THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961 (REFERENCE TITLE: (Sanitized))

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 124
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1961
• Content Type: STUDY

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA [ P ;9SO0427A00060011Q06'1!1
28 November 1961
OCI No. 5539/61
Copy No.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961
(Reference Title: 25X1A
Office of Current Intelligence
AMCHIVAL RECORD
SECRET RETURN TO AGENCY ARCHIVES
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A00060_014ao1 'X
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
SECRET
25X1A
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961
25X1A
This is a working paper, our first assessment of the
Chinese Communist leadership since We have thought
it useful to make this assessment in the context (a) of the
development of the Sino-Soviet dispute and (b) of the erratic
course of Chinese domestic policy in the period 1958-1961--
particularly because, in our view, a further deterioration
in the Sino-Soviet relationship and in the regime's economic
position may well force a crisis in the Chinese leadership,
In preparing this paper we have had profitable talks
with, and useful comments from, several other analysts, in
25X1A particular
of the China Division of the Sino-Soviet Bloc Area of OCI,
of the Far Eastern Branch
of Analysis Division of ORR, and of the Cur- 25X1A
rent Support Staff of ORR. We alone, however, are responsible
for the conclusions, which are controversial.
The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome further com-
ment on this paper, addressed in this instance to the coordina-
tor of the group, at Ext. 7447.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A oved For Release"GI k-RDP79W0427A000600110001-1
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961
SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS ................................... i
Introductory Note ............... ".......................... 1
Offensives, 1957-1958 ..................................... 1
Retreats, 1958-1959 ....................................... 6
The Purge, Autumn 1959 .................................... 14
New Offensives, Early 1960 ................................ 23
The Hard Summer, 1960 .....................................31
Intransigence and Retreat, Autumn 1960 .................... 41
The Moscow Conference and After, Winter 1960-61........... 48
The Sag Backward, Early 1961 .............................. 55
The Quiet Spring, 1961 .................................... 61
The 40th Anniversary, July 1961 ........................... 71
Continued Caution, July-October 1961 ...................... 77
Recapitulation, 1958-1961 ................................. 89
Sanitized - Approved For Release: T-CIA -RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
SECRET
VW I"#
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, 1958-1961
Summary and Conclusions
In the agitated developments in Communist China in the
years 1958-1961, there have been certain abiding features in
the relationship between Mao Tse-tung and various groups of
his lieutenants and in the relationships of those groups with
one another. The most important of these groups--not yet
cabals, possibly not even cliques--have been, and remain: the
party-machine figures around Liu Shao-chi, which include at
the politburo level Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Ko Ching-shih,
Li Ching-chuan, and Tan Chen-lin; the administrator-economist
figures around Chou En-lai, which include at the politburo
level Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, and Po
I-po; and (potentially) the military group once clustered
around Peng Te-huai, which at this time has less stature as
a group, but individual leaders of which would be important
in any struggle for power.
Throughout the period, "Mao's thought" has been the world-
view from which all Chinese policies have been allegedly de-
rived, the dogma from which there has been no appeal. Mao
has been given credit for formulating the main propositions
in the dispute with the Soviet party and for designing the
most important of the Chinese domestic programs, and these
have been presented as surpassingly brilliant in conception.
When circumstances have forced a retreat in either area (the
retreats in the domestic programs have been far greater), it
has been said that Mao's thought had not been fully understood,
or that Mao's policies had not been properly executed, or that
"objective circumstances" (e.g., weather) had been overwhelm-
ingly unfavorable. In such periods of retreat, Mao has always
been given the credit for initiating the desirable changes,
for having inspected the work of his subordinates and corrected
their errors. In periods and areas of militant advance (the
course to which Mao is predisposed) Mao has been emphatically
A
'fi d 'th 4. 11
4 d 1
id t
1'
t
h
t
t
i
J
an propos
S
i
i
W W a m
ions an VV es, w
en ereas
c
in periods and areas of retreat Mao has usually chosen not to
emphasize his personal association with the retreat.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release: CIA-RDP74600427A000600110001-1
Throughout the period, Mao has continued to give his favor
primarily to the party-machine leaders around Liu Shao-chi,
those whose predispositions are closest to his own. Although
in periods of retreat Mao has sometimes given slighter public
evidence of his favor for this group than in periods of ad-
vance, in all confrontations which could become a test of
strength, such as party meetings, Mao has made clear that they
remained his favorites, even when the policies associated with
them have been modified. Partly in the belief that this group
constitutes his most reliable base of support in the party,
and partly in preparation for this group (especially Liu) to
become his principal heirs, Mao has permitted this group to
strengthen its position in the structure of power, while he
has restricted the administrator-economist group and has broken
the military group.
It seems virtually certain that Mao in the years 1958-1961
has lost favor with some of his lieutenants. His prestige has
declined particularly in the eyes of some of the administrator-
economist figures and the military figures--not simply in the
obvious cases of those who have been discriminated against or
even purged, but with respect too to those who remain active
leaders in apparently good standing. He may have lost prestige
also with a few of the party-machine figures.
Although the pressure on Mao has been reduced by the ten-
dency of Chinese leaders to stand together as Chinese against
the Soviet party (a course which common prudence would also
dictate, since they and their families are at Mao's mercy),
at least some of Mao's lieutenants--especially among the ad-
ministrator-economist and military groups--have given indica-
tion of an understanding of the political, economic and mili-
tary consequences, both immediate and long-term, of the stand
against the Soviet party. These leaders could reasonably con-
clude, and some of them almost certainly have so concluded,
that Mao's basic position has been in error, or, even if his
position has been more right than wrong, that his aggressive
conduct of the dispute has been defective, in that it has en-
couraged the Soviet leaders to stand together against the
Chinese.
Mao has also lost stature, in the eyes of some of his
lieutenants--especially among the administrator-economist
and military leaders--for his radical domestic policies
Sanitized - Approved For RelggggijrIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap roved For F619HES : CIA-RDP7UO0427A000600110001-1
themselves, even considered apart from the role of these
policies in exacerbating the Sino-Soviet dispute. Some of
these leaders could hardly fail to conclude that Chinese eco-
nomic and military development, particularly the development
of agriculture, could have proceeded just as rapidly, with
a much more solid base for China's long-term development into
a modern industrial and military power, if Mao had not over-
turned the policies pursued prior to 1958.
Beyond this, even those leaders of the administrator-eco-
nomist and military groups who have remained in favor have had
good reason to resent Mao's preferment of the party-machine
leaders and Mao's discrimination against, and even purges of,
some of their own long-time comrades, including some whose
only offense has been that of being right when Mao and the
party-machine figures were wrong.
Mao has almost certainly remained, however, in the high
favor of most of the leaders of the most important group of
his lieutenants, the party-machine figures--the most important,
because Mao probably cannot do without their support. The
party-machine figures, who have shared the responsibility for
Mao's policies considerably more than have the leaders of
other groups, have naturally been disposed to exaggerate the
successes of such policies and to minimize the failures. They
have of course been gratified too that their mistakes have
not cost them Mao's favor--not only have they not suffered
for these mistakes, they have actually improved their positions
in the structure of power.
As of late 1961, then, the time seems to have come for
Mao when a significant, if indeterminable, number of his long-
time lieutenants would prefer to have another leader, as would
a substantial segment of the party as a whole. Moreover, the
Soviet party has made it clear that it would like to bring
Mao down, in favor of a more conservative and more responsive
leader like Chou En-lai. Mao does not seem disposed to step
aside at this time. If he has even given any thought to the
question of whether to resign as party chairman at the forth-
coming Ninth Congress, he seems to have concluded that, in this
time of sore troubles, he is indispensable.
Although Mao announced his intention to resign from his
post as chairman of the government at a time (December 1958)
of retreats in his domestic programs and in the assertions
Sanitized - Approved For F Ie#ff : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ajaproved For R I s T: CIA-RDP7 00427A000600110001-1
made for them, it seems very doubtful that he would be willing
to resign his really important posts--chairman of the party
politburo and central committee--in a comparable period. The
December 1958 announcement was widely interpreted--we believe
incorrectly--as a forced decision, a blow to Mao. Mao is
exceedingly vain, and he would not care to provide grounds for
derogatory speculation again. Mao's resignation from his
party chairmanship in a time of troubles would constitute good
presumptive evidence that he had indeed been pushed, and it
would probably soon be followed by his death, as Mao is not
a man who can be safely left to brood.
If Mao steps aside voluntarily, it is likely to be in the
early stages of a militant advance which he has initiated and
for which he can claim the credit--an advance which would
have to include a rapid advance in Chinese economic develop-
ment, particularly an improvement in agriculture, in order to
be meaningful. The earliest such period in prospect, accord-
ing to the Chinese party's own forecasts, is in 1963, and Mao
may now intend to step aside at that time. However, it is
doubtful that there can be another rapid advance unless and
until the USSR restores something like the program of aid to
China (including large credits) that existed before mid-1960,
and it is equally doubtful that Moscow intends to do this
until Mao has either backed down or is no longer the leader,
so conditions may not be any more favorable for his voluntary
resignation in 1963 than they are now. If the Chinese leader-
ship could content itself with becoming a first-class Asian
power in this decade, Mao might not be under significant pres-
sure to abdicate. However, all groups of Chinese leaders
appear dedicated to the goal of making China a modern military
and industrial power, capable of contesting the U.S. position
in the Pacific. With Mao's intransigence seen as standing in
the way of this goal, there seems to be, for the first time
since 1935, a possibility worth mentioning of Mao's involuntary
removal from leadership. This possibility will be discussed
presently.
