SE-38: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 28, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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sncuRITY. INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 April 1953
SE-38: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE musts CT ACTION
IN ELECTROMAGNETIC WAPYARE
Appendix As Evaluation of Economic Factors
I. INTRODUCTION
From an economic point of view, the telecommunications
resources of the Bloc consist of two principal components:
(a) the radio and wire communication systems in being, including
operating equipment, technical personnel, essential services and
supplies, notably electric powers and (b) the communications equip-
memt industry, including its plant facilities, manpower, and supporting
sources of essential materials and power. The present physical capa-
bilities of the Bloc for waging electromagnetic warfare are determined
almost exclusively by the first component, particularly by the quantity,
technical characteristics, and geographic distribution of the oper-
ating equipment. Bloc capabilities, moreover, could be increased by
diverting to electromagnetic warfare communications resources now used
for a variety of purposes. The communications industry is important prima-
rily as a determinant of the Blocgs ability to improve and expand its
dec4romagnetic warfare capabilities over the longer run.
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II* PRESENT BLOC RESOURCES IN
Ao Facilities
20 The Bloc operates extensive telecommunications facilities
to support its domestic, intra-Bloc, and international activities
over some 12 million square miles. Wire and radio facilities are
readily available at practically all important military headquarterso
3. The principal wire and radio facilities of the Bloc are
shown on the accompanying maps. Figure 1 shows the principal wire
lines and more than 2,300 fixed radio station locations; Figure 2
shows the location of over 1,000 aeronautical radio communication
stations (212 with radio navigation aid facilities), 333 maritime radio
communication stationc, and 103 maritime radio navigation aid facilities.
The stations spotted on Figure 2 all operate or serve mobile radio units
(aircraft, vessels, and vehicles)*
4. Al]. transmitters capable of emitting radio signals are potential
jammers* It is estimated that the Bloc os wire and radio communication
systems as a thole comprise SYMO 9,600 significant transmitters. A
complete breakdown of this total by type of service is not available,
tut Table 1 summarizes certain aggregate statistics on the Blocs tele.
communications system.
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5. The basic telephone and telegraph system of each Bloc coun-
try, employing both wire and radio, is Integrated nationally- and ser-
yiese primarily the state authority. Each of these systems in turn
shows some integration into one massive Blocwide system with Moscow
as the focal point. The basic system serves the general political,
social, commercial, and military needs of the Bloc. In addition, there
are functional systems, in the main connected with the basic system,
which meet the need for security, police, industrial, aeronautical,
maritime, meteorological, and military operations.
6. In the basic system alone there are believed to be over 30
main radio and wire centers in the USSR, 14 in Communist China, and
some 36 in the Satellites. For the handling of international point-to-
point radio and wire communications, there are believed to be 12 gate-
way cities* in the USSR, 28 in Communist China, and 30 in the Satellites.
Table 2 is a tabulation of reported Bloc international telecommunications
circuits.
7. Large areas east of the Urals and north of the Trane-Siberian
Railroad, as well as wide areas of Communist China, remain uncovered
MibitOMIV?011??=111111???????????=4?
* Gateway cities are cities with through international radio and/or
wire channels.
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or thinly covered by wire lines and depend largely or wholly on radio
for rapid comanications. The present long-range civil radio network
of the USSR handles 1$ percent of the traffic volume between the major
cities along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and 80 percent of traffic
north of the railroad. This system is equipped with numerous direc-
tional, high-gain antenna arrays which decrease susceptibility to
jamming. Aeronautical and .maritime networks are more vulnerable to.
jamming because of lower power and lets directional antennas.
8n Bloc dependence on radio is not limited to the areas lacking
wire lines$ mobile units are almost completely dependent on radio for
rapid communications and for certain navigational services. Radio also
is used heavily between many points within the Bloc which are connected
by wire.
9. The USSR employs radio more intensively and extensively than
any other country in the world. Cksuauniet Chines use of radio is
relatively inconsequential as compared with that of the USSR, but low
powered radio stations of). KW or less are located at many wire junctions
and supplement wire facilities. On the other hands, the EUropean Bloc
except for Albania) is well served by wire facilities, and does not
depend on radio so extensively.
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10. The Blot, mass aural radiobroadcasting systems make heavy
demands on radio facilitiee. Domestic services use at least 400 radio
transmittere, employing a wide range of powers and operating in the
low, mediumand high frequency bands below 30 megacycles (see Table 3).
Some of theme transmitters probably are employed at times in the
jamming operation. The international service is itself considerable
(see Table 4), though the number of transmitters employed for this
service alone is not known.
11, are lines play an increasingly significant role in Mop
mass aural domestic radiobroadcasting service. They are used to relay
broadcasting programs between some cities. More important, however,
is their use for the distribution of broadcasting programa to loud-
speakers. Such wire lines are generally independent and separate from
those used for telephony and telegraphy. Radiobroadcasting citations
are directly connected by wire with loudspeakers in their
vicinity. The wire link is also used to transmit programs to distant
wire-diffusion exchanges to which loudspeakers are connected. Tore
remote areas are served by wire-diffusion exchanges which pickup
programs by radio, amplify them? and distribute them to wired loud-
speakers. Table 5 gives estimates of the number and character of Bloc
reception facilities for 1952 and 1953.
