SE-36/1: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID-1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800060005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 14, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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E TIAL
N C Y
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE
14 July 1953
SU3,T.'sCT: SE-36/1: So let Ca rtbilities for Attack on the
US t hromf0h '_ id,.1955
1. Pxrm ant to AC-23>110, item 3, the Board and IAC
ropreeentatives, including ;re rreoentativee of the Ai-7,C and
FBI, have reviewed SE-%. the attached draft revteiov to
Intended to eapersede that ast.i1te.
2. The present text Is identical Frith that of 55-36
except as follows :
,Lt. :bra rapns S and 9 have been a ensively revisod
to brim; the disnuaeim up to date end a, new para. 13
e been added f,;,Yr the qrw purpose.
1a, ThE? last hoif of pcra. 21 is new, obviating
the footnote in M--36-
,9, Parma. 28-33 nd 42 are extensive revieiona
of the oo rr g on lmr passages of SE.-36, for clarification.
d. Consonant vor` L changes occur in pass. 1, 3,
16, and 40ta.
3. It is be1Ievrad that the rresent draft can be cleared
Informally at the 1.AC :Level.. Acccard.ingly you are requested to
signify your conci rrex a by telephone to the undersigned by the
close of business Eri& y, 17 July. If the est1mate cannot be
cleared in thf s r canner i It -:lit be V ,t on the IAC agenda for
Tuesday, 21. Ju].y. 25X1A9a
ltetl ecut?ve Se to
Distribution 'All
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5ECUIt I SON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC Y
14 July 1953
SUB .CT * SE-36/1 t VIET CAPABILITI ftR ATTACK
ON THE US T21ROUGH MID-1955
T E 11 OBLE
To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack
the continental US by open or clandestine means, through
imid?.1955 0
10PE
This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet
gross capabilities for attack on the continental US
during the period mid-1953 to mid-3.955, It does not
attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack
the US during that period or what courses of action
the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after
such an attack > "' wtb*rmore, the paper estimates
Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US with.
out reference to any oommitments of military forces
which the USSR might make elsewhere and without re.P
Terence to any advantages which the USSR might gain
for an attack on the US by previously occupying terri-
tory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc
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JATION
T I
S(NINT GROSS CAPAI3ILITIE3
SOVIET, MASS DESTRUCTION 1JEAPCNS
Atomic Weapons
l? ppr : The Soviet atomic energy program
has been given and almost certainly during the period
of this estimate will, continue to receive, one of the
h.i.sst priorities in the allocation of resources
available to the UaSx; T. emphasis of the program
continues to be on we pon development with the objective
of T:'urthmring their atomic weapon capability and the
by reducing thh relative advantage which the US has
in atomic weapons development, production,, or stock.
Piles., The USSR bas made substantial progress toward
t o objective 1 a development of now sites indicat e
tl .at its atomic enera y o o am is continuing to expend ,
fl mid-1952 tb) USSR had established a substantial
plutonium production capacity. and a major Increase
in. plutonium pz odue '.ion. probably became effective
dxroing the latter p in of 1952. The USSR has achieved
tho production of wwa -on ade uranium-.235, Uranium
reserves available ?o the USSR appear to be sufficient
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to support a large program, but the rate of exploits..
tion of these reserves will depend on the balance
decided upon between atomic energy and other Soviet
activities. In fission weapons the USSR ban reached
the point in technology at which the types of weapons
can be dictated bT- military requirements rather than
by technical limitations
2 Atomic -? ne S-toc 3.1e8 While estimates
of Soviet plutonium production during the period up
to mid-1955 are considered reasonably firm, a rela.
tively large uncertainty exists with respect to in.
