CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000040002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
COPY
Published 24 April 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 21 April 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
DEGLASSIflED
CUSS. CHANCED TD: TS S C
NEAT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HE 1G-2
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DATE: i tA;1 V W12v'ec1) eIease 2000/08/2
I01A'RDP79S01011AO
ATE1 2," U LK REVIEWER:_018557j
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000040002-3
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Fur-
ther dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the in-
formation for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-
ment of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar-
rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the significance of current Communist "peace" tactics.
ESTIMATE
1. Since the announcement of the death of
Stalin the various gestures and statements
by the Soviet and Chinese Communist gov-
ernments have followed so swiftly upon each
other, and the evidence concerning relations
among the men in the Kremlin has remained
so obscure, that any estimate of the situation
is apt to be quickly outdated. This estimate
is a brief presentation of provisional conclu-
sions on the subject as of the present date.
2. Recent statements and actions of the So-
viet and Chinese Communist governments
demonstrate that the Communists have
adopted, at least for the moment, a concilia-
tory posture in their dealings with the West.
3. There have also been developments within
the USSR which may prove to be of profound
significance for Soviet foreign policy. We are
unable as yet to estimate the meaning of
these developments. It may be that the
present Soviet Government is united, securely
entrenched in power, and has agreed upon
tactics which will be developed with con-
sistency and determination. It is also possi-
ble, however, that an intense struggle for
power may be in progress in the Kremlin.
If the latter is the case, current Soviet tactics
may proceed from the regime's instability,
and Soviet foreign as well as domestic policy
may fluctuate as one or another faction in
the Kremlin gains temporary ascendancy. So
far, however, the current Soviet tactics in
foreign relations give no indication of infirm
purpose in the Kremlin.
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4. In Korea, we estimate that the Commu-
nists are now prepared to make some con-
cessions in order to reach an armistice.
However, there are ambiguities in the Com-
munist proposals on the POW issue. These
ambiguities may conceal difficulties which
would prevent the conclusion of an armistice.
Moreover, we believe that, possibly in connec-
tion with the armistice negotiations, and al-
most certainly in connection with negotiations
for a political settlement, the Communists will
introduce proposals which the US will find
extremely difficult to accept but which some
members of the UN will not be disposed to
reject, especially in the atmosphere of hope
created by the current Communist tactics.
In any case, we believe that the Communist
objective to gain control of all Korea will re-
main unchanged.
5. With respect to Germany, we believe that
the Kremlin is unlikely to implement courses
of action which would jeopardize Kremlin
control over East Germany. The Commu-
nists may again make dramatic proposals for
free elections, for the withdrawal of occupa-
tion forces, and for the reunification of Ger-
many. However, we believe that such pro-
posals would contain conditions which the
Kremlin would intend to be unacceptable to
the West, or that, in making these proposals,
the Kremlin would intend to prevent their
implementation. These proposals would be
designed to frustrate the EDC program and
the rearmament of West Germany, capitaliz-
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ing on the atmosphere created by Communist
concessions in Korea and by the conciliatory
Soviet behavior.
6. Likewise, the Kremlin will probably con-
tinue to make proposals for general disarma-
ment, but we believe that these will be made
for propaganda effect, and not in the expecta-
tion that they would be accepted by the West.
7. In many other ways the Kremlin could
easily win some temporary advantage and em-
barrass the West without real disadvantage to
the Bloc. For example, the Soviet Govern-
ment might accede to the Tripartite Declara-
tion of 1948 calling for the return of Trieste to
Italy. It might offer a peace treaty to Japan
containing various attractive economic and
even territorial clauses. It might facilitate
the departure of Jews to Israel from Eastern
Europe and the USSR. The Communists
might propose an Austrian peace treaty, or
even offer a peaceful settlement of the war in
Indo-China, on terms difficult alike to accept
or to reject. The aim of such maneuvers
would be to impair the political and military
strength of the West, and to reap the greatest
possible benefits from a decision to end the
Korean War.
8. Our present view is that the purpose of cur-
rent Kremlin tactics is to create an atmos-
phere in which resistance to Communism and
to Soviet imperialism will be weakened. There
is no basis for concluding that the funda-
mental hostility of the Kremlin toward the
West has abated, that the ultimate objectives
of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the
menace of Communism to the free world has
diminished.2
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that with respect to Germany, the
Kremlin may be willing to withdraw its troops
from East Germany, if the Soviet Union consid-
ered that by doing so, it could force the Western
Powers to withdraw their troops from West Ger-
many, frustrate the EDC program, and the re-
armament of Germany. The Communists may
also make proposals for free elections and for
the reunification of Germany, in the hope that
they would be able to secure a demilitarized and
neutral German state.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes the last sentence of paragraph 8
should read: "Although there is no basis for
concluding that the fundamental hostility of the
Kremlin toward the West has abated, that the
ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have
changed, or that the menace of Communism to
the free world has diminished; it is possible that
the Soviets have adopted courses of action de-
signed for the present to reduce the threat of
general war."
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