Throughout the years 1958-1961, the party-machine leaders
around Liu have taken care to associate themselves as closely
as possible with Mao's positions, and Liu himself has been
given credit for helping to formulate some of them. These
leaders have been most prominent during the party's offensives,
with respect both to the Sino-Soviet dispute (they have been
the principal Chinese representatives since mid-1960 in
Sanitized - Approved For Re ~ CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For F e1ease : CIA-RDP74900427A000600110001-1
confrontations with the Soviet party*) and to Chinese domestic
programs. In periods of retreat, the party-machine figures
have been less conspicuous, although they have recently been
putting themselves forward as favoring for the time being con-
servative policies in economic development. Just as Mao can
never be wrong, so these leaders most firmly identified with
his policies have been able to contend that they too have been
right all along. Although they have sometimes been criticized
indirectly, no fundamental criticism of their policies has
been permitted, and they themselves have been able to shift
their positions with Mao to pre-empt any attack.
Throughout the period, Liu Shao-chi has been given addi-
tional tokens of Mao's preference for him as his successor:
e.g., Liu gave the principal address at the party congress in
1959, led the Chinese delegation to the Moscow conference of
the parties in autumn 1930, and gave the party's 40th anni-
versary address in July 1961. Moreover, in each of the three
main developments affecting the structure of power in this
period--the changes in the composition of the politburo and
secretariat in spring 1958, the purge of the regime in autumn
1959, and the re-establishment of the great regional bureaus
in or about autumn 1960--the party-machine leaders strengthened
their positions, getting into an increasingly solid position
for a showdown in the event that Mao's arrangements for the
succession are not respected.
Just as it seems clear that Mao has lost prestige with
other groups of leaders if not with the party-machine leaders
in recent years, so it seems clear that at least some of the
party-machine figures--including the most important ones, Liu,
Tong, and Peng Chen--have fallen into disfavor with at least
some of the leaders of other groups, for much the same reasons.
The situation is not black-and-white. Some of the party-
machine figures have shown some concern with Mao's intransigence
in the Sino-Soviet dispute and have shown some sensitivity
to problems of economic development, while some of the admin-
istrator-economists, particularly those given jobs in the
*The administrator-economist leader Chou En-lai headed the
Chinese delegation to the Soviet 22nd party congress, the most
recent confrontation. However, Liu, Teng, and Peng Chen have
played much larger roles in the past 18 months; and Chou's
delegation, apart from himself, was composed entirely of party-
machine figures. The Russians were invited to conclude, from
Chou's assignment, that they could expect nothing even from
their favorites.
Sanitized - Approved For RgP g : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rem WTCIA-RDP700427A000600110001-1
party machine and assigned important roles in the conduct of
the Sino-Soviet dispute, have been closely associated with
radical policies during periods of "leap" and have stood firm
with Mao against Moscow, so that in some periods it has been
hard to find a significant difference, on the record, between
right-wing party-machine figures like Ko Ching-shih and Tao
Chu and left-wing administrator-economists like Li Fu-chun or
Po I-po. Nevertheless, in addition to the obvious differences
between left-wing party-machine figures like Teng Hsiao-ping
and Tan Chen-lin and right-wing administrator-economists like
Chen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui, there have been and remain signi-
ficant differences between the party-machine figures, averaged
out, and the administrator-economists, averaged out.
In addition to losing favor with at least some of the
other leaders for their conduct of the Sino-Soviet dispute
and their obstructive intervention in economic development,
Liu, Teng, Peng Chen and other party-machine figures, as the
beneficiaries of Mao's favor in the various ways noted above,
have unquestionably provoked the resentment of some of the
leaders of other groups. They have also given the Soviet
party almost as much cause as has Mao to wish to see them
brought down. The fortunes of Mao and the party-machine lead-
ers thus seem intertwined. They appear to need each other,
because they have the same opponents, both domestic and
foreign, and each has assets important to the other. More-
over, without the continuing support of Mao, the party-machine
leaders may not become his heirs; and if other leaders become
his heirs, Mao can have no confidence (he can never have as-
surance) that his policies will prevail after he has relinquish-
ed the instruments of power.
Throughout the years 1958-1961, most of the administrator-
economist figures around Chou En-lai have been associated with
the policies of the dominant leaders (Mao and the party-machine
figures) closely enough to remain in active roles, but indivi-
dual members of the administrator-economist group have shown
various degrees of reservations about them. These leaders
have been most prominent in periods of retreat (much more mark-
ed in domestic policies), but even in these periods they have
not been permitted to contend that they were right or to make
direct criticism of the dominant figures, they have been obliged
to explain conservative policies in a context of defending
the radical policies for which others were primarily responsible,
and they have had to acquiesce in distortions of the record
Sanitized - Approved For Relea RA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App'Ved For ReleaEgTCIA-RDP79SQP427A000600110001-1
which could later be used (if necessary) against them. Calculat-
ingTthe balance of power and reading correctly the signs of
Mao's favor for the party-machine figure, they have apparently
been equally circumspect in party meetings and have avoided
a test of strength. In the various changes in the structure
of power in the past three years, they have not gained in
strength nearly as much as has the party-machine group, and
a number of second-level administrator-economists have been
purged.
In the light of the course of Chinese economic development,
most of the administrator-economist figures should have gained
in favor with Mao and the party-machine leaders in this period.
However, even if the dominant figures were fair-minded, most
of the administrator-economists, through their increased as-
sociation with "leap forward" policies from autumn 1959 to late
1960, have reduced the amount of credit they would otherwise
be entitled to. In any case, the dominant leaders do not ap-
pear to be fair-minded, do not seem disposed to concede even
privately, let alone publicly, that others have been more
nearly right than they have. As suggested above, the adminis-
trator-economist figures have seemed to be conscious of this,
have seemed to be careful not to give offense to the dominant
leaders by pointing out that they (the administrator-economists)
had been more nearly right.
As of late 1961, most of the administrator-economist lead-
ers seem to be in the limited favor of Mao and the party-
machine leaders. They seem to be in much better favor with the
Soviet party than are Sao and the party-machine group, but
they presumably recognize that Soviet favor for them, at
? least at this time, is positively dangerous to them. It seems
in their interest to try to continue to be regarded by the
dominant figures as useful technicians, to try indeed to
conciliate and please the dominant figures, until circumstances
are more favorable (if they ever are) for a showdown.
In the years 1958-1961, the military leaders have not had
a stable relationship with Mao and with the other groups of
leaders. Some of the military leaders, feeling strong enough
in 1958-1959 to contest the propositions and policies of the
dominant non-military leaders, and then desperate enough to
carry their case (through Peng Te-huai) to the Soviet party,
were the main objects of the purge of autumn 1959. Since then,
the military establishment has been subordinated to generals
responsive far more to Mao than to their military comrades.
Sanitized - Approved For FWJ 8 w. : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseRFEIA-RDP79SA427A000600110001-1
Since 1959, only Lin Piao of the professional military
leaders (as distinct from political officers, who are part
of the party-machine) has played an important public role.
In this role, he has defended the subordination of the military
to the party, applauded Mao's propositions on world Communist
strategy and proclaimed the loyalty of the military to the
party and to Mao personally. The pronouncements of Liu and
other military figures have shown an awareness that the non-
military leaders regard control of the military as the most
important part of the internal security effort.
As noted above, Mao's presumed loss of favor with some
of his important lieutenants has derived from his stand against
the Soviet party, his radical domestic programs, and his pre-
ferment of the party-machine leaders. Of these issues, the
Sino-Soviet dispute, in the context of Chinese economic mis-
fortunes, seems to have the greatest potential for causing
a crisis in the Chinese party in the near future.
There is evidence that the Kremlin has already selected
a 'Soviet team' in China--centering on Chou En-lai, with Chen
Yun as the principal economic planner and the purged Peng Te-
huai (or a more prudent associate with similar views, possibly
Su Yu) as the principal military figure. But Moscow cannot
field its team so long as Mao and the party-machine leaders
dominate the party.
In addition to continuing to withhold substantial economic
aid to China, it is open to Moscow to expel or to threaten to
expel the Peiping regime from the bloc. This could be done
by declaring publicly that the USSR will no longer honor the
wino-Soviet treaty, or by warning privately that this action
is contemplated; the latter would seem preferable, in order
not to encourage the Chinese Nationalists. If the Soviet
party chooses not to push the dispute to this point, and on
the assumption that the anticipated food crisis in China
does not become the kind of disaster which would result in
anarchy, Mao can probably continue as the Chinese party leader
without serious challenge--i.e., without finding it necessary
to purge more than an isolated leader or two, as he did Peng
Te-huai. However, if the Soviet party wishes to put maximum
pressure on Mao at a time of maximum Chinese weakness, an at-
tractive course would seem to be to threaten to withdraw from
the treaty, timing this action to immediately precede or to
coincide with the anticipated food crisis in spring 1962. The
Sanitized - Approved For R CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App1rerved For Releasg9 IA-RDP79S,QA-427A000600110001-1
Soviet calculation would presumably be--still assuming a crisis
short of a disaster--that Mao would not give in but that others
would wish to, thus forcing a test of strength between the Mao-
led intransigents and those who vto uld see no hope either for
China's development or China's defense without the alliance.
It is not inconceivable that, in such an event, the party-
machine leaders would turn against Mao, but tiis possibility
seems small, in view of their identification in everyone's eyes
(Chinese or Russian) with Mao's positions. The probability
is that Mao and most of the party-machine leaders would stand
together in a showdown, and that they would win.
It does not seem likely that the issue of whether to have
a new leadership with a new policy would be genuinely debated
among the 18 voting members of the politburo, because the
challengers could not afford to lose, and, even if they could
win a vote, they could not expect Mao and the party-machine
leaders to accept peaceably their dislodgement.