stalled or plain d uranium235 production capacity,
Furthermore,, other than some evidence of the composition
and efficiencies of the three bombs tested by the
USSR, there is no specific information concerning
the characteristics of weapons presently stockpiled
or likely to be stockpiled. In converting fissionable
material stockpiles to weapons stockpiles it has been
assumed that both composite (i e , containing U-23:
and plutonium) and all-plutonium weapons will be fab-
ricated. On this basis* the estimate of the cu ulative
Soviet atomic weapon stockpile for the period mid .1053
through midi955 is as folows:
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Date
Number of Bombs
(30-100 X TI)
Mid-.1953
120
Mid-1954
200
Mid-l958
300
3 Variations and Uncertainty in Stockpile
Estimates In view of the uncertainty in the evidence
concerning the production of fissionable material,
the stockpile for future dates may be as low as one.
third lose than the figure given (i,e n, 200 for mid.
1955). or as high as twice that figure 840 for
mid 1955), It also should be noted that by changing
weapon components it is possible to increase or decrease
the number of weapons in the stockpile substantially.,
Such changes would, however, alter the kilotonnage
yield according to the quantities of fissionable ma-
terial used in the individual weapons., It is eetima,xd
that the USSR is probably capable of producing fiesios:i
weapons yielding 200-500 kilotons, but in so doing
would reduce the number of weapons in stockpile, On
the other hand, the USSR could also make smaller yield
weapons (as low as 5.KP) than those used in calculating
the stockpile estimates given above,.
Thermonuclear Weapons
4. It in believed that the USSR has not conducted
thermonuclear tests, and consequently is not stockpiling
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this type of weapon, Research which riy be relevant
has been noted, but there is no evidence of develop-
ment activity at the present tiu*, There is no direct
evidence on idaich to base an estimate of the lead the
US may have in this fieldi never'heless, there is a
growing Soviet capability for quantity production of
thermonuclear materials, and therefore more advanced
research and development, and even field testing by
mid-1954,, are possible, It would be unsafe to assume
that the USSR will not have a workable thormonuolear
weapon by mid-l955
Radioiotieal Vie$pons
5, It is most unlikely, for technologieel reasons9
that t USSR will have the capability to produce
militarily significant 41 entities of radiological
warfare agents during the period of this estimate
However, the USSR will have available small quantities
of gross or separated fission products which might be
employed as RAY agents.
Biological Warfare
6, The USSR bat extensive knowledge of botull
plague, tularemia, brucellosis, various quick-Acting
yyam ~+1~ sESY
!
IICE"
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intestinal diseases. end some virus diseases. No
information is available re ?arding the production or
the stookpiling of BVV agents. The USSR could probably
mass produee such agents if it so desired
Chemical Warfare
7., The USSR can probably engage in chemical
warfare on a large soale9 Vie assume that the stock.
pile of standard agents and munitions accumulated
during World War II has been maintained and will be
available for use during the period of this estimate,,
In addition to these standard agents, the USSR may
have been producing at least one of the nerve bases
since 1949 and may have developed one other nerve gas
through the pilot plant stage. By mid?1955, stocks
of nerve gases may be available for limited operational.
emplo7ment8
DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
BY AIRCRAFT
Present -*Tozk 4k
.off 0n R. ,q~t _
Long Range Aviation consisting essentially of thx
Air Armies, one in the Par East and two in the western
USSR, constitutes the strategic striking force of the
USSR, The TM-4,, which was copied from the American B9
is the only Soviet bomber, known to be in operational
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use, capable of carrying atomic weapons to distant
targets. As of 1 July 1953 a total of about 1,050
TD'-495 was estimated to be available for operational
use., (Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air gi?
ments k nom to be equipped with or in process of being
equipped with TU-4 aircraft totals 1,220 aircraft, but
the TU-4 regime is are currently estimated to be at
only 85 percent of T, strength,) As of 1 July 196s
approximately 180 TQa4$ (seven regiments with an
aggregate TIE strength of 220) were located in the
Far East). It in believed that deliveries of T4 f s
to the Far East are continuing.
PAM.
