DRAFT : THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA ( FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010045-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 7, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
7 December 1951
SUBJECTS DRAFTS'THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTATN US COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO COifiMIST CHINA AND KOREA
(for Board consideration)
To estimate (1) the effect on Communist China of certain.US
courses of action, and (a) the Communist reaction to these courses
of action.*
1. If Communist China were cut off from its seaborne imports,
it would experience serious economic strains and shortages of some
items for its armed forces, but the regime's military power and its
ability to maintain control. would not be shaken, at, least in the near
future. To cut off these imports would require a UN naval blockade
together with an embargo on exports and shipping. The Chinese Communists
probably would attempt to counter a blockade with air attacks and
# The question of whether the UN would support the US in these courses
of action is beyond the scope of this paper.
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mine warfare against the blockading ships. The USSR would probably
respect the blockade of at least all ports except Port Arthus and
Dairen.
2. The Chinese Communist potential for military operations in Korea
would be seriously impaired by a major UN offensive in Korea together with
successful air attacks, particularly atomic air attacks, on targets in
North Korea and Manchuria. Ollhough the Communists might seek an early
armistice in response to this pressure, it is more likely that they would
increase their ground and air operations against UN forces with Soviet
assistance up to, but not including, the commitment of Soviet ground
forces. If, despite these efforts, it appeared that the Communists were
faced with defeat, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than
even that the Communists would seek an armistice rather than undertake
any course of action which would commit Soviet forces against UN forces
in UN territory,
3. A successful strategic bombardment of Communist China would
seriously reduce Chinese Communist military power, crLate chaos in the
Chinese Communist economy, and strain seriously the Chinese Comm:nist
economV, sapability to retain administrative control of the country,
To counter this threat the Chinese Communists would bring to bear
their maximum air defense carability. The USSR would probably bolster
Chinese air defenses by oommitting,,air units without delays If Commr{nist
control of North China and Manchuria were'pndan*ered, the USSR probably
would expand its aid, even to the extent !l that a de facto US-USSR war
would exist.
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4, The Nationalist military potential and the anti-Communist guer-
rilla potential for action against Communist China can only be realized
after a major US logistic and training program has been fully imple-
mented. After the" forces become effective (which could possibly occur
during 1953 if the US undertook ark expounded aid program without delay)
they could be employed in an invasion of Communist China, provided the
US furnished substantial 'operational air and naval support in addition to
logistic support for the inva ionforceso An invasion of the mainland
supported operationally by the US would probably be construed by Peiping
and Moscow as an indication of US determination to destroy the Chinese
Communist regime. Moscow would aid Communist China to the maximum extent
short of committing its forces openly. If, moreover, North China and
Manchuria were ser ously threatened, the USSR would do whatever was re-
quired to uphold the regime including the open commitment of Soviet forces
.against UN forces.
5. The Chinese Communists would probably b `most vulnerable'to an
intensification of~the Korean war together with air attacks against Man-
churia and China proper and a cessation of seaborne imports. If the Chi-
nese Nationalist Forces and anti-Communist guerrillas should realize
their potential capabilities, and if in combination with the courses of
action discussed above, they should be used againstthe mainland with US
operational support, a critical threat to the stability of theCommunist
regime would develop. Only in the event that Moscow believed that Soviet
security interests' in the Far East were threatened would the USSR be
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likely to take drastic measures; in that event the USSR probably would do
whatever was required to pphold Communist control ofnorthern Korea and
of Manchuria and North China, regardless of the risk involved and in-
eluding,, as a last resort, the open commitment of Soviet forces against
US forceso
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I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UN ATTEMPTS TO DENY COMMUIIST CHINA SEABORNE IMPORTS
A. Effects of This General Course of Action
1. Tha-economy of Communist China depends in large measure
on seabornd imports for such strategic items as POL, pharmaceuticals,
trucks, machine tools, and replacement parts. If these imports were
cut off, it is doubtful if they could be supplied in the volume required
by Communist China's economy over the already strained facilities of
overland transportation routes into China, Although A complete cutting
It
off of Communist China's seaborne imports would produce serious economic
strains on the mainland and would reduce the availability of some items
l~owu~u,
required to support the armed forces#A Communist China's military power
and the ability of the Communist regime to maintain itself in power
would not be shaken' at least in the near future.