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12. A possibly significant addition to the Bloc conenutications
eyetem
is represented by the development daring the last 3 years of
microwave radio relay equipment of predominantly 8-channel type. This
equipment permits highly directional transmission at extremely high
frequencies, with relay stations required at line-of-sight distances.
It provides much greater security from hostile interference and anew
interception.
B. ProductlEELEILIWIE!.
13. The Bloc electronics industry comprieea an estimated 120 to
150 plants in the USSR and over 135 plants in East Gernany, Czecho-
slovakia, and Hungary. Approximately 85 percent of the plants are
engaged in the assembly of end products and major subassemblies? and
the remainder in production of tubes and other component parte.
14, It is estimated that the total production of the Bloc elec-
tronics industry in 1.952 was 475o million at US prices. Approximately
three-fourths of the electronics equipment prodnoed in the Bloc is
allocated to military needs, and the remainder to civilian needs.
15. The Bloc produces nearly all its own transmitter equipment.
Most of the production is from 12 known plants in the USSR, but East
German and Hungarian production is also significant. East German
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production for the period 19504952 was approximately 600 transmitters
with a total. .rated power exceeding 2,500 KW. Of particular importance
because of their high power were 9 units ranging from 100 to 500 KW
and 17 units ranging from 3 to 50 KW. Hungarian factories are reported
to have produced 700 transmitters (5 of which ranged between 120 and
135 Vi)for the USSR during 1949-1951.
16.. It is estimated that the Bloc produced 64 million electron
tubes of all types in 1952, neatly 3 million of which were transmitting
And other special tubes (see Table 6). There has been no indication
since 1950 that the Bloc transmitter program has been hampered tar
Shortages of tube manufacturing facilities In fact, East Germany has
a capacity to produce transmitting tubes which is currently not being
fully utilized.
17. It is estimated that the Bloc has produced about 21,700 micro-
wave equipment units (oath unit comprising a transmitter and a receiver)
during the period 1949-1952. Approximately 1,750 units were produced
in East Germany (see Table 7) and the remainder are believed to have
been produced in the USSR. There is no evidence of microwave equipment
production in the Satellites other than East Germany.
.18. Production of all types of civilian radio receivers in the
Bloc increaaed from slightly more than], million sets in 1948 to about
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1.6 million seta in 1951. During the same period the output of short-
wave receivers decreased from 8252000 to roughly 6502000 sets. This
decrease does not indicate any special difficulty encountered by the
Bloc in producing short-wave sets, but probably reflects an effort to
reduce the availability of those types of radio sets capable of receiving
Western broadcasts.
19. Bloc production of telecommunications wire line equipment is
adequate to maintain existing wire oommunication systems and to expand
them in accordance with published plans. However, despite the rapid
expansion of wire and cable plants since 19481 the Bloc is dependent on
imports for 20 percent of its wire and cable. Production of wire could
be greatly increased if raw copper were diverted from other uses. The
Bloc requires an estimated 814,000 metric tons of -copper for its current
production of both communitations and industrial wire and cable. This
requirement represents over -- percent of the Bloc's production of
copper, estimated at 3232600 metric tone. Bloc production is supple
-
merited by an estimated 802000 metric tons of imported copper in the form
of crude metal and wire and cable*
.1.11.4Y1131.. .........40.1?????????????
* Of the 1.6 million receivers produced in 19512 4502000 were relatively
insensitive crystal receivers.
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20. Soviet dependence on Western imports of critical electric
and electronic test equipment is rapidly decreasing. In 1951 the
estimated total of imports was $14 million, or 2 percent of Bloc
production of electronic equipment. These imports included large
shipments of transmitter equipment and tubes for some components of
Which the Bloc is still partly dependent on foreign mimes.
21. Present trade controls have kept the Blocos imports of
electronic equipment below the 1951 level. However, significant
quantitiee of materials, and certain machines, required in the manu-
facture of tubes and components are still being imported. Many of
the materials in this trade, such as refractory metals and diamond
dies, are difficult to interdict effectively because of the small
tonnages involved.
C. Electric Power Supply
22. Only a small percentage of Bloc total electric energy pro-.
duction ie consumed by telecommunications facilities. There are no
indications of a shortage of electric power having affected the oper-
ation of Bloc telecommunications. Electrical power services are available
from central stations to most of the Bloc area west of the Urals and to
certain limited Bloc Asiatic areas. In regions without central station
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supply, power must be obtained from more localised sources such as
generators or batteries. Conaequently, in large areas of Siberia and
China it might be difficult to insure reliable rapid communications
services under conditions of sudden heavy demand.
D, Manpower Resources.
23. Through stepped-up training programa, the USSR by 1950 had
largely overcome the more critical postwar shortages of skilled workers.
It is estimated that 4,600 electrical engineers are now being graduated
annually from college-level inititutions? and 109000 technicians from
advanced communications achools.
