EXCERPTS FROM PROJECT TROY REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FEBRUARY 1, 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

TO? SECRE'T
Approved For Release k100/08/28cuelitheRINgfealallAQ1109000300119-13
Excerpts From Project Troy Report to
the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :EFAM9S01011A000900030019-8
Approved ForReleaseh100/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A,Q90900030019-8
TOP SECRET
Security Information
EXCERPTS FROM PROJECT TROT REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FEBRUARY 1, 1951
The following are excerpts from or summarizations of portions of the
subject report covering the use of radio as an information medium prepared
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
MAIN REPORT
FOR
Project Troy was set up by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
as the means for carrying out, under contract with the United States
Government, investigations requested by the Department of State
The organisation of the project involved the establishment of a
manageable, full time, ad hoc group relieved of other duties so that
they could, for three months or so, give their undivided attention to
the problems involved.
The group (of panel members) was divided into cross-disciplinary
panels to bring in outlines of parts of the problem which ought to be
investigated. These outlines were subjected to protracted scrutiny and
discussion by the whole group. 8pecia1ist!,74 were assigned to the parts
accord with the relevance of their knowledge. Care was also taken to in-
clude non-specialists in each party. The findings of each party were dis-
closed to the Whole group and the drafts of their contributions were exawin-
ed, discussed and amended by the whole group? Towards the end an Editorial
Committee was establiehed. Their editorial revisions were in turn discussed
and amended in plenary sessions.
Although the main report has no identified individual authorship, the
annexes have not been subjected to plenary scrutiny and each annex there-
fore bears the names of members of the sub-group responsible for it"
Approved ForRelease2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
TOP SECRET
Security Information
Approved For Release0/0116119gEfitherRDP79S01011A400900030019-8
Security Information
The initial stuOy requested by the Department of State was directed
primarily toward the technical problems confronting the Voice of Merica
in the light of Soviet jamming. "At the outset, however, it was generally
*greed that we should also look at other methods of perforating the Iron
Curtain and that the nature of any technical facility was inevitably tied
to the target and to the content of the material to be conveyed, and finally
to the effect which was ultimately desired."
"As a consequence of this broader study, we have emerged with a concept
we call apolitical warfare'."
"The importance of our present feeling about 'political warfare is
therefore not a matter of invention, bat rather in its emphasis upon that
point that comprehension of the whole is what matters most rather than the
individual component elements. The newness of our idea, if any, lies in
the understanding of the strategic powPr of the several elements when com-
bined as a well rounded and coordinated whole."
"With respect to political warfare, this report pretends to develop
only the fundamental strategic power of the concept, with examples of typical
elements such as the Information Program, the defector program, the overlor,d
and delay program,? No attempt has been made to develop these programs In,t-
operational projects." "But in tendering this report, we cannot but repeat
once more that the idea which may on the surface appear most naive, the
idea that the United States must develop a coordinated political warfare
effort is the most important idea in the report. Many people know this
must be done. But it will not be done until it iR done."
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
Security Information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For ReleaseM00/06a9af.difkRDP79S01011AQ00900030019-8
Security Information
POLITICAL WARFARE
"Invited by the Department of State to try to defeat Russian jamming
of the Voice of America, we soon realized that no such isolated study of
radio would meet the real issue. The technical problem constitutes only
one of a collection of inseparable conditions."
"We have become convinced that the aims of an information program can
be fully realized only when the many elements of our national power, polit-
cal, economic, military, are wielded as an integrated effort. We therefore
urge the unification of political warfare."
"Political warfare, we are convinced, ehould be organized like any other
form of warfare, with specialized weapons, strategy, tactics. logistics,
and training."
"It is within the framework of this conviction that we have closely
examined several of the components of political warfare e.g., our tele-
communications system, information program, a program for defectors, and
program designed to produce overload and delay within the enemy's adminis-
trative structure."
"The USSR is using political warfare against as today The Russians
constantly force us to make plans which we have to abandon before they are
put into effect. The Russians apply pressure, and, when we move to coanter
it, they remove the pressure or change its form, so that our efforts may be
made to seem ridiculous or hysterical. They attempt to undermine our coriA-
dence in our leaders, and to destroy the western alliance."
TOP MUT
Security Information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release N160/081,89 sidatiRDP79S01011AQ#0900030019-8
Security information
*In spite of the U0S0 beginnings in political warfare such as the:
Marshall Plan, The Point Four program etc6 we are convinced that the United
States must 410 beyond these excellent measures and go over to the offensive
in an aggressive, integrated, and comprehensive political warfare program.
