SE-36 : SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID - 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 18, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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SECURITY INKIINATION
CENTRAL INTILLIGINCE AGENCY
le February 1953
NEMCOANDIDI Fat Mr, Sward Wiedemenn (OW
Lt. Co 'anal Dean Taaderhoeft ESA (04)
Commander William Mark, USN (MI)
chamsta Jack Thomas* USAF (A10,111-2B)
Colonel Linecott Halls 113AF (ina)
SUBJECT I SE-36: Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the
In through 1116-1955
=PERMC1E Diernoranther to the ?AC dated 9 February
1953
1. 'The attacked draft has been Trepared by the 0/11E
Staff on the basis of existing national aud departmental esti,-
mates.
2. Where different setimatee exiat on
important points
the range of the T5.4), have includeCeet .
3. This text has ad been reviewed by the Bout of
National Estimates. The primary purpose of circulating it
to you now is to get working-level review and ammendronte in
order to permit a revision of the text along the lines which
it would haw taken had there been time to get written contri,
buttons from you in the first butane*.
4. The next step will be discussed at a meeting now
scheduled for 10:00 Thereday, 19 February, in Room 132 South
Building. No nreneration la required by you for this meeting.
co: OK) 25X1A9a
.Director Ada.
National Estimates
25X1A9a
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
0 OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 February 1953
SUBJECTS SE-361 SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US
MOOR, MID-1955 (Pnaiminary draft)
VE PROBLEM
To estimate the cap*ttUtiee of the USSR to attack the
continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955.
1. The USSR has deci
an attack would
ASSUMPTION
attack the US9 reoogniaing that guch
generaliser with the US.
2. The USSR has comquded $hat circumetandes are such that a
general war with the USvircel. Ile an acceptable method ofoontributing
to its long-range oblective of a nommuniet world dominated by MOSCOO,
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10 SOVIET )SS ;$ ES
Ao Atomic reepons
Genera]. ! The riet atomic energy program has enjoyed
and almost certainly during the period of this estimate will continue
to enjoy, OW Of the hiOlest priorities in the Soviet allocation 4
resources. The objective of the program continues to be on weapOA
development and the achdemement of. rate of weapon production ani
flexibility which will plsre the USSR in the best possible power
position vis-a-vis the US The USSR has made substantial progrear
toward this objective,. in stoma? weapons F the USSR has reached a wint
in weapon technology at which the weapons stockpiled can be dictated
by military requirements rather than by technical limitations.
2. Atoaic. v;etiE?ns riteciVLes Other than some information
1
on the composition and efficiencies of the bombs tested by the US$Rt
there is no specific information available concerning the characteristics
of weapons presently StOOkrdled or Akely to be atockpiled during the
period of this estimate. Tr calculating stockpiles it has been a umed
that the USSR will fabricate both all-vlutonium weapons and composite
veaponsj, and that it 'will produce as mew composite weapons as possible?
The table below contains v,he boot available estimate of the Soviet
stockpile for the period mid-. 95? to mid-1955s
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Da'te
Mid-1953
Mid-1954
Mid-1955
Mother of Bombs
(30-100 KT)*
120
200
300
3. Error and VarIations on Stockpile Estimate: Because ,1.7
the nature of the information on which it was based T the above
estimate is subject to considerable error., in view of the uncertainty
in the production of fissionable materials, particularly uranium-4359
the stockpile for the period under review may be as low as one-third
less (i.e?, as low as 200 far mid-1955) or as high as twice (Le,,
600 for mid-1955) the figure given, It is also possible, by changing
the weapon components to increase or decrease the number of weaponl
In stockpile substantially with a given quantity of fissionable
material. Such changes would hceever, alter the kilotonnage yields
according to the quantities of fissionable material used in the indivi-
dual weapons, Judging by ttte high efficiencies achieved in the second
and third atomic teeter the USSR could probably obtain kilotonnage
yields Close to the high 6,1nd of the 30w.100 KT yield used in the tab e
for a given quantity of fissionable material. It is estimated that
the USSR is probably capable of producing fission weapons yielding
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200.500 kilotons but in so doing would reduce the number of weapons!
