SE-36: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BEFORE MID-1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000800050011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 3, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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7
- #8 ?- (5925-b
s,EC Rm INF Itl"IATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGLNCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NAT1t*IkL ESTIMITES
3 'March 1953
NEM(RANDUM FCIR THE nn=ICEIo ADVISORY Wffr V'EE
SUBJECT : SE.-36: Soviet CaTiabi1itiee for an Attack on the
United Stated before Mid-1955
1. The attacYed draft emir to has been approved by
the Board of National. F,stimetss pursuant to a consideration
of it by the IAC representatives.
2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the
IAC meeting scheduled fbr 2:30 Tuesday, 3 I.larch 1953.
Distribution "As
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3" 1'. `
Y INFORMATION
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
2 March 1953
SUBJECT: SE-a36, SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US
' `111I 011 TAID-1955
To estimate the cat abilities of the USSR to attack the
continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955.
This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capaw.
bi .ities for at-Lack an the continental US during the period
z .d-1953 to zni,d-1955 It does not attempt to assess whether
the USSR intends to att a lc the US during that period or what
courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with,, or
after such an attack,, Fiwthermore,, the paper estimates Soviet
gross capabilities for attack on the US without reference to
any commitments of mtli.t.ai7 forces which the USSR might make
elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the
USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupy rg
territory that r1, s not now ul thin the Soviet Bloc o
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PART I
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
I. SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
A. Atomic Weapons
to Generals The Soviet atomic energy program has been given
and almost certainly during the period of this estimate will
continue to receive, one of the highest priorities in the cello..
cation of resources available to the USSR. The emphasis of the
program continues to be on weapon development with the objective
of reducing the relative advantage which the US has in atomic
weapons development, production, or stockpiles. The USSR has made
substantial progress toward this objective, The development of
new sites indicates that i atomic energy program is continuing
to expand. By mid-1952 Irt had established a substantial plutonium
production capacity, and a major increase in plutonium production
probably became effective during the latter part of 1952. The USSR
has achieved the production of weapon grade uranium-235, Uranium
reserves available to the USSR appear to be sufficient to support
a large program, but the rate of exploitation of these reserves
will depend on the balance decided upon between atomic energy
and other Soviet activities. In fission weapons the USSR has
reached the point in technology at which the types of weapons
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stockpiled can be dictated by military requirements rather than
by technical limitations
2, Atomic Weapons Stdckpiles s While estimates of Soviet,
plutonium production during the period up to mid-1955 are con-
sidered reasonably firm, a relatively large uncertainty exists
with respect to installed or planned uranium-235 production oapa..
city, Furthermore, other than some evidence of the compition anal
efficiencies of the three bombs tested by the USSR, there is i.o
specific information concerning the characteristics of weaponii
presently stockpiled or likely to be stockpiled. In converti?rg
fissionable material atookpiles to weapon stockpiles it has been
assumed that both composite (i.e., containing U-235 and plutonium)
and all-plutonima weapons win be fabricated. On this basis,
the estimate of the cumulative Soviet atomic weapon stockpile
for the period mid-1953 #ough mid-1955 is as follows:
{d-d-1953
M. :t.d-1954
J Ld.1955
Number of Bombs
(301001)
300
3, Variations and Uncertainty in Stockpile Estimates In
view of the uncertainty in the evidence concerning the production
of fissionable material, the stockpile for future dates may be- as
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a
lw as one-third lees (ie., 200 for mid-1955) t1n, or as high as
ticks (i.e., 600 for mid-1955), the figure given, It also should
be noted that by changing weapon components it is possible to in-
crease or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile substan.
tially. Such changes wouuld,, hwever, alter the kdlotonnege yield
according to the quantities of fissionable material used in the
individual weapons. It is estimated that the USSR is probably capable
of producing fission weapons yielding 200-500 kilotons but in so do-
ing would reduce the number of weapons in i& stockpiles On the
other hand, the USSR could also make smaller weapons (as low as 5-KT)
than those used in calculating the stockpile estimates given above,
B. Thermonuclear 1 ppaW
4o It is believed that the USSR has not conducted the moon.
nuclear tests and cons
equently uw not stockpiling this type of
weapon@ Research which my be relevant has been noted, but there is
no evidence of development activity at the present time, There is
no direct evidence on which to base an estimate of the lead the US
may have in this field; nevertheless, there is a growing Soviet capa-
bility for quantity production of thermonuclear materials, and there.
fore more advanced research and development, and even field tee"
by mid-l954, are possible. It would be unsafe to assume that the
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USSR will not have a wort ble thermonuclear weapon by mid-1955.