We may yet achieve our purposes without armed combat.*
"With all these things in mind, we present recommendations, specific
and general, designed to stimulate the development of an integrated program
of political warfare suitable to the demands of the present crisis.*
INTO
"A major task of political Warfare Is to reach our enemy. This sectiost
is devoted to the means of communication at our disposal. We were asked
specifically to investigate two ways to pierce the Iron Curtain: by radio
and by balloon.* But there are other means of reaching the people in the
shielded areas.
Concern with mechanical devices may tend to conceal the fact that news
does travel by itself. One part of the taik of the information service is
to build up. throughout the free world a reservoir of the kind of news about
ourselves that we want to have flow through the porous holes in the curtain,
Some specific means of transmitting information through the iron curttOx
are available, such as direct mail0 the professional journal0 the industrial
and commercial publications, etc. Expansion of the effort to communicate aj og
these normal channels to those behind the .curtain is justified even, if
initially, it only means the maintenance of communication for communication ,E
sake,.
- it -
TOP SECRET
Security information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved F6r Release Ntb0/0812.:SEMRDP79S01011AQ$0900030019-8
Security Information
All the other means noticed in these paragraphs are a legitimate part
of political warfare. Of less immediate tactical value, perhaps, than
radios or balloons, they are nevertheless vitally necessary elements in
the politidal warfare operations of the Information Service.
Zan.
"This chapter deals mainly with the technical problems of radio as a
means for perforating the iron curtain. Our recommendations and proposals
fall roughly into two classes: first, improvements that can be made now by
more or less conventional means; second, fundamental advances requiring coil-
siderable preparation, but promising, in the end, very great advantages,
Several palliative measures of the first sort are mentioned below and are
discussed at greater length in the appropriate Annexes."
Important advances can be made by a) by developing a broadcasting
system which combines standard elements so as to achieve the effect of
enormous power, and I) by developing a tiny, cheap, self-contained receiver
that could eventually be distributed in large numbers over the world, Neither
of these ambitious programs can give immediate results, but the way to proceed
is clear, as we shall explain below.
"We believe the long-wave band can be profitably used in Eastern Eqr pe,
and eventually in other places as well."
"To strengthen our broadcasting position in Europe., the Facilities
Branch of the International Broadcasting Division mast be assisted by
determined and skillful negoiation at the political level, based on a
realistic telecommunications policy."
- 5 -
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 20007138M PelAgigliP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved ForRelease0/08/24P:=ARDP79S01011AW0900030019-8
Security Information
"The jamming of VOA broadcasts, in our view, is only one aspect of
a larger struggle - a contest for control of lone-distance radio communi-
cation in Europe and eventually in other parts of the world too, Our
national interest is involved in many ways. The most immediate and obvi-
ous threat is to our overseas high-frequency communications. We believe
that our vital transatlantic channels can and should be made secure, and
propose means for doing so in Annex 22, But this is only the first impor-
tant defensive action in the electromagnetic war, We must try to seize
the initiative -- the high-power transmitter program is a step in that
direction -- and we must prepare, by proper organization, to conduct a
resourceful campaign of measure and countermeasure. This is part of
political warfare."
It is hard to reach radio listeners behind the iron curtain because
a) the bulk of the audience is far from our transmitters, b) the listener
must have control of a tunable radio receiver, in some privacy, c) he must
dare to listen, d) jamming.
From transmitters nearer the boundaries of the target area, and ranged
around it, many more listeners could be reached effectively by medium-wave
and long-wave broadcaets. Political restrictions limit this, however, both
on the availability of sites and on the availability of frequency channels.
X4ropean allocation of frequencies gives the VOA no elbow room at all in the
long-wave and medium-wave bands,
The VOA labors ander the technical handicap arising from the practice
of originating programs in the United States, These programs must be
-6
TOP SECRET
Security Information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release MVOS/183410ATRDP79S01011Q90900030019-8
Security Information
transmitted on high-frequency channels to European outlets for rebroadchst.
This takes a large proportion of the technical and financial resources of
the VOA Facilities Branch. The relays from the United States to Europe are
not invulnerable to jamming.
"In spite of these difficulties, the Voice is heard behind the curtain
as is perhaps most convincingly demonstrated by the reaction in the Soviet
press and by the jamming, We don't know bow many listeners are reached,
We do know from recent monitoring reports that the jamming is heavy and
effective in Moscow, but not very effective against a determined listener
in at least some other places." The reported ineffectiveness of the jamming,
in rural areas is not necessarily reassuring -- It may mean that in thesv
regions the number of unsupervised high-frequency receivers is too small to
matter. The Soviet government broadcasts to its own people by long wave
(which VOA does not use), medium wave (with which VOA cannot now effecte17
reach Batista), and on a very large scale, by loudspeakers wired to radio
centrals,"
"The Soviet jamming effort is nevertheless formidable. At least several
hundred, possibly a thousand,' jamming transmitters are in use. Perhaps ofve3
more significant is the way they are ased. The jamming transmissions appear
to be centrally controlled, although the individual transmitters are widely
distributed."
