SE-20: THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNISTS OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010047-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: November 19, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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SECURITY INFOB ATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
19 November 1951
25X5
Colonel B. B, Talley, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Colonel S. N, Lensing, JIG
SUBJECT s SE-20: The Effect on the Communists of Certain
US Courses of Action.
1. The enclosed terms of reference were agreed on by the
IAC representatives meeting on 19 November.
2. All agencies are requested to contribute to the second
part of the problem, i.e., "the Communist reaction to these
courses of action"; part VII; and to every other section on which
they have pertinent information. Specific responsibilities have
been assigned as follows:
OIR: I B, II D. III B, IV B, V B, VI B. VII B,
Annex A.
ONI2
AFOIN:
0/RR:
0/lea
3. It
this office
I A, V A, VI, Annex C.
II A, B, C; III A. Annex A.
I A, III A, VI.
I A; IS At B, C; III A.
IV A, Annex B.
is requested that contributions be received in
by the close of business Tuesday, 27 November 1951.
DO,OUMtENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
~J, ? DECLASSIFIED
''0 CLASS. CHANGED Tot
G NEXT REVIEW DATE
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AU
Executive Secreta
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SECURITY INr' Rt!ATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
19 November 1951
SUBJECTt TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-20t TITE EFFECT ON THE
CO',.U,UUNISTS OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
To estimate (1) the vulnerability of the Chinese-Communists
to certain US courses of action, and (2) the Communist reaction
to these courses of action in the Far East,*
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I, MAJOR OFFENSIVE USING ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS
A, If the US should press the war more vigorously in
Korea using all available weapons and, in conjunction
with'this offensive, carry out bombing attacks on
The questions except in the case of the shipping embargo and
naval blockades of whether the UN would support US policy in
this regard is beyond the scope of this paper,
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military installations and lines of communications
in Manchuria, what would be the vulnerability of the
Chinese Communists to this course of action?
B. -What reaction from the Communists could be expected?
II. SHIPPING EK3ARGO AND NAVAL BLOCKADE*
A. Full Embargo On EXncrts to Communist China- If the US;
supported by its major allies,imposed a full embargo
on exports to Communist China, what would be the
vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action?
B. Control of Ship trig. If the US, supported by its major
allies, should institute a shipping embargo of Com-
muniet China! what would be the vulnerability of the
Communists to this course of action? (See Annex "A")
C, Nava. Blockaded If the US, supported by its major
al.l.ies, should institute a naval blockade of Communist
China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists.
to this course of action? Include the following considerations
# Con' in these measures the exclusion and inclusion of
(1) Port Arthur and Dairen, and (2) Macao and Hong Kong.
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lQ Enfor--ement of present trade restrictions;
2, A ,pacific blockade;
3, A complete blockade, including mining
operations,
D, What would be the Communist reaction to these courses
IIIs. BOEING ATTACKS TTTROUGHOUT CHINA
A? If the US should launch a systematic air and naval
bombardment of Communist China, what would be the
vulnerability of the Chinese Communists of this
course of action?
B,- What would be the reaction of the Communists to
IV. SUPPORT OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
A. What is the extent of the vulnerability of Communist
China to US supported guerrilla activity? (See Annex "B")
1, Under present circumstances?
2Q In conjunction with the other courses of action
discussed in this estimate?
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1U.
B? What would be the reaction of the Communists to this
course of action?
V? CHINESE NATIONALIST ATTACK WITH US LOGISTIC SUPPORT
A$ What is the vulnerability of Communist China to attacks
by the Chinese Nationalists supported logistically by
the US?
1. Under conditions of presently contemplated US aid
with removal of restrictions on Nationalist
operations against the mainland?
Under conditions of greatly expanded US logistic
support,, but not operational supports of the
Nationalists?
B. What would be the communist reaction to this course
VI. CHINESE NATIOI!ALIST IIWVASION ViITH US LOGISTIC NAVAL AND
'ITR MOT
A. If the US provided full logistic supports plus naval and
and air support for the Chinese Nationalists,, what would
be the Chinese Communist vulnerability to Chinese Nationalist
invasion?
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B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of
VII. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SEVERAL OR ALL OF THESE COURSES
0 A ION
A? What would be the cumulative vulnerability of Communist
China if the US undertook several or all of the courses
of action discussed above?
B. What would be the Communist reaction to several or'
all of these courses of action?
A. Foreign trade data for Communist China by month
during 19510
BQ The guerrilla situation in Communist China.
C. Chinese Nationalist Capabilities.
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