Aviationt The future strength and composition of the
Soviet long-range bomber force is difficult to estimate
We have very little information on Soviet development
work on new types of medium or heavy bombers a There is
strong evidence of the development of a c ~sig"d
Jet medium bomber, and a prototype of such an aircraft
may have been flora- A prototype heavy bomber has
been observed and was probably powered by piston engines
It may ultimately be powered by turbo.-Jet engines,
SECRET
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This type of aircraft is not known to be in series
production, A recently reported sighting of several
of those aircraft is not yet fully confirmed. This
siE4ting, if fully confirmed, would indicate that
at least pre-series (i .1 ewuL . -in
t f1
heae env
ir_t ? a muw~e.r of z~ r.a.ti
.axt, f t to t .1 o a TAr,10r.
aui:aa tle
=1v~ rtt? ?r k
yi 311 wrALI r At r c,.f- gij.re r'i . -,7ar techn1. sl t t? i xa u.a . t na a lP
:WboLt vtai'* labor as #:!` fim $*ip w+,"rU ii_ bop repel' t !L ^n
eporA d> ai=> . tr- give high ;rraklsa and. e o as s eib?, .
v*W wn re difficult Ve tranerAm-t r
am-ti {+t.. 19 com#-}e1 v,*.i ,;~.y~,;e ~ti t'.l mr t~ ffaas .oi?am 1e teri 1,
wes6~i . r
. e i J! mow. S . the ..r 3 x state otber im nta
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could be fabricated or cu .. In this country - Thi acam ,
haver, would re,ulre t_:aretul advance planning and ewirdinat io
by as srs isery personaeI With -ew~..neerirg skill a to i.1iari
-with the tE sources of reedese et nta, and you ui teelta a 1j m
time to carry out. it would probably r result in a reducel yield
for a given aunt at fissiaiable material- tt Lld incur a
substanti*l.lyv greater security risk than the clindestiae intro-
duct-ion of all esnents .
3l :o A variety of form at clandestine deliver}r su ; est
'h elves. Assembled veapocas could be drec by e. rently
friendly aircraft, oui be deetcearrted in the hold of a mere t
*tip, or could be ?~ as uu darrvater * a+ei zither c nerts
or assembled veapous ceu.i 1r bre at In w, er diploaaratic iffiur1tj,
smuggled across land or sea frontiers, introduce: tbrou h norml
inert cha nls, or br?* gbt In as bonded nre iza awaiting,
trar:ns$shipaaea+rt a The ? eele"ction of t method of Introduction
and of tram port and asa iy vithis the US old depend on the
Soviet objective and tt risk of detection wthlcb the ?J& R vas
willing to accept
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(es idert g t #- Aso .Li 1tatinw. of the of
iystcal dete-tirn, it i;3 pr*able tb&.t the 'M ceuli intraluc,'I;
into the :L na d(Knmt !' is pawe a considerable nu r cl'
T,ta&ic ve pen by c. ei tiz means. ever the IJ.S M ski
have to take Into acc-oust aot orrei r the e;aitimte d cbawia of
detection, but also the cocas aces of possible detection in
,irfeilting the else :nt: of su pri.ae in any intended overt attack
a i in provok1n .+r c ouzr9:ericttit n P .G the numbs.: -) v"'Pma
cP1c n estine] y iatraduved ,me :inaeeYr~eased the risk cap" C Oe
i ould increase.. Tb ts iar?rti.sed risk we old be leas a t ctton of
lZ enpabilit Ies for ;ye. , detee tt n tbas of the a o e a
cca )lpxity of the c: a tisee opcreticara; *rtitu ar ly lnuoftr
as lax. ;per numbers of 3vi.etta ;aea levolveii a f.;macid-is ini:;,
the co equeac?es of a bre b of security, the t i:ould pre bly=
be ril]Aji to rs si the use of wren selected and trained t .gents
in such saadlaers as oul be involved is a clandestine attack
a scale ct ;rab .e to t- bat r Lich md,3bt be delivered crcrtl y
aircraft. We conclude, therefore, tbatt, althou h elaaartestina att zt,
with ate .c w apona eight oc P- a ee..inst specially selected tip
as a supple mat to overt deli y by' e it , suz b an attack, or. IL
scale cca reble tc thnit whicri sight to deli-tvere-.i ov3i VL;.y zVj ,e~. r
ram probably be precluri+ by =e .rityr ceesIdere ttor?,4c.
