SE-43: REACTIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 10, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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s u c INFORM TION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 April 1953
SUBJECTt SE-183Y REACTIONS OF THE NON-C TNIST 14ORLD TO
CURRENT COh4MUNIST TACTICS
To estimate the probable effects of current Communist "con-
ciliatory" tactics on the peoples and governments of the non-Communist
worlds and the probable courses of action which the major non--iCommuu.et
countries may pursue in response to a possible continuation of those
DISCUSSION
1. The Coxr nunist shift in tactics has been manifest for so
brief a period that there is as yet little evidence on which to base
an estimate of the effects upon the peoples and governments of the
nonCon1nist world. The popular reactions have been on the whole
at least guardedly hopeful, while the reactions of 'governments and
political leaders have been tentative and cautious
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2. The vulnerability of the non-Communist world to "peace"
tactics has been acknowledged in previous estimates. Concessions on
the POW issue sufficient to bring about an armistice in Korea.. com-
bined with minor concessions elsewhere and a series of conciliatory
gestures and statements, would be well calculated to play upon this
vulnerability. The tact that the change in tactics followed almost
immediately on Stalin?s death makes it plausible to believe that a
real change is taking place in Soviet policy. Moreover, Western
governments are likely to be responsive to any suggestion of a genuine
moderation of the cold war because they are presently confronted with
such problems as latent disagreements over possible US measures to
and the Korean war, the stagnation of negotiations over the terms on
which West Germany is to be admitted into the Western coalition, And
economic strains attendant upon efforts to raise defense programs to
higher levels, The moment is one, therefore, in which the governments
and peoples of the West are likely to respond favorably to Kremlin
overtures.
3. The reactions of non Communist peoples and governments will
probably be influenced greatly by the manner of the US response to the
new Communist tactics. Should the US response be seen abroad as
adamantly negative, there would tend to be a decline in the willingness
of other states to follow US leadership, On the other hand, if it
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appeared that the US, relying on Communist professions of peaceful
intent, was about to reduce drastically its defense effort and its
aid to its allies, the confidence of the Western Powers in US leader-
ship would be undermined. If, however, the US appeared willing to
negotiate, in consultation with its allies, but at the same time
appeared determined to maintain its military readiness and defensive
posture, the non-Communist world would be likely to continue responsive
to US leadership. In this event, there appears to be a good chance of
averting the separation of the other Western Powers from the US, which
is almost certainly a primary aim of the new Communist tactics.
1 The governments of Western #aiarope which depend upon shifting
parliamentary majorities may have increasing difficulty in Sustaining
their defense programs and in working in harmony with the US if an
armistice in Korea does result, and is followed by conciliatory moves
in rope, such as an end to the harassment of Berlin or an Austrian
peace treaty. The effectiveness of Communist parties in some countries
may increase as they develop united front tactics and seek to associate
with themselves in "peace" fronts those non-Communist elements which
are pacifist, hostile to the US, or opposed to the association of a
rearmed West Germany with the West, The French Government would
probably be peculiarly vulnerable to these. tactics , and in Italy the
center coalition of De Gasperi might fail to win a majority in the
coming elections. The Adenauer coalition would also be endangered in
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its election campaign. Comanist strength in West Gern*xW would
probably not greatly increase. However, neutralistep the anti-
Western Right, and the Social Democrats would probably gain strength
if there seemed a possibility of reuniting Gerry ny by negotiations
with the USSfta
5 ostensibly attractive trade offers which could be expected
to acct the Communist "peace" tactics might constitute an increas-
ingly formidable, Soviet weapons particularly if there were economic
reverses in the West. The sharply widened dollar gap which would
result from even a minor recession.. ,in the US would increase the diffi-
eseent controls on trade with the Soviet Bloc.
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69 Far Eastern issues which mgy arise in connection with or
subsequent to an armistice in Korea are likely to be the most immediate
source of danger to the relations between the US and its allies. The
views of the US and its allies might seriously diverge on a final
political settlement in Korea,, on the future of Formosa and the Chinese
Nationalist Government, on Commmanist China:?s admission to the UN,a and
an trade with Comrrnu ist China. The consequences of such divergence
would be most serious if failure to settle Far Eastern issues appeared
to the allies of the US to prevent settlement of pressing issues else-
-wh+ere o
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$. We do not believe that air Kremlin proposals on disarma-
ment are likely to find a widespread response in non-Communist
countries or to divide the Western allies so long as major political
issues remain outstanding between East and West.
9. The abandonment by the Communist Bloc of its aggressive
tactics toward the non-Communist world would probably have little
effect in the Middle East- states,, where the importance of the East-
West struggle is overshadowed by the more immediate problems posed
by the Palestine dispute and relations with the West. The Communist
shift in tactics would be felt chiefly through changes which might
eventually take place in the policies of the US and its Western allies
toward the Middle East states. In any event,, it is unlikely that
current Middle Eastern problems would either be greatly aggravated or
brought much nearer to solution in consequence of the new Communist
tactics.
10. Some realignment of the policies of member states in the
UN would doubtless result from any easing of East-West tensions.
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There would probably be an increasing tendency for smaller powers
to act in concert against the larger, and closer alignment of the
Arab-Asian and Latin American blocs might be one consequence.
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