SE-22: CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600030010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 26, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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SEOf3RXTY INFORM&TION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD CF RMOP, . a RIATES
26 February 1952
1.04CAIDUM FOR: Mr. A11an J ns, OIR
Colonel B. B. Taney,, G-2
Captain Rey t alp ae, ONI
Colonel Edward. H. fir, AFOIN
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG
SUBJECT : SE 22: Consequenoea of Certain Possible US
Courses of Action with Respect to Indochinaa
Burma, or Thailand
1. -The attached drat estimate is forwnrded for review.
2. It is requested that your representative be prepared
to meet with us at 9:30 Wednesday,,, 27 February, in Room 146
South Building, to disc this estimatet,
25X1A9a
Acting Esoutive Secretary
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [J
n DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO, TS S
NEXT NEVIEW DATE:
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SECU T! i JFORMATION 53976-c
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25 Februax7 1952
SUBJECTS SE-22s CO JSEQUENCM' OF CI AIN POSSIBLE US Ct UR$J OF
ACTION V4 H RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURLMS, OR
THAILAND
To estimate the consequences of certain possible US courses
of action with respect to an i dentif'iable Chinese Communist
military intervention in Indochinai Burma, or Thailand.
The United Kingdom, Prance,, Australia and New Zealmd will
join the United States in yarning Commuiat China that the five
powers will at Chinese Co nrnist military intervention in
Southeast Asia, with miiitax counteraction,
* Me- aym de-Fi:fie Chinese Communist military interwentionu
is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged military inter-
vention or an unacknowledged military intervention of such a scale
and nature that its existence could be demons trated a
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"I EFFECT OF A JOINT WART '?G
1, We estimate that the Chinese Communists do not intend
to lam an early "identifiable milit< intervention" in
South oast Asia We do not belienm that a. joint warning against
such on intervention would tend to provoke it, if 9 contrary
to our estA-ngto9 tt Chinese Cor.,zurdsts do contemplate an early
"identifiable military lntervent .ion" in Southeast Asia? or if
in the future they should o ntemplatc such an interventions a
joint warning by the five pc ers would tend to deter them.
2. 'men the absence of a joint forma, warmth,, the
Chinese Comm nuts probably estimate that reidentif`1able military
intervention' in Southeast Asia would entail substantial risk of
joint military counteraction$ ,d that such a risk is unnecessary
in view of the prospects for achieving Lout control or
Southeast Asia without such 1nterrer hion0 They m 9 homv;r, dis
count this risk in view of known or saunpoyed differences in policy
among the give powers and of possible doubt Whether prompt and
offective military counteraction Is within their capabilities,
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3v The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent
woi 1d depend in large' measure on Comet conviction that8
a. The five powers were not bluffing, and were
united among tier elves as to the military
counteraction to be taken,
bo The five pomors were actually capable of prompt
and effective mdlit ry counteraction,
c,, The cowsteraction would be directed against Communist
China itself as wall as toward repelling the Chinese
Communist intervention
4. If the Chinese Connimists were convinced on the
foregoing points they would have to recognize that inter.
vention in Southeast Asia would bring military counter
action the, probable coneaqucncea of which would be gem r war in
the Far East.; if not global warn It is 'dmprcbable9 ther+efore., that
they would initiated an "identifiable military interventions in
Indochina9 Burma'. or Thailand in the face of a joint warning by
the five pc wore un1eas3 on the basis of lobal considerations 9 they
were willing to accept global war or at least general war in the
Far ast ?, So far both Commrn ist China and the USSR have shown a
desire to localirte the hostilities in Korea, Indochina,, Burman,
=I Valaya.; Furthermore, the favorable prospects for the success
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of present Communist tactics in Southeast Asia make probable
a continuation of these tactics., unless global considerations
impel the USSR and the Chinese Communists to accept grave risk
of Sba1 war.
5 0 India.. whose adherence might have a profound effect on
Communist China, would almost certainly refuse to participate4,
It is improbable that Japan would wish to take such a provocative
step at this time and uncertain whether 'T'hailand would wish to do
so. Few$ if any,, no Asiatic governments would be willing to join
in a formal warning,,
6o It is unl ly . that thatever additional signatories that
could be obtained would increase the effectiveness of a joint
warning. ]ven if the Philippines., Japan and Thailand. did participate
the Communists would discount their adherence because of the military
weakness of these countries and their existing ties with the West,
The Communists would assume Chinese Nationalist support of the
warnings whether or not explicitly expressed.
Other Effects
7. A joint, warning would considerably increase the morale
of the Thai. M. Vietnamese governments and might increase the
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twill of the Vietnamese people to continue resistance to the
Viet L:inho In Burma any encouragement derived from the
warning would probably be offset by fear of involvement in a
conflict began the great pomrs and general suspicion of
r'estern "imperialist" motives,
8m Elsewhere in East and South Asia the effect would be mixed,,
There would be a tendency,, notably in Japan and the Philippines&
and to some extent even in India$ to applaud this new manifestation
of Vlestern determination to check Communist aggression, On the
other hand,, the feeling would be widespread., especially in India
and Indonesia9 that the warning represented another instance of
Western meddling in Asian affairs and another indication of
1ulestern willingness to sacrifice the lives of millions of Asia
stn pursuit of colonial cb jectives. This reaction might have a serious
adverse effect on popular and governmental attitudes if use of atomic
weapons was threatened in-the warning,
9n The effect of a warning on other countries would probably
not be of major importance. A warning might well revive the
fez in the smaller NATO powers regarding the dangers of general
war or of an over-extension of flestern strength in the Far East,
but it is unlikely that the basic attitudes of these countries
would be changed.