G, Radiological We
?. It is moet unlilely, for technological reasons, that the
USSR will have the capability to produce militarily significant
quantities of radiological warfare agents during the period of
this estimate. However, the USSR will have available small quanti?
ties of gross or separated fission products which might be employed
as RW agents,
Biological Warfare
6, The USSR has extensive knowledge of botulism, plague,
tularemia, brucellosis, various quick-acting intestinal diseases,
and some virus diseases,. No information is available regarding
the production or the stockpiling of BW agents, The USSR could
probably mass-produce such agents if it so desired,
Warfare
7, The USSR can probably engage in chemical warfare on i
large scale. We asstn7ne that the stockpile of standard agents and
Iinmitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and
will be available for use during the period of this estimate. In
addition to these standard agents, the USSR may have been prod-acing
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at least one of the nerve lea since 1949 anti may have developed
one other nerve gas through the pilot plant stage. By mi.d-1955,
stocks of nerve gases may be available for limited operational
employment,
11. DELIVERT OF CONVENTION .L AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPON
8, Present Strength at l Range Aviation: Long Range
Aviation, consisting essentially of three Air Armies, one in the
Far East and two in the western USSR, constitutes the strategic
striking force of the USSR, The TIP-4t which was copied from
the American B?-29. is the ardy Soviet bomber., known to be in
operational use, capable of carrying atomic weapons to dietntt
targets, A s of 1 J a n u a r y 195 , a total of 900 to 950 TU-41s
was estimated to be available for operational used (Table of
Fouipment strength of Soviet: air regiments known to be equipped
with or in the process of being equipped with TU i aircraft totes
i,l90 aircraft. but the TUB regiments currently are estimated to
bt- at only 75 to 3O percent at TIE strength] As of 1 January
5 3 approximately :9.80 TUB is (seven regiments with an aggrega
TIE strength of 22i) were lcsc.ted in the Far East,, It is believed
that deliveries of TUB.:s to the Far East are continuing-,
9. Future Strength and Composition of Long Range Aviation,
:".e future strength and composition of the Soviet long-range
of
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bomber force is difficult to estimate. There is very little in-
formation on Soviet development work on new types of medium or
heavy bombers. No prototype jet media bomber is known to exist.
A prototype heavy bomber has been observed and was probably powered
by piston engines. It may ultimately be powered by Kturboprop
engine' This type of aircraft is not known to be in series pro-
duction, It seems only safe to assume, however, that the USSR
is planning to replace the obsolescent TU-4 with aircraft of higher
performance characteristics, The following table of the estimated
actual strength and composition. of the Soviet long-range bomber
force through 1955 is based, therefore, on the assumption that the
USSR. has begun production of a heavy bomber and that it will initiate
such production of other advansed types of long-range bombers during
the period of this estimate. It should be noted, however, that
there is no positive evidence that this development has actually
begun or is planred0
.d-1953 Mid-1954 Mid-1955
Medium Ember
jet Possible Prototype 10/20 120
Piston 1,000 1,250 1,100
Heavy. Bomber Few 14080 180
Total 1,000 1,300-1,350 1,1400
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10, TU-+4 Aircraft Characteristics: The Tu 4, wider nor-
mal operating corditiorse, is estimated to have a combat radius
of 1,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 3,100 nautical
miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load, Under cruise control condi-
tions necessary to reach distant target areas, its speed would
be approximately 175 knots at an altitude of about 10,000 feast,
However, it is capable of attaining a maximum speed of 347 knots
at about 32,500 feet for short intervals. Although there is 'no
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intelligence to indicate the 9rrd;4 ~-- --- - - done so. lot,/Ss cor:-
idered t capable of modifying the TU?4 to increase its
range in the same manner that the American B-29A was stripped to
produce the B-29B. This modification involves removal of defen-
sive armament, except for the tail turret, and increase in the
fuel capacity, with a net weight reduction of 2,600 pounds in
take-off weight,, So modified, a TU-4 would have markedly reduced
defensive capabilities against interceptor attack, but its com-
bat radius would be increased to 2,150 nautical miles and its
combat range to 4,000 miles carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load,
n. With moderate technical advances, it is possible that boar
mid-1955 the USSR may be able to improve performance characteristics
of the TU-4 to some degree, but there is no current evidence of
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Soviet development or production of the more powerful piston
engines which would be essential to najor improvement. We eon.
si.der it more likely that the USSR would devote effort to develop-
-Iz
ing an aerial refueling capability for TU-4#9., and the creation
1
of a heavy bomber force.
