COMMUNIST REATIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS'

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020002-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2000
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 13, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020002-5.pdf218.2 KB
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ed For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S010ifgW069000024002-5 SPECIAL ESTIMATE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT OF A "VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS" Published 13 April 1953 The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli- gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 9 April 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. p o DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO,. TS S? ipq NEXT REVIEW DATES l 1 AUTH: HR 10.2 Approved For Release 2000/08/2% __ J&N NQg,Q1rM99 000020002-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020002-5 DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Fur- ther dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the in- formation for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart- ment of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De- partment or Agency 2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar- rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020002-5 Approved For Release 2000108/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000020002-5 COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT OF A "VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS" PROBLEM To estimate Communist reactions to US establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" (VFC) composed of anti-Communist "escapees" from European Satellite States formed into national units under the command of US officers, and to psy- chological warfare measures designed to stimulate escape and enlistment in such a Corps. ESTIMATE The Kremlin's Estimate of the Corps' Significance 1. The Kremlin's primary concern with the establishment of the VFC would be to de- termine its significance as an indicator of over-all US intentions toward the USSR and toward Soviet control of the Satellite States. Much would therefore depend upon the gen- eral context of US policy and action in which the VFC was presented. Regardless of the terms of enlistment, the national groups established, the degree of US control, and other related factors, the Kremlin would cer- tainly regard the establishment of the VFC as a further indication of US determination to liberate the Satellites. However, it would regard the VFC as part of a long-term pro- gram, not as an indication of imminent US military action. 2. The Kremlin would be unlikely to regard the VFC as in itself a militarily important force. It would appreciate the difficulties inherent in the recruitment, administration, and utilization of such a force, and it would probably estimate that Communist counter- action could prevent it from becoming a large and effective military organization. The Kremlin would probably estimate, however, that in the event of general war the VFC could have significance as a rallying point for defectors. 3. The Kremlin would probably estimate that the most significant aspect of the VFC would be its psychological and subversive potential within the Satellite States. At the same time, the Kremlin would estimate that it could exploit psychological warfare opportunities arising from establishment of the Corps by the US : e.g., by contrasting Soviet efforts for peace with US preparations for a new war, or by stressing US recruitment of European manpower to fight US battles. It would al- most certainly estimate that establishment of the VFC would generate new strains within the Western alliance. Probable Communist Counteraction 4. The establishment of the VFC would be unlikely, of itself, to cause the Kremlin to adopt countermeasures which, in its judg- ment, would involve increased risk of general war. Neither would the Kremlin be moved by the VFC to make concessions designed to bring about a relaxation of tensions. 5. The principal Communist counter-effort would probably be an intense propaganda campaign, within and beyond the Bloc. This campaign would be designed to frustrate the US propaganda effort in support of the VFC by discrediting the VFC as a device for re- cruiting European "cannonfodder" to fight for US imperialism, by discrediting the US as Approved For Release 2000 : 1A- DP79S01011A001000020002-5 1 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000020002-5 preparing for new aggressions, in contrast to Soviet efforts for peace, by stimulating re- newed effort and vigilance within the Bloc to counter hostile US designs, and by creating fear and dissension within the Western alli- ance. In the course of this campaign the Soviet, Satellite, and West European Commu- nist agencies of the Kremlin would probably evince a greater alarm than the Kremlin actually felt. 6. In coordination with this propaganda cam- paign, the Satellite governments would al- most certainly take political action in the UN and elsewhere to indict the US for subversive intervention in their internal affairs. The Satellite governments would further restrict the movement of US nationals within their territories and might even sever diplomatic relations with the US, with a view to termi- nating all US access to Satellite territory. 7. However, if the Kremlin at the time of the establishment of the VFC were engaged in an attempt to reduce international tensions, its reaction might be more moderate in character and might be delayed. 8. The Communist authorities would of course exercise their ample police powers to prevent effective recruitment for the VFC from the Satellite States. They would reinforce their already formidable frontier and internal po- lice controls, terrorize prospective recruits, and threaten retaliation against their families and friends. However, they would probably arrange for a minimal and controlled flow of recruits designed to penetrate the Corps, sub- vert or intimidate its members, establish clan- destine control within it, and destroy its use- fulness. The Communists would also seek to use the VFC as a means of extending their in- telligence activities, particularly if elements of the VFC were to be trained in the United States. 9. If for any reason the VFC were not a suc- cess, the Kremlin would certainly exploit to the full the psychological advantage thus obtained. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000020002-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000020002-5 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79SO1011A001000020002-5