GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000090036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: June 16, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Relea6 ! 9 : CIA RDP79SO101lAO01 0009 036 1+Wl
~Securnty Information CONFIDENTIAL
FROM
SUBJECT
25X1A6b
1. The following is from passed to us v
OSI's Teleconference with his morning:
25X1A6b 4
GERMANY APPEARS TO
REVERSE OF POLICY-OR TACTICS-IN E
1
.
.
BE UNIQUE IN SOV ANNALS. ITS MAGNITURE AND DARING IS ALARMING.
TO REGARD IT AS A MERE ROUTINE UPSET WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS
HAVING ORDERED SUCH FAR REACHING CHANGE OF COURSE, KREMLIN C
NOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED TO STOP THERE. WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED
IF FURTHER SENSATIONAL MOVES WERE ANNOUNCED.
2. BELIEVE THAT, WHILE ALSO DIRECTED TOWARD W. GERMAN VOTERS,
NEW MEASURES HAVE A FAR MORE SINISTER ASPECT. KREMLIN PROBABLY
ASSUMES THAT MERE DIVERSIONARY MANEUVERS INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT
W. GERMANY TO REMAIN UNDER WESTERN INFLUENCE NO MATTER WHETHER OR
NOT ADENAUER REMAINS IN POWER. HOWEVER, WE CONVINCED THAT THOUGHT
OF REARMED GERMANY EXTREMELY PERTURBING TO SOVS TO EXTENT WHERE
THEY WOULD MAKE SUCH CONCESSIONS THAT WERE NECESSARY TO CLEAR THE
WAY TOWARD THEIR MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE: TO GET US OUT OF
EUROPE.
3. TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, UNIFICATION OF NEUTRALIZED GERMANY
MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED. FOR ONCE THE COMMIES DO NOT LIE WHEN THEY
OPENLY ADMIT THAT MEASURES IN E. GERMANY SHOULD HELP ACHIEVEMENT
OF UNIFICATION. INASMUCH AS SOVS MUST REALIZE THAT SUCH UNIFICA-
TION PRESUPPOSES CONCESSIONS TO WEST, BELIEVE POSSIBLE THAT CON-
CESSIONS WILL BE MADE AND GERMANY GRANTED FREE ELECTIONS PROVIDED
U.S. AT LEAST OBLIGATES ITSELF TO QUIT GERMANY AND AT MOST ALSO
GIVE UP RING OFAIR BASES.
4. THUS BELIEVE IT PROBABLE THAT RECENT MOVES SEEK TO PRE-
PARE GROUND FOR. EQUALIZATION OF ZONES, AT LEAST TO A DEGREE, THAT
WOULD NOT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR FREE ELECTIONS TO TAKE PLACE.
CONSIDER ALL SUCH CONSEQUENCES AS CUTTING FLOW OF REFUGEES BY-
PRODUCT.
KREMLIN FEARS NOTHING AS MUCH AS REARMED, INDUSTRIALLY STRONG WEST
GERMANY. IF UNIFICATION WOULD NEUTRALIZE GERMANY AND TIE IT COM-
MERCIALLY TO THE EAST BY OPENING NEW MARKETS SUCH AS COMMERCIALLY
COMPETING WEST CANNOT GRANT, IF U.S. WOULD QUIT GERMANY (AND THERE-
FORE EUROPE), IF NATO WOULD SEEM TO HAVE NO LONGER REWNYRND.
CHANGE IN
ECLASSIFIED CLASS. [I
CONFIDENTIAL NO D
Approved For Releas 0 } ?m,,IA RDP79S010A% 41fA A? n0036=I--~
Germany
 Approved For Releao , =9 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000090036-1
'Security Infornlatiof
CQN FI DENTIAL
EXISTENCE AND VANISH WITHOUT MUCH PUSHING,--THEN ENTIRE QUESTION
OF PRESENTLY DISPUTED TREATIES BECOMES SUPERFLUOUS. ONCE U.S.
WITHDRAWS, USSR WILL REMAIN MASTER OF EUROPE. IT MAY HAVE LOST
TIME SOVIETIZING GERMANY BUT TIME IS NO OBJECT FOR COMMIES. ALSO
SOVIETIZATION IN EE SATELLITES WILL HAVE PROGRESSED RELENTLESSLY.
THE KREMLIN MAY THEN TRY TO STAGE A REVOLUTION IN GERMANY BUT
EVEN IF IT DOES NOT, IT CAN PROBABLY MANAGE TO KEEP A GERMANY
WITHOUT PHYSICALLY PRESENT U.S. SUPPORT NEUTRALIZED FOR INDEFI-
NITE PERIOD. 25X1 A
5. IT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ESTIMATED THAT SOVS
WILL NEVER GIVE UP E. GERMANY. INTELIGENCEWISE, THIS POSITION
HAS PRODUCED CERTAIN ONE-SIDEDNESS MAINLY BECAUSE TERM "GIVE UP"
HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED IN TERMS OF TIME. IN LONG RUN, SOVS WILL OF
COURSE NOT GIVE UP E. GERMANY. IN SHORT RUN THEY MIGHT OSTENSIBLY
DO SO. STALIN POLICY HAS LED KREMLIN INTO DEAD END ROAD. NEW
RULERS MAY WELL HAVE DECIDED THAT DRASTIC CHANGES ARE DUE SINCE
STALEMATE LEADING TO WEST'S CONSOLIDATION IN GENERAL AND W. GER-
MANY'S REARMAMENT IN PARTICULAR. DON'T BELIEVE SOVS WOULD QUIT
GERMANY UFLESS WE DO SAME, BUT CONSIDER IT DANGEROUS TO REMAIN SO
INFLEXIBLE, IN OUR ESTIMATES THAT WE RULE OUT CONTINGENCY OF SOV
WITHDRAWAL OFFER FROM GERMANY. NOR SHOULD WE OVERLOOK FURTHER
SOV "CONCILIATORY" MOVES IN AUSTRIA MADE FORSOMEWHAT DIFFERENT
REASONS.
6. CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH SCHEMES ARE INCALCULABLE. IF WE RE-
FUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN FOUR POWER TALKS, WE'LL BE IN BAD WITH EAST
AND WEST. IF WE CONSENT AND REJECT SOV CONCESSIONS, WE'LL B E IN
BAD TOO. WE FIND OURSELVES CORNERED AND NEED ALL OUR INGENUITY TO
FIND A REASONABLY GOOD WAY OUT OF DILEMMA. THIS IS REASON WHY IM-
PORTANCE OF NEW MOVES CAN HARDLY BE OVERESTIMATED.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2R r' batAfRDP79S01011A001000090036-1