If this issue did indeed come to a vote, it is probable
that the challengers would lose right there. On the assump-
tion--an unrealistic one--that everyone would vote according
to his conscience and with confidence that the results would
be accepted, Mao and the party-machine leaders even in those
circumstances could probably count on at least ten votes:
Mao, the party-machine leaders Liu, Teng, and Peng Chen, Mao's
old military comrade Chu Te, the military leader Lin Piao,
Lin's oldtime political officer Lo Jung-huan, and the lesser
party-machine figures Tan Chen-lin, Ko Ching-shih and Li Ching-
chuan. If one of the less loyal or less radical figures, say
Ko, were to join the opposition, Mao would still have a stand-
off, but rather than a shift in that direction, it seems more
likely instead that Mao and the others named above would be
joined by some of the administrator-economist figures--perhaps
by the party elder Tung Pi-wu and by those who have worked
most closely with the party machine, Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-
nien. The opposition might consist, for example, only of
Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, and the disappointed onetime
field army commanders Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung.
Still on the unrealistic assumption that the Chinese party
would adhere to parliamentary procedure, if a stand-off in the
politburo were submitted to a plenary session of the central
committee (as Khrushchev has maintained was the case in his
Sanitized - Approved For R ~ R~ : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - proved For ReJease : CIA-RDP7'6500427A000600110001-1
" in June 1957) it is again
clash with the "antiparty group machine group would win. Of
probable that Mao and the party- members
the 93 (at most; perhaps no more than 85) full (voting)
the party's dominant leaders could
of the central committee, so that
probably count on about 45 votes from the start,
virtually all the other members would have to combine from the
start to make a stand. As that the caswe of ould tbe aorapidr it
lad transfer
t mrik o' orters, with only a few too proud
to eo th the ra e ankss of fMaprush.
or too obtuse to join the
In any case, it is not credible that Mao and the party-
machine leaders could be dislodged by means simply of a vote
in the politburo or cenrl to co rushchevwbytther"athe case nti-partyay
have been in the challenge arty the challengers
group" in June 1957, in the Chinese party confidence that
almost certainly would not act until they
they could bring greater military force to bear than could the
f develop-
challenged. In this connection, certain
Stalin'sedeath in 1953 are
ments in Moscow immediately after
relevant: namely, that Beriya surrounded the Kremlin with
secret police troops, and these in turn were surrounded and
regular army forces.
neutralized by
It would be hard for any group of challengers--to Mao
and the party-machine leaders--to have confidence that they
could command greater resources in armed force. pTheoforces
es would following
which could be brought
binationon o of the Jui-thing (Lin's
figures: Lin Piao (minister of de) Lo security forces) , Li
Ya-
chief-of-staff, and commander of public
lou (believed still chief of the secret police), Liu ur
lou (commander of the air force), Hsu Kuang-ta (c of
armored forces), and Yang Yung (the last-identified com-
mander of the Peiping regional headquarters and of thasPeiping
garrison command). The first two named are re9
to Mao Teng
own men and the third isbsn~e~Liu)eofothevremainingand three is
Hsiao-ping jointly, while associated for
assignment) was to and continuation in
many with Lin Piao Yag'sanother
many years with Teng; reflects Teng"s assess-
ment sensitive Peiping posts presumably
ment of him as reliable. In sum, not only would the challengers
u sufficient armed support from these
have a hard time lining p even once, their overtures
sources, but, if they guessed wrong
would be reported and their group would be wiped out.
Sanitized - Approved For Releases F-TRDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For F AR : CIA-RDP7&S00427A000600110001-1
It was noted earlier, however, that there was a possi-
bility worth mentioning of Mao's involuntary removal. For
one thing, the width and depth of resentment of Mao is believed
to be such that there is a continuing possibility of his
assassination. In Mao's ramblings about China, he must some-
times be an easy target, and an assassination might be managed
by a person acting either on his own or in collusion with some
of Mao's lieutenants. Mao might also be killed by a small
group at a meeting in Peiping, with the death explained as
due to cerebral hemorrhage or whatever.
Moreover, the above calculations on the structure of
power--on the responsiveness of individuals and components
to Mao and the party-machine leaders--represent simply proba-
bilities, and a mistake or a change in any part of these
calculations might lead to a very different conclusion. For
example, if the party-machine leaders as a group were to turn
against Mao, in combination with some of the administrator-
economist and military leaders they could probably bring him
down. If Teng Hsiao-ping alone, of this group, were to turn
against Mao and other party-machine leaders, in combination
with other groups he might be able to bring down both Mao and
the other party-machine leaders, as he has apparently built
himself a position in the structure of power inferior only
to Mao's (he does not appear to have Mao's resources in armed
force). Also, Peng Te-huai had the same public record of whole-
hearted allegiance to Mao that Lin Piao has had, but Peng
nevertheless turned against Mao, and it is not impossible that
Lin will do so; should Lin do so, he might, despite the ill-
ness that reduces his ability to lead a military group, be able
to put decisive force at the disposal of the challengers. The
Peiping headquarters and garrison commander, Yang Yung, who is
not known to be close to Mao, and secret police chief Li Ko-
nung, who has been reported by some sources as close to Chou
En-lai, are both well-placed for swift action in support of
a coup. Moreover, there have been renewed indications in re-
cent months that the party leaders are not yet satisfied with
their degree of control of the military.
The possibility of dislodgement that exists for Mao exists
also for the party-machine leaders, if Mao were to try to pre-
serve his own position by sacrificing them to a strong coali-
tion of administrator-economist and military challengers. But
Mao himself would probably not long survive the fall of the
Sanitized - Approved For R&': CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Re? CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
party-machine leaders. Moreover, if not caught unprepared
and confronted by massive armed force, the party-machine
leaders could make a fight for it, and might win. They have
important sources of both intelligence and fast-moving (if
small-scale) armed force: Teng Hsiao-ping is the probable
supervisor of the secret police, which among other things
guards party leaders and directs counter-intelligence in the
armed forces, and Teng has some of his own men in that body;
as secretary-general Teng oversees the political department,
and has some of his own men there too; the minister of public
security and the political officer of the Peiping headquarters
are both Teng's proteges; and Peng Chen is the party secretary
in Peiping.
The party's Ninth Congress, supposed to convene in 1961,
will probably not be held on schedule, and might even be post-
poned until the party has a lot more to celebrate than it does
now. On the assumption, however, that the congress is to be
held sometime in the next six months, Mao and the party-machine
leaders may be devising right now the changes in the central
party organs, to be 'voted' at and immediately after the con-
gress, which will preserve them in their dominant positions.
The role of party leaders in making the principal reports
to the congress should again illustrate (deliberately so) the
relative standing of individual leaders and the various groups.
Some conclusions might be drawn too from the degree to which
the congress is an open affair; the September 1956 session was
open, the May 1958 session largely closed.
As at both sessions of the Eighth Congress, Mao will prob-
ably make some rather brief but important opening remarks and
Liu Shao-chi will then give the principal report, which will
cover the full range of the party's affairs, outlining the
situation, describing the party's general line, and defining
the party's tasks. Teng Hsiao-ping seems likely to make the
report second in importance, a more detailed discussion (than
in Liu's report) of the Chinese party's position in the world
Communist movement (in particular, Sino-Soviet relations) and
perhaps also of the Chinese party's state of health. It seems
likely that the third of the principal reports, a more detailed
discussion (than in Liu's or Teng's reports) of economic ac-
complishments and plans, will be given by one of the administra-
tor-economist figures, probably Chou En-lai or Li Fu-chun.
Sanitized - Approved For Rei~~TCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A oved For R ARV CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
At the May 1958 session all three of the main reports were
given by party-machine figures, but this time, in a period of
depression, it is doubtful that any of them would care to
make the economic report. After many more lesser speeches by
lesser figures (perhaps more than 100), the format calls for
the congress on its last day to publish the namelist of the
new central committee, which in the following day or two holds
its first plenum to elect the officers of the central committee
and (concurrently) politburo and the members of the politburo,
secretariat, and control commission.
As noted earlier, Mao apparently intends to remain chair-
man of the central committee, in which post he is automatically
chairman of the politburo and senior member of the politburo's
now small standing committee (the inner circle of the inner
circle). If instead he becomes honorary chairman (an action
we would regard as involuntary at this time), Liu Shao-chi
would probably become the chairman; the dark horse is Teng
Hsiao-ping.
The five vice-chairmen of the central committee, con-
currently members of the standing committee, Liu Shao-chi,
Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Chen Yun, and Lin Piao, will probably
retain these posts; there is a chance, however, that Chen Yun
will be dropped from these posts for rightist sentiment while
keeping his membership in the politburo. The party-machine
leaders might add Peng Chen to the officers of the central com-
mittee and hence to the standing committee, while the adminis-
trator-economists would probably like to add Chen Yi or Li Fu-
chun, the latter being more acceptable to the party-machine
group; the addition of either Peng or Li would put a second
person in the position now occupied by Teng Hsiao-ping alone,
i.e. being a member concurrently of the politburo, standing
committee, and secretariat. Teng will probably remain the
secretary-general, hence a member of the standing committee
and senior member of the secretariat.
The other eight full (voting) members of the politburo
--in addition to the seven officers named above, plus Peng
Chen, Chen Yi, and Li Fu-chun--will probably be retained.
These are the party-machine figures Ko Ching-shih, Li Ching-
chuan, and Tan Chen-lin (although there is an outside chance
that the extremist Tan will be dropped as a sop to other lead-
ers); party elder Tung Pi-wu and the administrator-economist
Li Hsien-nien; the inactive military figures Ho Lung and Liu Po-cheng
Sanitized - Approved For R 9 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appre'ed For RetVf
NTCIA-RDP795Q,427A000600110001-1
(although there is an outside chance that Liu will be dropped);
and the inactive political officer Lo Jung-huan. Any or all
of the alternate (non-voting) members of the politburo--the
party-machine figures Kang Sheng and Ulanfu, the administrator-
economist figures Po I-po and Chang Wen-tien, and the propagand-
ists Lu Ting-i and Chen Po-ta--might be elevated to full member-
ship, except for Chang Wen-tien, who may be dropped for right-
ist activity.