24. The Bloc would not encounter a serious manpower Shortage in
Increasing its electromagnetic warfare activities. The total number of
workers in the Bloc electronics and telecommunications manufacturing
industries is estimated as 292,000 for 1951, and 372,000 by the end of
1952, Non-military personnel operating the communications facilities
of the USSR are estimated at 600,000. The military services and the
radio amateur group are additional sources of trained manpower.
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III. BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR WARDED FLMTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
A. Diversion of Telecommunications Facilities from Normal
ce
25. It is believed that the Bloc could increase its current
jamming effort by use of reserve transmitters, by more efficient use
of facilities and serviced', and by diverting traffic to alternative
media. While it is estimated that roughly 1,000 to 2,000 additional
transmitters could be employed for jamming parpoeed without significantly
impairing Bloc telecommunications, the extent to which transmitters could
be so diverted depends on the number of hours of jamning operation, the
time of day, the target area, and the location and technical character-
istics of the transmitters available.
26. It is not possible to determine the precise degree of diversion
of transmitters which each of the msasures discussed below might permit.
The estimated ability of the Bloc to use these measures is based in part
on analogical comparisons with operational procedures standards in other
countries. Also., some of these measures may already have been exploited
to some extent in support of the current Bloc jamming operation.
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ao Use of Reserve Transmitters
Most countries provide reserve transmitters for their
main radio Oations in order to insure continuity of
service; each of the Bloc stations probably has at
least two transmitters. It is also likely that the
Bloc has a considerable number of transmitters in
strategic reserve. In addition9 there are probably a
number of transmitters actually in service which are
potentially an additional reserve such transmitters
would include unite engaged in threw traffic to conceal
operational surges in traffic, in other types of decep-
tion traffice,and in training radio operators on live
circuits.
b. Rationalization of Transmitter Facilities,
It is estimated that there are hundreds of lightly
loaded services which do not require the use of their
transmitters on a 24-hour stand-by basis and thus could
provide many hours of jamming service Release of such
transmitters might be obtained by redncing the number of
transmitters at a single location operating in different
;services. Additional use of transmitters also could be
gained by increasing within limits the speed of tele-
graphic tranemiseion, and/or by increasing the channel
capacities served by a single transmitter.
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Co IT2Ergar112!!!!!ik-A5.22-22ta0-211211-Ved.Serlirice
The output of transmitter facilities would be greatly
increased by flattening out the 24-hour traffic load
curve, and accepting some delays in less essential
service. For example, a substantial number of trans
mitten; could be released by the reduction of the
number of points involved in direct intercommunication.
d. Reduction of Nonessential Services and Use of Alternative
Diversion of non-official private messages from point-to-
point rapid communications services to the mails would
release some radio transmitters and wire lines for higher
priority messages. In addition, the Bloc probably could
divert a number of transmitters now engaged in mass aural
radiobroadcasting. The reduction of aural radiobroad-
casting would be offset to some extent by continued
expansion of the extensive wire-diffusion network developed
for carrying programs to loudspeakers. Present dependence
on radio for rebroadcasting to wire-diffusion centers is
decreasing and could be overcome by further extension of
wire and by forwarding program transcriptions by physical
means.
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co Rescheduling of Essential Radio Services
The radio communication services which the Bloc would
continue to maintain under conditions of extended
electromagnetic warfare could be rescheduled as to time,
area, frequency band, and/or transmitter assignment in
such away as to improve the availability and freedom
of action of facilities for jamming operations.
B. Diversion of Production of
27. It is believed that the Bloc electronics industry could provide
for substantial increases in the production of transmitters for jamming
by cutting back non-essential electronics production. For example, the
cost of producing 1,000 standard 10-Ed communications voice transmitters,
which are entirely adequate for jamming operation, is estimated at
approximately $22 million at US prices. This cost represents about 3
percent of the total value of output of the Bloc electronics industry for
1952, or about 12 percent of the 1952 value of Blop non-military elec.-
tronics output. The production of the first additional 1,000 tram-
mitters in a year could probably, be undertaken without serious displace.:
ment in the industry; production of jammers at higher razes would entail
serious diversion of resources and production.
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28. The Bloc would encounter at least a short-run difficulty
in expanding significantly its output of communications cable and wire.
Supplies of raw copper already are tightly allocated because of Bloc
dependence on imports.
C. Diversion of Manpower
29. Most ManpoWerreqeirements for expanded electromagnetic war-
fare could be met without difficulty by the reallocation of personnel
in the existing communications services and electronic equipment indUstry.
D. Pr_.2s.imIs_iovelL.the Next.2.1e_ars
30. The natural rate of growth of rapid communications facilities
will yield a sizable increase in Bloc capabilities. Output of electron
tubes, the best indicator of electronic capability, is expected to
increase over 100 percent in value terms during the next 2 years (see
Table 6) We estimate that microwave radio equipment production (see
Table 7), wire-diffusion networks (see Table 5).0 and wire line and coaxial
cable construction will expand rapidly. Some increases also are expected
in existing wire line capacities. If electromagnetic warfare were to
receive greater emphasis in production planning with particular attention
to reducing dependence on radio communication below 30 megacycles, Bloc
capabilities could be significantly increased.