"The Soviets rely far more than we do on short-wave radio for intermi
communication, and they have reached a high state of competence in this fle
We thus find the technical forces of the International Broadcasting Div:
- 7 -
To aciaT
Approved For Release /6605b1/26n:ftWiii5F'79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release Ntomet2esgatiRDP79S01011AQ,P0900030019-8
? Security Information
pitted against an opponent whose resources in equipment and trained persons
are most imposing,"
"The evidence suggests that the operation Is growing in scale and is
a direct and major threat to highp.frequency radio communication within and
kt Europe generally."
Measures which can be taken along conventional lines to expand and
improve the VOA relays and broadcasts include higher power, highly directive
short-wave antennas, improved relay receivers, and, finally, the ambitious
expansion of sites and facilities envisaged in the "Ring" plan, which in-
cludes a high-power short-wave beam directed from Alaska across the Pole
into northern BIAPlao The transpolar beam, in particular, is more than a
merely conventional improvement; it is an ambitious step, boldly conceived,
and in our opinion basically sound (see Annex 19),
The Ring plan is a good start, and strong efforts should be made to
obtain the sites and frequency channels it calls for.
We emphatically endorse efforts to originate more programs in Europe
whether by recordings and teletype script or by actual script preparation
in AUrope.
? "There are strong arguments for expanding the Voice of America
4r.
operations in the medium-frequency band and for moving into the low,
frequency bend. Receivers for medium and long waves are cheaper and more
numerous than short-wave receivers; a method discussed below for creating
a very powerful signal can be used for long waves and perhaps also for
medium waves; finally, a strong signal at long or medium waves provides
clear, reliable, easy reception."
-8
TOP
TOP SECIUT
Approved For Release 2?1043A41$42%/ifclitatilaP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved ForReleaseNt0/0eaftfELA-RDP79S01011AW0900030019-8
Security information
"To move in this direction, we need more frequency channels and more
favorable transmitter sites."
"Until some of the issues are resolved, the only way to strengthea
our voice on medium waves in Western Europe and the near Satellite areas
is the indirect one of helping other countries to tell our story through
their own radio programs., This is being done now, and the effort deserves
the strongest support and encouragement because of the psychological advan-
tage of this approach (see Chapter IV)."
"A few very powerful transmitting facilities of our own, suitably
located, could send into Russia and the satellites a signal strong enough
to compete with jamming,"
"When our broadcast signals compete with jamming signals at the
antenna of a receiving set, the strongest signal wins," There is no sub-
stitute for a strong signal." "If we doable our broadcasting power, the
jammer has to doable his, but no more."
"But the situation is fundamentally changed if we concentrate All, our
power on ma of the target area for a broadcast, then quickly shift the
concentration to another part of the target, and so on." "Analysis shown
that in this case, as each side strengthens its effort, the jammer has ulti-
mately to increase his investment by the square of the factor by which the
broadcaster has increased his."
(The report describes a possible method of accomplishing this.)
The described technique would enable us to send out a signal so strong
that a) it cannot easily be jammed over a large area; b) it can be heard
9 -
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release0/0900/29fiSatiRIDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved FOrReleaseNtOnt240.1CA-RDP79S01011A40900030019-8
. Security Information
with a receiver as insensitive ata simple crystal set. We shall have taken
the initiative by a move that requires the Soviet to make a strenuous tech-
nological effort in a new direction in order to counter it. Such effort
involves the production of equipment which serves no useful military purpose?
which from our point of view would be a welcome diversion of their industrial
resources.
A final retaliative measure is always possible s the confiscation of
receivers. But this strikes directly against the Soviet people themselves
and would mark a major psychological victory for us. If that day comes,
we ought to be prepared to supply them with receivers,.
One of the biggest barriers we face, not only in Russia, but in Many
other parts of the world, is the scarcity of radio receivers that can hear
our broadcasts. "We recommend a concerted effort to develop crystal and
transistor receivers for mass production. A good 'cover ? as well as a
sponsor for this operation may perhaps be found in the Civilian Defense
Program, since there is good reason to believe that domestic distribution
of receivers net dependent on electric power may be an important step in the.
preparation of defense against military attack."
