PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010013-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 9, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

A r d or a 200'x/ ,3~DC A-RDP 7 S01011A000010015'AR 9 .
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SECURITY INFORNATION
SEo39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE
ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LTADERSHIP
I. THE INITIAL TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
1. The problem of transfer of[authority from Stalin, is one
of the most difficult which the Soviet system could face, The
rapidity and precision with which the initial transfer of authority
has apparently been effected represents an important achievement
for the Soviet system, The smoothness of the transfer suggests
that arrangements had been completed, or at least outlined, in
advance and that Nalenkov had been granted by Stalin, or was in
a position to acquire, effective control over the Soviet Communist
Party, the government, and the security and armed forces.
2, It is difficult to estimate with accuracy and confidence
the effect which the apparently successful completion of at least
the first stages of transfer will have. However, while this
apparently successful transfer does not eliminate the possibility
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of discord and even of open conflict, it almost certainly reduces
seriously the likelihood that an ultimate struggle for power
within the Soviet hierarchy will jeopardize Communist control
over the U!%%
a, The clear and quick transfer of authority will
probably help convince any potential rivals of Malenkov
to support the new leader, if only for their own safety,
There will probably be fewer rivals and fewer intrigues
because of the apparently certain establishment of control
in the hands of Malenkov.
b, 1alenkov, as head of the Party, almost certainly
has firm control over the security and armed forces.
Co Successful transfer of authority at the center and
at the top of a highly centralized system simplifies and
even ensures the transfer in the lower echelons of all the
hierarchies throughout the entire country. Therefore,
Malenkov will presumably have little or no difficulty in
establishing his authority over the entire USSR.
d, Successful transfer of authority reduces, but does
not eliminate, the likelihood of major and irreconcilable
differences over policy, Coamnunist discipline and fear of
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foreign attack would probably prevent any discord over
policy from developing to the point of open conflict, at
least during the first few months. After that period,
if Ma]enkor succeeds in consolidating his power and in
attaining unchallenged control, the likelihood of serious
conflicts over policy will probably decline.
3, Malenkov's key position in the Soviet Communist Party ' '" .,,..
throughout the past fourteen years, his conspicuous and apparently
planned elevation since 198, his prominent role at and sires the
19th Party Congress, and the apparent ease with which the initial
accession to power has been achieved suggest that there will be no
immediate challenge to his authority. However, we cannot estimate
whether he has the qualities necessary to consolidate his position
and to attain unchallenged power, since he has always operated with
the backing of Stalin.
4. A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet biers.
archy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state,'such a
struggle would probably be restricted to the higher echelons of the
Soviet Communist Party. In any case, the peoples of the USSR are
unlikely to participate actively in the struggle, and-the hold of
the Communist Party over the USSR is not likely to be shaken,
5. It is impossible to estimate with confidence the signifi-
canoe of the "anti-Zionist" campaign of recent months or to determi
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the connection between recent developments In that campaign,
particularly the so-called "doctors t plot", and the establish-
ment of the new goverunent. The "anti-Zionist" campaign apparently
represents an appeal to traditional Russian antiemitiam. as a
part of the general campaign to intensify the security drive, to
promote Russiftoation, and to strengthen the regi'm'e popular
support. It may be significant that none of Stalin's doctors
were Jews. In any case, the "doctors' plot" doss strengthen
Malenkov's position, because it clews him of suspicion in the
death of 7hdanov, who was MMalenkov's chief rival at the time he
died in the owmr of 1948.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW SOVIET ORGANIZATION.
6, The outstanding features of the new Soviet organization
of power thus far appear to be the concentration of power under
Malenkov's leadership in virtually the former Politburo and the
consolidation of the fusion between the Party and State. The
14alenkov reorganization has revealed the existence of a Bureau
attached to the Presidium of the Party Central Committee. This
disclosure reveals the almost complete continuity of persons and
responsibilities from the former Politburo to the present Presidium.
The key men in the new Presidium, in addition to )Ialenkov, are, in
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the order listed: Beriya, Molotov, Voroshilov, Xhrushchev,
But j nin, Kagaovich, Mikroyan, Saburov and PervukMn, two ex-
perienced. administrators and economic specialists in their
forties, have been raised to the status of full membership in
the Presidium. No important former members of the Party hierarchy
have been dropped.