13. Future Heavy Bobber Characteriatiees The prototype
heavy bomber, assuming it is put in series production and equipped
with a turboprop power plant, could have a combat radius of 3,9420
nautical miles aid a combat range of 6,600 nautical miles with a
bomb load of 10,000 pounds. By mid?.1955 technical modifications
and improvements on such a heavy bomber might permit a combat radius
of 3,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 7,000 nautical miles
with a bomb load of 10,000 pomade
314 Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the United States.
Three base areas, the Ohukotaki Peninsula in Northeast Siberia,
the Kola Peninsula in Northwest USSR and Soviet and Soviet-con.
trolled territory along the Baltic and in Eastern Germany, are the
closest to the United Statue. From any of these bass areas the
stripped-down TU-4 on a one-way mission with one i nf" f ht refuel-
ing could reach any target in the United States. TU.-4 'a employed
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in this ter, having the 56D0 nautical mile range, could also
operate from bases in the interior of the Soviet Union for
strikes against the US.
15. Of the three base areas mentioned, the Chukotsld Penin-
sula is nearest to the United States. The standard TU-Z (with
no inflight refueling) on a two-way mission could not reach the
United States. On a one-way mission it could reach targets within
i&e arc drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior. The stripped-dawn
TU-4 on a two-way mission could reach Seattle without infl.ight re-
fueling, With outbound mnflight refueling on a two-way mission,
this type of aircraft could reach targets within an arc Zee /L-o-
Lake Superior. A one-way mission, without inflight re-
fueling, would permit the stripped down TU-& to reach targets in
all parts of the United States except Florida from the Chukotaki
base area. Soviet heavy branbers, if actually produced, could
operate from northeast Siberia on a two-way basis with one refuel-
ing against targets anywhere in the United States, and even without
refueling, against targets located north and west of an are drawn
generally from central Texas through central New York,
16. Logistics problem are difficult in the Chukotski
Peninsula, but these could be minimised by advance stockpiling and
use of the area for staging bases only. Barbers attacking the
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United States from stern Siberia would have favWable
tail winds mast of the year. 2~rse are now no known first-class
airfields which could be need for sustained operations, and air-
field information is not sufficient to enable positive identifi-
cation of v specific installation as a launching site or staging
base for n edi n bombers. t4arkovo (65-41x 179-i 5w) and Anadyr/ y *
Wivnsny (64-48H 1?7-33E) could possibly support staging operations
by TU-4+s, at least during nine months of the year, if adequate
advance preparations took place. Other similar possibilities are
yelal, T uners Magadan, a "i vlovsk, It is possible that
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new airfields have been built without detection. The Ssris' e
home emphasized use of frozen surfaces in the Arctic, which makes
possible the wintertime use of airfields with a mum of pre-
paratory efforts
17. TU-4 aircraft sorbied frcmt the Kola Peninsula and
Baltic-East German areas Could not reach the United States and re-
turn to their bases, even with one outbound refueling. The prin..
cipal TU-4 threat to the united states from these base areas would
stain frown one-way missions flown by stripped-down aircraft
possessing a combat range of 4,000 nautical miles. F'roam the Mur-
mansk area, such a range would permit Soviet bombers to reach
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targets roughly north and east of a line from Charleston,
South Carolina, to southern Oregon. Fran the Baltic area,
such a range would enable TU441s to attack targets north and
east of a line drawn generally from Charleeton,8outh Carolina,
through Montana. All of the northeastern industrial centers of
the United States could be reached from either area, The esti-
mated characteristics of heavy bombers zhould enable them to
reach the New York.New England area on two-way missions from
either the Kola Peninsula or the Baltic area. With one outbound
refueling they could attack Any target in the industrial north-
east and return to home bases
18, There are now no known airfields in the Kola Peninsula
area capable of sortie-ing TU-L 1s, However, Alakurtti, at the
base of the peninsula, and MurmanskcVayenga, nine and a half
uld readily be adapted to accommodate
miles northeast of 'Iurmanak co l
TU- ?sa Eight other airfields in 1945 offered runways or take-off
areas 4,500 feet or more in length, It is possible that some or
all of these bases could have been improved to accommodate medium
bombers, As elsewhere in the Soviet Arctic, virtually all. of
these airfields are extensible and all will bear the weight of
TU-,?s during the six or more months of the year the ground is
frozen, During the spring the a and summer months cnift permanent
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seck -4 H"
all.veather runways of suitable length coinbe-ved0 Both
Alakurtti and Murmarisk-Yaa are favorably situated logisti-
cally, and great circle routes from this area would avoid initial
overflight of nations friendly to the United States. The Baltic-
East German area has adequate bases to support large numbers of
medium bombers. These bases are favorably situated with respect
to communications and weather and are adequately served by existing
transportation facilities. A major disadvantage is that great
circle routes to the United States pass over portions of Western
grope or Scandinavia and any attempted air strike might be de-
tected early enough to provide warning.