2.1 A UN embargo on all exports to Communist China would be
of limited effectiveness by itself because: (a) there would be a suf=
ficient number of non-cooperating countries to maintain a continued
flow of exports to China; (b) goods sent in normal trade by cooper-
ating countries to non-cooperating countries could be transhipped to
China; and (c) the premium which Communist China would pay for vital
materials would stimulate evasion of the embargo in all countries,
If exports were permitted to Port Arthur and Dairen on the premise that
they were Soviet ports, this would leave another important loophole,
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Finally, unless exports from Hong Kong and Macao were prohibited, the
purpose of the embargo would be largely nullified.
3, An embargo on shipping to Communist China would be some-
what more effective than an embargo on exports. Regardless of where
seaborne exports to Communist China originate, the bulk of these exports
are carried by non-Communist registered shipping. Furthermore, the dis-
tribution of goods within China depends heavily on coastal shipping by
foreign flag vessels which would be withdrawn by an effective embargo.
A shipping embargo would not be effective, however, unless it were
combined with restrictions on the sale or charter of merchant ships to
Aoviet Bloc and other non-cooperating countries, together with effective
movement regulations such as refusal of clearance, blacklisting, and
other world-wide pressures. Although such an embargo could be overcome
partially by the employment of more Communist ships in the China trade,
the consequent dislocation of Soviet-bloc shipping might pose serious
economic problems for the Soviet bloc.
tt.. A naval blockade of Communist China would produce more
immediate results in cutting off seaborne exports to Communist China than
any other trade control measure. However, unless the naval blockade
were-preceded or at least accompanied by an embargo on exports and ship-
ping, it would create many difficult problems in its enforcement. If
Port Arthur and Dairen were not blockaded, a substantial loophole would
exist. However, distribution of goods from these ports to China proper
would be difficult as a consequence of the blockade on coastal shipping.
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50 The Chinese Communists would probably react to an expert and
shipping embargo by attempting to increase imports from Soviet-bloc and
other nonQc.operating countries and by increasing smuggling from all
countries.
6. In the event of a naval blockade, the Chinese Communists prob-
ably would attempt to counter with air attacks and mine warfare on the
blockading ships,, Furthermore, the inclusion of Hong Kong and Macao in
the blockade might well influence a Chinese decision to move against thoim,
since their paeoa.at usefulness to China in their present status would be
all but eliminated.
7o The Soviet reaction to an embargo on exports and shipping would
be to increase Soviet-bloc exports to' Communist China. In the event of
a naval blockade, the Soviets would probably respect the blockade at
least of all ports except Port Arthur and Dairen. If Port Arthur and
Dairen were blockaded, the USSR would at least make representations before
competent international bodies, and might well attempt to run the blockade.
Ho A MORE VIGOROUS US WAR EFFORT IN KOREA USING ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS
A o Effect s Hof ; This Course of Action
8. The. Chinese Communist potential for military operations in Korea
would be seriously impaired by a major UN offensive in Korea together
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with successful air attacks, particularly atomic air attacks on the fol-
lowing targets in North Korea and Manchuria: (a) major military in-
stallations, particularly airfields and storage depots; (b) lines of
communication, including railroad yards, bridges, and choke points and
trucks and truck routes, and (c) large troop concentrations in re-
stricted areas.
9p Successful attacks on the targets listed above in conjunction
with a major UN ground offensive in Korea would have the following effects
on the Chinese Communist military potential: (a) considerably reduce
the capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force, perhaps to the extent
of eliminating the present offensive threat to. US ground forces; (b) seri-
ously disrupt the flaw of military traffic now supporting Communist opera-
tions in Korea; (c) increase the vulnerability of military installations,,
lines of communication, and troop concentrations in North Korea to US air
operations; (d) increase the vulnerability of North Korea and Manchuria
to guerrilla and commando operations; (e) impair the replacement system
of the Chinese Communists; (f) reduce the production of munitions in
Manchuria, thus increasing Chinese Communist reliance on the USSR for. all
types of military supplies and equipment, and (g) divert an increased
number of Chinese Communist Forces to Manchuria and Korea, thus creating
greater opportunity for Nationalist raids and guerrilla operations in
China proper.