7. In the Council of Ministers, the most important organ
of the State apparatus, power has been concentrated, under Malen.
kov's chairmanship, in the hands of four First-.Deputy Chairmen:
Beriya, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. This group is exactly
the same as the wartime Committee of State Defense under Stalin,
except that Mikoyan is not now a member.
8. Under the Malenkov reorganization, policy-mald.ng power
is highly centralized and apparently follows the de facto pattern
which existed under Stalin. Malenkov apparently now holds the same
comanding heights within the Presidium and Secretariat of the
Party and in the Council of Ministers that Stalin held, and direct
authority over all ranks of the Party, security, military, and
economic apparatuses has been consolidated under bin in the new
Presidium.
9, Our analysis of the distribution of authority in the
Council of Ministers strengthens the impression, formed after the
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19th Congress, that active conduct of policy in the USSR has been
passing since the war into the hands of men of long administrative
and Party experience in their fifties, backed by administrators of
substantial experience in their forties. It is significant that
the Presidium, the most important Soviet policy>maki.ng organ, has
an average age of 56.
as Pia The reconstruction of the Party Presidium
from its original size of twenty-five full members and eleven
to ten full members and four alternates
alternate 'probably makes organization correspond alrose]y
with actual operation. The presence of five new men (Saburov,
Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, and Bagirov) on the highest
level of this policyaking body, represents public recogni-
tion for achievement and probably provides considerable incenn
Live for ambitious Soviet bureaucrats. The Party Secretariat,
the locus of power throughout the Soviet regime, has been
streamlined under Malenkov's leadership, The membership has
been reshuffled, with the addition of three new members, in.
eluding the administrative head of the MOB, and with the
shifting of four members to duties in the goverment. Presi.
diwa member Khrushchev, who has been in the Politburo since
1939, appears to have the role of administrative supervision
over the Secretariat.
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b, Security Forces, The merger of the MVD and MGB
into the MVD follows the pre-war and wartime pattern of
organization. Beriya'a appointment as Minister probably
formalizes the previous arrangements. In view of the turn.
over of high administrative personnel in the security
forces during the past two years and of the apparent repre.
sentation of Party functionaries in these organs,. it is
unlikely that a threat to Malenkov and to the Party's
authority will develop from the security forces,
c. Military Forces. The transfer of the aged
Marshal Voroshtlov to the ceremonial post of Chairman of
the Supreme Soviet, the fictitious legislative body, and
the appointment of Marshal Bulganin as Minister of War
probably does not represent any significant change in the
structure of military control. Bulganin'a long experience
as a political functionary apparently ensures Party con.
trol over the military. The appointments of Marshals
Vasilevsky and Zhukov, the outstanding wartime hero, as
First Deputy Ministers of War was probably designed to
secure a base of popular support for the Malenkov regime,
d. Economy, The appointment of Kaganovi.ch to a post
comparable to that which he held in the Committee of State
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dense during World War XI probably onsures the continua.'
tion of high,-level control over the national econoopr?
The appointment of Sabu rov, Pervukhin, Nalysh+ev, and Nosy.
chenko, about whom little is known, to important-posts in
the economy provides clear evidence of the tranahr of
real power within the Party from the professional revolves
tionaries to the carefully selected and trained managerial
elite,
in. PRCRABLE C))NSEQUFNCI 4P DEATH AF STALIN
A. Probable Future Soviet Policies
10d In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will
almost certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic policies
established during recent years. It will probably not believe it
necessary or expedient to revise the emphases placed upon un-
remitting hostility to the West, upon eking the Bloc economio
base, and upon increasing Bloc military power.
11. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while
ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his
ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his
foreign policy,, It would be unsafe to seams that the new Soviet
regime will have Stalin's ,skin in avoiding a direct } ision
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with the West. It will also lack his freedom of action and his
ability to manoeuvre, since it will not possess Stalin's i:,ense
prestige and authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the
new regime will probably find it more difficult to abandon poei-.
tions than did Stalin. Thus, it might even precipitate global
war if it suspected that the West were about to seise Albania.
. ~a
12. The new Soviet regime almost sertainly has a genuine
fear that the West will launch an attack while it is in the pro.
cess of consolidating its power, It will view with extreme
suspicion any moves made by the West, particularly those involy..
ing long-range air forces or military forces close to the Bloc
frontiers. If seriously frightened, it may adopt policies which
appear reckless and even aggressive to the West.
130 If the West should suggest reexamination of the
principal issues which have divided k% st and West,-the new Soviet
government will probably reiterate its established policies..