19. Crew Proficie s Achievement of a high-level of coma.
bat effectiveness has been retarded by lack of combat experience
and by restrictions upon flying Intensive training has been under.
way for five years, but there is no evidence of extensive training
in long-distance flying and navigation. It is probable, ho ever,
that by mdd??l95 some of these deficiencies will be removed. It
is also probable that even now a limited number of crews have been
given sufficient trainirg to undertake an attack against the US.
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Aac, The USSR is able to
20. eti a
Bop
obtain the data necessary for identification of most targets
In the US under visual and blind-bombing conditions. The USSR
possesses optical bombsights equivalent to US World War II type
models. Soviet aviators could therefore be expected to execute
satisfactory bomb placement under visual conditions. The USSR
has produced, and is equipping its TU-4 and IL-28 (light jet)
bombers with blindbomb: and navigation type radars of the US
AN/APS-15 and AN/APQ-13 vs.rlsty. It is estimated that a sufficient
quantity of this equipment is available for use in aircraft employed
in attacks on the continental M. The accuracy of the Soviet blind
bombing system is estimated at about 3,000 feet CEP, but we have
insufficient evidence to estimate the degree of accuracy which
4-
Soviet crews would actually achieve.
21. Anilal~i - _t R t9 s.~Re~al e;eme or: From
a variety of circumstantial evidence, including US experience,
it is estimated that the W SR could have about 90 percent of its
TU-4 strength operationally available for an initial, deliberately
prepared surprise attack. However, the number actually sortied
would depend upon a multiplicity of other factors. In view of
the fact that most US target areas could be reached only by one-
way aerially-refueled missions, the attrition rate would be ex-
tremely high. The abort rate on those staged against US targets
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is estimated at 20-25 percent without consideration for interception
and poor navigation, and with variations in either direction acoord-
ing to season, weather, extent of preparation, and other factors.
No appareciable reserves of T( 's are believed available (the
same would apply to argr new types of aircraft introduced during
this period). At present, TU-,4 production is estimated at about
30 planes per month, a figure which could probably be increased
slightly in the short run.
22. Weather: The USSR has consistently devoted considerable
emphasis to both short and long period meterorological forecasting.
Special techniques for upper air research and improved synoptic
methods are being developed foar use in weather forecasting for
periods longer than one ronth, although we cannot estimate the
degree of success which will be achieved during the period of
this estimate. By 1955 it is believed that the USSR will have
achieved a short period prediction oapabiltty in at least the
European USSR of 85 percent reiiabil ty as oaf with the
present reliability of 60 percent. This prediction capability
plus extensive experience in meteorological research in the extreme
northern latitudes, good woacther reporting facilities in Siberia,
availability of records of ureather conditions which have prevailed
throughout North America for marry years., and constant access to
current North American weather conditions and forecasts should
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enable the USSR to prediat both route and target weather with
reasonable act.
23. Meotra-a' a Cruz sasureo: The USSR has had access
to a wide variety of U8 defensive radar and to US jsaening equip-
ment. The USSR is apperent3y well aware of the tactical advantage
to be gained by Jamal ig defensive radar and other communications.
We estate that today the USSR can seriously disrupt long-range
radio communications between the continental US and its overseas
facilities. We further believe that the USSR will Increase the
effectiveness of its jamming equipment as well as the proficiency
and number of its trained personnel throughout the period of this
.estimate. It is believed probable that the USSR has produced
sufficient electronic countermejeures devices to equip some TU-4
aircraft. It is not known whether Soviet TU-4 t s have in fact
been equipped with such Jamming equiimant.. or what would be the
effectiveness of those devices against US defensive radar. Use
of effective jamming equipment right require the employmnt of
extra aircraft equipped specifically for this purpose.
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A. Quided Missiles
24. : There is no positive ianf'oarmation that the USSR
now has slat guided missiles in an operational status. It is known
that the USSR has been conducting an intensive research and develop-
ment program. The V-2 and V-2 type weapons, which were used
operationally by the Germans during World War II, are estimated
to be the only missiles presently available. These types probably
have been improved, and may be available in limited numbers.