B. Communist Reactions
100 If the US should press the war more vigorously in Korea, using
all available weapons, and carry out air attacks on Manchuria, the Commu-
nists would probably estimate that the military lose of all Korea was a
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serious possibility, Under these circumstances,, the Communists might feel
compelled to donclude an early armistice.
lb It is more likely, however, that the initial Chinese Communist
reaction would probably be to: (a) request increased Soviet aid; (b) at-
tempt to conduct air operations with aircraft manned by Chinese Communist
crews against UN ships, ports, lines of communication? and other military
targets in South Korea and possibly Japan and Okinawa; (c) atttipt to
sustain their operations capabilities in Korea by greater dispersion of
troops, with less reliance-on vulnerable heavy equipment and vehicular
transport, and. (d) intensify propaganda efforts to rally popular domestic
support against the "aggressor" and to divide the US from its allies.
12, The Soviet Union would probably react immediately by strengthen-
ing Communist air defenses with the object of gaining air supremacy in
Manchuria and North Korea. It would also attempt to step up its logistic
support to the Communist ground forces. The Communists might be willing
to accept a costly prolonged war while continuing efforts to develop a
modern Chinese Communist ground and air force behind the screen of Soviet
air defenses.
13, However, if these measures should prove insufficient to insure
the continuance of Communist military operations in Korea, the Communists
would have three possible courses of action. They could (a) withdraw
from Korea and continue by guerrilla and air attacks to harass the UN
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occupation; (b) agree to an armistice while still in control of some
portion of North Korea, and (c) commit Soviet forces to the extent neces-
sary to hold a line in North Korea. Under these circumstances, we'believe
the chances are somewhat better than even that the Communists would seek
an armistices r ( r ~~ 10-4w dow a p
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III. STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA
A. Effects of This Course of Action
14. The Chinese Communist Air F,c, cce would be the most important
target in a strategic bombardment of Communist China. Successful attacks
against the airfields on which this force is deployed could be expected
to produce the following results: (a) the reduction of CCAF offensive
capabilities and elimination of the immediate threat of a major CCAF
counter.-air offensive against US ground, naval, and air forces; (b) the
destruction of air base facilities and installations; (c) high casualties
among trained aviation personnel; (d) the reduction of CCAF air defensive
capabilities, and (e) the placing of heavy logistical demands on the
Soviets for replacement of aircraft and related equipment and possibly
for trained personnels
15o Chinese Communist naval bases and ship ards are high priority
targets because their neutralization would eliminate their use by the
Soviets for supporting naval operations against UN forces.
16, Troop concentrations, some of which may contain 25#000 to
200,000 Chinese Communist troops, may normally be found in Communist
China. These are vulnerable to atomic bombing attacks, particularly
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surprise attacks. Successful attacks on these troop concentrations would
seriously weaken the Chinese Communist Field Forces.
17. Chinese Communist transportation, particularly its inadequate
railroad transportation system, is particularly vulnerable to systematic
air attacks. Successful attacks on the transportation system could
divide China into several areas which could be separately subjected to
air interdiction, thus preventing mutual military and economic support.
The Manchurian rail network, upon which the Chinese Communists must
~~- depend for such criAcal imports from the USSR as petroleum,'*.anks,
P, E
motor vehicles, navy weapons,, munitions, aircraft parts, and possibly
ft 'aircraft is singularly vulnerable* If traffic on this rail network was
interdicted on a continuing basis, the capability of the Communists for
continuing the war in Korea would be seriously impaired.
F,
(targets for a strategic bombing effort. Destruction of POL storage
facilities and refineries would result in shortages of aviation fuels
and fuels for surface transportation. Since the electric power industry
serves virtually all the significant manufacturing plants in China, plays
a major part in powering equi.ment for the extraction of coal from China's
f
mines, and performs other important military functions such as lighting
transshipment centers along the transportation systems, its destruction
would have a significant deleterious effect on Communist war-making
potential. The Chinese Communist munitions, iron, and steel industries
would make profitable targets because their destruction would increase
the strain on the tenuous supply lines leading to the USSR from Communist
China.
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19, There are 16 urban complexes in Communist China which together
have a population of over 17,000,000 and contain the major part of all
modern Chinese Communist manufacturing installations. Their destruction
would virtually eliminate Communist Chinese manufacturing plants and
would halt,, at least temporarily, rail transportation on all major rail
routes. From a long range point of view the destruction of these 16
complexes would involve the lose of technical and managerial personnel
who could not be easily or quickly replaced,, Heavy losses probably would
also be caused to governmental and military personnel.,,
20. In summary, successful air attacks on these targets would
seriously reduce Chinese Communist military power, create chaos in the
Chinese Communist economy, and strain seriously the Chinese Communist
capability for administrative control of the country,
B. Communist Reactions
21. If this strategic bombardment of Communist China. was launched,
the Chinese Communists would immediately bring to bear their maximum air
defense capability and would attempt to attack US bases of operation,
(See TAB "B" for a detailed estimate of Chinese Communist air defense
capabilitities.).In addition, they would seek increased Soviet assistance.