However, the new government will almost certainly show less con-
fidenae and eldll i
f
i
n
ac
ng a new issue ar in handling a Western
proposal, whether dramatic or discreet, never before made to the
Soviet government, Lacking an established policy and deprived
of Stalin's guidance, the new government might blunder in such a
way as to reduce its support in the countries forming the Western
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coalition and in the neutral states. It might even lose the
initiative in political warfare.
B. Probable Effects Mn the Russian Peoples
i. The death of Stalin removes not only the dictator
of the USSR, but also the symbol of authority who bore the mantle
of the "little father" for most Russians, even those strongly
opposed to the Soviet system, Stalin was the man of steel who
raised Russia to industrial and military power, who withstood the
German attack, and who led the peoples of the USSR to the greatest
military victory in Russian history., Moreover, Stalin as the
universal g enius . and the benevolent despot was not held responsi? I
ble by most Soviet citizens for the evils of the Soviet system.
It will be difficult for the Soviet people to recover from the
psychological shock of his death, and the new Soviet leadership
will require at least several years before it can fill the vacuum
he has left.,
Probable Effect Ron the Bloc and the international
omm s movement
15. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able
to achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol
of the international Communist movement and as the undisputed
leader of world Comunisn0 Therefore, at least temporarily, the
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cohesion of the world Coninunist movement will probably be impairedo
if there should be a struggle for power within the Soviet Cm=='
jet Party, this struggle would almost certainly spread to the Com-
munist Parties outside the Bloc.
16. Kremlin control over the Satellites is so firm that we
do not believe it will be impaired by the death of Stalin. How-
ever, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Coiamm-
ist Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security
Forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almost certainly
be shaken,
17. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change
as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not purely
personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav national
interests with the Soviet Communist Party, Moreover, both sides
have taken action and adopted positions which would be extremely
difficult to reverse. The Kremlin could not recognize Tito as an
independent Ccm-munist ally without undermining its position with
the European Satellites,
18. Tito's prestige and influence with fellow-.traveller,,
particularly in Western Europe, may expand with the death of
Stalin, We do not believe that Tito's influence within the
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Satellites will increase, unless there should be a prolonged
struggle for power in the USSR.
199 We believe that Stalin's death will have no immediate
effect upon Sino.$oviet cooperation or upon Chinese Communist
foreign policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have pres-
tige and authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao
as leader and theoretician, of Asiatic Communism will inevitably
increase with the disappearance of the former supreme leader. Mao
will almost certainly claim more influence in the determination
of Bloc policy affecting Asia, but he will not seek or obtain
leadership of the international Communist movement.
20. The new Moscow leadership will probably deal cautiously
with Mao; if it does not, serious strains in Sino.Soviet relations
will almost certainly develop/ However, the new Soviet Goverment
may fear an increase in Mao's stature in the Asian Communist move.
ment and in his influence in determining Bloc policy affecting Asia.
It may, therefore., devote more attention to the Far East. It may
also increase its efforts to develop Chinese economic and military
strength, especially in Manchuria, with the aims of thereby in.
J
creasing Soviet influence in Communist China.
TV. PROBABLE WESTERN REACTION TO DEATH OF STALIN AND ELEVATION
OF MALENKOV
21. We believe that in general the Western European leaders
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will now be disposed to conduct the Rant yst struggle with
greater heaitani y and caution, They probably believe that the
danger of war has been increased by the death of Stalin, and
this fear may grow if the authority of the new Soviet regime
is quickly consolidated. They will probably fear that any
Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger of war
and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the tMSRI They
will also probably hope that, if Western pressure is not exerted,
the long-.run problems involved in the transfer of authority in
the USER will bring about at least a temporary relaxation of tensions
and enable them to
postpone disagreeable policy decisionsHow-
evers they may ultimately
Y come to resent any US failure to seize the initiative during this tine of crisis to relax the tension
which now exists in relations between Bast and West,
22, If Malenkov succeeds in consolidating his position and
in attaining unchallenged power in the USSR and if Bloc economic
and military power continue to grow, undisturbed by this crisis,
the peoples and the leaders of the West may undergo a severe psy.
chological shock, The West has so long hoped that the Soviet system
would totter or even be shattered by its inability to solve the
immense problems involved in the transfer of power that Western
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morale might be severely shaken by Soviet survival of this
major testa In some segments of world opinion] successful
Soviet transition of this crisis and continued growth of Bloc
power might seem s, demonstration of invincibility by this
new "wave of the future 4"
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