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Table 1
Tabulation of retimates on the Soviet floc Telecommunications System
(P,adio Telegrnnh, Telenhons, Telenhoto)
19460 P60452
tattle Sys
? ,...,....?????????0?R
Woneters of -Wire 11/
'Thousands)
2; Radio Transmitters
(All Services) .
.; Radio 'blue:matters
aroadcasting Ser-
Radio Stations in
Point -to-Point
Service
5, Radio Stations
1- 9. kw
2 - 30 mc
6. Radio Stations
10 - 19 kw ,
2 30 me
Radio Stations
20 kw & Over
2 - 30 me
Conver-
sations,? 'Dotal All
gypes (Millions)
9. Telegrams? Total
All Types (Millions)
as
3,000 (1952)
7,150 (1952)
168 (1952)
1,490 (1951)
NoA0
N0Ao
425 (1951) Ej
132 (1951)
283.5 (1951)
s re
h, tthae of the stations in the point-to-point .service for thrt European
Setellites end 277 for Commwaist China are helm the 1-kllowatt (kw) minimum
power covered for radios in linss 5,0 6, and?.
0. The mssn has submitted a total of 425 notifications to the tntermational
Telecommunications Union (XTVY) for call letters .for radio transmitters of
15-kw power or more in the frequency range from 6 to 13 megacycles (mc).
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Satellites
Communlet
Chtna
30,000
(1952)
6o0 (1952)
1,250
(1952)
1,210 (1952)
105
(1952)
149 (1952)
100
(1951)
.1_,/
328 (1950) y
63
(1951)
41. (1951)
11
(1951)
8 (1951)
17
(1951)
a (1951)
144
(1951)
605 (1951)
51
(1951)
)4.3 (1946)
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l!able 2
Tabulation of Reported Soviet Bloc International Telecommunications Circuits a/
1 january 1952
Mater of
NuMber of Circuits
Number of Bloc
Gateway
tatal Number or
with Other Bloc
Countries Contacted
Cities in
Tots1 Number
Circuits
Coomtries
Country
of Countries
Radio
Radio
Wire
Country
Shown
Contacted
Radio
Wire
Radio
..e.??????????
Wirt
Only
UssR
12
30
35
32
11
If
3
Albania
2
5
3
If
2 1
0
,.;,
1
East Austria
1
20
11
3 2k
2
2
3
BUlgarbs
1
16
13
26
6 5
1
1
5
China
28
30
73
42
15 14
2
2
1
Czechoslovakia
5
35
35
110
7 45
if
2
3
East GermBUY
3
16
11
7
7 2
0
7
1
IlUngarY
if
27
55
8 28
3
3
.2
s
Poland
8
22
21
39
7 19
if
2
Rumania
6
17
19
30
8 3.9
if
1
-,paermmenitra0M.I.F.
Taken from RIC- 2 APPe
Se.
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Ditakk 3
Estimated Nombitr of Transuittars Used for RadlObroadoasting
by the Soviet floc !,./
(L Low-Frequency; M Madium-Frequeney; H Eigh4rRquency)
15 Amory 1953
-,....4,..../...*+???11.012.15,
No. of
Cit/es
Having
Trans-
Fre-
quency
lowatm_
glitters
Bend
.01-4
SR
87
L
8
m
15
I!
24
Albania
6
L
m
4
II
5
Ft
6
L
Austria
M
6
B
4
eolgaria
3
L
m
H
6o
L
M
lio
/I
21
Czecbo-
14
L
a tovakia?
M
9
H
Rest
L
Aermany
M
14
H
?Amory
5
L
m
3.
II
Poland
11
L
M
2
U
5
14
2
totels
215
Power
in Kilowatts
Tot,..1;
5-19
20-99
100.199
200-422 500
Sub-
& Orier totals
13
20
15
13
12
20
9
10
7
44
57
66
167
10
1
5
5
1
7
144
6
1
2
1
2
149
3
1
114
lo
4
35
1
3
2
6
1
21
1
1
2
1
1
3
5
1
1
14
3
3
10
3
3
7
1
2
3
1
2
6
lo
5
5
1
1
lo
2
3
1
6
3.
3
fl
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Table
Tabulation of it on Soviet lam
International Aural Radlobroadcasting Services
3. January 1953
,...ranwerspw.rocomentarmolvn*Inrcwe4almaftememeatmoosnowlonomm.,???ennwor.ter
No. of Citiea
Broadcasting
in Country
Shown
Averaee
Number of
Programs
Average
Daily
Program
us at
No of
Different
Langsegss
Used.
Frequency Band
Used
Low Medium EA
CIBBS
Albania
East Austria
1
1
229
26
.1 .0
102
8
35
11
X X
x
x
Bulgaria
1.
30
18
11
x
x
China
2
brl
22
14
Czechoslovakia
3.
55
29
14
East Cern:Bey
2
Hungsay
1
46
27
12
x
x
Poland
1
78
45
13
x
x
Rurasnia
2.
16
10
9
Totale II ,E,
rt7-74EN77. 'fir-0 t : ?-"ECWA?v. ppiin-AWC-117.?