A few party leaders will probably be added to the polit-
buro, as either full or alternate members. At least two party-
machine figures, including one or more of the following four,
will probably be selected: Tao Chu (Southwest Bureau), Sung
Jen-chiung (Northeast Bureau), Liu Lan-tao (secretariat, and
possibly North China Bureau) and Hsieh Fu-chih (minister of
public security). (It should be noted that Liu Lan-tao has
been out of the news for a year; although we think it likely
that he has been occupied with an unpublicized task, another
observer may be right in surmising that Liu, who announced
and played a part in the purge of autumn 1959, has himself
been purged.) Other party-machine figures who may be con-
sidered, each of whom seems to have an outside chance of mak-
ing the politburo, are Liu Ning-i and Liu Chang-sheng (labor
leaders), Li Wei-han (united front), Wang Chia-hsiang, Li
Hsueh-feng and Yang Shang-kun (members of the secretariat),
Tan Cheng and Hsiao Hua (political department), and Lin Feng
(education coordinator).
One or more of the administrator-economist figures will
probably be added to the politburo. Those who seem to have
the best chance to be named appear to be Nieh Jung-chen (chair-
man of the scientific-technological commission) and, of all
people, Teng Tzu-hui (rural work department), whose appearance
(smiling broadly) with the leaders on National Day may mean
that he is again in good favor. Those with an outside chance,
if the leaders wish to bring a woman into the politburo for
the first time, include Tsai Chang and Teng Ying-chao, both
active in work among women, the wives respectively of Li Fu-chun
and Chou En-lai.
There are a few non-military leaders not regarded as aligned
with either the party-machine group or the administrator-econo-
mist group who seem to have an outside chance of selection for
the politburo. These include the party's oldest el.ders , Mao's
old teacher Hsu Te-li and old follower Wu Yu-chang, Liao
Cheng-chih (specialist in "peace" fronts), and Chao Frh-lu
(machine building).
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For F~ ffiff l : CIA-RDPM800427A000600110001-1
It seems probable that another active military figure,
Lo Jui-ching, chief-of-staff, will be added to the single
military leader, Lin Piao, now on the politburo. However,
as noted earlier, Li, like Lin, is responsive to Mao, not to
his military comrades. None of those eligible who would be
more nearly representative of most military leaders seems to
have more than an outside chance of being named: Hsu Hsiang-
chien (inactive), Hsiao Ching-kuang (navy), Liu Ya-lou (air
force), Hsu Kuang-ta (armored forces), Yeh Chien-ying (military
academy), and Wang Shu-sheng (a deputy minister of defense).
Party-machine figures already occupy eight of the 11
posts in the secretariat: Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary-general,
who directs the work of the secretariat and is believed to
supervise directly secret police work; Peng Chen, his senior
deputy, and the probable supervisor of the organization de-
partment; Tan Chen-lin, the link with party and government
organs concerned with rural work; Wang Chia-hsiang, concerned
with liaison with foreign Communist parties; Tan Cheng, the
link with political control of the military; Li Hsueh-feng,
organs concerned with industry and communications; Liu Lan-
tao, disciplinary and security bodies; and Yang Shang-kun,
central committee administration. The others are the adminis-
trator-economists Li Fu-chun, the link with organs concerned
with economic planning, and Li Hsien-nien, finance and trade;
and Mao's writer Hu Chiao-mu, indoctrination. Huang Ko-cheng,
the secretariat's link with the party's military committee
and the military (as opposed to political) affairs of the
military establishment, was dropped some time ago for his as-
sociation with Peng Te-huai in opposition to Mao's policies.
All of the above 11 (not including Huang) appear to be
in good favor, and almost all of them, except those given key
posts outside Peiping which would not permit them to take part
in the daily work of the secretariat, will probably keep their
posts, with some of the alternate members becoming full mem-
bers. It is possible, however, that the extremist Tan will
be replaced (conceivably by his rival, Teng Tzu-hui, more likely
by a party-machine figure like Liao Lu-yen or Chen Cheng-jen),
that the relatively inactive Tan Cheng will be replaced by a
similar but more energetic type like Hsiao Hua, that Wang Chia-
hsiang will be replaced by Wu Hsiu-chuan, his deputy in the
liaison department, and that Liu Lan-tao will be replaced by
Chang Ting-cheng or Wang Tsung-wu if Liu has been assigned to
one of the regional bureaus.
Sanitized - Approved For Re T CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Relea?fdRCItA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
NNW
Some secretaries,may be added to the secretariat, to act
as links with party and government organs in some other areas
of concern regarded as now meriting a full-time secretary.
It would seem necessary, for example, to replace Huang Ko-
cheng (this may already have been done) as the link with the
military, and each group of leaders would like to see one of
its own men in this important post. The party-machine lead-
ers will probably succeed in installing a primarily political
or security type like Lo Jung-huan or Lo Jui-thing, whereas
the administrator-economists would like to have a onetime
military leader close to themselves like Nieh Jung-then or
Yeh Chien-ying, and the active military leaders would prefer
someone like Su Yu or Hsu Kuang-ta or Yang Cheng-wu.
Some other areas of concern which may be given greater
representation on the secretariat than they now have, and
some party leaders qualified to deal with them (party-machine
figures unless otherwise specified), are: minority nation-
alities, which have been a problem, and which would probably
require a man with a public security or intelligence back-
ground as well, such as Li Wei-han; the secret police, Hsieh
Fu-chih, or Li Ko-Hung; scientific development, Lin Feng or
Chang Chi--chun; foreign affairs, Wu Hsiu-chuan, the unaligned
Liao Cheng-chih, or the administrator-economist figure Chang
Han-fu; foreign trade, the administrator-economists Yeh Chi-
chuang or Fang I; youth and women's work, Hu Yao-pang, or one
of the wives of the administrator-economist leaders; and the
regional bureaus, one of the current regional first secretaries,
such as Ko Ching-shih, or an administrator-economist figure
with similar experience such as Hsi Chung-hsun.
The relatively unimportant control commission, concerned
with disciplinary questions below the central committee level,
can safely remain in the hands of the unimportant party elder
Tung Pi-wu, who in any case is supervised by his senior deputy,
Liu Lan-tao, from Liu's post on the secretariat. Some inef-
fectual members of this body will probably be dropped.
The directors and deputy directors of the party's central
departments, which are subordinate to the secretariat, are
not to be named by the party congress. These departments are
established, altered, and staffed as the need arises, by the
politburo standing committee and the secretariat.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For 6W& : CIA-RDP74800427A000600110001-1
The party's central committee now probably has between
85 and 93 full members (depending on how many of those in
disfavor have already been removed), and between 87 and 92
alternate members. Both groups will probably be expanded,
as the party membership has increased. Among the full (vot-
ing) members there are about 10 persons aligned wholly with
Mao, about 35 party-machine figures (by far the largest group),
about 15 administrator-economist figures, about 15 military
men, and about 15 miscellaneous types not regarded as being
in any group. Roughly these proportions are expected to pre-
vail in the new central committee.
Many of the members and alternate members of the central
committee elected in 1956 are not expected to appear on the
new namelist--both those positively in disfavor and those
who have done nothing much to retain favor. Peng Te-huai and
Huang Ko-cheng should be among the missing, as should Li Tao
and Chao Chien-min, the provincial secretaries who fell in
1958. Others who may be dropped include: Ku Ta-tsun, Feng
Pai-chu, and Pan Fu-sheng, provincial secretaries criticized
as rightists in 1958; Chang Wen-tien, who may have ventured
too far to the right in 1959; Yang Te-chih, Hung Hsueh-chih,
Chang Ta-chih, Teng Hua, Wan I, Hsu Hai-tung, Chou Pao-chung,
Wang Shih-tai, and Liu Chen, military leaders who dropped out
of the news during or soon after the purge of autumn 1959;
Chia To-fu and Yang Hsien-cheng, who also disappeared in 1959;
Shu Tung, Liu Ko-ping, and Chou Hsiao-chou, the provincial
secretaries removed in 1960, and Chien Ying, the minister of
internal affairs replaced in 1960; Lin Tieh and Chang Chung
Jiang, among the provincial first secretaries recently re-
placed or missing from the news in recent months; Yang Te-
chih, a military leader missing for the past year; Chen Shao-
yu, Mao's old antagonist who has been ill in Moscow for many
years; and several others who have been inactive owing to ill-
ness or some unapparent failing, including (but not restricted
to) Teng Tai-yuan, Chang Yun-i, Wang Wei-thou, Cheng Wei-san,
Li Li-san, and Chen Chi-han. There are only two important
party-machine figures in this speculative list, and two or
three important administrator-economist figures, whereas there
are ten important military figures. Whatever the precise
composition of the final casualty list, the military are
expected to be hit the hardest, and the party-machine group
the least hard.
Sanitized - Approved For Rem: CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseETCIA-RDP744S00427A000600110001-1
As the foregoing discussion suggests, it is probable that
Liu Shao-chi will succeed Mao--if, as thought probable, Mao
survives any crisis in the party in the next few months and
if, as is possible, he dies of natural causes or steps aside
voluntarily in the period 1962-63. Again, however, the posi-
tion of Teng Hsiao-ping and the military leaders will be
important. Teng seems to have enough strength to challenge
Liu, if he chooses. Lin Piao's allegiance has been to Mao,
not the party-machine leaders, and many of the professional
military figures have even less reason to cherish Liu than
they do Mao; the alignment of Lin and/or other military lead-
ers with the administrator-economist group, after Mao's de-
parture, might even the odds for a struggle with Liu and Teng,
together or separately. On the other hand, the present ad-
ministrator-economist leaders, without the standing threat of
significant support for them from the military, might be picked
off and squeezed out.