"Incidentally, the crystal receiver in conjunction with high-power
transmitter can play a useful role in the development of backward areas;
it makes possible widespread communication in advanceof electrification."
"We have examined a number of novel proposals with sufficient care to
be able to dismiss most of them from further consideration."
Broadcasting from airplanes over Russia in the event of war, sudden
internal rupture, or other emergency may be useful (Annex 26).
- 10 -
TOP SBORBT
Approved For Releasge290trfa8/241151A0RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release MDCWO8/RftkielA-RDP79S01011A40900030019-8
Security Information
We do not believe that jamming of Russian high-frequency communica-
tions is a tactic to be recommended. Such communications are not believed
to be highly vulnerable. "A somewhat more attractive proposal is the
insertion into transmissions over the Russian point-to-point net of capallei
bits of propaganda Which would thus be sure to reach the ears of some listfa-
er. This would have to be a rather carefully and neatly planned "grey or
black operation.
The Russian jamming operation Seems to as to have clear and serious
implications extending beyond the immediate problems of the Voice of Aoe Ica,
Soviet radio maneuvers in the last few years strongly suggest a calculated,
determined attempt to take control of the ether over Europe, Indeed, the
jamming of the Voice of America may be only an opening skirmish in a long
struggle which we have called the glesr_tmLnatzt,. "In another direc-
tion the Soviets have been systematically 'cornering' frequency allocations
in the short-wave spectrum, by quasi-legal methods, and are establishing a
position as the real frequency-controlling authority on the Eurasian conti-
nent,"
"Aggressive moves by us will, of coir, intensify the struggle. But
if we do not recognize and accept the challenge, the free world may find
itself without long-distance communications lines."
We see serious weakness in our present national position, "We have
no central authority, no 'general staff", to direct a long campaign involv-
ing All of our external lines of communication, governmental, private, and
military. Technical intelligence, absolutely essential for conducting sach
a war, has to be organized for the job." "If our high-frequency tranamissina
- 11 -
Approved ForRelease2000/08/221EICIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Security Information
Approved For Release te6001)/212aafiliA-RDP79S01011Ag9o90003oo1 9-8
Security Information
were jammed (they could be jammed tomorrow) and the Atlantic cables cut by
submarine action, air mail would be our only means of communication with
Europe."
"While we make no specific recommendations on organizational steps at
this time, the problem must be faced, as a matter of national security? row "
"We believe, it is now technically feasible to make our transatlantic
communication channels secure against possible jamming and to provide, whil4.
so doing, much better facilities for communication to Europe than we now ha-e
"We believe it is in the national interest to undertake itithout delay
the improvement of our transatlantic communication channels. We have explo.-
ed this problem with some of the agencies that might be involved and hive n1L)t
on all sides ready recognition of its urgency."
"The technical intelligence on jamming and on related Soviet radio
operations is recognized by all concerned, and especially by those most
directly involved in its collection and evaluation, to be sadly inadequa e, '
SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A) The long- and medium-wave bands offer the best opportunity for
strengthening our broadcasts and expanding our audience,
3) To combat jamming effectively, standardized high-power transmiti n;
anits for long and medium waves should be developed for use in coherent arrtys.
Engineering studies leading to equipment specifications shoild be initiated
at once,
0 Design of a small crystal receiver suitable for large-scale manu-
facture and wide distribution should be initiated at once; at the same
TOP SECRET
Security Information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release N6Q,/,(03/31*EscIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Secirity Information
devei pment of transistor reaaivers should be started,
a) A wiaeband transatlantic communication facility, reliable and
siecus against jamming ? can and must be provided. The appropriate agency
shoulA at once sponsor a thorough engineering study of the several possible
meth,49,
The national telecommunications policy must be reexamined, taking
into aenoant Soviet aggression and expaneion in the ether, our own long-
ranga plans, and the present welter of conflicting interests in European
The challenge of the electromagnetic war is serious mici we are
not nrgAnized to meet it,
21,i,0021S
The report discusses balloons in some detail, both as to possibilities,
possinle countermeasures, timing, operational feasibility, logistic probleme,
USSR aotentialities for balloon warfare, etc. The recommendations of the 1.-,
port are as fo1lows0
An enhanced balloon project should be carried oat especially in
If possible critical sitaations,
The balloon problem is a part of political warfare, It cannot be
handid by a sepnrate balloon shop, Organizational planning for use of
balloons in political warfare, leaflet preparation, stockpiling and site
-nelecAon must start now. They should be integrated in a general political
warfe program Timing and responsibility for final operation must be
held -n this integrated program,
3 -
Approved For ReleaggipaCCUMAIRDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release 2f/60/08619 s1tleRDP79S01011A490900030019-8
Security Information
3n Evaluation of Russian potentialities should be made part of the
integrated program.
