IMPOSITION OF A UN EMBARGO ON SHIPPING AND EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010037-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: January 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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3a
Z osition of a UN Embargo on Shipping and Exports to Communist China
a. A UN embargo on all exports to Communist China would be of
limited effectiveness by itself because; (a) there would undoubtedly
be a sufficient number of non-cooperating countries to maintain a con-
tinued flow of exports to China; (b) goods sent in normal trade by coop-
erating countries to non-cooperating countries could be transshipped to
China; and (c) the premium which Communist China would pay for vital
materials would stimulate evasion of the embargo in all countries. If
exports were --ermitted to Port Arthur and Dairen, this would leave another
loophole. Finally, unless exports from Hong Kong and Macao to Communist
China were prohibited, the effect of the embargo would be-largely nullified.
b. An embargo on shipping to Communist China would be somewhat more
effective than an embargo on exports. Regardless of where seaborne ex-
ports to Communist China originate., the bulk of these exports are carried
by non-Communist registered shipping. Furthermore, the distribution of
goods within China depends heavily on coastal shipping by foreign flag
vessels which would be withdrawn by an effective embargo. A shipping
embargo would not be effective, however, unless it were combined with
restrictions on the sale or charter of merchant ships to Soviet Bloc and
other non-cooperating countries, together with effective movement regu-
lations such as refusal of clearance, blacklisting, and other worldwide
pressures.
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c. The combination of these two courses of action would be sub-
stantially more effective than either imposed by itself. However, such
controls would still leave many loopholes for exports to Communist China*
d. Although t=iese controls would be sufficient to intensify the
existing serious-economic strains in Communist China, their impact would
be long term and would not, in themselves, force the Chinese Communists
to end the Korean war or threaten the stability of the Chinese Communist
regime. ,
e4 The Communists could overcome partially the effect of these mea-
sures by employing more of their ships in: the China trade, even though
such dislocation of Soviet Bloc shipping might impose serious problems
for the Soviet Bloc. The USSR would also endeavor to expand overland
shipments to Communist China.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010037-3