(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010043-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: REPORT

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prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao as transshipment poipta
for trade with Communist China. (See Tab A for data on
Chinese Communist trade during 1951o)
b, Such interdiction would create serious economic
strains in Communist China, but would not in itself force the
Chinese Communists to'end the Korean war or threaten the in-
ternal control of the Chinese Communist regime,
c, The Chinese Communists would be unable to counter
such a blockade effectively but would probably employ mine
warfare against the blockading ships and might employ air-
craft and submarineso
d, The USSR would probably do its utmost to offset the
economic effects of the embargo and blockade by expanding over.
land shipments to Communist China. The USSR would probably
refuse to recognise the legality of the blockade. It would
probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur
and Dairen (if these ports were blockaded), and might escort
Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports, Interception of
such Soviet shipping might well create serious incidents, but
we believe it unlikely that the USSR would make such incidents,
in themselves, a casus .
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20 Intensification and bcpansion of UN Military C erations
Vie Korean Area,
Large scale UN ground operations in Korea, combined
with unrestricted UN air attack on Communist military targets
in North Korea and Manchuria, would, if successful, seriously
impair the Communist military capability to maintain their
position in Korea,
b, Such a course of action might compel the Communists
to conclude an early armistice. We believe it more likely,
however, that the Chinese Communists would retaliate by offen-
sive air action against UN forces and targets, conceivably
including even those in Japan,
Go The USSR would probably react immediately by giving
all possible support short of the commitment of their own
ground forces, including the commitment of additional elements
of their own air defense forces to the air defense of Man-
churia and North Korea0
do If these measures should prove insufficient to per-
mit the Commmists to maintain themselves militarily in Korea,
the Communists might: (1) withdraw from Korea and continue by
guerrilla attacks to harass the UN occupation; (2) conclude an
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armistice while still in control of some portion of North
Korea; or (3) commit Soviet forces. on balance, we believe
the chances are somewhat better than even that the Communists
would conclude an armistice. We believe it unlikely that the
USSR would commit Soviet air forces to combat over UN held
territory or Soviet ground forces to combat against UN forces,
Expansion of the Korean War by Bombardment of Strategic
7
farge s throughout Communist China.
a. A bombardment of-strategic targets in Communist China
(including airfields, naval bases and shipyards, troop concen-
trations, transportation systems, industrial facilities and
urban complexes) would probably., if successful, seriously re.
duce Chinese Communist military power, disrupt the Chinese Com-
munist econonr, and eventually jeopardize Communist control over
at least some parts of south and southwest China. (See Tab B
on Strategic Targets in Communist China.)
b. The Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are sub-
stantial in Manchuria and North China but are slight elsewhere.
(See Tab C on Chinese Communist Air Defensive Capabilitieso)
The Chinese Communists would almost certainly seek to counter
the US strategic bombardment by offensive air action against UN
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forces and targets;' possibly including those in Japan and
Okinawan
cc The USSR would commit additional. Soviet units for
the air defense of Communist China.
d, If the Communists found that their air defense capa.
bilities were insufficient to defeat the US strategic bombard.
meat, and if they estimated that the consequences listed above
were likely to ensue, they might commit Soviet air forces to
offensive operations against US forces and bases, or they
might seek an armistice on the best terms available, on
balance, we believe that in these circumstances the Communists
would conclude an armistice if part of North Korea were left
under their control.
ansion of the Korean War b to ent of Nationalist
M tary Forces .
The Chinese Nationalist forces could not be effectively
used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist main-
land unless the present US program for equipping and training
these forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were
wiling to provide not only logistic support for an invasion
but substantial air and naval support as wall. In any event,
Nationalist forces could not be ready for an invasion operation
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before 19534 (See Tab D for detailed statement of Nationalist
capabilities.)
ansion of the Korean War by Utilization of Non-Communist
AAirei in China.
The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing
the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these
forces do not now have a significant operations]. capability.
(See Tab E for detailed statement of guerrilla capabilities.)
Even _if guerrilla capabilities were developed, the guerrillas
could be employed effectively only in conjunction with other
courses of action directed against Communist China.
ansion of the Korean War by a Combination of Several or
a. An intensification of UN operations in Korea and an
expansion of the war to include successful tactical and strate-
gic bombardment of Manchuria and China proper and a successful
interdiction of Communist China's seaborne importx Iould have
the following effects on Comnninist capabilities: (1) the
Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale
operations in Korea; (2) lines of communication in Communist
China would be disrupted; (3) Communist China would be forced
into complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies and
@g?
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other critical imports; (14) Chinese Communist capabilities
for large-scale military operations in Southeast Asia would
be eliminated; (5) Communist Chinos ability to maintain
effective control of the mainland would be progressively re-
duced,
bo In response to these US courses of action, the USSR
would almost certainly expand its aid to Communist Chinas
This aid would probably include increasing commitment of
Soviet air defense forces in Communist China and North Korea but
would probably stop short of commitment of Soviet air forces
to combat over UN-held territory or Soviet ground forces to
combat against UN forces. If such aid failed to counter the
US effort, the Communists would probably seek an armistice
which would leave some part of North Korea under Communist
control. While at every point the USSR would probably seek to
avoid the precipitation of general war, there would be grave
danger that general war might result from action not intended
to produce that result..,
apm
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