In their stockpile. On the other hand, they could also make smaller
weapons than those wed in calculating the stockpile estimates made
in the above table. It is possible, therefore, that by the end of _the
period of this estimate the USSR il1 be approaching a stage in whi4h
the availability of weapons may not be a major limiting factor in the
scale of an attack which coeld be launched against the United States.
B. Thermonuc ear Weapenst
4. It is believed that the USSR has not conducted thermo-
nuclear tests. Reaearoh which may be relevant has been noted, but there
is no evidence of development activity at the present time. There is,
however, a growini Soviet capability far quantity production of thermo-
nuclear materials. Consequently, more advanced research, developornt,
and even field testing are possible by mid-1994. We cannot assume
that the USSR will not have a workable thermonuclear weapon by
C. amR114.%_.12111jitsellt
56 It is most unlikays for technological reasons, that :the
USSR will have the capability to produce militarily significant qyan-
tities of radiological warfare agents, although the USSR will have
available small quantities of gross or separated fission products which
might be employed as RW agents primarily for their peychological effect.
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D. 131,11.......12/2,Efare2
6. Intelligence information and Soviet scientific puha cations
indicate that the USSR has extensive knowledge of the dissemination of
agents causing botulism, plague* tularemia, brucellosis, various quick-
acting intestinal diseases, and some virus diseases. Little information
is available regarding the prcduation of, and none regarding the stock-
piling of, EU agents. The USSR could probably mass-produce such agents
if it so desired
E, Chemical Warfare:
7. The USSR can probably engage in chemical warfare on a large
scale. It has large stocks pf chemical warfare agents including nerve
gases. Moreover, research is continuing and new nerve gases are
probably under development,
110 DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESIRICTION WEAPONS IN AIRCRAFT
8, Present StreAll?f*.lemilawli_viation: Long-range-
nisilmimmonho?sowswerrs...,
Aviation, consisting of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two
in the western USSR, constitutee the strategic striking farce of the
USSR. The TU-Z4 is the only Soviet timber, known to be in operational
use, capable of carrying mess destruction weapons to distant targets.
In December 1952 the number of TU-Lols believed to be operational use
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was estimated at 900 aircraft. (This figure vas based primarily upon
the Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air regiments known to be
equipped with, or in the process of being equipped with, TU4i aircraft-)
About 20%, or about 190 TV-404, of the medium bonber strength is
located in the Far at
9. Future streNt of Lohg-Range Aviation Future Soviet
long-range bomber tx'eng+,h ie difficult to estimate, No prototypi jet
medium, bomber capable of attack on the continental. US from Soviet bases
has yet been Observed, A Prototype heavy bomber has been observed and
was probably powered by a piston engine. It is speculated that it may
ultimately be pcwered by a turboprop engine. This type of aircraft
not known to be in seriee production. Estimated future strengths Ire
also uncertain becauee there is not adequate intelligence on rates of
production of the TU-4 and botaule even estimated rated, bawl upon
presently known j oduticn fecilitieeF could becane obsolete if the 05.5T
were to devote additionel reeagrees to production. The future strength
estimates given below are baser! !Ton the assumption that the USSR It now
producing, or is about to ibitinte Reties production of, other types
than the TU-4.
Medium Bomber
!dd-1954
mid-1955
Jet.
