SE-8: POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN SUGGESTING A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000400020015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 2, 1951
• Content Type: NE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD
2 July 1951
SUBJECT: SE-8t POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN SUGGESTING
A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA
To examine possible Soviet objectives in proposing a
cease fire and armistice in Korea,
THE COMMUNIST CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL
l4 On 23 June, Soviet UN Chief Delegate Malik, speaking
on a UN program series, presented a vague suggestion that the
"belligerents" should start discussions for a "cease fire and
armistice" in Korea, on 27 June Malik?s statement was clarified
to some extent by Soviet Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko, who'
stated to US Ambassador Kirk that the representatives of parties
fighting in Korea ("representatives of the Unified Command plus
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South Korean Command and of the North Korean's People's Re.
public Conmand plus representatives of the Chinese Volunteer
Unite") should meet and conclude a military armistice, to
include a cease-fire, Such an armistice, Grovqko said, would
be limited to strictly military issues and would not involve
political or territorial matters, GronVko also said that
assurances against resumption of hostilities should be dis-
cussed between the military representatives fornailating the
terms of the military armistice.
20 Peiping's only reaction to the Malik speech was con-
tained in an editorial in the semi-official Peiping Peo less
D?, The editorial endorsed Malik'p proposal,, but failed to
clarify Peiping's attitude on the cease-fire. The only other
significant Communist development in connection with the cease.
fire suggestion was a reported North Korean broadcast on 27
June in which the Conmaznist propaganda line calling on the People's
Army to drive the enesy into the sea was changed to driving "the
enem3r within the 38th Parallel."
CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA AND MANCHURIA
3. Conusiniet forces in Korea have suffered more than a
million casualties in the face of a substantial increase in the
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effectiveness of UN forceso North Korean losses have strained
the limits of available North Korean manpower and North Korean
forces are now capable of only limited offensive actions,
The Chinese Communists can replace their heavy casualties and
can continue large scale military operations in Korea if they
receive assistance from the Soviet Union in replacing equipment
losseso Unless, however, the Chinese Communists develop and
employ substantial numbers of heavily equipped troops with strong
air support, they not only will, continue to be unsuccessful. in
attempts to defeat UN foroes,but mmV well eventually be driven
from North Korean
I.s Communist Air Forces in the Korean-Manchurian area have
been steadily expanded, and combat effectiveness has been greatly
increased by the addition of over 1400 jet aircraft supplied by
the USSRO With .a total of approximately 1,000 aircraft avail-
able, the Chinese Cormrauaists now possess a far greater air capa,-
bility than they had last November and many, within a few months,
be capable of contesting UN air superiority in North Korean
There are fairly reliable indications that some tanks and heavy
equipment are being supplied and that some training in their use
is going on in.Manchuriao There is also a possibility that the
-3?
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USSR has agreed to train and equip at least 30 Chinese Comm
muniat divisions. It is doubtful if they will soon have
available sufficient Chinese troops in Manchuria trained and
equipped with heavy weapons to offset the present heavy ad-
vantage of UN forces in firepower, Even should the essential
heavy equipment be available in Manchuria,, however, Communist
logistic difficulties would continue to prevent the movement
of the necessary amounts of material and manpower to the Korean
front to permit Communist forces to sustain large-scale offen-
sives unless the Communists have been able to achieve air
superiority,
5, There is some evidence of limited Soviet participation
in the Korean war, beyond the known provision of aircraft, radar,
antiaircraft equipment and technical personnel, Soviet pilots
may have flown jet aircraft in combat and fairy reliable re-
ports state that Soviet crews are maiming antiaircraft equipment
in North Korea, There are also unconfirmed reports of Soviet
combat troops in rnarq locations throughout Manchuria, including
towns near the Korean border,, but the available evidence does
not give clear indication of a significant increase of Soviet
participation in the near future,
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6o Recent POW reports indicate growing friction between
Chinese and North Koreans and a bad possibly critical - food
situation in North Korea, The reports also indicate that
Communist morale in Korea has been good except among troops
exposed to several days of combat under very severe conclttionso
POS,STBLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN PHDPOSING CEASE-FIRE
To On the basis of present evidence,. it is impossible to
determine the Kremlin's objectives in proposing a ceasefire
in Korea or to predict with any assuranoe what course of action
the Cominista are likely to pursue. It is possible that the
Kremlin's plans remain flexible, The Communists may intend to
begin cease-fire discussions to discover how much freedom of
action they could retain under ceasefire terms, or they mar in-
tend to conclude a cease-fire agreement and then enter into a
discussion of military, territorial, and political issues chile
simultaneous3y building up Communist military strength in North
Korea or in Manchuria, The Communists could in this way avoid
a final commitment to any particular course of action until they
have had an opportunity to study the political and military reac-
tions of the West to the situation as it developed
so 5o
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8. Discussion of Cease-Fire without a Firm Intention
of Bringing Negotiations to a Conclusion. The Kremlin may
have made its ceasefire proposal with no firm intention of
carrying through the negotiations to the conclusion of a
cease-fire.
ao AMment for this course of action:
(i) The Politburo may have reasoned that the
more announcement of a Soviet "desire" to
bring about a ceasefire would be a potent
propaganda weapon in the Soviet "pease"
campaign, and that a subsequent accusation,
however, f andulent, that the UN refused
"to cooperate in a peaceful settlement"
could be exploited in further support of
that campaign.