261
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Table 5
Estimate of the BUMber and Character of Soviet Bloc
Aural Radidbroadcasting Reception. Facilities
1952-53
?Amite
1952W
Wire-Diffusion ystems
1953 ?i
Wire-Diffusion Systems
-------Ig--Coup ..12:251..:. Loudspeakers Radio Receivers .Exchanges Loudspeakers Radio Receivers
USSR
36,500 109000,000 4,500,000 40,000 10,500,000 5,000,000
Albania
100
LA0
19,000
100
Ift,A.
20,000
Bqlgaria
891
114,595
2509000
1,100
1439000
26c000
China
(Thousands)
&A,
190009000
(Thousands)
Iii..4,
1,000,000
Czechoslovakia
LA.
500,000
2,600,000
NA,
500,000
297309000
East Austria
LA0
LA0 2/
900,000
MA.
N.A.,
950400c
East Germany
LAO
N.A0 2/
440004000
N0A0
LAO
411000000
RUngary
NA.
16(v)oo
627,000
N0A0
190,000
635,000
Poland
7,450
725,000
102500000
8.v000
7854,00o
1,,330ls000
Rumania
200
100,000
3004000
300
150s000
3l0. 000
Total Bloc
.1594469000
335,00-
a. The 1952 estimates are from EM-R.1.24 Appendix J. S.
b. The 1953 estimates are projected from CR estimates for previous years.
c. Fragmentary reports indicate that wire-diffusion systems are also under development in these'
countries,
Y. 91.1
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`lald
Year
1951
1952
1955
Table 6
Taal Estimated. Output of Electron Ubes
in the SovietBloc"
(Bate of Output at End Year)
1951-52,? 1955
AllemeseeverimgrierieNwa
t=fiVansmitting end
Rather of Tithes Dollar Way, amber
62 2.4
50
64
115
82
170
? 2.9
5.5
a. ir put capaci y quent 'or ',cause
manufacturing variables. These figures are based oa
forthcoming supplement to CIA/HR 7, The Electron Tube
Zndustry in the Soviet Bloc 29 Augm132.-171)?--
ZIM1rroMW.04fidopted on the basis of the
analysis of plant output rather than analysis of plant
capacity.
*A-
Table 7
Estimated Production of'. Microwave Radio Equipment
in East Germany
1949-55
Tear
1949-50
1951
.1952
1953
1954
1955
Units
Amount fis.
500
500
750
1000
1500
11800
a. Pm?du-al?on is expressed in equipment units.
Each unit includes a transmitter and receiver.
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Security Information
5E-38: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLi. COURSES OF ACTION IN
ELECTIMMETIC YvARFARE
Appendix B: Evaluation of Technical Factors
I. BLOC ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
A. Extent and Techniques of Broadcast Jamming
1. Short wave jamming was first directed against Russian-
language VOA and BBC programs on 3 February 1948, and continued on
a moderate scale during the next year. On 24 April 1949 jamming
action was greatly stepped up.* Frequency ranges were extended to
include medium and long wave broadcasts, the number of jammers
employed was increased, and jamming was extended geographically
through the coverage of Satellite and Finnish languages. sources
eXc" crre_z_e
of,programs jammed included Aadio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, and
Vatican City. In 1953 Hebrew and Turkish language programs have
also been jammed.
2. In general, the jamming has been directed against programs
intended for reception within the Bloc area. However, on 30 January
1953 a Danish long wave broadcasting station was jammed while
carrying a domestic program in Danish which the Soviet Minister had
stated was insulting.
*OSI-1- 0 "Historical Developments in the Jamming of the VOA by
the USSR", CIA, 20 January 1950
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3. Broadcast signals ranging in frequency from 230 kc. to
21.7 mc. have been reported jammed. The jamming signal is usually
a relatively narrow band so that it will not be likely to affect
neighboring channels. The jammers in use at the present time have
very wide variations in power output, depending upon the frequency of
operation and the type of coverage intended. Output ranges from a
possible low of 1 kw. to highsiof 50 to 200 kO. on high frequencies
and to 500 kw. on medium or low frequencies.
4. 'We estimate that the number of transmitters employed for
jamming is approximately 900. The majority of the jamming stations
are in the European USSR; a relatively small number are in the
Satellites. The USSR has at various times diverted transmitters
from domestic program service to jamming, and has jammed even when
-it'-covered domestic programs. Cooperation between the USSR and
Satellites, and between Satellites, is indicated by use of jammers
in one bloc country to cover programs directed to another.
5. Control of 30% to 40% of the jammers is immediate and
flexible so that they can follow changes in schedule or frequency,
often within a minute or less. This reveals existence of an ,
efficient monitor control network. Control of the remaining jammers
is apparently less direct since they do not quickly respond to
changes -- sometimes not for several days. The organization
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responeible for the control of the jamming of VOA has not been
positively determined. However, responsibility for basic policy
probably is assigned to the UGB (Ministry of State Security).
6. In addition to preventing Western broadcasts from reaching
Soviet and Satellite peoples, the Bloc ,s jamming effort has provided
trainin3 in jamming techniques and system coordination.