Poseftle Prototype
10/20
120
Piston
9fl0
1000
900
Heavy Bomber
Rew
40/80
180
Total
900
1050 - 1100
1200
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10. TU64 Aircraft Characteristics: The TU-4, under normal
operating conditions, is estimated to have a combat radius of
LS10.97
nautical miles, and a combat range of 53227 :nautical miles with 1
10,000 pound bomb load. ander cruise Control conditions neeessar,i to
reach distant target areas its speed would be approximately 175 knots
at an altitude of about 10,000 feet. HOwever, it is capable for P
limited period of time of attaining, a maxims speed of 347 knots et
about 32,500 feet with a aerates ceiling of 39,500. 2Fith technical
modifications and improvements, the TU-4 by mid-1955 might be able to
increase its combat radius to 2650 nautical miles (3700 with one aerial
refueling) and its -range to .5000 nautical miles :7
11. Future
Bomber Characteristics: It is estimate that
the prototype heavy boatel
assuming it is equipped with a turboprlp
Z3429)
power plant, would by mid-1955 have a combat radius of 277027 naut,4a1
56007
miles and a range of 1.70067 nautical miles carrying a 10,000 pound bomb
load. It would have a speed of 360 knots at 30,000 feet ander otuise
control conditions necessary to accomplish long distance mission? the
flight speed would be somewtat lessened. Aerial refueling with this
aircraft is not considered practicable in view of the limited numbere
which would be available even f series production was undertaken.
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12, Base Arae for direct air attack on the US: The olos
base areas to the US are the Kola Peninsula area in the northwest USSE
Soviet and Soviet-controlled territory along the Baltic and in Yzetern
_
Germany, and the Chukotakl Penineula in northeast Siberia. Of these
three, the Chukotski is nearest to the US, From this area, the present
Soviet TU-4 under normal operating conditions ,gould bomb only
northwest extremities of the IS and return to the base. Flying a nne
may mission from Chukoteki rwh a plane could barely reach New /Cak.
but could strike anywhere north and west of a great circle from Fic-IT
to San Antonio, including all of the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi
Valleys Ir mid-1955, if the USSR made the technical improvements and
modifications in the TU-h of which it is probably capable and developed
aerial refueling techniques, planes based in the Chukotski Peninsula
ould reach all of the tJS ectreot southern Florida and perbably return
to their bases? On one-erey rdestons, such aircraft could rev.h an
point in the US.7 gould not hmMb even the northwest extremities cf
the US and return to their bas. s, Flying a one-way mission from
Chukotski such a plane eculd not reach New Tack or the (teat Lakes
industrial region. bat oould etrike in the Los Angeles area, If the
USSR is willing to accept the high attrition attendant with aerial
refueling over defended territory even with fully developed aerial
refueling techniques it is possible to reach all important tercet
areas in the US on a ons-awar rieston
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13, However, the Chukotaki Peninsula is a poor base area
from the standpoint of woather and logistics. /t has now no known
first-class airfields which oould be used for sustained operations,
although there are several airfields which could be employed as staging
areas for a limited neither of sorties.
14. Present TU-4 aireraft based in the Kola Peninsula area
and the Baltic-East Gerearky area could not reach the US, and return
to their bases. _en oneamay missions they could barely reach New York,
but could range over New England and Upper New York State. ay m1d-1955
if the USSR made the technical modifications and improvements in the
TU-4 of which it is probably capable and developed aerial refueling
techniques, planes based in these areas could reach most of the northr.
ern and northeastern US, including the Great Lakes, and return to their
bases, On one-may missions they could reach any point in the US.,
gar could they, on one-way missions, reach New York City or the indus-
trial area of New England and upper New Yark State. If the USSR was
willing to accept the high attrition attendant upon aerial refueling
over defended territory, TU4118 on one-way missions could reach the
northeastern US, but could not reach the southern, south-central ar
western parts of the countryg
15. The Kola Peninsula area does not now have bases capable
of scrtie-ing medium bombers, but has several airfields which could
readily be adapted to do so,, Supply would not be a difficult problem.
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This area would afford the advan-age of great circle routes which!?ould
obviate overflight of mations friendly to the US. The Baltic-East
German area has adequate banes to support large nuMbers of medium
bombe's. Weather and logistics woad be favorable. They are hoUiver,
even more distant from key Wtarget areas, flights would be subject
to greater risk of detection? and only a very limited number of target
areas could be reached even or one-way missions using aerial refuoring
16, Crew Proficiency Achievement of a high-level of canbat
effectiveness has been retarded by lack of combat experience and
restrictions upon flying laipoeed by the Sacrist security system, Inten-
sive training has been undetway for five years, but there is no evidence
of extensive training in toevedistance flyinu and navigation, or of the
development of operational aertaL refueling techniques and equipment.