In sum, it seems likely that Mao and most of the party-
machine leaders will stand together successfully against their
opponents until Mao retires or dies, even if the Soviet party
exerts maximum pressure on Peiping at a time of maximum Chinese
weakness. There is a fair possibility, however, that Mao will
be dislodged in a coup, which would probably be concealed from
the party masses and the public. Similarly, it seems likely
that Liu will succeed Mao, but there is a fair possibility that
he will fall with Mao or be brought down soon after succeeding
him. However it goes, there are likely to be additional casu-
alties among Mao's present lieutenants. The vaunted cohesion
of the Chinese Communist party leadership, once unique among
Communist parties, seems clearly to be a thing of the past.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIeEIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReA2ftgp CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
Introductory Note
25X1A
In the early M papers, we discussed Mao's lieutenants
in terms of three principal groups: a group of "party-machine"
figures, led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and including
Peng Chen and Tan Chen-lin, whose power derived mainly from
their key positions in the party apparatus; a group of admin-
istrators and economists around premier Chou En-lai and his
senior deputy Chen Yun, including Chen Yi, who became foreign
minister in 1958, and including the economic specialists Li Fu-
chun, Li Hsien-nien, Po I-po, and Teng Tzu-hui, most of whom
also had posts in the party apparatus but whose importance de-
rived mainly from their key positions in the government apparatus;
and the military leaders around Peng Te-huai or (if his health
improved) Lin Piao.* The men whom we aligned in these groups
usually had records of long and close association with one
another, seemed to have common interests as a result of their
functions, and appeared to have a common general attitude and
approach. The party-machine leaders were those who seemed to
have a radical and "leftist" attitude or approach to both
domestic and foreign policy--the attitude most congenial to
Mao himself, although "objective circumstances" sometimes forced
Mao (and the party-machine leaders) to retreat toward more
conservative positions normally occupied by other leaders.
Offensives, 1957-1958
25X1A
To recapitulate some of the early _ papers, in mid-
1957 Mao and his comrades were faced with the failure of the
"hundred flowers" experiment, a continuing "ebb" in China's
economic development, and confusion in the bloc as to just
where Peiping stood on matters of intrabloc relations. A new
those cited in this paragraph are full members of the
politburo except Po I-po, an alternate member, and Teng Tzu-
hui, whose earlier "conservatism" kept him from being named to
this body in the elections of 1956 and-1958.
Sanitized - Approved For Re1968F CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A{Wroved For R64OF CIA-RDP7a800427A000600110001-1
hard line became apparent in the period June - November 1957:
in the June official version of Mao's earlier speech on "con-
tradictions"; in the conduct of the anti-rightist campaign
and the party's "rectification" campaign and the merger of
those into a nation-wide rectification campaign in September;
in attacks on "rightist conservatism" and in predictions of
a forthcoming 'upsurge'' in economic development in the same
period; and in Mao's conduct at the Moscow conference of the
Communist parties in November.
The party machine leaders, who had seemed unhappy with
the experiment with "liberalization" and with the "ebb'' in
economic development, came into their own in the latter half
of 1957. As the principal supervisors of the "anti-rightist"
rectification campaign--the progress report on which was given
by Teng Hsiao-ping in September--they were well situated to
direct the energies made available through rectification into
the new "upsurge" in economic development, which was to derive
primarily from an unprecedented exploitation of labor. In
this process, the party machine was to assume most of the
responsibility and authority for economic development at all
levels. After Mao had given the signal at a party plenum,
the party machine leaders Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and
Tan Chen-lin took the lead in autumn 1957 in publicly exhort-
ing the "upsurge" and in criticizing the moderate positions
taken earlier by other party leaders such as Chen Yun and
Teng Tzu-hui, There seemed a happy coincidence of their party
positions, their roles in the major campaigns of 1957-58, and
the courses of action which they personally favored. Further,
Teng Hsiao-ping was Mao's principal aide in his visit to Moscow
in November 1957 for the meeting of the parties, and Liu Shao-
chi and Peng Chen made the principal speeches in Peiping on
the eve of the same occasion. Chou En-lai and others of the
administrator-economist group clearly played lesser roles in
the latter half of 1957, their pronouncements being minor or
unpublished, although Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien and Po I-po
all publicly endorsed the "upsurge", and Li Hsien-nien was
one of those accompanying Mao to Moscow. Peng Te-huai, the
principal military figure, also made the trip to Moscow,
where he and other Chinese leaders apparently tried and failed
to secure a Soviet promise of nuclear weapons.*
*Until the time of this trip, Chinese comment had suggested
an expectation of early accession of nuclear weapons; after
the trip, Chinese comment strongly suggested the reverse.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIe f~RE,TCIA-RDP79S00427AO00600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RP06 F : CIA-RDP7 00427A000600110001-1
The scope of the intended Chinese challenge to Moscow--
on questions related both to the building of Communism and
to world Communist strategy--was not apparent in 1957. This
25X1A was not to become apparent until the launching of the unpre-
cedentedly audacious commune program in 1958 (discussed in
detail in the early ~ papers) and the systematic develop- 25X1A
ment in 1958-1959 (discussed in detail in later - papers)
of certain strategic concepts put forward by Mao in Moscow
in November 1957. No doubt Peiping's thinking was not fully
developed by the end of 1957. However, events of 1958-59
suggested increasingly that Mao and the party machine leaders
had made a number offundamental and closely-related decisions
as far back as the period June - November 1957. These were:
to abandon the conservative program of economic development
based on the Soviet model, which had hitherto prevailed, and
to launch a radical program based on the utmost possible
organization, exhortation, and exploitation of the human mate-
rial; to abandon the relatively liberal line on intrabloc
relations, to become champions of unity and discipline, and
at the same time to resist Soviet efforts to bind China it-
self tighter to the bloc; further, contending that there had
occurred a decisive shift in the balance of power, to incite
the Soviet party to lead the world Communist movement in a
much more aggressive program, especially in Asia and the other
underdeveloped areas; and, in the interest of all of these
policies, to denounce conservatism, conciliation, and "revi-
sionism" wherever they were found.
During 1958, this complex of decisions was expressed in
many ways, among them the following: in early 1958, the trans-
formation of the "upsurge" in economic development into the
"great leap forward"; in the spring, the sustained Chinese at-
tacks on Yugoslavia and "modern revisionists" everywhere, at-
tacks aimed in part at the Russians; in the summer, the begin-
ning of the mass campaign for the study of Mao's thought; in
August, directly following the Mao-Khrushchev talks, the or-
ganization of the "people's communes" on a nation-wide basis;
in the late summer and early fall, Peiping's venture in the
Taiwan Strait, which followed an apparent Chinese effort (suc-
cessful) to prevent Khrushchev from arranging a summit meet-
ing on Middle Eastern developments.
The party machine leaders in 1958 continued clearly to
be the most powerful group of Mao's lieutenants. Following
Mao's lead, they were constantly on stage to proclaim his
policies.
Sanitized - Approved For R leasse : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
SRT
 Sanitized - Approved For R S A CIA-RDPM600427A000600110001-1
In early 1958, again on Mao's signal, party machine figures
played the principal roles in exhorting the "great leap forward"
(which was to last for three years) and in threatening those
opposed to a headlong course. Although Chou En-lai and some
others of the administrator-economist group associated themselves
moderately with the "leap" in February 1958, these leaders were
silent in March and April during the wildest gyrations of the
"leap", with its profusion of unrealistic goals--goals which
displaced those with which the administrator-economists were
personally associated.
The status of the party machine leaders was strikingly
illustrated at the party congress in May: the most important
report--summarizing the party's situation, general line,* and
tasks--was given by Liu Shao-chi. The other two major reports,
on intrabloc relations and on agricultural development--were
given respectively by Teng Hsiao-ping and Tan Chen-lin; and
all three of the party leaders added to the politburo--the new
agricultural spokesman Tan Chen-lin and the regional leaders
Ko Ching-shih and Li Ching-chuan--were proteges jointly of Mao
and the party-machine leaders. Added to the politburo stand-
ing committee at the same time was the ailing Lin Piao, Mao's
longtime favorite military leader, who had apparently improved
enough for limited activity. And added to Teng Hsiao-ping's
party secretariat were Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien, two of
the three most active economic specialists, who were not party-
machine figures and who almost certainly had reservations about
the policies of these leaders but who could serve the party
machine well in its expanded role in the "leap" and the immi-
nent "commune" program; the addition of the Li's to the sec-
retariat was a shrewd move, as it gave them a new point of
view, the view from inside the party machine, and thus served
to reduce the differences between party-machine leaders and
these key figures of the administrator-economist group.
The party congress of May 1958 in passing criticized three
alternate members of the central committee, each of them a
provincial party secretary, as "rightists." None of the three--
Ku Ta-tsun, Feng Pai-chu, and Pan Fu-sheng (first secretary
in Honan)--was regarded as an important figure or as a member
*The general line, reflecting Mao's confidence in the power
of the will ("subjective" factors), called and still calls
for "going all-out, aiming high, achieving greater, faster,
better, and more economical results in building socialism."
Sanitized - Approved For Rele` 7EURRA-RDP79SO0427AO006001
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
SECRET ~..:
of any one of the groups in the leadership with which we have
been concerned. Peiping's comment on them at the time did not
suggest an immediate intention to drop them from the central
committee, and they appeared occasionally in the news there-
after. However, none has appeared since early 1959, and all
three may since have been dropped.
Mao, Teng, and the military leaders Lin Piao and Peng
Te-huai (Peng's dominance of the military group was now con-
tested, with the return of Lin to active duty) all spoke at
a conference of military leaders in July 1958, with Peng also
making the summary speech. None of these was published, but,
in the light of articles in military journals at the time,
and also in view of the unusual length of the conference, the
party leaders were apparently taking up with the military the
entire matter of party control of the armed forces, including
the party's right to impose doctrine (e.g., Mao's strategic
thinking in the light of failure to obtain nuclear weapons),
and the related matter of Mao's plans for the military in the
"leap" and commune programs; the conference may also have
discussed the forthcoming venture in the Taiwan Strait.