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33. ?,=e have -no ev .dams to i cate whether or not team
USSR has actu -lar twrie my p-yaart or pre ratio for the clef s, :L e
delivery of at is Y > N
alb. ole .cal Weavers. Sew EX-1 agents are peculiarlyr
adaptable to clandestine in uctton0 Tice Introduction of
amunta of ageats would be difficult to detect or id.etatify as
to source, but Soviet operativ s would be required, for their
dissemination. A Large number of people would be required for.
extensive disse "ati.on of .B ,4asarts, and Soviet security con-
siderations would be a .:tiaaitii.saan, factor in the scale am6 ttsthg
such an attack
35. Cie ical ?de ns: " agents are not l l ;r adaptable
to clandestine use Ian addi iort to the l:l itatia e noted above
as applicable to BW attack, C'am' agents are easily identifiable by
their isss l.i'ate of ;aots and it robebly would not be feasible to
build up sufficient supplies or to procure the mumms clandestinely
for their dies essgi t1 ,a .at large population centers. The =DGt
practicable use would be s .s t personnel in key installations,
but even this would be difficult. We have no evidence to Wicate
whether or not the t 9 i is developing the heal for the clandestine
delivery of ahe ,c4a.1 weapa
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3A vi 'l: eapabj .
,tt*a k1.wag the t vtth
torcte a l'yit.aaa; r:;OOVeMT
Ace fleet is OOphitj CAW, iec uYlVa Pe Was, bee
limited operwti.sa I. exp r e" and does not possess a ship s
air &M. Its raliaer ea hs$as?t vessels, includir ; r i. biot x typa .
are entiroly unsuited ftor. trF : : a tie attack. The Soviet a rcl &rtt
Marino, which would be 101, rpC+ra to provide the lift, could
be develop into an of 'icie aza illary e.iere t to e ibiou=
operations on any si '"ieat. &e 0 The Daly a` ub +ta i.a1 naval
threat to the US wbith he A"AR could aster- would be that of its
aubrasrins force. In ad+ ttlor to its potential is connection with
the delivery of mass de* t ?uct ie . weapons, the submarine force caul
at least in the initial phaL a of a conflict, inflict serious daaw
on US overseas coca unie attona and. carry out offensive mining in the
shipping approaches to principal US harbors. It is expected that
during the period of this eat: to the submarine force will be a ?-
larged. and improved by the introduction of additional numbers of
improved ocean patrol ty by the progressive modernization
existing types, . by the poaasi:ble adaptation of submarines to
missile launching
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> Ate
W. Soviet , ; bi UtIe a far aitbarae extt ee -
tiseataal US Q t a1se vary lUdtard. 29-499 cmd4
b
es.
'9 it t a the
far t -e.ailli , a1
~ a
?
p?
Acgits sad. and the as ~itiee m as the TU-4 be ' o We ta,
as svidaseea to iai.teatw vboftw or ast the UBM bas aaR'ia a y p3mas
for tba dregojds at vlAwaa fer s !a the UB,x but the
U
it it abase, dreg a +41%i soisult eat forcerv
for atte sk UPW t but a 'ieult bembiad tams
Pty k M 9OVM ` Cr
20 >l MM 1 2. A.
TyAr,W(K 20 MUM M U.S.