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I::, YP~ I ON OF THE W IN TUE 'k a OF l d'I`LYZA}3L CO 1 UNIST
MLTARP INTEN'M.'ION IN IIDOCHD A, tW-U :Mai, OR `; HAILAID
1O, If identifiable Chinese Coax tmdAt ,litay-r intervention
in Southeast Asia actually took place, the UN could probably be
led to adopt couanterrTaeaaures sinr lar to those taken, regarding Korea
if the ITS, ttt" and France advocated these measures,, Action by
the Security Council would certainly be blocked by a Soviet veto,,
but the matter could then be taken to the General Assembly
within twenty-four hours under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution,
The Ganera'to Assembly would probably begin by calling for a cease.
fire, Were this action to be i red (as it pr?e su ably auld be)..
a two-thirds majority? could probably be mustered for resolutions
condemning Communist China as an nggr.?eUsorq recomending? military
counteraction to repel the aggression, and setting gap a unified
r alit y command (though not necessily under the US) to that end,
Wet UN members., however, because of their fears of a general wars
would Probably not be v g to r;ivs aap ecif'ic authorization fear
tr iator7 military action against Co a i t China itself,
JL The willingness of the TIN to adopt a stag:d ag lnet
Coam: r st int ?venti.on in Southeast Asia w uld be ccontigont on the
reaalir; ss of the victim to appeal to too USE, Indochina and Thari.: a-, .
would almost eertai .lr be prompt in seeki.rzg assistance against
Chinese Coranun1st military irate rent1on.,, but there some d2ager
that Burma might fail to snake a tint A-7 appeal..,,
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124, The degree of UN support for action against Chinese
Commnmist aggression would hinge on various other factoas,
There mould probably be a large number of Arab and Asian
abstentions if the victim were Indochina, which is regarded
as a French puppet, but the Arab-Asian reaction might be more
favorable than in the Korean case If the victim were Burma'
which has followed a policy of non-involvement. If the five
powers took countermeasures without UN authorisation? waprld
support of their action would be considerably lessened, Hcer,p
some advocates of a strong line against aggression? such as the
Turkab, might still wish to contribute.
III PROBABLE EFFECTS OF WE ACTUAL E ELUTION OF JOINT
COO TWEAS $
Reaction of the Chinese Cc anisst and Soviet Governments,
13, If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable
militwy intervention in Southeast Asia despite .a joint warning
against such a move, Con nimiet planning unquestionably would
have taken into account the likelihood of Western military counteraction,
The t mnediate effect of such military counteraction would almost
cortainl .r be to accelerate Chinese Cosmmnist military operations,
s Consequences of Certain Possible US Courses
of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea," treats the
material discussed in this section in more detail.,
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The Chinese Communists would probably expand their campaign
to other parts of Southeast Asia and,, having already accepted
the danger of expanded hostilities,, they might well intensify
operations in Korea and seize Hong Kong and Macao. Highest
priority would be given, howeverg to the air defense of Communist
China,
].la., Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning would
almost certainly involve the prior consent of the USSR, and the
USSR could be expected to attempt to provide sufficient aid to
insure the success of Peiping a s military operations This aid
would probably include increasing commitment of Soviet air defense
elements in Communist China and other areas of conflict and might be
accompanied by diversionary threats in other parts of Asiaa9 the
Fiddle East and Europe- If the Communists found that such
measures were proving unsuccessful in countering the five piers
effort,, the USSR would probably intensify its aid. This aid
might vM11,include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It
might even include the erVloyrncnt of Soviet forces to such an
extent that a de facto war between the five powers and the USSR
would exist in the Far East, If, howevery the global interests
of the USSR would be served by disengagement,, the Kremlin would
probably endeavor to end the conflict by political negotiations,,
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Reactions in Indochina, Burma., and Thailand
150 the initial roaction in Indochina, Burma, and Thailand
to identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in any
of those countries and to Western military countermeasures would
be one of dismay at the prospect either of suffering Chinese
Communist conquest or of suffering devastation like that in
Korea. The conduct of these peoples and governments would depend
upon their estimate of the probable outcome of the conflict
between the Western Powers and Communist China and of the havoc
that might be wrought locally meanwhile, If military counter-
action by the five powers included naval blockade and the con-
ventional bombing of targets in Communist China, reaction in
of three countries attacked would probably be generally favorable,
provided blockade and bombardment more added top, rather than sub-
stituted for, effective countermeasures at the point of attack. If
atomic weapons were used there would be at least initially a widespread
revulsion against the five powers o
Reactions of other Asian nations
16.. Sentiment in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines
would generally support from the outset vigorous military countermeasures
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against Communist Chinas, If operations were to be conducted
from Japanese bases,
peam popular apprehension over the
possible invocation of the Sino.Soviot-past might weaken the
government's position and limit popular support until the
effectiveness bf the operations was assured, In Indonesia
and India there would probably be passive acceptance of local
militaa'y counteraction to repel the Chinese Communist aggression.,
although there would be some tendency to regard the war as a con-
flict of rival aggressive imperialisms o The Indian attitude 'w'ould
be more favorable to Western counteraction if the object of Chinese
Communist aggression were Burma rather than Indochina, At least
initially India and Indonesia would be opposed to military counter-
action against China itself o
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