B. Effectiveness of Broadcast Jamming
7. According to an analysis of 2258 monitoring reports
propaganda program transmissions
directed to the European Satellites areas -
-and-oan-be-heard-wit(good emisielbter reception on at least one
channel for over half the program periods. Programs to the kar, East
can be heard with good/oitedaVioqt reception on at least one high
frequency channel for nearly all program periods, but medium
frequency is received well only about half the time. Some of this
difficulty may be due to interference other than deliberate jamming.
On the other hand, these programs have only sporadic penetration
within Western USSR, especially in the large urban areas. Technical
expedients, such as greatly increasing the number of frequencies
used simultanenusly to carry the same programs, have apparently
not been very successful in the European USSR.
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8, Reports from listeners within the Bloc are limited to
non-technical information on effectiveness. Some reports from the
Satellites provide technical information on transmitters which
could be used for jamming, on development activities, andon tubes
and transmitters; these reports phed some light on capabilities.
Most of the technical details concerning the present jamming effort
have been obtained from careful and repeated observations at receiving
7*--
stations in friendly territory.; Particular' excellent results have
come from a restricted but continuous effort by experienced observere
0. Jamming of Signals Other Than Broadcast
9. In the past three years there have been more than 40 cases
of interference with US communication circuits which might have been
instances of Soviet jamming. A review of these cases indicates that
it it exceedingly difficult to distinguish among: (a) unintentional
interference, (b) radio jamming against VOA and BBC which spills over
into U.S. communications circuits, and (c) deliberate radio jamming
of communications circuits. Incidents of this last type have generally
involved air-ground frequencies.
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10. The various incidents reported thus far do not appear to
Jsrs7'e
indicate -eri...axerh.aWkieviet-pIan-lorj-nterference witI US communications
circuits. All reported and investigated cases of interference with
navigation aids seem to have been unintentional interference from
transmitters operating on assigned frequencies. After due allowance
for VOA radio jamming andltp unintentional interference, however,
there still remain a few instances which cannot be readily explained
except as deliberate jamming of communications circuits. For example,
successful jamming of long range shore-to-ship communications by a
jammer apparently located in the vicinity of Leipzig occurred during
The shipborne receiver was
within the effective range of the jammer, a condition which could
exist a large portion of the time in the course of naval operations
in general war with the Bloc.
11. The lack of conclusive evidence of intentional jamming of
military circuits does not indicate a lack of capabilities.. The
techniques used for broadcast jamming could be used against long
range military circuits. It should be noted that for jamming
purposes broadcasts to the Bloc offer one great advantage that
commercial and military circuits often do not, namely, relatively
fixed schedules and channels and proximity of the receiving end.
Nevertheless, the Bloc is carAble of seriously disrupting long range
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific circuits. It is believed, however,
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that it is not likely to employ boordinated measures against military
communications circuits unless a general mar occurs.*
II. PRESENT BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
A. A.22122921.11AE-1.11121E-22WEMEM.
12. Large scale jamming operations require: (a) transmitters
and associated antennas, (b) monitor-control networks, and (c) com-
petent personnel. The Bloc today possesses these necessary elements
of a large-scale jamming system.
13. Transmitters and associated antennas, In order to evaluate
properly the Bloc jamming transmitter capability, it must be recognized
that ma/radio transmitter can be used to jam certain targets.
However, transmitters to be utilized for jamming long range circuits
must be capable of operating in the frequency range over , hich the
jamming is to take place. They should be situated geographically to
take advantage of varying radio propagation conditions, they should
have a reasonably high power output, and they should be designed to
make fairly rapid frequency changes. Large numbers of directional
* The technical problem of jamming long range communications has been
considered with respect to U. S. transoceanic circuits. It is considered
that they are illustrative of the problem of long range communications
of other western countries. Time has not permitted an investigation
of the special technical problems of jamming of Arctic communications.
Consideration has been given to the problems of jamming long range
navigation systems used by other NATO countries as well as those
used by the U.S.
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antennas capable of beaming transmissions to the target areas, should
be associated with the transmitting stations.
14. Since the Bloc has shown ability and willingness to divert
transmitters from other services, the entire Bloc transmitter plant
should be considered as a potential source of jamming equipment. It
is estimated that there are at least 9600 significant radio transmitters
in the Bloc. Available information on broadcast transmitters operating
in the Bloc indicates a total of 421, ef which 167 are in the USSR.
-
In the Moscow area there are approximately 38 broadcast transmitters,
25 of which have been active internationally. Since the Bloc began
intensive jamming operations, there has been an increasing number of
jammers capable? of rapid frequency changes. Some jammers make changes
of 10-15 kc. in as little as a few seconds, while others require up
to a minute. kany radio tranamitters now in other services probably
44
could be diverted to a jamming operation with no effect on essential
traffic handling capability; additional numbers Of transmitters
could be diverted through some sacrifice of least essential services.
15. Interception of experimental Loran type signals operating
on 150150 kc. shows Bloc has high powered transmitters on LF. Bloc
transmissions have been observed on frequencies as low as 20.1 kc/s.