(ii) The Kremlin may also have estimated that
the mere suggestion of a cease-fire would
bring to the fore divergent views on the
conditions for a Korean settlements with
divisive effects within and among the UN
countries (a great divergence of views is
already evident between the Republic of
Korea and its UN allies) o
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(iii.) In view of the considerable Commardst
build-up in the Far East, the KrerWn
msy intend to engineer a breakdown of
armistice discussions in order to
"Justify" increased Soviet support to
the Chinese Communists and North Koreans
and possibly the commitment of Soviet
forces in combat,
bQ Argument against this course of actions
(i)
Although the Kremlin will undoubtedly
press vigorously the propaganda advano
tages of its proposal and will be quick
to exploit any division which might
appear among the UN allies,, these ad-
vantages would be merely temporary if
the Communists in fact broke off the
discussions.
Similar3,y, if the Communists took the
initiative in breaking off the discussions,
they would gain little in their efforts
to exploit the Soviet cease-fire proposal
to "justify" a subsequent increase in Soviet
support of the Chinese Communists and
North Koreans,
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ca Probability of this course of actions
The initiation of cease.-fire negotiations
without the intent to complete such negotia.
tions would offer temporary advantages in.
sufficient in themselves to justify this
course of action, Furthermore, we do not
believe that the Soviet Union desires to run
the risk of war inherent in the Soviet pro-
vision of essential air support and heavy
weapons* For these reasons we believe it un..
likely that the Communists will undertake this
course of action0
9a Conclusion of a Cease-Fire of Limited Duration with
Intent to Resume Hostilities. The Soviet ceasefire proposal
may have been intended to result in the conclusion of a cease-
fire and armistice of limited duration,
a. Armor this course of ac %
(I) if a cease-fire were concluded, the prom
paganda and political advantages cited
in paragraph 8 a above would be greater
increased,
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(ii) This respite would give the Communi3ta
time in which they might improve their
logistic and tactical situation both
within Korea itself and in areas beyond
the cognizance of UN inspection teams
(e.g., Manchuria).
(iii) A cease-fire could serve to interrupt
successful UN military action in Ko:tea
at a point where important Con tnist
military positions are about to be over-
run, and during a season of the year par-
ticularly favorable to the use of
mechanized ground equipment and naval and
air power,
bo ,Ar vment against this course of actions
(i) In view of the inspection arrangements
that would almost certainly be included
in a cease-fire agreement, the Con vista
will have difficulty in building up, with-
out detection sufficient military strength
in North Korea to change the military
balance of power materially.
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(ii) The resumption of hostilities after an
armistice would compound the risks of
war with the US which we have estin?nted
the USSR wishes to avoid at -this time
ce Probability-of this course of a tisaaas
In view of the fact that this course provides
only temporal and limited advantages and in.
creases the risk of general war,, we do not
believe the Soviet Union would pursue this
course of action,
10? Conclusion and Indefinite Prolongation of an Armistice
without a Firm Intent to Reach a Final. Settlement of the Korean
Cow. A possible Communist course of action would be to
meet the UN demands for an a stiee, but to prolong the a s?
tics indefinitely by conducting protracted negotiations for a
final military$ territorial., and political settlement of the
Korean conflict without a firm intention of making Important
concessions which would permit such a settlement,
ao Argz zsent for such a course of action:
(1) A prolonged armistice would,, in effect s
restore the statue quo ante shun in
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Korea, In the light of the heavy
coat of the Korean war thuI3 far, the
Conanunists might well feel that ~dt
facto control over the area north of
the 38th Parallel represenbed the most
favorable terms on which the Korean
war could be brought to a eslrseo
Xii) It would enable the Chinese Co1ramanists
to maintain their original poli.tioal
demands (a seat in the CAT, control over
Formosa, etco) and so avoid the conse-
quent loss of face which aich a retreat
would entaie
(iii) It would tie up substantial UN forces
in Korea for an indefinite period-
(iv) It might subject UN troops in the field
to a debilitating and demur lasing Period
of inaction WA create official 3nd PoPU-
lar pressures on the Part of the UN
belligerents to withdraw their forces from
Korea,
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(v) It might slow down the rate of mobiliz
tion and rearmament of the free world,
It would give the Communists time to
increase the combat effectiveness of
forces in training, including such elite
forces as may be training with modern
Soviet weapons in Manchuriae
(vii) It would provide the Chinese Cormnnists
with an extended respite which they could
use to further consolidate their control
within China.
