G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-96: 'THAILAND'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND COMMUNIST PRESSURES AND ATTACKS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000070003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 15, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 0-2, INTELLIGENCE
TAB "Al,
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
MAY 15 1953
G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 96: "THAILAND'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND
COMMUNIST PRESSURES AND ATTACKS"
I. Oral contribution on military factors given 12 May 1953
II. THAILAND'S CAPABILITIES TO WITHSTAND COMMUNIST PRESSURES OR ATTACKS
A. No contribution.
B. Communist Attacks
bilities would Thailand have to counter an invasion
in the Immediate future by Indochinese Communist Units?
The Thai Army (approximately 119,000) has the equivalent of
5 regimental combat teams deployed throughout northern and eastern Thailand.
In the event of an open Viet Minh aggression in divisional strength, the
Thai Army could counter initially with one of the 5 regimental combat teams
presently deployed in the border region. Reinforcements could be accomplished
with 3 regimental combat teams and supporting armor and cavalry units from,
the Bankok area and would provide sufficient strength to force the Viet Minh
to withdraw or to disperse into guerilla groups.
It is not believed, however, that Viet Minh operations in Laos
pose the threat of an overt invasion of Thailand in the immediate future. It
is considered unlikely that the Viet Minh, even if successful in an attempt
to gain control over major portions of Laos, would attempt direct military
action against Thailand. A Viet Minh invasion of Thailand would weaken and
divide the strength required for the accomplishment of local objectives,
consolidation of gains, and for containment and elimination of French forces
in the area. It should be recognized that the primary objective of the Viet
Minh is undoubtedly the complete elimination of the French forces in Indochina
and the establishment of a Communist state. It Is, therefore, Improbable
that they would consider a diversion of their forces from the accomplishment
of this objective for an. invasion of Thailand. However unlikely such a course
might be, the Viet Minh could release a force of up to division strength
(10,000). for action against Thailand without unduly weakening their position
in Indochina. TT S f p
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2. An invasion by Indochinese (Viet Minh) gaits at Ps time
following the 1953 rainy season and after Indochinese Communist unite had
consolidated recent wins made within Indochina?
The coneideratiozwhich are believed to govern the Viet Minh
decision for attack against Thailand in the immediate future will probably
continue to be the controlling factors after the rainy season. gven assuming
a consolidation of Viet Minh gaine,(an accomplishment that is not indicated
by the present situation) it is unlikely that the Viet Minh would be able to
divert a force of greater than division strength for operations against
Thailand. Under these circumstances it is likely that initial Viet Minh
successes would be somewhat greater and the capability for continuing operations
over o longer period of time would be increased, but it is doubtful that the
outcome could be materially altered from that discussed in par 1 proceeding,
3. An invasion by ma4or Chinese Communist units, eu orted or
not sup ported by Indochinese and Burmese Communist unite, at any time?
The Thai Armed Forces would be incapable of withstanding an
attack by a numerically superior Chinese Communist force. While the extent of
their resistance would be determined largely by political considerations,
militarily the Thai forces could only delay for a short time a Chinese Communist
advance to the southern peninsula.
4. What capabilities would Thailand have to control the border
and pre-vent infiltration or guerrilla activity by Indochinese.or Chi
Communist directed forces?
The Thai-Indochina border extends for over 1,300 miles, some
600 of 'which are adjacent to the area of recent Viet Minh operations in
northern Laos; roughly from Pakeane to the Burma border. It is manifestly
impossible for the Thai to control effectively this border and prevent the
infiltration of small guerrilla forces or Communist agents, couriers, etc.
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The Thai Government has, however, taken a number of precautionary measures
to strengthen its border security in the present circumstances. Although
the Thai Police are responsible for border security, 2d Army headquarters and
Police headquarters at brat are coordinating security measures in the border
region. Some 2,000 border Police are being imoved to the Laos border (with
the heaviest concentration between Chieng hen and Paksane), regular patrols
are being instituted, and air patrols reportedly are to be established. In
view of these additional security measures, it is believed likely that the
Thai Government forces, although not able .to prevent the infiltration of
Communist guerrilla units, would be capable of undertaking military operations
to harass the guerrilla bands and prevent the establishment of firm base
areas in Thailand. These Thai forces, however, would be unable to prevent
the development of terroristic guerrilla activity.
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.5. What capabilities would Thailand have to counter Camnunist-
inspired armed insurrection within Thailand at amy time in the foreseeable
future ?