International radio frequency registration shows 00E64 26 assignments
below 60 kc/s. The indicated power is generally comparatively low,
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although there are two assignments of /20 kw. and one of 100 kw. It
is apparent that the special techniques of LF and VLF are well known
to the Bloc.
16. The Soviets have been active in the field of antenna design
for many years. Observation of some of the main communication centers
in the Bloc reveals vast antenna farms of directional antennas
permitting efficient transmission in many directions. The Bloc
probably has satisfactory antenna arrays associated with many of its
transmitters enabling direction of jamming signals toward their
target areas.
17.- Monitor and Control Networks. An effective monitor/control
network must be an integrated part of the jamming system to achieve
maximum efficiency in attacks and to nullify evasive action. This
network searches out target transmissions, assigns missions to the
jammers, and checks results. Study of jammer operations indicates
existence of a highly efficient Bloc monitor control net which
probably utilizes wire line communications. One centerof such
control is believed to be located at Beelitz in East Germany. It
is likely that the Bloc could increase these facilities as needed.
18. Competent Personnel. A cadre. of personnel skilled in
electromagnetic mix-fare obviously has been developed since concerted
jamming commenced in 1949. There have never been any indications
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of general shortages of qualified communications personnel in the
USSR. The Soviets are sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled in
the field of radio wave propagation to deal with the jamming
problem They have had access to information on most of the work
done in the field in the U.S. and elsewhere, and have conducted an
extensive research program of their own.
U. Ceyabilit for Dimption of lien rspge Telecommunieations
Circui s an av obit on .1 s
la. The attached map shows Boas, of our iv)ortant high frequency
transoceanic circuits, and indicates how close the termini of many
of them corm to Bloc territory. The signala of several circuits
traverse soviet territory'in following a great-circle aath.
25X1B
aonsideration
was given to !ammer and winter conditions of propagnaieaa
4esults
showed that conditions are favorable to jamming of all six ClICUiL3
during a.large portion of the time,
20. The receiver at the U.5 end of the circuit is particularly
vulnerable because of the proximity of bloc territory to the
transmitter at the far end, making wave propagation conditions very
similar over the paths of desired signal and the jamming
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signal0 with jammers strategically located within Bloc territory,
it is concluded that a jamming signal can be established at this end
at almost any time. In most cases, the direction of arrival of the
jamming signal and the desired signal would be so nearly the same
that the use of directional receiving antennas would be little or no
help in discriminating between them.
21. The receiver at the end of circuits nearest Bloc territory is
in general about as vulnerable as the one at the U.t.J. end during the
summer months. During the winter months freedom from jamming could
exist for a period of about four hours or less 'by a careful selection
of operating frequencies. In some cases, directional receiving
antennas would be of considerable assistance, but not where the
communications :ath traverses Bloc territory.
25X1 B
23. These considerations of jamming point-to-point communications
can be applied, to mobile communications (shore-to-ship and ground-to-air),
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noting that vulnerability may be higher because the mobile station
usually employs relatively low power and does not employ directional
antennas. Moreover, there are generally no alternative means of
communication for such purposes.
24. Communication with subterged submarines largely depends on
very-low frequencies (VLF), chiefly because of their greater under-
water penetration. Jamming of these very-low frequencies would
seriously impair long-range communications with U.S. submarines.
Coverage by existing VLF stations is not presently adequate for
world-wide reception even on the surface and in the absence of
jamming. As present day receiving antennas are little better than
omnidirectional, these frequencies are very vulnerable to jamming;
this situation probably will not be improved within the next two
years.
25. Recent Soviet experiments on their LF Loran chain operating
on 150 kc. showed substantial capability for jamming in the field
of low frequency high power transmission. Practical experience
gained by the Soviets in experimenting with their own long-range
navigation aid system would be of value to them should they attempt
to jam western systems of a similar nature. Propagation characteristics
would grant our NA. Atlantic Loran chains a high degree of immunity
during daylight hours, but no such immunity could be expected when
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the path of the jamming transmission lies wholly or for the major
part in darkness. However, alternate navigation aids operating
in the frequency band under 30.0 mc. -- the Decca navigator, low/
medium frequency beacons, and uonsol -- are available in the
European theater. 1111 three systems operate an low frequencies and
use some form of continuous wave transmissions; they are vulnerable
to "spoofing" and, to a lesser degree, to jamming.
26. The effectiveness of a jamming signal will vary according
to the type of service against which it is operating. The over-all
problem involves a complex combination of types of communications
and jamming signals. Skillful employment of a diversity of communica-
tions channels having differing vulnerabilities to each tyIe of jamming
can increase the amount of penetration attained, but no conventional
system is invulnerable. Nevertheless, there is one type of communica-
tions of limited utility which is relatively difficult to jam;
namely, the "Squirt" system whereby short messages are transmitted
at very high speed on pre-arranged frequencies. The short time the
signal is on the air makes it difficult to locate it and set the
jammers.