Soviet air units, probably represented as Chinese and/or volunteer for-
ces, would be committed in defensive roles without delay. Soviet sub-
marines would seek to interdict US naval units. If Communist control
of North China and Manchuria were endangered, the Soviet Union would
probably expand its aid, and USSR forces might be employed to such
extent that a de facto US-USSR war would exists
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22o If Communist control in any area should break down, latent
anti-Communist sentiment in that area would probably coalesce around
guerrilla forces or other leaders who might come to the fore. However,
it is unlikely that such a movement would gain momentum until a major
invasion of the China mainland by anti-Communist forces was effected.
If Peiping lost contact with their forces in south China, these forces
might be evacuated in order to establish a hard core in the North.
23. Popular reaction to US bombing operations would depend on the
nature of the operations and on a number of other variables, such as
dislike for the Communist regime and the residue of good-will toward the
US. When Nationalist air attacks were carried out on Shanghai in Feb'.
rurary, 1950, no hostility toward either the Nationalists or the US was
observed and many Qhinese actually cheered the attacking planes. If the
US bombardment was confined to military and strategic targets, civilian
casualties probably would not appear too extreme, and, if the operation
gave promise of establishing a popularly acceptable government, genuine
anti-US sentiment probably would not be stimulated.
IV. NATIONALIST ATTACKS ON COMMUNIST CHINA
A. Effect of this Course of Action
24. The Nationalists will not be able to carry out attacks,
other than sporadic commando raids, on Communist China until the effec-
tiveness of their Armed Forces is substantially improved. (See TAB "C"
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for a detailed estimate of the capabilities of the Nationalist Armed
Forces). The Nationalist Ground Forces may become combat effective after
receipt of presently proposed US materiel aid and after training in its
use. However, under the present US aid program, the effectiveness of
the. Nationalist Air Force and Navy will not be improved.
25. After the Nationalist Ground Forces become effective (possibly
during 1953 under the present US aid program), the Nationalists. might
be able to establish a bridgehead on the China coast, provided that the
US furnished substantial air and naval support in addition to logistic
support for the Nationalist invasion forces. If the US program for the
Chinese Nationalists were greatly expanded so as to improve Nationalists
military leadership and provide the materiel and training needed for
existing ground, naval, and air forces plus such additional manpower as
could be recruited on Taiwan, the Nationalists might be able to establish
a bridgehead on the China coast without further US participation. How-
ever, we do not believe that such a bridgehead could be consolidated and
expanded, unless the US provided tactical air support in addition to con-
tinuing logistic support for the Nationalist forces. Even under these
circumstances, it is doubtful if the Nationalists could recruit suffi-
cient additional manpower on the mainland to enable them to break out of
a lodgement andactually threaten Communist control over large areas of
the mainland. With appreciation of current Chinese Communist capabilities,
the Nationalists could accomplish this result only in conjunction with
a major US war effort, including at least a US strategic bombing cam.
paign and probably the support of US ground forces.
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26. A Nationalist invasion of the mainland, supported opera-
tionally by US naval and air forces, would probably be construed by Pei-
ping and the Kremlin as an indication of US determination to destroy the
Chinese Communist regime, The Chinese Communists would probably immed-
iately invoke the Sino-Soviet Pact, pressing the USSR to enter the Far
Eastern conflict on a war basis. If the Communists failed to contain
the initial beachhead, they would withdraw ~nland in order to concen-
trate their strength andto lengthen the invaders lines of communication.
27. Moscow would almost certainly regard a strong US supported
Nationalist invasion as a serious threat to its objectives in the Far
East. 'Consequently, when it became evident to the Kremlin that Communist
control of north China and Manchuria appeared seriously threatened,
the USSR probably would do whatever was required to uphold the regime,
regardless of the risk involved and including, as a last resort, the
open commitment of Soviet forces against US forces, However, so long
as Chinese countermeasures were successful,, Moscow would probably prefer
to maintain the fiction of non-intervetAtion.