4. Plans for a full operational-test should be made now,: A rrogram to
fix standards for production and operating procedures, to locate productiou
facilities and to obtain enough production for such a test should be started.
now.
Development work should be continued on basic technical aspects o'
operational feasibility gas bags, flight equipment, meteorological back-
ground and trajectory forecasting, and especially gas supply,
ANNEU51.1 IONOSPHERIC MATTERS
.(This Annex is a semi-technical discussion of radio propagation
phenomena, particularly with reference to how the penetration by the VOA
may os improved from the standpoint of the physics of radiowave propagetion,)
The report concludes with the following, "Based on this general account,
which is well known, but not often discussed in print, it is possible to mike
certain suggestions with regard to Voice of America operation
(a)
The extensive and ever-increasing use of Tangier as a relay poinf;
is excellent. The development of alternative high-frequency relzy
points somewhat farther south should be considered, as well as
the exploration of other possibilities for communication or
program transmission to Europe (see Annex 22 on transoceanic
relays).
(b) The possibilities of high-frequency broadcasts beamed to northero
Europe and in particular to the northern part of the
both European and Asiatic from northeastern Alaska, should be
- 14 -
Approved For Release 2000/0812951CMRDP79S01011A000900030019-8
Security Information
25X6
1CF SECRET
Approved For Release 2II00408i2ey: fthilialan9S01011AQ00900030019-8
given careful consideration (see Fig. 1). The available evidenue
is that they would be moderately successful and probably worth
while. Care should be taken to avoid twice crossing the zone
maximum disturbance even at right angles, and broadcast points
from southern Alaska should therefore be avoided. There are other, 25X6
and probably propagation-wise better northern sites to be consie_cred
should the suggestion be adopted in principle.
ANNEX 20
RICE POWER BROADCASTING
1111=,.. elatefter .
(his Annex reviews the techniques and state of the art of high-power
broadcilnting and proposes areas of research and development, and concludes
with thc: following:)
St51fl37Of the l'222L1174.
As the basic unit of a low-frequency coherent array we recommend
one-megawatt transmitter,- and an antenna consisting of two vertial
Further engineering study is needed to determine whether both
.Dyers should be drlven, and Whether top-loading tricks should be em
toyed. Obviously, there are many other points that will require
,I.irefUl investigation if the most economical and practical design is
- be achieved. The basic units should be uniform in design, and em-
sis should be put on simplicity, reliability, and ease of installation.,
Approved For Release 2000/08/12T :851EMP79S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Release )1100/0W9stah-RDP79S01011A1120900030019-8
?
Security Information
The equipment should be, so far as possible, transportable, and should
be patterned after military equipment rather than commercial broadcast-
ing equipment.
"A sketch of one embodiment of these ideas for a 200-kc array is
shown in Fig, 10, For this example, the simplest two-tower antenna
has been chosen - one driven radiator and one parasitic. The plan view
shows the layout of a 10-unit cluster, with a separation between units
that is probably more than would actually be required, Allowing for losses
in the ground or antenna structures, this cluster should have an effective
radiated power of at least 100 megawatts in the main lobe, The width of
the main lobe would be about 310? and it could be directed anywhere within
a 120? arc, The night sky-wave field strength at 1000 miles would be about
20 millivolts per meter, and about 10 millivolts per meter at 1400 miles,
Over good ground, the ground-wave field strength would fall to 20 millivolts
per meter at about 500 miles,
"We have not discussed the transmitter-antenna problem for the broad-
cast band, Suffice it to say that, if propagation measurements show ade-
quate sky-wave phase stability for the application of the coherent-array
technique in the medium-frequency band, the design of a one-megawatt unit
for that range does not appear to present any unusual engineering problems."
ANNEX 22
BROADBAND TRANSOCEANIC COMMUNICATION
(This Annex reviews the necessity of establishing a broadband trans-
oceanic communication system, particularly across the North Atlantic. It
- 16 -
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 20eitinIi2lJn!Mhk,5079S01011A000900030019-8
Approved For Releaset600/0i7rfOliVIDP79S01011AZY0900030019-8
reviews tAe various possibilities, including cable*, relay systems,
around,-wave relay systems, and various types of scattering mechanisms.
The report concludes with certain observations and theories which have
since led to the development of the so-called "Forward Scatter" technique,)
Abstracted by IPO/FOPHTrimmertgec
3/10/53
- 17-
TOP SECRET
Security Information
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8