THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060008-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 22, 1951
• Content Type: SE

Approved For Release 1~79SO1011A000500060008-1
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
SE-17
Published 22 October 1951
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 19 October.
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 Approved For Release 79S0101lA000500060008-1
THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan
1. On 16 October Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassi-
nated by a man now officially described as an Afghan national.*
The Premiership has been assumed by the Governor-General of
Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin.
Effect on the Stability of the Regime
2. There is unlikely to be any immediate threat to the stability
of the regime. The popular reaction to the murder has been one
of shock and revulsion and the assassination cannot be taken as
an indication of widespread opposition to the government. The
group of Moslem League leaders which Liaquat headed occupies
a dominant position in Pakistani politics, has maintained a
strong grip on the armed forces and on the press and radio, and
appears to be dealing efficiently with the situation. Although
there is some danger of disorders in the traditionally turbulent
tribal areas in the North West Frontier Province from which
the assassin came, the government will probably be able to
contain them. Opposition groups are weak. The army conspir-
acy of last spring appears to have been effectively crushed.
3. Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to provide as firm
leadership as under Liaquat. Nazimuddin is a capable but rel-
actively colorless East Pakistan politician, who appears to have
* The Director of Intelligence, USAF, would note that the motives
and affiliations of the assassin are not yet sufficiently deter-
mined to permit a full assessment of the implications of this
assassination.
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been chosen as a symbol of national unity and as a neutral
chairman; neither he nor any of his colleagues appears to
possess Liaquat's high degree of personal vigor and political
prestige. The absence of an established line of succession may
encourage rivalry within the ruling group.
Effect on the Kashmir Dispute*
4. The assassination does not affect our present estimate that
neither Pakistan nor India is likely deliberately to initiate
hostilities over Kashmir prior to the end of 1951. The leaders
of both countries appear genuinely shocked by the assassination
and anxious to avoid trouble, and are probably capable of pre-
venting public pressure from getting out of hand.
5. However, the assassination comes at a time when Pakistan's
leaders are obliged to review their Kashmir policy. The meeting
of the pro-Indian Kashmir Constituent Assembly, scheduled for
31 October, and the submission of the Graham report to the UN
Security Council make further decisions inescapable. In the
absence of any conciliatory act by India, the Pakistan Government
would almost certainly exert the utmost pressure for firm UN
action, either in the Security Council or through submission of
the issue to the General Assembly. If these tactics failed to pro-
duce results acceptable to Pakistan, army and popular pressures
for war would increase. Although the leaders of the new govern-
ment can be expected to follow a policy at least as moderate as
that of Liaquat, it is possible that lacking his influence and stature
they may be less able to withstand these pressures.
* See NIE -41, "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute
to the end of 1951," published 14 September 1951.
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6. There is a slight chance that extremist elements in Azad
(pro-Pakistan) Kashmir may attempt in the near future to take
advantage of the situation and, by attacking Indian troops, to
bring about a general resumption of hostilities in Kashmir.
There is also a slight chance that some hot-headed Pakistani
army officers might attempt similar action.
Effect on Relations with Afghanistan
7. The official description of the assassin as an Afghan national
may create some popular pressure for action against Afghanistan.
If it is verified that the Afghan Government was in some way in-
volved, Pakistan may demand that Afghanistan make atonement
for the assassination and renounce further agitation in regard to
Pushtoonistan. If Afghanistan proves unresponsive, the Pakistan
Government might countenance border raids by tribesmen, but
it is unlikely that it would resort to war against Afghanistan.
Effect on Relations with the West
8. The new Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed
Zafrullah Khan, and the new Governor-General, Shulam Mohammed,
have all shared Liaquat's pro-Western leanings. But the un-
settled state of the Kashmir dispute, plus increasing anti-
Westernism in the Moslem world, particularly as a result of the
Anglo-Egyptian crisis, will make it more difficult for Liaquat Ali's
successors to maintain a pro-Western orientation.
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 :. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION,CIA
Kan can
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79SOS,JANM0060008-1
THE CURRENT OUTLOOK
IN PAKISTAN
S~E-17
Published 2 October 1951
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