CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600030007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 4, 1952
• Content Type: SE

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INE
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US
COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO
INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND
028-173
DATER? FS REVIEWERJ_O18557~
RUTH: HR 70.2
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
DOWN NT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO? TS S
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE
U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REV-
ELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UN-
AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US
COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO
INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND
SE-22
FINAL COPY
The text of this estimate is identical with the advance
copy distributed to the NSC on 29 February :1952.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prep-
aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee concurred in this estimate on 28 February
1952. See, however, footnotes to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3b.
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CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR
THAILAND
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the consequences of certain possible US courses of action with respect
to an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention* in Indochina, Burma, or
Thailand.
ASSUMPTION
The United Kingdom, France, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand will join the
United States in warning Communist
China that the five powers will meet
Chinese Communist military interven-
tion in Southeast Asia with military
counteraction. Whether or not the four
other powers will join the US in such a
warning is beyond the scope of this esti-
mate. We are also unable to assess which
of various conceivable methods of trans-
mitting a warning would have the great-
est deterrent effect.
ESTIMATE
The Effect of a Joint Warning Against
Chinese Communist Military Intervention
In Southeast Asia
On Communist Intentions
1. We do not believe that a joint warning
against an "identifiable military interven-
tion" by the Chinese Communists in South-
east Asia would tend to provoke such inter-
vention. If, however, the Chinese Communists
contemplate an early "identifiable military
*The term "identifiable Chinese Communist mili-
tary intervention" is intended to cover either an
open and acknowledged military intervention or an
unacknowledged military intervention of such a
scale and nature that its existence could be demon-
strated.
intervention" in Southeast Asia, or if in the
future they should contemplate such an in-
tervention, a joint warning by the five powers
would tend to deter them.*
2. Even in the absence of a joint formal warn-
ing, the Chinese Communists probably esti-
mate that "identifiable military intervention"
in Southeast Asia would entail substantial risk
of joint military counteraction, and that such
a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, would add the following sentence: "On
the other hand, if the Communist leaders conclude
from Western actions and statements that the West
intends to attack Communist China regardless of
Communist actions in Southeast Asia, the deterrent
effect of a warning would be nullified."
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for further Communist gains in Southeast
Asia without such intervention. They may,
however, discount this risk, estimating that
there are differences in policy among the five
powers and that these powers may not be
able or willing to take timely* and effective
military counteraction.
3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a
deterrent would depend in large measure on
Communist conviction that:
a. The five powers were not bluffing, and
were united among themselves as to the mili-
tary counteraction to be taken.
b. The five powers were actually capable of
timely and effective military counteraction.*
c. The counteraction would be directed
against Communist China itself as well as
toward repelling the Chinese Communist in-
tervention.
4. If the Communists were convinced on the
the foregoing points they would have to rec-
ognize that intervention in Southeast Asia
would bring military counteraction, the prob-
able consequences of which would be general
hostilities between Communist China and the
five powers, if not global war. It is improb-
able, therefore, that they would initiate an
"identifiable military intervention" in Indo-
china, Burma, or Thailand in the face of a
joint warning by the five powers unless, on
the basis of global considerations, they were
willing to accept global war or at least gen-
eral hostilities in the Far East. So far both
Communist China and the USSR have shown
a desire to localize the hostilities in Korea, In-
dochina, Burma, and Malaya. Furthermore,
the favorable prospects for the success of
present Communist tactics in Southeast Asia
make probable a continuation of these tactics,
unless, because of global considerations, the
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of
State, holds the view that the Communists might be
seriously concerned over the prospect of delayed
military counteraction, even though they believed
that timely counteraction need not be feared. He
therefore believes that the words "timely and"
should be omitted.
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USSR and the Chinese Communists decide to
accept grave risk of global war.
5. It is unlikely that additional signatories
would increase the effectiveness of a joint
warning. India would almost certainly re-
fuse to participate in such a warning. It is
improbable that Japan would take such a
provocative step at this time and uncertain
whether Thailand would do so. Few, if any,
additional governments would join in a formal
warning. Even if the Philippines, Japan, and
Thailand did participate, the Communists
would discount their adherence because of
the military weakness of these countries and
their existing ties with the West. The Com-
munists would assume Chinese Nationalist
support of the warning, whether or not ex-
plicitly expressed.