Neither is knoom to be in series production.
25. y-1 Characteristi.ce: The USSR has continued development
on the V-1 missile. A single pulse-Jet version could carry a
2,000 poind warhead to a range of 210 nautical miles at a speed
of 370 knots. A twin pulse,-het version has been developed which
could carry a warhead up to 4,500 pounds: for shorter distances.
Launching an improved V-1 fro a submarine is considered currently
feasible and within Soviet capabilities. ftnwr,* to date, no
launching equi.pnent,, stowage faoil'ties or missiles ha'v'e actually
been sighted on Soviet submarines. While a few intelligence reports
are available indicating that the USSR has launched guided missiles
from submarines, these reports are of low or undeVrniined reliabi.lityy
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und have not been. oenfiard,
Conceivable that, the V-1 type
could be fitted .rith an st inlet +ruurhriad, althoutrh there is no idi
tion that the USSR has cither developed such a warhead type or
Incorporated it in a guided masile. it is estimated that the
'USSR would net atter?nt to imprx ' this missile type in regard to
range or speed, but wild accept the. factors of reliability, load-
carrying characteristics, accuracy, and the techniques of rapid
preparation and firing frrm the launching, crafty
26. V-2: The USSR hr?.s carried forty u d the development of
the German V-2 type ' listic rissile; however, this missile could
not produce a threat against the eo,tinental US during the period
of this estimate.
B. Man 1e 0e1 ae
27. 4oic Ua z The USSR j rape ble of producing, atomic
weapons which COMM he --IFd into the U'S, either as complete
assemblies or as come neat perta or r;ub-aesenblt.es. The assembled
-d,vioes could rant*ez from small v"'I:+ d weenons (e.g. 5 KT weighing
a few hundred pounds to 1 rr -ro r -vi- ld caeapons (e.g. 30-50 KT) weigh-
in,g several thousand founds. r o s i - could ranee from a package
sr all ennutph to fit t;ja Iss o-ee
a package large enour to :-or_rt
Banns could be bro?- :.n doi,rn
rr>?~r^rtrtent of on automobile to
to an automobile, The smaller
.C) r+ r ,Tiber of relatively simple
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and readily transportable components which would not require Brea:
technical skill to asreerble Such a small weapon would give a
relatively low efficiency and kilotonnage yield. Weapons giving
a higher yield would require more skill to assemble and would
involve more difficulties in transporting to the point of detonation.
It is conceivable that only the fissionable material (in small
kilogram ecounts) need be introduced into the US, the other com-
ponents being procurable an a ooni rcial basis. Such a plan,
however, would require highly skilled personnel and subject the
i xole enterprise to
security hazards.
28. A variety of forms of clandestine delivery suggest hem-
selves. Atomic weapons could be delivered by disguised T[T-4air-
A
craft, could be detonated in the hold of a merchant ship or sawn
as underwater mines.. Either aampanents or assembled weapons could
be smuggled in under the diplaanatic i munity, put ashore by sub-
marines, smuggled across land borders, introduced through normal
import channels, or even introduced as bonded merchandise await-
Ing transshipment. The selection of the method of introduction,
and of methods of assembly and transport to point of detonation,
presumably would be wades according to the objective desired and
the risk of detection which the Soviets i were willing to assume.
It is not considered possible that the USSR could surmount the
security and technical problems involved in delivering a-esetive
s .ILF?.. !,L
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. against the US by clandestine meazm. -a ire
that the t has taken aW at-elm toward platrng azy nethodd of
clandestine delivery.
29. Biol.cal WeanM: Some BW ogents are pecUI19r]q sapt-
able to clandestine introduction. The introduction of small amounts
of 3W agents would be diffleat to detect or identify as to aeo'z e,
but Soviet operatives would be required for their dissemination, g-~--
tK tai k~ z
o B4t ag~snts, and So et
ty eoasidooas would be a liriit-
ing factor In the scale and toning of such an attack.
30. Chemical Wea = Q1 agents are not easily adaptable
to clandestine use. In addition to the limitations noted above
as applicable to HW attack, (]I agents are easily identifiable
by their Inmediate effects and it probably woi'ld not be feasible
or
to build up sufficient supplies/to prods the means clandestinely
for their dissemination against large population centers. The
most practicable use would be against personnel in key installations,
but even this would be difficult. There Iszm- . -Td }
USSR is developing the means for the clandestine delivery of ahem-
ical weapons.
o
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 Approved For Release`2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000$te050011-5
IV.
=A" M T1
MEMIM
A. Covent1mial 11