In July 1958 Mao Tse-tung was firmly identified (by his
spokesman Chen Po-ta) as the architect of the commune program,
and the party machine leaders Liu Shao-chi and Tan Chen-lin
took the lead in promoting the program in the countryside (Liu
found occasion to remark that Communism in China would be
realized "very soon," and Tan made a number of equally extra-
vagant predictions), followed by Mao himself in tours in
August. Also in August, Mao initiated the campaign for mass
production of iron and steel, i.e. the 'backyard steel' pro-
gram, which was probably opposed by most of the administrator-
economist figures, especially by Chen Yun, the only one of
the party officers not credited by Peiping with having provided
"guidance" for the "leap." In September, Mao, Liu, and Teng
Hsiao-ping all found occasion to advocate the formation of
urban as well as rural communes. Other party leaders played
much smaller roles in this period, although Chou En-lai ac-
companied Liu on an inspection tour, Li Fu-chun spent September
on a tour of the Northeast with his new boss Teng, Chou and
Peng Te-huai took part in the Mao-Khrushchev talks in early
August, and Po I-po was active.
In Mao's venture in the Taiwan Strait, which began in
earnest in late August 1958, shortly after his talks with
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R 9T: CIA-RDP74W00427A000600110001-1
Khrushchev, individual leaders of the CCP did not play public
roles, apart from Chou En-lai's role as premier in the retreat-
ing phase of the venture. Earlier in the year, the most im-
portant party-machine figures (Liu, Teng, Peng Chen) and the
leaders of the administrator-economist group (Chou En-lai and
Chen Yun) had alike associated themselves with certain of Mao's
propositions on world Communist strategy--especially the con-
cept of the East Wind prevailing--which underlay the Strait
venture in the late summer. However, at the time of the ven-
ture itself, the party's position was stated under a pseudonym,
in a harsh article in Red Flag which justified and in effect
signalled the venture.
Retreats, 1958-1959
The Taiwan Strait venture was the beginning of a bad
autumn for the Chinese leaders. As we have argued controver-
sially in other papers, Mao Tse-tung, in order to exert maxi-
mum pressure on the Nationalist offshore island garrisons and
on the Sino-American alliance, needed a firm and high-level
expression of Soviet support in the advancing stage of the
venture, i.e. in late August or early September. But Mao did
not get it until the retreating phase of the venture had been
initiated by Chou En-lai's 6 September offer to renew ambas-
sadorial-level talks with the United States.
Peiping's humiliation in the Taiwan Strait venture called
for a massive application of propaganda. Mao and party lead-
ers of various groups--e.g. Chou, Peng Chen, Peng Te-huai--
played roles in this effort to explain that not Peiping but
another party (the CPSU) was really responsible for the failure.
By far the most important development in the campaign was the
publication in October 1958 of a collection of Mao's writings
on the theme of the imperialist "paper tiger," which conceded
that the paper tiger was still too much of a match for Peiping
itself. Addressing itself, in effect, to the question of why
the Soviet decisive superiority (asserted by Peiping) was not
brought to bear in China's just cause in the Taiwan Strait,
the collection replied that the question of assessing the balance
of forces was one which still bewildered "many people." Mao's
insistence on the need to exploit aggressively the world's
revolutionary opportunities was made in several ways, most
slyly in these terms: "If the East Wind does not prevail over
the West Wind, then the West Wind will prevail over the East Wind."
Sanitized - Approved For R%1,9&; CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For I eF sse : CIA-RDP7 600427A000600110001-1
During the same period, autumn 1958, there developed a
serious conflict between the commune in theory and the commune
in practice. Responding both to the pressure of events and
to increasing Soviet and domestic criticism of the commune pro-
gram, the CCP leadership in a series of urgent conferences ex-
tending through November and early December decided on a major
overhaul of the commune program. The party retreated from the
principle of distribution "according to need," modified the
role of the commune as the organizer of all aspects of rural
life, and enhanced the authority of the lower-level production
brigade at the expense of the commune administrative committee.
At the same time, the party decided to undertake a less obvious
and less abrupt, but equally substantial, overhaul of its "great
leap forward" program, which had admittedly been under attack
by a "small number" of party members.
At about this time, the party apparently purged two al-
ternate members of its central committee, both provincial
party secretaries. Li Tao, a secretary in Liaoning, was re-
moved from his post amid comment suggesting that he had been
guilty of a Kao-Jao type of activity, i.e. attempting to dis-
place some of his superiors in the hierarchy. Chao Chien-min,
a secretary in Shantung, was removed on the grounds of "indi-
vidualism and localism." Neither has been mentioned since.
Li was not regarded as aligned with any of the principal groups
of leaders, but Chao had been a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping's
for some years; Chao was the first person regarded as a party
machine figure to fall since the fall of Jao Shu-shih in 1954.
This brought to five the number of alternate members of the
central committee, all of them provincial secretaries and one
a first secretary, publicly brought down during 1958.
The party's decisions to retreat, in the "leap forward"
and commune programs, were formalized at a party plenum last-
ing from 28 November to 10 December 1958, at which time Mao's
decision to resign as chairman of the government was revealed.
The plenum was attended by all 20 of the full members of the
politburo (a deliberate display of solidarity) and by 64 of
the 77 remaining full members of the central committee, plus
82 of the 95 alternate members.
The resolution adopted by the plenum attempted to conceal
the extent of the retreat on the commune program, but its
magnitude was apparent in a clumsy effort to balance the con-
cept of "uninterrupted revolution' by the concept of "revolution
Sanitized - Approved For Rea CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RMFT CIA-RDP00427A000600110001-1
by stages," by acknowledgement of the Soviet position that mate-
rial abundance in industry and agriculture were necessary for
the advance to Communism, and in suspension of the claim that
the communes were applicable to other countries. With respect
to the "leap forward," the plenum called for the party to put
economic planning on a "completely reliable basis" and to main-
tain suitable proportions between targets. Nevertheless, the
plenum accepted and publicized exaggerated estimates of 1958
production and put forward very ambitious goals for 1959, in-
eluding the preposterous goal of 525 million tons of grain.
The plenum was said to have been held under the "guidance"
of Mao, and Mao was credited with originating the decisions
to retreat. The plenum went to some effort to demonstrate--
falsifying the record to do so--that Mao all along had charted
the correct course despite the opposition of "rightist conser-
vatives" on one hand and of "leftist adventurists" on the other.
In fact, it was precisely Mao and the party machine leaders--
principally Liu, Teng, and Tan Chen-lin--who had assumed per-
sonal leadership of the "leap forward" and commune movements
throughout 1958. This fact could not possibly have been con-
cealed from the administrator-economist and military leaders
who had had reservations about these programs and had opposed
various features of them. Nevertheless, Mao's resignation
from the government post was almost certainly not forced. The
strongest group of his lieutenants--the only group which ap-
peared strong enough to press him--were the very leaders who
had been most closely identified with his policies, and most
of the administrator-economist and military leaders themselves
had been drawn into the programs sufficiently to be in a com-
promised position. Only a few--including Chen Yun and Teng
Tzu-hui--seemed to bear little or no responsibility for the
party's erratic course.
In the three months following the December plenum, there
continued to be significant differences in emphasis between
the pronouncements of the party machine figures and those of
the administrator-economists. The former group--including Liu
Shao-chi and Tan Chen-lin* and Liao Lu-yen, and possibly Teng
Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen in their unpublished speeches, sup-
ported by the economic specialist Po I-po who a year earlier
Tan Chen-lien remained the most extreme of the extremists.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIg?pRE;CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Re %TCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
*_41r, Vee
had seemed to go over almost completely to the party-machine
group--chose to emphasize themes that would make it appear
that they had been right all along. These were the leaders
who strongly defended the policies and programs of 1958, who
again implied that Chinese programs were applicable to other
bloc states, who reaffirmed the principle of "putting politics
in command," who denounced the "ebb" of 1956-57 and called
for "continuous forward leaping," who exhorted struggle against
"rightist conservatism," and who spoke darkly of the "tide-
watching clique" and the "account-settling clique."
The emphasis in the pronouncements in this period of the
administrators and economists--including Chou En-lai, Chen Yun,
Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien and Teng Tzu-hui, supported by one
party-machine leader, Ko Ching-shih--was on practical problems.
These leaders--in particular, Li Hsien-nien, Ko Ching-shih,
and Chen Yun--introduced the concept of operating the country
as a "coordinated chess game." This concept constituted a
strong, although indirect, criticism of most of the economic
policies favored by the party-machine figures during the "leap."
The essence of the "chess-game" argument was that the party
machine on local levels had outdone itself in wielding the
"three major keys"--the "general line," and "leap forward,"
and "communes." Costly production of unusable products and
poorly planned construction of economically infeasible pro-
duction facilities had diverted labor and materials from the
key production facilities and key construction projects which
constituted the core of the Chinese industrialization effort.
The "chess-game" theme called for more centralized control of
economic activity, according to firm priorities, and condemned,
as People's Daily put it, "laissez faire dispersionism and
organizational egoism which are alien to the practices of cen-
tralized leadership and overall arrangements." There seems
to be little doubt that the December plenum had endorsed this
line, for the theme was already being circulated at provincial
meetings in early January. So far as is known, none of the
party-machine figures (except Ko) chose to associate himself
publicly with this line. Later in the year, one writer plau-
sibly imputed authorship of the "chessboard" theme to Chen Yun.
In February and March 1959, the party held an expanded
meeting of the politburo in Chengchow, at which a "series of
important decisions" was made. These decisions related to
specific measures for carrying out the December directive to
"tidy up"--i.e., overhaul--the commune program.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
i
 Sanitized - Approved For ReI q QIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
25X1X
For some months after March 1959, the pattern of pro-
nouncements was much as it had been during the "ebb" of 1956-
57. That is, the party machine figures in general were silent,
while the administrator-economists took the lead in explaining
and justifying the party's less radical policies.