28. It is likely that a successful invasion, in which the
US was an integral, active element, would attract an increasingly large
segment of mainland discontents. However, it dose not appear that at
the present time there would be a significant number of defections from
the Chinese Communist military forces, unless key Communist military
leaders surrendered. large bodies of troops. There is no intelligence
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to indicate that any key military leaders are so disaffected that they
V. SUPPORT OF GUERRIL1AS OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST C"!IHA
A. The Effect of This Course of Action
29. Present anti-Communist guerrilla operational capability
is insignificant. (See Tab "D" for an estimate of guerrilla capabili-
ties.) However, if the. guerrillas were organized, equipped, and coor-
dinated, they could make ansignificant contribution to the success of an
anti-Communist invasion of the mainland. Except in coordination with
this effort, however, it is not expected that the guerrillas will develop
the capability, even with substantial US support, to do more than hinder
Communist control in some areas of~China and divert a significant portion
of the Communist Armed Forces to anti-guerrilla operations.
B. Communist Reactions
30, The Chinese Communists have the capability of executing
effective repressive countermeasures against guerrillas. At present the
guerrilla situation is under such effective control that the Communists,
except in a few isolated areas, have replaced regular troops by local
militia for the conduct of anti-guerrilla operations, Should the militia
be incapable of coping with the situation in any area, regular forces
could be committed in adequate numbers. It is likely that the Chinese
Communists will continue to have the capability to control the guerrilla
situation except under the circumstance of a successful anti-Communist
invasion.
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VI. TT ; CONSEQUENCES OF COMBIH-1 COURSE, OF-WT-TOR
A. The Effects of Combined Courses of Action
31, If the Korean war shoul'. continue, the Chinese Communist
regime would probably be confronted; with increasing domestic problems
such as inflation and popular disaffection, and possibly dissidence among
Chinese Communist leaders. All of these factors might seriously impair
Chinese Communist capability to counter any or a combination of the mea-
sures discussed above.
326 The Chinese Communists would probably be most vulnerable
to an intensification of the Korean war together with air attacks against
Manchuria and China proper and a cessation of seaborne imports. This
combination of actions would have the following effects: (a) severely
disrupt lines of communication throughout China; (b) severely strain the
Chinese Communists' ability to continue the war in Korea; (c) force the
Chinese Communists into complete dependence on the USSR for military sup-
plies and critical imports; (d) virtually eliminate Chinese Communist
capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia, and (e) progres-
sively reduce the ability of the Chinese Communist regime to maintain
effective control at a local levels
33- If the Chinese Nationalist Forces and anti-Communist
guerrillas should realize their potential capabilitieR, and if in comma
bination with the courses of action discussed above, they should be used
against the mainland with US operational support, a critical threat to
the stability of the Communist regime would develop.
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34. Communist reaction to any combination of these courses of
action would be determined by the degree of threat presented, So long as
Chinese Communist military resources are considered sufficient to neu-
tralize or contain the anti-Communist threat, it is likely that, in order
to localize the conflict and to reduce the risk of global war, Soviet aid
to Peiping would be limited to materiel and covert air and possibly sub-
marine assistance (increased in proportion necessary to counter the US/
Nationalist measures taken). Only in the event that Moscow believed that
Soviet'security interests-An the Far East were threatened would the USSR
be likely to take drastic measures; in that event the USSR probably would
do whatever was required to uphold Communist control of northern Korea
and of Manchuria andNorth China, regardless of the risk involved and inclu-
ding, as a last resort, the open Commitment of Soviet forces against US
forces,
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1. Present Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are due
directly to Soviet active participation in supplying equipment, operational
proceduc+es, Ong, and, in matV cases, Soviet personnel. In assess-
ing such capabilities, the following factors are pertinents
(a) Fighter . Appro tely 525 first-line jet
fighters of the MIG-15 type are located in the Ihikden-Antung area
of southern Mauzchuria. Some 225 jet fighters are located in the
foUowv ng four strategic areas in China proper: Peiping-Tientsin,
Teingtao, Shanghai, and Canton.
(b) Early Wasving. A radar defense system has been installed
and set in operation, with the assistance of Soviet radar engineers,
technicians, and advisers, which is believed to give praoticaliy
continuous early-warning coverage from the Nhnchur3a border a oath
to Canton. A visual system supplements the electronic early-
warning system.