?chile the Thai Govermsent measures to strengthen border
security are believed adequate to cope with Communist activities on the scale
which can be expected to develop in the immediate future, less attention has
been given to measures designed to cope with possible Communist efforts to
cause disaffection among the local population. The presence of Communist
forces along Thailand's northeastern border will increase considrably the
Communist's capabilities for subversion and the development of a dissident
movement either among the estimated 50,000 Vietnamese or among the local
mixed population. The northeastern provinces have long been economically
depressed relative to the rout of Thailand. This condition has fostered a
degree of dissatisfaction among the local population which could be4zploited
by the Caanmunists. The Government, however, appears to be aware of this
problem and is considering the soretg and removal to southern Thailand of
some 400-600 leaders and subversives among the Vietnamese population. Despite
this action to-increase internal security and the measures to strengthen
border security, the Thai Army and police forces would not at present be capable
of preventing a Communist-directed and .supported insurrection within
Thailand. The Army and Police forces, however, would probably be able to limit
such an insurrection to guerrilla activity.
C. Contingencies affecting Thai capabilities.
In what manner would the above Thai oa abilities to withstand external
and internal Communist pressures or attacks be affected brz
1. Events in Indochina?
a. A major gain in Communist strength, and the consolidation
of Communist strength on Thailand's northern and eastern borders?
Such a gain would enhance Communist capabilities visivis
the Thai Army and Police capabilities. It is impossible however, to estimate
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all of the consequences of a major gain in Communist strength, but it is
believed that the factors which militate against a Viet Vinh decision to
begin an open invasion of Thailand (discussed in par H. 1 proceeding)
would not be materially changed. A course of open aggression against
Thailand would be probable only in the event that the Soviet and Chinese
Cbmauuniat leaders had determined to risk general war, in which case any
invasion of Thailand would probably be undertaken by the Chinese Communist
forces*
b. A major decline in C6mmunist stre th, and a removal of
CoV..muni st strength from Thailand's borders?
A major decline in Communist strength and the removal of
Communist strength from Thailand's borders would increase Thai Capabilities
relative to the Viet Minh forces, but would have no material effect upon Thai
capabilities with respect to the Chinese Communists. Such a decline prooably
would not significantly reduce the Communist capability to create Communist-
inspired disorders in the northeastern provinces, but might lessen the
prospects of their utilizing this capability.
c. A continuation of the indecisive warfare in Indochina with
little or no consolidation of Communist strength on Thailand's borders?
A Continuation of the indecisive warfare in Indochina with
little or no consolidation of Communist strength on Thailand's borders would
have no significant effect upon Communist capabilities to exploit existing
dissatisfaction, to create Communist-inspired strikes, and to organize
armed terrorist groups.
2. Western assistance to Thailand?
as A major increase in 1estern air, including guarantees of
Thailand's s~curity?
A substantial increase in Thai military capabilities,
over the short run, can be expected from a step-up in the development of the
present U.S. aid program, by a shortening of the present period of reorganization
and by the adoption of a more effective tactical organization.
5c~
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Thai military capabil?~8Mt fr f JVgffeased materially in the long run,
through two means& (1) increased Western military assistance= and t2) a
concerted effort by the Thai people to correct the general dbficiencfe s which
exist in their military establishmient. Improvement in the present system of
transportation and oommunications and in logistical support capacity of the
Thai economy will also greatly enhance, in the long term, Thai Arapr
capabilities.
A security guarantee by the West would have ocnaiderablp effect upon
.any decision by the Government to exercise fully its present military
capabilities against the Communists. It would have only a minor effect upon
Thai military capabilities per seo
be A major decrease in Western aid and committments?
A major decrease in Western aid and committment.s would not
materially reduce present military capabilities but would slow the present
expected rate of improvement.
Cu A continuation of the present level of Western aid and committments?
A continuation of the present level of Western aid and
committments will result in the continued, but slow, improvement in the Thai
forces and a corresponding modest, but effective, increase in capabilities.
3. Events in aorea?
a. An. Armistice?
An armistice would temporarily increase Thai capabilities it the
Thai battalion presently in Koresia returned promptly. This unit would provide
additional combat veterns for assignment throughout the Army.
b. A ma or intensification or eion of the Korean War?
A major intensification of the Korean war would have no
aignificata effect upon Thai capabilities.
o. A continuation of indecisive warfare in Korea?
A continuation of-indecisive warfare in Korea would have no
material effect on Thai military capabilities. Soma slight improvement can be'
expected however, by continued rotation and training of troops under combat
conditions.
4. Possible events elsewhere in Southeast Asia?
Other foreseeable events elsewhere in Souheast Asia would have no
significant effect upon Thai military capabilities,
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