In the first week of April the party held another plenum
in Shanghai. The party evidently did not revise its 1959 goals
at this time, as several leaders publicly reaffirmed them later
in the month. However, Mao made an "important speech" at this
meeting on methods of work--methods which, as indicated in
heavy publicity given them in the next three months, emphasized
flexibility and encouraged a scaling-down of targets.
The same encouragement was provided in the speeches of
several of the administrators and economists. In this more
sober atmosphere, the conservative agricultural expert of the
party, Teng Tzu-hui, who had long been silent, reappeared,
emphasizing the retreats that had been undertaken in the com-
mune program and deriding the "foolish ideas" of those who had
wanted to move rapidly from socialism to Communism.
Early in May, Mao sent a letter to party committees at
all levels. Although the contents have not been reliably re-
ported, it is clear that the letter gave further encourage-
ment to the process of revision of goals. Also in May, Red
Flag--always a vehicle for Mao's views of the moment--emphasized
that targets should be realistic, that they "should not be
formulated in the imagination of a handful of persons behind 25XlXppr
closed doors." The result,
was that a sharp scaling-down of targets
was undertaken in May, under the name of "verification"--a
process which could not be stopped at the desired level.
Peng Te-huai, at that time still the regime's principal
military figure as Minister of Defense, returned in early June
from a two-month tour of the bloc--during which he had talked
with Khrushchev. At the end of June, Peng disappeared from
the news. Although Peng's public record was one of firm as-
sociation with the positions and policies of Mao and the party
machine figures, subsequent pronouncements by the regime's
leading political officers suggested strongly that some of
the military leaders had in fact been opposed; and reports
received much later indicated that Peng himself had not only
opposed the policies of the dominant leaders but had taken
Sanitized - Approved For ReIERF-cWE IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R & ' : CIA-RDP79.%00427A000600110001-1
his case to the USSR--presumably on his spring tour--where he
had found much sympathy and had ensured his own downfall.
There were several interesting articles in June, most of
them by the administrators and economists. In two articles
Teng Tzu-hui again criticized a number of the policies asso-
ciated with the enthusiasts. Hsueh Mu-chiao, who as director
of the State Statistical Bureau had been personally victimized
by the procedures which encouraged false reporting, gave a
radio talk which amounted to a systematic defense of Soviet
principles of economic development. Chou En-lai, at a banquet
for visiting Soviet officials, observed that China should learn
from the Soviet Union and also from "Soviet leaders."
Two articles by party-machine figures in June made clear
that they were well aware that mistakes had been made in both
the conception and the management of the regime's programs.
Liao Lu-yen, who earlier in the year had been among the lead-
ing sloganeers, put aside his slogans and urged that people
try to get the facts. Tao Chu, in an article about Mao's
working methods, contended that "greatness" lay not in being
infallible--which was impossible--but in adapting intelligently
to new situations. This article by a party-machine figure,
clearly intended as a defense of Mao and the party-machine
group, also made clear that they had been under attack.
The party's dominant figures were being attacked not only
by the right wing in China but by their comrades abroad. Speak-
ing in Poland in mid-July, Khrushchev publicly derided the
concept of the commune in early Soviet society, in terms which
left no doubt that he meant his remarks to apply to Peiping.
Much later, Red Flag, reviewing a book on the theme of not
fearing ghosts (imperialists, reactionaries, rightists, etc.),
observed that the book was put together in the spring of 1959
when imperialists, reactionaries and "revisionists of various
countries" had organized a "grand chorus of vilification of
China." The book was completed, Red Flag said, in summer 1959,
"at just the time when domestic revisionists rose to respond
to international revisionists and staged a wanton attack on
the leadership of the party. "
The party's version of the attack on the dominant figures
and their policies conceals the degree to which Mao himself
in the spring of 1959 had fostered the very attitudes which
Sanitized - Approved For W Mf : CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized -Approved For Re'ds' CIA-RDP7 00427A000600110001-1
were later to be denounced as rightist opportunism. In the
party's account of the matter,
...after the Chengchow conference, during
the period of April, May, June, and July, a
small number of right opportunists...staged a
wanton attack against the party and against so-
cialism. They were against the general line,
the great leap forward, and the commune policy;
and they opposed leadership by the party, command
by politics, and large-scale mass movements...
According to this same account, the party meetings held
25X1X at Lushan in July and August of 1959 were help precisely to
"strike back resolutely" at these right opportunists. The
first of these, in July, another expanded meeting of the polit-
buro apparently did not in fact 'strike back resolutely."
the July
meeting was apparently concerned instead with "suimnarizing
experience," i.e. with debating the issues, and it was not
until the August meeting that the rightist trend throughout
the country was reversed. This was admitted by Li Fu-chun
in a report in March 1960; he observed that `'right opportun-
ists" had organized "sectarian groups" and had attacked the
positions of the majority, and that it was the August 1959
plenum which "thoroughly frustrated /hese7 frantic attacks..."
However, the question of which group was to emerge in the
dominant positions in the party--Mao and the party machine
figures who defended their programs, or those leaders of the
administrator-economist and military groups who attacked them--
was never in doubt. Of the 20 full members of the politburo
at that time (one has since died), it seems likely that only
one--Deng Te-huai--attacked strongly in the July meeting,
while one more--Chen Yun--stated a conservative position; only
Peng--who had taken his case to the USil{--was later purged.
Of the six alternate members of the politburo, Chang Wen-tien
is believed to have joined the attackers; there is some evid-
ence that he went far enough to be linked with Peng in private
party discussions of the affair. Of the national leaders just
below the politburo level (lesser and local figures will be
discussed later), only Teng Tzu-hui (a specialist in agricul-
ture), Huang Ko-cheng (then chief-of-staff), and Chia To-fu
(specialist in light industry and economic planning) are
suspected of having been i:_ the attacking group. Of these
Sanitized - Approved For Release CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For F el0ase : CIA-RDP7 00427A000600110001-1
three, only Huang seems to have been purged in the same sense
that Peng Te-huai was purged (loss of party posts), and per-
haps more for the closeness of his association with Peng than
for the heat of his attack. The other administrators and eco-
nomists among the top-level figures (Chou En-lai, Li Fu-chun,
Li Hsien-nien, Po I-po) had at one time or another indicated
reservations about the programs imposed by the dominant group
and they may well have criticized certain features of them in
the July meeting, but it seems clear that they acquiesced in
these programs as a whole and were not thought to be non-co-
operative in carrying them out.
During the first two weeks of August 1959 there was an-
other plenum of the party in Lushan. Whereas in May and June
there had been indications that the party might revise down-
ward its claims for 1958 and its targets for 1959, pronounce-
ments in August, during the plenum, indicated that if the do-
minant leaders did indeed make these revisions they would do
so only while proclaiming at the same time that they had been
right all along. People's Daily editorials on 6 and 7 August
discussed the overcoming of rightist sentiment among "some
cadres" and argued that the situation favored a continuing for-
ward leap. The editorials criticized those who had exaggerated
difficulties and underestimated achievements, who had a right-
ist conservative attitude and therefore favored a simple plan
and modest targets, who had engaged in the "criminal" activity
of dampening mass enthusiasm, and who had failed to "let poli-
tics take command."
The resolution adopted by the party plenum on 16 August--
a plenum again held "under the guidance" of Mao--formalized
the retreat. Although the great victories of 1958 and 1959
''fully testified to the absolute correctness of the party's
general line," it had been necessary to retreat further from
the original concept of the commune,* the party had grossly
_.. *The resolution announced that the "production brigade" (a
lower level) now possessed "basic" ownership of the means of
production in the commune. In other words, the production
brigade--generally corresponding to the pre-commune collective
farm--was at least nominally to have the main responsibility
for organizing production and the daily life of the peasants,
to be the main owner of the tools and animals with which work
was carried on, and to have most of the authority in distributing
income. These modifications, if carried out, would restore farm
operations to something resembling the picture before 1958, while
permitting retention of the communes. However, as will be dis-
cussed later, the system was not implemented as promulgated.
Sanitized - Approved For R1
e&: CIA-RDP79500427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R AMT. CIA-RDP7 00427A000600110001-1
overestimated agricultural production in 1958 (it had estimated
375 million tons of grain; the "verified" figure was 250 million
tons),* the steel produced in the backyard steel program had been
found unsuitable for modern industry, and the party had made
drastic reductions in its four principal targets for 1959--grain,
cotton, coal, and steel. The reduction in the grain target
was spectacular--from 525 million tons to 275 million tons.
The resolution of 16 August insisted (correctly) that the
revised plan was still a plan of "continued leap forward," and
it gave various practical directives. It underlined the point
that the party's programs represented Mao's own "creative in-
tegration" of Marxism-Leninism and China's situation. It also
attributed the "great victories" of 1958-59 "precisely" to the
increased role of the party machine, its principle of "putting
politics in command," and its reliance on mass movements. In
other words, although Mao and the party machine leaders had
fallen far short of what they had insisted at the tops of their
voices that they could do, the party and its redefined programs
were to continue under the same management.
The Purge, Autumn 1959
On 16 August, ten days before the resolution of the August
plenum was published, Red Flag attributed a rightist tendency
to a "small number" of cadres who exaggerated difficulties,
discouraged the masses, and wanted a further reduction of goals--
i.e., were not satisfied with the extent of the retreat, with
respect to both the "leap" and the communes, agreed on by the
party plenum. In this brief first stage of the anti-rightist
campaign these people were not defined as enemies--indicating
that the August plenum was discussing what to do with them.
The communique and resolution of the eighth plenum, both
published on 26 August, had much to say about rightist senti-
ment--in harsh language aimed at "enemy" and "hostile" elements"
*It was much later asserted that Mao at this plenum had
specified the development of agriculture as the most important
economic problem.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIg R,,pIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A roved For F~4 9iFe : CIA-RDP74WO0427A000600110001-1
both within China and without. The resolution observed that
such quarters had attempted to influence "infirm elements"
in the party, and it strongly implied that some of the latter
were about to be purged. The communique added the detail that
the rightists had described both the "leap forward" and the
commune program, in Leninist invective, as "petty bourgeois
fanaticism."