(e) Antiairera t. In China-Zknnhuria, there is believed to be
over 500 antiaircraft artillery pieces and an equal number of anti-
aircraft automatic weapons. Most pieces are 85 mm., 37 am.,, and
12.7 am. of Soviet i nufacture. Reports continue to indicate that
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the total AAA strength is being increased by shipments of Soviet
equipment. Heaviest concentrations are located in the. Mukden
area, Shanghai, and in the vicinity of Canton. AAA defenses ap-
pear to be employed for the protection of the industrial. area,
harbor facilities, airfields, and major Junctions in the ccmmavnioa-
tions and supply systems. Gun-laying .radar has been reported in
acme areas.
(d) A34craftControl. The Chinese Communists possibly have a
capability for limited ground-controlled interception.
(e) Soviet Influence. The air defense organization of the
Chinese Cammnnists appears to be patterned after that of the Sovi-
eta. The aver-all air defense capabilities of this defense organi-
zation with respect to fighter defense, antiaircraft defense,
early warning, aircraft control, and passive defense measures
probably will continue to increase as long as the Soviets continue
to assist Casmmunist China.
2. The air defense capabilities of the Chinese Communists are es-
timated to be as follows:
(a) In the Mukden Antung area of southern Manchuria, the
Chinese Communists possess a major air defense capability against
daylight bombing missions,,. At night their air defense capabilities
would be considerably less because of their limited ground-controlled
interception ability. (See la above.)
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(b) Chinese Communist air defense capabilities for Chita
proper are considerably less due to a greater area and fewer
available aircraft. In areas where distance prevents likely imme-
diate jet air reinforcements, i.e., Shanghai and Canton, the defense
capability of the small jet strengths presently allocated to those
areas is considered negligible as against a major air offensive in
daylight attacks or night missions. In the Peiping-Tientsin and
Tsingtao areas, which are considered mutually supporting,a substanr
tial jet strength of some 150 MIG-15's?presents a very formidable
defensive capability if sufficient early warning was given to enable
this strength to be used as a single force, The geographic posi-
tion of Taingtao creates a greater vulnerability to air attack than
does that of Peiping--Tientsin. Against a major air attack, however,
the defense capability of some 75 MIG-15?s located at Tsingtao is
considered at least fair. Due to Tsingtaoes protective position,
however, the defense capability of Peiping Tientsin against a major
air attack is considered to be good to excellent, The defense
capability of those areas is considered negligible against night
attacks of major size. It is believed that a major air offensive
would encounter flak of limited effectiveness over targets in
China proper such as industrial areas, harbor facilities, airfields,
and major junctions in the communications and supply systems,
(c) Air defense capabilities of the Chinese em masts,
especially in southern Manchuria, are such that considerable losses
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of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during a cam-
paign of systematic air attacks. Under conditions of prolonged air
attack, the ability of the Chinese Cc?nnists to maintain effective-
ness would be in direct proportion to the amount of support which
the Soviets would continue to render.
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CHINESE NATIONALIST. Ate, FQRC
1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 451,000 personnel
organised into 38 Infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop
groups 3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments, and,2 independent bet-
talions. The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat
e1eAnents 'are looted, on Matsu, Quemoy., and the Pescadores Islands. The
Nationalist Army has no significant number of trained reserves, and under
present circumstances its mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass
induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US'greatly
expanded its proposed MAP. Even in this event, the dependability and
effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present
time, the Nationalist Axe is short of awe types of ammunition, arms,
and Other equipment, and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous
and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack
of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack
of interservice coordination), the' 'combat effectiveness of the National-
ist Army is pro After receipt of the proposed US materiel aid and
after training in its use, its effectiveness will be substantially im-
proved.
2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combat groups
possessing 384 tactical aircraft. Of this total, however, only 121 air-
craft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light bombers and
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86 piston fighters predominantly of World War II design. Because of the
lack of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combat ef-
fectiveness of this force is very poor. Under conditions of sustained
combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would
be reduced to a negligible factor in a day or two. In spite of these
difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the
organizational structure and necessary personnel to absorb and utilize
the additional equipment necessary to snake it an effective force. How-
ever,. the present US aid- program is not expected to improve the National-
ist Air Force or even maintain its present capabilities.
3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 mis-
cel]Aneous craft, the largest of which are 7 destroyer-type vessels,
Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval
opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to two
divisions in assault by means of orthodox landing craft and following up
with five or six water lifted divisions. No amount of logistic support
could immediately effect a great increase in the effectiveness of the
Nationalist Navy. Training in large-scale operations, command reorgani-
zation, the removal of political intrigues, and other slowly achieved
changes are prerequisites to arV major improvement.