17 It is possible*,Ii
Is
that bf7 mid.1955 some of these
deficiencies will be removed, it is also possible that even now a
limited number of crews has been given sufficient training to undet-
take an attack against the US. If the Soviet aviators should be tiained
and equipped with the nav5gational aids which the USSR could probably
produce in quantity if it chose to do so, Soviet aviators could prbbably
cross even the polar region Int stay an course.
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16 autitItt and Emlibing Accuraszs The USSR is able i
obtain all the data neoessary for identification of targets in the US
under visual and blind bombing conditions. The USSR possesses actiosi
bombsights equivalent to US World War II type models. Soviet avi tore
could therefore be expected to exeoute satisfactory bomb placemert
under visual conditions The USSR has produced, and is equipping its
TU-4 and IL-28 (light) bombers with blind-bombing and navigation type
radars of the US AN/APS-15 and ANAFQ-13 variety. The accuracy of the
Soviet blend bombing syytem is estimated at about 3000 feet CEP,
19. Avaiaabili.tz! Abort Rate Replacement Factors From a
variety of circumstantial evidenoe, including US experience, it In
estimated that the USSR could sortie about 90% of its TU-4 strength for
an initial, deliberately-prepared surprise attack, However, consider-
ing the limitations of base areas for use against the US only a limited
percentage of these aircraft could be staged against targets in the US,
In view of the fact that Zioar.ghai7 US target areas could be reeohed
only by one-way aerial refueling missions, the attrition rate would be
ff00gilmost 1047. The abort rate on those staged against US targets
is estimated at 20-25% without consideration for interception and poor
navigation, and with varying Increases according to season, weather,
extent of preparation, and other factors. NO appreciable reserves of
TU-Isgs are believed available (the same would apply to any new types of
aircraft introduced during thisperiod). At present, TU-4 production
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is estimated at 20 planes per uh a figure which could probably be
increased slightly in the short run. A considerableexpansion of plint
capacity, or the conversice of ther plants to bomber production would
be necessary if the USSR uere to plan on a sustained strategio bombiztg
campaign.
20. Weather No
niteiligence is available concerning Soviet
doctrine for the tactizal 1390 of weather conditions. The USSR has
excellent weather reporting facilities in the Siberian area and is
probably capable of making reaenrably accnrate predictions of route
weather conditions on a day-to-day basis. Weather conditions in
potential base and rout e areas rIlezt .7ertain1y would have a serious
limiting effect upon operational mioabilities in certain seasons,
21. Klectromic Countermeasures: The USSR has had access to
a wide variety of US defensive radar and to US jamming equipment. The
USSR is apparently well aware of the teetical advantage to be gained by
Jamming defensive radar and other communications. It hassdemonstrated
a high proficiency in jaxii.n nv.nttona1 broadeaste? From circum-
etantial evidence, it is believed prebable that the USSR has produced
sufficient electronic countermewuree devices to equip some TU4i air-.
craft. It is not known whether SoiIrt TU-42s have in fact been equipped
with such jamming equipment, or what would he the effectivenese of theee
devices against US defensive radar
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III. DELIVFAT OF CONVJJTIONAL AND MASS DESTUCTION WEAPONS BY
OTRUI WANS
A. Guided Missiles
22. Oemrals There is no positive information that the USSR
nom has any guided missiles in an operational status. It is knCen that
the USSR has been contwting an intensive research and development
program, ani it appears tha-r. an objective of that program is to produce
operational missiles at the earnest possible date. The V-4 and'i
type weapons, which were used operational-14r by the Germans during World
War II, are estimated to be the only missiles presently available
These types probably have been improved and may be available in -Limited
nuMbers. Neither i8 knewri to be in series production.
23, V-1 Characteristics: The V-1 is a winged missile Al
which the USSR has continued development. A single engined version
could carry :a 2000 lb. warhead .to a range of 210 nautical miles At a
speed of 370 knots. A twin jet version has been developed which 'could
carry a warhead up to 4500:1b. to s range of 75 nautical miles with a
compensating increase in range with decreased warhead weight. There is
fragmentary evidence that the USSR has investigated the possibility of
launching V-los from submarines; this could also apply to surface. vessels.
