SE-39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010016-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 9, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONH DENT L
S&39
This is a provisional eeti.rnatee The subjects heroin
treated will be discussed at greater length in NIS?65t
Soviet Moo Capabilities through 1957.
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CEIiTRgL CONFIDENTIAL
INTELLIQEtiCx AaEUCY
9 March 1953
SUD wrl SE.39s P1 DABLE CO'1Srrim-Css O! 7111' DE tT'I OF STALIN
AND OF THE ELERATIOfl OF MALEtJCOV 10 L'' tDER.
,SHIP IN TEIE USSR
1. THE INITIAL TR:IIISFER OF AMITUIORSTY
1, The Problem of transfer of panzer is one of the most diffi.
cult which the Soviet system could fame The important initial step,
the fornal transfer of authority, has apparently been effected with
rsmarrkabls rapiditq and precisiono The smoothness of the transfer
of authority to Malenkov and the speed with which the Government
and Party posts were filled, suggest an acute aarareness on the
part of the Soviet leaders of the danger* inherent in the situation,
2, Ualenkov?s key position in the Soviet Cornm:nist Party
throughout the past fourteen years, his conspicuous and apparently
planned elevation since 1946, his prominent role at and since the
19th Party Congress, and the accolade accorded him by Baria at
Stalin's funeral suggest that there will be no immediate challenge
to his aruthority, However, we cannot estimate whether he has the
the new organ nation, 1`alenkov apparently now holds the same
cormanding; position within the Presidium and the Secretariat of
the Party and in the Council of Ministers which Stalin held,
In the Council of Idinisters, power has been concentrated in the
hands of L4alenkov as Chairman and four First Deputy Chairmernt
Berta, L?ol.otov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich, These five make up
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a body that in nature
and membership closely parallels the wartime Committee of State
Defense under Stalin. The concentration of power has been in.
creased, and the top party and government organs have been repo
duced in n?maber and in size. The new organisation of Party and
Government and the extensive reorganization and merger of several
major industries under ?alenkov appear to tighten and ,greenling
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qualities necessary to consolidate his position and to attain
unchallenged power, since he has always operated with the backing
of Stalin. Neither is it possible to estimate with confidence the
capabilities or probable courses of action of his possible opponents.
3, A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet
hierarchy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such
a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization.
In any case, the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to participate
actively in the struggle. Even if a struggle should break out in
the near future, we believe that the hold of the Communist Party
over the USSR is not likely to be shaken during the next years We
do not believe that such a struggle would in itself lead the rulers
of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war,
IIa PROBABLE CONSE1QUENC75 OF DEATH OF STALIN
A. Probable Future Soviet Policies
14., In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost
certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic policies esta-
blished during recent years. It will probably continue to emphasize
unremitting hostility to the West, the enlargement of the Bloc
economic base, and the increase of Bloc military power,
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5. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruth-
less and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his
ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his foreign
policy. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet regime
will have Stalin's skill in avoiding general war. At least initially,
the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to
manoeuvres since it will not possess Stalin's immense prestige and
authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will
probably find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin
and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to what it
regarded as new aggressive moves of the West. If the West should
suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided
Fast and West, the new Soviet Government would probably adhere to
established Soviet positions.
6. The new Soviet regime probably fears that, while it is in
the process of consolidating its power, the West may make aggressive
moves against the Bloc. It would probably view with extreme sus-
picion any new moves made by the West, particularly those involving
long-range air forces or military forces close to the Bloc frontiers.
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B. Probable Effects on the Peoples of the USSR
7. The death of Stalin removes the man who had been built
up to the status of a demi-godp To maxr of the people of the USSR,
he was the man of stool who had raised Russia to industrial and
military power, who withstood the German attack, and who led the
peoples of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian
history. Stalin's death will be a psychological shock to large
numbers of Soviet people. However, we estimate that the psychological
shock will not significantly affect the strength or the effectiveness
of the new regime.
C. Probable Effect W n the Bloc and the International
tommunlBt movement
8. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able to
achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol of
the international Communist movement and as the undisputed leader
of world Communism., Therefore, the cohesion of the Communist move-
ment outside the Bloc may be impaired, at least temporarily. If
there should be a struggle for power within the Soviet Communist
Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc would
almost certainly be weakened.
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9. Kremlin control over the European Satellites is so firm
that we do not believe it will be impaired by the death of Stalin.
However, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Comma-
nist Party should spread to the Soviet Amy and the Soviet Security
Forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almost certainly
be shaken.
100 Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change
as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not purely
personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav national
interests with the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, both sides
have taken actions and adopted positions which would be extremely
difficult to reverse. The Kremlin could not recognize Tito as an
independent Communist ally without undermining its position with the
European Satellites.
ll. We do not believe that Tito?s influence within the Satellites
or within Communist Parties outside the Bloc will increase, unless
there should be a prolonged struggle for power in the USSR.
12o We believe that Stalin's death will have no immediate
effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation or upon Chinese Communist foreign
policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have prestige and
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authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao as leader
and theoretician of Asian Communism will inevitably increase with
the disappearance of the former suprene leader. Mao will almost
certainly have more influence in the determination of Bloc policy
affecting Asia. He almost certainly will not seek leadership of
the international Commminist movement. The new Moscow leadership
will probably deal cautiously with Mao; if it does not,, serious
strains in Sino?Soviet relations will almost certainly develop.
III. PROBABLE W1STERN REACTION TO Dt TH OF STALIN AND ELEVATION
13. We believe that in general the Western E ropean leaders
will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East-West struggle
with greater hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that
any immediate Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger
of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR.
They will also probably hope that, if Western pressure is not exerted,
the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the
new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relax-
ation of tensions and enable them to postpone disagreeable policy
decisions.
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