4. It is evident that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist
Anmed Forces are extremely limited. It is estimated that the Chinese
Nationalists are at present incapable, by themselves, of defending
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Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese. Communist Forces. On the
offensive side, the Chinese Nationalists could not at present establish
a lodgment on the mainland without the full participation of US forces,
including US ground forces. After receipt of proposed US materiel aid and
after training in its use, the Nationalist Army could provide 10 infantry
divisions for an assault on the mainland if the USSS continued logistic
support to the invasion force. However, since the presently proposed aid
will not improve Nationalist air and naval capabilities, an attempted
assault on the mainland. still would have no hope of success unless the
US provided powerful air and sea operational support.
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 CONFIDENTIAL,
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ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND
CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-CO4MUNIST GUEPv-
glum Is r!xrrnTa
A. MLR STRENGTH AND LOCATIOIl
1. The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all
China, which can with ar r certainty be said to exist at the present t
is appa`ccadmately 175,000. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in Un-
known =zbers, but the utility of this category is and probably will re-
main man, pending all-cmt war or revolution in China.
2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in inao-
cessible areas --~ mountainous regions and on Nationalist-held offshore
islands. Principal,regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River
and Canton area, the Kwang ang-Fukien border, the Ivangsi KweichcN border,
Szechwan, the Chekiang coast, Southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in
the Mongol and Moslem northwest.
B. THEI11 PHYSICAL, C0N1'OSITION ANDCONDITION
3. The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since these resistance
forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition fraox
one unit to another, Generally speaking, guerrillas fall Into the follow-
ing categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom profess amlegi--
ante, but most of wham owe no allegiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented
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affijh
landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret
societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most
active and effective units are those in categories (a) and (e).
4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a total lack of central direction
and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often from
lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious de-
ficiencies in arms and ammunition, and, perhaps most importantly, from an
almost total lack of co miunioation facilities d In addition, guerrilla
forces sub ist on submarginal food, clothing, and medical levels.
C. THEIR MOTIVATION AND ALLEG NCE
5. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the
basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the present time is
the struggle for existence and self-preservation.
6. Despite Nationalist and independent claims? the Chinese guer-
rillas are and will be allegiant for the most part to whatever leader and
whatever political group can support and maintain them.
7. Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is
primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist
guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual because of the
hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
8. Independent elements continue to claim a substantial guerrilla
potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of
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one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid,
but this group does not have the resources to maintaain its assets without
outside support.
D. TA,,,IR CONTINUING DECLINE, INST1E AM EFF~ECT11
9. Chinese Cammunist countermeasures against dissident elements
have been most successful.; and, with the further consolidation of control
by Peiping and the forming by Peiping of an effective anti-guerrilla.
militia throughout China, guerrilla strength and activity under present
circumstances will probably continue to decline.
10. The perhaps surprisingly low figure mf on2y 175,000 guerrillas
should not be ascribed wholly to the successes of the Chinese Camm-unist
anti-guerrilla program because this figure is the result also of a
g'r'eatly increased and far more accurate US intelligence product concern-
lug anti st resistance in China.
THEIR PRESENT CAPABILITIES
11. It is unlir__ely that at the present time the guerrillas can ac-
complish any of the following to any significant degrees
(a) Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another
of the Chinese Cyst armies;
(b) Seriously - interdict Chinese C mist :Lines of ermmunf c a-
tions or. logistic support;
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(c) Attract to their ranks air substantial numbers of defec-
tors from the Communists;
(d) Significantly abet military operations should a National-
ist invasion ,be launched in the near future,
12. Anti-Commn4ist guerrillas may be judged to have at the present
time the following capabilities:
(a) Sporadic raids;
(b) Occasional sabotage operations;
(a) Raids, feints, and diversions against'the mainland from
the l tionalist held offshore islands;
(d) Intelligence source concerning Communist China, and
(e) Potential basis for possible :resistance movement in Chino
13. Axy hope of increasing present guerrilla capabilities is con-
tingent upon a Program of sizeable outside support and upon arevitaliza-
tion of the Chinese Nationalists,
]4. In summary, the present outlook for the guerrillas is dim.
They nevertheless represent an asset with considerable potential provided
they can be properly equipped, organized, and directed. If so supported
from outside, anti-Cammunist guerrillas can form the nucleus of a possi-
ble future resistance movement in China,
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