It is conceivable that the :V-1 type could be fitted with an atomic mar-
beads although there is no indication that the USSR has either developed
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such a warhead type or incorporated it in a guided missile. It is
estimated that the USSR would not attempt to carry inommements IA
this missile type toward inormas in range or speed but would aceent
the factors of reliability, load carrying characteristics, accurazy,
and the techniques of rapid preparation and firing from the launehing
craft.
24 V.2: The MI, has carried forward the development of
the German V-2 type ballistic missile; however, this missile could not
conceivably produce a threat against the continental US during the
period of this estimate
B. Clandestine Deliver(
25 Atomic reaponms ii;o be prepared upon receipt of ipecial
JAEIC contributiaad
26. Bial2,1 Keepons: BP agents are peculiarly adaptable
to clandestine delivery. and they could be introduced preceding or after
an open surprise attack or without an open surprise attack even 'taking
place. Small amounts of MK agents introduced under cover of diPlomatic
immunity or by smuggling would be difficult to detect or identify as
to source. In almost all oases the dissemination of BC agents Would
require the clandsetir collaboration of DB residents, and this le a
serious limitation upon either their massive dissemination or because
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of Soviet security consider us, their use immediately preceding an
open surprise attack. There is no evidence, however, that the USER
is developing the means for the clandestine delivery of biological
weapons.
27. Chemical Weefens: Unlike BR agents, Cg agents are: not
easily adaptable to clandestine use. In addition to the limitations
noted alkyls as applicable to HW attack, CW agents are easily identi-
fiable by their immediate effects and it would hardly be feasible to
build pp sufficient supplies or procure the means Clandestinely tear
their dissemination against large population centers. The most prac-
ticable use would be againist personnel in key installations immediately
preceding an open attack. , In this instance, Soviet security consider-
ations might preclude suchen effort. There is no evidence that the
USSR is developing the means for the clandeetine delivery of chalice'
weapons .
IV. ATTACK ON T annum ONLL NAVAL AND AIRBORNE FORCIT,
A. Conventional Naval Attack
28. Soviet capabillties for attacking the US with naval
forces carrying conventional armament are comparatively low,4/ The
--------
- As noted in paragraph 22 above, the USSR could, if it chose, develop
a capability for the delivery of guided missiles carrying an atomic
warhead by launcning & V-1 type missile from a !submarine or surface
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Soviet surface fleet is geographically divided, lacks advance ba
has limited operational experience, and does not possess a shipbotne
air arm. Its minor combatant vessels, including amphibious types, are
entirely unsuited for transoceanic attack. The Soviet merchant marine,
which would be called upon to provide the lift, could not be developed
into an efficient auxiliary element to amphibious operations or aay
significant scale. The only sUbstantial naval threat to the US which
the USSR could muster wrovld be that of its sdbmarine force. In acidition
to its potential in connetiom with the of mass destruction
weapons, the snbmarine forte oould, at least in the initial phase of
a conflict, inflict serious damage on certain US overseas communidations
and carry out offensive mining in the shipping approaches to prinauel
US harbors RTeept for enlargement of the submarine force, replaCement
of older and limited-rang," *steels by new snorkle types, and the akapta-
tion of submarines to missile launching, little change in the over?all
Soviet naval capability is expected during the period of this estiaate.
Airborne Attaok
???????1.1?????4?.????Wa???????. +????=0.n?=/?
29, Soviet oapbUitia for airborne attack upon the US are
also very limited, The USSR does not possess any operational tran
aircraft capable of two-way miseions to the US. TU4i's could be
adapted for troop-carrying service and operate within the same limits
and under the same conditions as the TU-4 bomber. There is no indication
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that the USSR has sads any plans for the dropping of airborne force
in the US, but the USSR could, if it chose, drop apectally trained
asaault and sabotage forces for attack upon important but difficilit
bathing targets.