38a 'The SsvU t wom a direit attack an taw
kited States to jp^eetpft r gemorel war. Is s '^ . a %ar the
rulers taOu1d 039PWit to kya as iattial aw 4t a tart'
PM*r as th* 11 IMS cest , but i* tbaeir taeSk up em cop-
Us sl would be eemmw4 to Wow : (a) to retaliatory
attack as the Boa t WAS vitb pas of mass destrue ttea;
(b) Wbiliaatiea the a rUw asr of at tea viestem
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V
read aferca .t at su i[-ssnriet farms la Mmmla.
39< ma Soviet ruloars have was!~ratod their ssaesitivity
to tat dlx n:r of S air atteek vita weapons at aasss dsstrue ties
by the )ate prift-MW v+bich 007 bay gtvos to the e]svo]aaa~pseeaaa b at
d teaaa+row s e last such am sttsuek. Despite the si staa isl progress
already se bieved in bulMag up tbsir date mwe, it is unlikely
Out tba y iaauld rord tbmir eteetemlvo aspsbilitiss ss sdsquate
to pa'eveft substsmttal staeaeOors at sttsekiaaag & reraft from rasaah'
tang strstsgte tsrgsts is the e It is Iikely, tiesarsfeea, that
is itsittotiag steaadlt Urrfo rs thas W IM would be a eerm:dr: (a) mdtUy
to stm or ~~ +1J0 Was fw Is kied, tth
gal-rtteular xfw"m to i e lso si. sad was basses; (b) to
deliver so* as attse k oaae iw*sstr #sl mA psye3as]sgiesl targets in
the netted atates as waal(d pr,vaast, or at least birdtr, the aamaflb:L
satilelaa of the US ssr ps etUa; sad (e) to rstsi the emotes to
e &W 1 retotarsssea% at awasia o
40. As s .sg the avaa Usble toaress and wsapsas for attaclktasg
the ewrti~. 880 the !wt's fi t aspebility lies to epees
adlitary attsak aritb atatte Umbs delivered by TU.4 type aircraft
for the follariag r+sasssw
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altios, gsrticulsrly tbst at taw Uaited, 8tat4es; saa (a) 1$
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a. ' fi e lair c a l * b t .itires of c m v a ioas1 a e i v a 1 fereen
.M airbo w ,lamas a*.
b. 'Tee me amity d lfiaaeltiea inhere t is the delivery
Of b *Wpwobla wmmbws at "=I e teens by c]alnndes.a
Use Noma.
e- Mar wthads of d&Uv or etaaia weayens are
iaaeuftiet *t:Ly developed for large-s*&U ue..
d o Mar mum dart ti ae v.apons are iasuffte ently
dr or e b jest to ether baodiaaps la Moir
laPg-seerle Me.
41- The Soviet MUM at, svar, arge]aa other earth de
of at ok sag the tic careeurrestly with or iarr~ead3artely fulYML11k
as open S M direct atomic atty. In the cases of f idod adeeiloe,
airbaae att+acelc, svl riarr bor ar.+ meat, aced biolo~gics2 Vert$".*
aeviot calobilitfe r at best appear to be severely United. They
bsv* a granter +eaapsbil ty for ahem al attack in connection with,
or subaeayaa to, atoeeic bouW.ap;.
42. Claudestii att c ft the for* of mabotao-e or
smaU-
awls biological werftm M4& oc at any tiw, sad witbout an
evert attack over be 3aumnbed, The LUM mint weatgb the tialeg
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value the ftbeUa3 a to r laticx to their p,
-campifto
.' eta aad its t
Mp" . O-lu+iltty of the LWted 8t~at,
~steay a l#ts *ttack. C ostiae attset ,
stands vea
p?~` t ~' tb
' a tall - "lofted Urggts soT
"~ ? 7.~set to overt di4jv by aireran a '~4 t t,
+awrt ottsch oa
. a att h to r fora, OMOA be @3Woftad to
s P+6otiemib3 as .sae .
433 V* beltev, tb&t the id ratios$ at~ect Soviet
+~ tZael r wrpsbilit~tes VIu rea ultra this
parted esee'rtf4L~.y the smw as the., outlIU4 above,
WIN
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