(viii) It would give the Peiping regime time to
strengthen its east coast defenses against
possible Nationalist assaults, and/or per-
mit Peiping to build up strength in South
China for possible action against Southeast
Asia or Hong Kong and in East China for
a possible invasion of Taiwan.
It might also provide the USSR with greater
freedom of action to exert pressure on
vulnerable areas elsewhere.
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be Ar ent Maimt thin' course of action:
U)
The abandonment of the Commmist objec?
tine. of driving UN forces from Korea
might have an adverse effect on the morale
of Conmexniet forces in Korea and might
also aggravate existing frictions be..
twoen the Chinese and the North Koreans,
(ii) It might bring to the fore problems of
control over North Korea and possibly Man.
churia and might eventual7,y strain Sim.
Soviet relations c,
(iii) An indefinite abandonment of maxF.antim
Communist objectives in Korea would in-
volve severe lose of Commtanist prestige.
(iv) It wouldvindicate Western policy of re-
sisting aggression,
cc Probability of this course of action:
We believe this course of action is the one
that the Communists are most likely to follow,
By agreeing to an armistice and prolonging in,.
definitely the discussions of a final settlement,
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the Communists might well obtain for an rode-
finite period effective control of North Korea
without making political, military, and terri-
torial..concessions and without the loss of as
much international prestige as would be in-
volved in, a final settlement.
110 Conclusion of
Armistice with a Firm Intention of
Concluding a Settlement in Korea. A fourth possible course of
action for the Communists would be to agree to UN armiatioe
terms as a first step toward the achievement of a final miliQ
tart', territorial, and political settlement of the Korean
conflict,
ao nt for this course of actions
(i)
A final settlement of the Korean con?
flict would permit the Communists to
close out what they maar consider a costly
and unrewarding incident* It is con-
ceivable that both the USSR and Communist
China are so anxious to avoid global war
at this time that they would be willing
to accept a serious local setback in order
to preserve and build up their strengtho
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(ii) It would permit the Chinese Comnwiste
to proceed with the consolidation of
China, to strengthen and redeploy their
forces for possible military operations
such as Southeast Asia or Taivano
(iii) It would result in the withdrawal of
UN forces from Korea and would remove
what the Conmrnuniasts have declared a
threat to the security of Manchuria
and the Soviet Union4
(iv) The withdrawal of UN troops that would
follow final, settleinent of the Korean
conflict would permit the Chinese
Communists to pursue by political and
subversive means in Korea what they
failed to achieve by military methods,
(v)
The USSR might estimate that final settle.
ment of the Korean war would slow the
rate of Western rearmament and niobiliaa.
tion by removing the sense of urgency
which the hostilities in Korea have
created,
CM
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bo Ar ent t this course of actions
(i) The UN terms for a. final settlement
in Korea will probably include pro-
visions for eventual unification of
Korea under a popularly elected govern-
menta The Communists would probably re-
gad such a solution as contrary to their
interests in this area0
For the foreseeable future, it is pro-
bable that in a reunited Korea, the non-
Communist elements would be able to
outweigh the influence of the reduced
and greatly disorganized Korean Comammztst
elementsp barring strong rapport from
the Chinese Communists or the USSR mhich
would presumably be precluded by the terms
of the final settlement.
(iii) A final settlement in Korea on UN terms
would be a tremendous propaganda victory
for the West and would destroy the myth
that Communism is an irresistible forced
This would entail a loss in the prestige
of both Communist China and the USSR
throughout the world and particularly in
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co F " r o b a b i l i of this c o u r s e of a c - L i o n :
Unless the USSR and Con unist China are so
tous to liquidate the Koren conflict that
they would do so at. :ea st aray price., it is
almost certain that they will not adopt this
course of action0 We believe that the USSR
and Comanist China are not under sufficient
coiulsion to liquidate the Korean cox .-ct to
mace a final sett1cuir_ent on UN ter o
120 In View of the foregoing ma .yeis' we believe that
the Commnists have probably decided to forego their m; tnrinn
objective in Korea (the expulsion of UN forces). The ]creml.in
will, undoubtedly, attempt to gain maxinws political and pay-
ehologic . advantage from a Cormmnist4.nitiated ar 1at7.,.e In
Korea., and will attempt to minlmlze the loss off:` prestige in-
volved in their abandonment of their maxinum objective in IoreL,
We believe the most probable objective of the Kremlin is to con-
clude an indefinitely prolonged adstace which would'. in effect,
result in a reign to the status quo ante bellma if, in the
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cease-fire and armistice discussions, the Communists decide
that they cannot obtain an armistice which would, in effect,,
result in a return to the status quo ante bellum, we believe
they would protract the negotiations long enough to build up
their capabilities for the resumption of hostilities,, possibly
with increased Soviet support.
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