V. SOVIET AIR TIMM
30. The oviet rulers have devoted to the improvement of
their air defense system an allocation of effort and resources whih
is probably second only to the oviet atomic weapons program, Thp
air defense effort has faced numerous developmental and production
problems, and despite considerable progress, deficiencies artill egi
There are insufficient number oi trained personnel, modern interreptors?
radars, and heavy AA guns. 'kart of the air defense ocamunicatione net-
work ie subject to long-range jamming. Interceptor capabilities under
conditions of poor visibility are seriously limited. By mid-1951i name
of these deficiencies will be reduced. The interceptor force wilI
probably be fully jet-equipped, all-weather interception facilities
improved, and comminications,minershilities reduced. Further isprove-
manta will be acoamplished by mid-1955. Nevertheless, we do not, believe
that the Soviet rulers will at any time during the period of this esti-
,
mato conclude that their air defense system would be of sufficiep
quality to prevent aijlastaatial numbers of attacking planes from finding
strategic targets.
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VI. EFFECT OF UVERALL SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND VDINFROILITIES UPON
TWIR'STRATEOY IN THE ASSUMED SITUATION
31. The Soviet rulers would probably estimate that:
a. If not blocked, the US could inflict an unacceptable
level of damage upon the USSR by strategic air attack.
b. There is not adequate assurance that the Soviet air
defense system could prevent an unacceptable level of damage
from occurring.
c. The U3 would be unable to invade and occupy the
.US by military force.
d. The US and the other free world countries poetess
an overwhelming quantity of the world's resources and if permitted
to mobilize tholes resources could probably defeat the USSR.
32. The Soviet rulers probably woulds, therefore, pursue the
following strategy:
a. They wouId employ the maximum effective air bombard-
ment effort against US strategic air facilities in the US and
overseas.
b. They would attempt to deny to the US access to or
control over strategically important areas of the Eurasian land
mass. To this end, they would attempt to occupy as much of the
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Eurasia as possible and te sever its communications with the qs.
They would utilise such resources as remained (after allocatisn
to US strategic air facilities) to assist in establishing such
control and to prevebt. the US from assisting or reinforcing
defending forces.
Thevimmad attempt to destroy the overall US ability
to wage war against the UbSR by additionally utilising such re
sources as remained eggwially air bombardment resources) agsinet
military and quasi-military targets in the US,and the general
industrial, economic and psychological strength of the US.
dc, Aside from la conceived priority in the general
allocation of resour, 4 6ov1et rulers might make sp cial
efforts in ardor to achieve damage or destruction of critical
targets or to achieve political or psychological advantagee
33. Its among the available forces and weapons for attacking the
US, the USSR would be Obliged to rely primarily upon open military,
attack with atomic bombs deliTered by TU-4 aircraft, for the folicming
reasons;
The lc CP tbilities of conventional naval forces
and airborne forces.
b The st uifficulties inherent in large-eca1,?
clandestine attack the ooviet rulers have a pathological
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distrust of their own people, including Communists, and almost
certainly would not trust them in massive clandestine operations
under circumstances in which defection or failure would have
potentially disastrous consequences for the USSR itself.)
co Other metbode of delivery of atomic weapons are
insufficiently developed for effective use.
d. Other mass destruction weapons are insufficiently
developed or subject to other handicaps in their large-scale use.
34. The Soviet gnaws might, however, rely upon other methods
of attacking the US concurrently with or Immediately following an open
and direct atomic attack. In the C4808 of guided missiles, airborne
attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet capabili-
ties at best appear to be severely limited. Chemical attack in connec-
tion with, or subsequent to, atomic bombing is a more serious possibility.
35. It Is entirely reasonable to expect that it will do so,
and that magnitude of the Soviet threat will be greater. We believe,
however, that their overall strategy and the priorities assigned to
offensive resources, will remain throughout this period essentially the
same as those outlined in paragraph 32. Likewise the ooviet rulers
throughout this period would be obliged to rely primarily upon open
military attack with atomic bombe delivered by TU-4 aircraft, although
additional types of 'wows and aircraft may be available in limited
numbers.
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