SE-40:COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO U.S. ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS' (REVISED DRAFT FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020008-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORM ;ATION 'WAR S 1., 1151
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIUATES
31 March 1953
SUBJECT: SE-40: COIiI!UNIST REP CTIONS TO U. S.: ,STAB.
LISHLICNT OF A "VOLUNTEER FREED3U
CORPS" '(Revised draft for Board
consideration)
TIDE PRO BLEU
To estimate Communist reactions to US establish.
meet of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" (VFC) eomponed of
anti-Cormzunist "escapees" from European Satellit3
States formed into national units under the command
of US officers, and to psychological warfare mca3ures
designed to stimulate escape and enlistment in aueh
a Corps.
ESTIMATE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
The Kremlin's Estimate of the Corpse S , ,nificancr)
~ i1rY4Y - ~ilYrY.rmOfvm _r..O
1, Regardless of the terms of enlistment k the
WC and other details as yet undecided, the Kreni_I.ines
primary concern would be to determine the significance
of the VFC as an indicator of over-all US intentions
toward the USSR and toward Soviet control of the
Satellite States, I.Uuch would therefore depend o.i the
general context of US'policy and action in which the
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VFC was presented. The itremlin would certainly regard
the establishment of the VPC as a hostile act and as
a further indication of US preparations for an eventual
attack on the Soviet Bloc. However, it would probably
regard the VFC as part of a longterm program, not
as an indication of ir:miinent US military action.
2. T m Kremlin would be unlikely to regard the
VFC as militarily important in any case. It would
appreciato the difficulties inherent in the recruitment,
adrzinistration, and utilization of such a force, and
would probably estimate that Communist counteraction
could prevent it from ever becoming a lame and effectivo
military organization.
3, The Kremlin would probably estimate that the
most significant aspect of tho VFC would be its psycho-
logical and subversive potential. At the same time
the Kremlin would ostiraato that it could derive important
psychological warfaro o,),)ortunities from US establishment
of the Corpst e.g., by contrasting Soviet efforts for
peace with US preparations for a new war, or by
stressing US recruitment of oL)ean manpower to fight
US battles. It riiCht also hope that establishment of
the VFC would generate new strains within the :.astern
alliance.
4. The Kremlin almost certainly -buld estimate
that a failure of the VFC, whether by reason of a lack
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of volunteers or because of subsequent frustrations
and disillusionments, would soverely affect US psi.
chological warfare capabilities.
Probable CorrLuniat Counteraction
5. The establishmnt of tho VFC would be unlikely,
of itself, to causo the Kremlin to adopt countermeasures
which, in its judgment, would involve increased risk
of g?neral war. Neither xrould the Itroralin be moved by
the VPC to make concessions designed to bring about
a relaxation of tensions. Co:.inunist countermeasuros
would probably be directed toward frustrating the VFC
itself and toward deriving maximum psychological
advantage from the US initiative in creating it.
6. The principal Communist counter-effort would
probably be a violent propaganda campaign, within
and boyond the Bloc, designed to (a) smother US pro-
paganda in support of the VPC, (b) discredit the VFC
as a device for recruiting European cannonfodder to
fight for US imperialism, (o) discredit the United
States as preparing for new aggressions, in contrast
to Soviet efforts for peace, (d) stimulate renewed
effort and vigilance within the Bloc to counter hostile
US designs, and (e) create fear and dissension within
the kjestern alliance. In the course of this campaign
the Soviet, Satellite, and hest European Communist
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agencies of the Kremlin would probably evince a
greater alarm than the Kremlin actually felt.
7. In coordination with this propaganda campaign
the Satellito Sovornments would probably take political
action in the United nations and elsewhere to indict
the United States for subversive intervention in their
internal-affairs. The Satellite governments might
also sever diplomatic relations with the United States,
:ith a view to terminating all US access to Satellite
territory,
Be The Communist authorities in the Satellite
States vdould of course exorcise their ample police
powers to prevent effective recruitment for the VVC.
They would reinforce their already formidable frontier
and i nternal police controls, terrorize prospective
recruits, and threaten retaliation against their families
and friends, However, they wou14 probably arrange for
a minimal and controlled flow of recruits in order to
penetrate the Corps, subvert or intimidate its members,
establish clandestine control within it, and destroy
its usefulness.
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