Other Effects
6. A public joint warning would considerably
improve the morale of the Thai and Vietna-
mese governments. In Burma any encourage-
ment derived from the warning would prob-
ably be offset by fear of involvement in a con-
flict between the great powers and by general
suspicion of Western "imperialist" motives.
7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia the ef-
fect would be mixed. There would be a tend-
ency, notably in Japan and the Philippines, to
applaud this new manifestation of Western
determination to check Communist aggres-
sion. On the other :hand, the feeling would
be widespread, especially in India and Indo-
nesia, that the warning represented another
instance of Western meddling in Asian af-
fairs in pursuit of colonial objectives.
8. The effect of a warning on other countries
probably would not be of major importance.
A warning might well revive the fears in the
smaller NATO powers regarding the dangers
of general war or of an overextension of West-
ern strength in the Far East, but it is un-
likely that the basic attitudes of these coun-
tries would be changed.
9. The inclusion in the warning of a threat to
use atomic weapons would produce a wide-
spread and serious adverse reaction through-
out the non-Communist world.
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Initiation of Action in the UN and
Probable UN Reactions Thereto
10. If identifiable Chinese Communist mili-
tary intervention in Southeast Asia actually
took place, the UN could probably be led to
adopt countermeasures similar to those taken
regarding Korea if the US, UK, and France
advocated these measures. Action by the
Security Council would certainly be blocked
by a Soviet veto, but the matter could then be
taken to the General Assembly within twenty-
four hours under the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution. The General Assembly would prob-
ably begin by calling for a cease-fire. Were
this action to be ignored (as it presumably
would be), a two-thirds majority could prob-
ably be mustered for resolutions condemning
Communist China as an aggressor, recom-
mending military counteraction to repel the
aggression, and setting up a unified military
command (though not necessarily under the
US) to that end. Most UN members, how-
ever, because of their fears of a general war,
would probably not be willing to give specific
authorization for military counteraction
against Communist China itself.
11. The willingness of the UN to adopt a stand
against Communist intervention in Southeast
Asia would be affected by the readiness of the
victim to appeal to the UN. Indochina and
Thailand would almost certainly be prompt
in seeking UN assistance against Chinese
Communist military intervention, but Burma
might fail to make a timely appeal or fail to
support an appeal by another UN member.
12. The degree of UN support for action
against Chinese Communist aggression would
hinge on various other factors. A large num-
ber of Arab and Asian countries probably
would abstain if Indochina, which they re-
gard as a French puppet, were invaded. The
Arab-Asian reaction might be more favorable
if the victim were Burma, which has followed
a policy of non-involvement. If the five pow-
ers took any countermeasures without UN
'authorization, support of their action would
be considerably lessened.
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Probable Effects of the Execution of
Joint Military Countermeasures
Reaction of the Chinese Communist
and Soviet Governments*
13. If the Chinese Communists undertook an
identifiable military intervention in Southeast
Asia despite a joint warning against such a
move, Chinese Communist planning unques-
tionably would have considered the likelihood
of Western counteraction and would have
been coordinated with the USSR. It is possible
that such an intervention might be under-
taken in the belief that the warning was a
bluff, or at least that the countermeasures
would be confined to the area of the aggres-
sion. In this case the execution of forceful
military countermeasures might induce the
Communists to seek a settlement. It appears
far more likely, however, that such an inter-
vention would be undertaken in full recogni-
tion of the risks involved. Under these cir-
cumstances, the immediate reaction to such
military counteraction would probably be an
attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist
military operations. The Chinese Commu-
nists would probably attempt to extend their
operations to other parts of Southeast Asia
and, having already accepted the danger of
expanded hostilities, they might well intensify
operations in Korea and seize Hong Kong and
Macao. Highest priority would be given, how-
ever, to the defense of Communist China.
14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint
warning would almost certainly involve the
prior consent of the USSR. The degree of
Soviet aid to Communist China would depend
upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of
success of the Western counteraction, and (b)
the degree to which the existence of the Pei-
ping regime seemed to be jeopardized.
* SE-20: "The Probable Consequences of Certain
Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to Com-
munist China and Korea" treats most of the ma-
terial discussed in this section in more detail.
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