III. POTENTIAL kon IhatiEk61140 PRESENT CAPABILITIES
A. Capability for Diversion 01.12illall..12T11.1.412!
27. The technical problem of diverting equipment and personnel
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from other services to jamming, at least in the high frequency
bands, is probably not difficult because (a) the basic techniques
are well worked out in the existing system, and (b) there is no
apparent lack of facilities available for diversion. Diversion
of broadcast transmitters, regularly done during periods of
maximum jamming effort, would imply that the control system
presently used for jamming has connections already established not
only with stations which are set up exclusively for jamming, but
also with other radio communications centers. kany of the estimated
900 jammers now employed maybelocated at such communications
centers -- there is definite evidence of this in several cases.
28. iversion of high powered VLF and IF equipment is not
as easy as the diversion of HF equipment deoause of technical and
operational problems such as greater difficulty in making frequency
changes. This diversion nevertheless is within present Bloc
capabilities.
B. Potential for Increased Facilities
29. The scientific and developmental potential of the Bloc in
electronics is large and could support greater jamming activity.
There are indications of current laboratory developments in the
jamming field. The Bloc has developed and constructed a substantial
number of high-power transmitters, and has done considerable research
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in this field. High-powered (20 to OO kw) tie and HF transmitters
have been developed in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia for
broadcast and other uses. The development of a number of high-power
tubes by the USSR, Hungary and Germany will also contribute to the
Soviet potential for the design of high power jamming transmitters.
Little is knom about specific developments which would contribute
to Bloc potential in VLF communications during the next two years.
30. Other factors which may indirectly contribute to Bloc
jamming capacity are the normal expansion of wire line and multi-
channel carrier telsphone facilities, as well as the expanding use
of decimeter and microwave links to supplement these and existing
point-to-point radio facilities. A considerable effort is being
made to develop and produce large numbers of these items for civil
and military use. This could release existing radio facilities for
other purposes such as jamming of long range communication circuits.
IV. BLOC VULNERABILITY TO AlliMING
31. Both microwave and wire communication facilities are
practically immune to jamming. The Bloc has extensive wire line
and probably some microwave facilities in the muropean area. In
Asia, coverage by these alternate means is nearly non-existent.
Expansion of alternate means probably will continue, further reducing
the vulnerability of Bloc communications to radio jamming.
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32. The Bloc can greatly mininise the effect of its jamming
on its own communication circuits by judicious selection of
transmitter locations, by use of suitable directional antennas, by
use of alternate means of communication, and by advance planning. It
is unlikely that interference could be avoided entirely, Due to the
heavy use of the 3500-6000 kc. band by Bloc services (see attached
chart), jamming in this frequency range would undoubtedly cause some
trouble to their awn services.
33. The Bloc fosters, controls, and trains a large number of
amateur radio operators* Many of them have developed a high degree
of skill in the reception of voice and telegraphy due to the heavy
interference which exists on the amateur bands, This amateur skill
may contribute to Bloc capability to mitigate its own and western
jamming of voice and radio telegraph.circuita.
34, The basic technical considerations in jamming Bloc
communications area (a) propagation conditions, (b) performance
characteristics of equipment, and (c) ability to operate jammers in
strategic locations. In cases where jammers could be positioned near
one end of a Bloc circuit on the great circle extension of the circuit,
the receiver at the other end would be highly susceptible to jamming.
Receiver antenna directivity would offer no protection in such cases
because of the similar directions of desired and jamming signals.
In other cases, the conditions for jamming would vary greatly With
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each circuit considered and the times of operation.
V. EFFECT OF GENERAL EAR ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS
35. The technical capabilities existing during the cold war
would obtain in general war conditions. It is believed that general
mar would be launched with jamming of long range communications
circuits as part of the initial surprises and that there would be
little or no communications jamming in advance, This would include
VLF communications to submarines. In addition, spoofing and jamming
of navigation aids probably vould be common.
36. Although the Bloc might not find it necessary to do so,
confiscation of some or all broadcast receivers would release the
broadcast system for jamming military targets. In that event it
wvald be necessary to place major reliance for mass communication's
to the Bloc public upon the extensive wire diffusion network.
Restrictions on Bloc no&-essential communications traffic vould
release additional transmitters for jamming purposes. However, the
probable change in the total volume of essential Bloc traffic under
general war conditions cannot be estimated.
37* Depending on the cold war political and military situation,
there may be a change in the availability to the West of sites at
strategic locations for retaliatory jamming. In the event of
general war, direct military action might destroy significant
quantities of the jamming transmitters.
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:JD
zve." INDICATIONS OF PRECLUSIVE USE 'POLICY
38. The Bloc has registered a large number of frequency assign-
ments with the International TelecoLmunications Union. It has been
generally held that the number exceeds its requirements. If so,
it could be for the purpose of providing a stockpile ofAfrequencies
either with or without a precise plan for arbitrarily controlling
the spectrum to preclude use by other nations.. There is some
1 evidence that the Bloc has made moderate use of frequencies to
i demonstrate those frequencies are required. However, this tactic
! has been employed by practically every nation and would appear
, to have no unusual significance.
\:
SEE 8 APRIL DRAFT FOR FOLLOLING ATTACHNENTS:
I -- Soviet and Satellite transmitting facilities.
II -- Map showing US Government and commercial radio
circuits, and usaa major radio communication centers.
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