERE TO:
1. Seek rapid implementation of the program outlined in Section D abare?
A rapid implementation of the Cabinet's program probably would
result In civil disturbances verging on civil war in whth the Armed Forces
in the territories generally opposed to the Cabinet would be supported by
Moslem and Socialist party followers.
2. Seek to implement its program over a six-month yertod or la r,
meanwhile seek to replace leaders in the Armed Forces and kepersonnel
In the ministries with rersons loyal to.the new government?
Should the new government be successful in gradually replacing
leaders in the Armand Forces and key ministries, the Communist position in
Indonesia will be strengthened.
G. WHAT IS TEE LIKELY DURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT? WHAT WOULD BE
THE PROBABLE COMPOSITION OF A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMNT?
The present Cabinet is very likely to enjoy a life as long as the
record 14-month service of the preceding Wilopo Cabinet. Succeeding
Cabinets probably will be even more leftist in composition.
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