SE-17: THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN (DRAFT FOR IAC CONSIDERATION)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060012-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 1998
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 18, 1951
Content Type: 
SE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060012-6.pdf184.77 KB
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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000500060012-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 18 October 1951 SUBJECT: SE-17s THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN (Draft for TAG Consideration) The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan 1, On 16 October Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated by a man now officially described as an Afghan national. The Premiership has been assumed by the Governor- General of Pakistan, Khwaja Paasirsauddi.no Effect on the Stability of the Regime 2. There is unlikely .to be any immediate threat to the -stability of the regime. The popular reaction to the nu-der has been one of shock and revulsion and the assassination cannot be taken as an indication of widespread opposition to the government, The group of Mosl+en League leaders which Liaquat headed occupies a dominant position in Pakistani politics, has maintained a strong grip on the army and on the press and radio., and appears to be dealing efficiently with the situation. Although there is some danger of disorders in NO CHAt' C t"~ _ F..~ 7. I tJ J L CLASS. G! AN"--'-) o: NEkf RLV1 A i')a I L % V IY I I V LI V I Ire.. AUTH: HN'U .ATE: ~ las' i.-f,E.VIEWER: CI~ Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :CIA-RDP79SO1011A000500060012-6 Approved For Releas4000/08/ 11 A000500060012-6 the traditionally turbulent tribal areas in.the North West Frontier Province from which the assassin came, the govern. tent will probably be able to contain them, Opposition groups are weak. The armor conspiracy of last spring appears to have been effectively crushed, Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to provide as firm leadership as under Liaquat. Idazimuddin is a capable but relatively colorless Dart Pakistan politicians Who appears to have been chosen as a symbol of national unity and as a neutral chairman; neither he nor are, of his colleagues appears to possess LiaquatGa high degree of personal vigor and. political prestige. The absence of an established line of succession may encourage rivalry within the ruling group, Effect on the Kashmir Dispute* 4 The assassination does not affect our present estimate that neither Pakistan nor India is likely deliberately to initiate hostilities over'Kashmir prior to the end of 195., Sae NIE, "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the end of 195," published i4 September 1951, Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000500060012-6 Approved For Relea 2000/08/29 P79S01011 000500060012-6 nnnir~nr-nIT14 VV III U-1 61 MIN The leaders of both countries appear genuinely shocked by the assassination and anxious to avoid trouble, and are pro- bably capable of preventing public pressure from getting out of handQ. 5. However, the assassination cornea at a time when Pakistan?a leaders are obliged to review their Kashmir policy. The. meeting of the pro-Indian Kashmir Constituent Assembly, scheduled for 31 October, and the submission of the Graham report to the UN Security Council make further decisions in- escapablea In the absence of any conciliatory act by Indiaa the Pakistan Government would almost certainly exert the utmost pressure for firm UN action, either in the Security Council or through submission of the issue to the General Assembly, If these tactics failed to produce results acceptable to Pakistan, army and popular pressures for war mould Increase, Although the leaders of the new government can bpi expected to follow a policy at least as mmderate as that of Itaguat, it is possible that lacking his influence and stature they ma be less able to withstand these pressures, 6, There is a alight chance that extremist elenants in Azad (pro-Pakistan) Kashmir moor attempt in the near future to take advantage of the situation and,, by attacking Indian troops,,, Approved For Release 2000/ 0101 1A000500060012-6 Approved For Releas00/08 P79S01011A000500060012-6 v% to bring about a general resumption of hostilities in Kashw mir0 There' le also a slight chance that some hots-headed Pakistani arn{y officers might attempt similar action. Effect on Relations with Afghanistan 7a The official description of the assassin as an Afghan national may create some popular pressure for war against Afghanistan. Pakistan may demand that Afghanistan make atonement for the assassination and renounce further agitation in regard to Pushtoonistana If Afghanistan proves unresponsive, the Pakistan Government might countenance bor. der raids by tribesmen, but it is unlikely that it would resort to war against Afghanistan, Effect on Relations with the west 8e The new Prime Minister? the Foreign Minister, Sir Mohamed 7afrullah Khan, and the new Govvernor~.Genera1, Shulam Mohanuaed, have all shared Liaquatas pro-western leanings, But the unsettled state of the Kashmir dispute, plus increasing anti-Westernism in the Moslem world,, particularly as a result of the Ang`2o-; ptian crieia, will make it more difficult Liaquat A1ia s successora to maintain a pro-Western orientatione Approved For Release 2000/0 1011 A000500060012-6