On the same day (26 August), Chou En-lai reported on the
revision of the 1959 targets. He followed the line of the
eighth pleaum and surrounding comment in emphasizing the "vic-
tory" of the leap, in denying that the commune program was
either premature or unsuccessful, in presenting shortcomings
as "isolated and transient," and in asserting that the "small
number" of pessimists must not be allowed to dampen the
enthusiasm of the masses. Perhaps recognizing that he lacked
the power to challenge the party machine leaders even when
they had clearly been mistaken, Chou attributed the mistakes
of 1958-59 not to the ignorant sloganeers of the party machine
but to the inexperience of the regime's "organs in charge of
planning and economic affairs." He also denounced the ''right
opportunists''--people, not simply sentiments--but devoted very
little of his long speech to this. People's Daily went further
the next day in specifying that there were 'right opportunists"
within the party, that they had 'joined" hostile forces, and
that they were "incorrigible."
Red Flag on 1 September continued the attack on the right-
ists, clearly aiming its remarks in part at the Soviet party
leadership, some of whose positions were being invoked by the
rightists. The party journal reaffirmed the importance of
revolutionary initiative and energy, in "direct contradiction"
to the view espoused by "opportunist leadership." It again
insisted that the successes of 1958-59 were owed to the prin-
ciple of putting politics in command and the practice of
mobilizing the masses, and it again denounced reactionary ef-
forts to influence "infirm elements" in the party. It observed
that in making a new world there were not available "ready-made
patterns for everything"--i.e., Soviet programs would not answer
all of China's requirements--and it derided those who thought
otherwise as "fools who do not know what revolution is." It
concluded that the right opportunists were people wino had "lost
faith in the undertaking as a whole," people who in disseminat-
ing their pessimism were guilty of "criminal activity."
Sanitized - Approved For Relee? CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RARE CIA-RDP74SO0427A000600110001-1
In the same period, mid-August to mid-September, Mao and
the party machine leaders (and those who had come to terms with
them) began to reaffirm strongly their positions on world Com-
munist strategy. The immediate occasion was the announcement
of a forthcoming exchange of visits between Khrushchev and
Eisenhower.
During 1955, the Chinese party leadership had stated
clearly Mao's view that the East Wind was prevailing and that
the consequent revolutionary opportunities should be seized;
and earlier in 1959 it had criticized the assumptions of Khru-
shchev's tactics toward the United States, taking the line that
the nature of imperialism could not change and that American
policies therefore would not significantly change. On 16 August,
in the same number of Red Flag that signalled the beginning
of the anti-rightist campaign with respect to internal policies,
the party leadership readdressed itself to the rightist posi-
tion in foreign policy.
"Yu Chao-li," whose article in the same journal a year
earlier had justified and signalled the Taiwan Strait venture,
in this August 1959 article argued that the United States was
devoted to its "policy of aggression" and could not be expected
to give up this policy. Although the U.s. under pressure might
agree to some degree of relaxation of tension, the article went
on, it would never agree to the conditions of genuine coexist-
ence--namely, a withdrawal from foreign bases and the ending
of "occupations" (e.g. of Taiwan). This article, and a state-
ment by foreign minister Chen Yi the same day, called for "un-
remitting struggle."
The 16 August article was comparatively restrained and
polite, implying rather than stating clearly Peiping's posi-
tions. "Yu Chao-li" made up for this in another article in
Red Flag on 16 September, the day of Khrushchev's arrival in
the United States. This attack on Khrushchev's positions,
cast in the form of an account of the Chinese people's struggle
against imperialism, contended that the Chinese under Mao had
learned how to defeat imperialism. Mao long ago had pointed
out that imperialism could not change its nature, the article
said. The bourgeoisie were "afraid" of exposing imperialism,
of struggling against it, and of provoking it, as if restraint
could induce a change of heart; but Mao had insisted on drawing
Sanitized - Approved For Re. CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R f& : CIA-RDP74900427A000600110001-1
a "clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries"* and
had insisted also that one 'must not show cowardice in the
slightest degree." The article cited the Korean war as a bril-
liant example of the way to fight imperialism: the war had
showed that the U.S. was a "paper tiger," had given courage
to all revolutionary forces, and was a great contribution to
"world peace." The East Wind was now prevailing, the article
said, and,if the people struggled against all expression's of
imperialist aggression, they would win.
On 17 September, in the first public action against the
rightists, Peiping announced a number of changes in government
posts. The most important related to the military establish-
ment.
Peng Te-huai was replaced as Minister of Defense by Lin
Piao, and Huang Ko-cheng was replaced by Lo Jui-ching as chief-
of-staff. These changes installed in the two most important
military posts Mao's longtime favorite military leader (Lin)
and a security specialist (Lo) who had long been close to Mao;
Lo himself was replaced as Minister of Public Security by one
of Teng Hsiao-ping's proteges, Hsieh Fu-chih. Subsequently,
the party almost certainly dropped Peng from the politburo
and Huang from the secretariat and dropped both from the central
committee too. Their complete disappearance from the news
soon removed any doubt as to whether their replacement was a
punitive action. Chang Wen-tien was removed as deputy foreign
minister at the same time.
The full extent of the purge of the military undertaken
or begun at that time cannot be stated with confidence, be-
cause Peiping, which has never given much publicity to its
military leaders, has given even less in the past two years,
presumably as part of the effort to put and keep the military
in its place. However, among the senior military figures of
the regime who were active in 1959, there is reason to ques-
tion the status of at least the following: Yang Te-chih, com-
mander of the Tsinan headquarters, long close to Peng Te-huai;
Hung Hsueh-chih, then director of the logistics department
*The Chinese party in the same month (September 1959) gave
practical expression to this dictum on drawing a clear line
by refusing to cooperate in several of the world Communist
front organizations, demanding a more militant line addressed
to a narrower audience.
- 17 -
Sanitized - Approved For R~ r: CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Red&S#JT CIA-RDP7WO0427A000600110001-1
of the general staff, closely associated with Huang Ko-cheng,
who disappeared from the news at the same time as Huang; Chang
Ta-chih, then commander of the Lanchow headquarters, who was
closely associated with Peng and has not appeared since 1959;
Teng Hua, then commander of the Mukden headquarters and once
Peng's deputy commander in the Korean war, who was apparently
relieved of the Mukden command in November 1959 and demoted
to a petty post in Szechuan; Chou Huan, political officer of
the Mukden headquarters and also an associate of Peng's, who
was apparently demoted to a provincial post at the same time;
and Wan I, Hsu Hai-tung, Chou Pao-chung, Wang Shih-tai, and
Liu Chen, most of whom had been associated with Peng and all
of whom have been out of the news since 1959.* Although it
is likely that some of these military leaders will reappear
in favor, it also seems likely that others who have seemed to
be still in favor--at least to the extent of appearing at
ceremonial occasions, such as Deputy Ministers of Defense Su
Yu and Liao Han-sheng--will turn out to have been sharply
demoted. Perhaps as many as eight or ten of the regime's
senior military men, most of them concurrently members or al-
ternate members of the central committee, were brought down
in the fall of Peng Te-huai and Huang Ko-cheng--thus amount-
ing to a substantial, although not spectacular, purge of the
military.
Other party leaders--all members or alternate members of
the central committee--who dropped out of the news in autumn
1959, and have not reappeared, are: Tong Tai-yuan, minister
of railways; Chia To-fu, the specialist in light industry and
economic planning who lost one of his posts at that time but
was given another; Yang Hsien-cheng, director of the central
committee's own senior party school, who was subsequently re-
placed in this post by a party-machine figure (Wang Tsung-wu);
and Chou Hsiao-chou, first secretary of the party's Hunan
Committee and a onetime deputy of Huang Ko-cheng's, replaced
in the Hunan post at that time. Although some of these pro-
longed absences (e.g., Teng's) may be explained by illness,
some of these leaders too were probably caught in the anti-
rightist campaign.
*Of these persons, Teng and Hsu are full members of the
central committee; Yang, Hung, Chang, Chou, Wan, Chao, Wang,
and Liu are alternate members.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI d TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For I48RsTe : CIA-RDP7QS00427A000600110001-1
The senior figure among all of those believed to be right-
ists, Chen Yun, a vice-chairman of the politburo and a member
of the standing committee (superpolitburo) of the politburo,
who retained these posts, made few appearances in autumn 1959
and said and wrote nothing publicly. The next in party rank,
Chang Wen-tien, alternate member of the politburo, disappeared
from the news, possibly undergoing reindoctrination. Teng Tzu-
hui seemed not to be in disfavor, as he appeared twice with
articles on agriculture in that period and rea.ained director
of the party's rural work department. These three apparently
had not carried their opposition as far as the purged military
leaders had, i.e., were more careful in stating their dissent
and had not committed the unforgivable offense of carrying
their case outside the party to the Soviet party.
On 23 September, with the purge of the rightists well
along, Liu Lan-tao, a party-machine figure, an alternate mem-
ber of the secretariat and the most important person on the
party's control (disciplinary) commis ion, made clear that
there had indeed been a high-level purge. Writing in People's
Daily, Liu explained that imperialism and reaction at home
ana broad were constantly trying to secure agents within the
party, "even within the core of leadership of the party." The
party was endangered additionally, Liu wrote, by those with
bourgeois views who attempted to turn the party into a "party
of opportunism." Liu reviewed the cases of Chen Tu-hsiu (1920s),
Chang Kuo-tao (1930s), and Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (early
19F-0s), the best known of those party leaders found to be
"bourgeois agents," and he related these cases to the current
crop of "rightist-inclined opportunist elements" who had en-
gaged in "anti-party activities" in opposing the general line,
the leap, and the communes. He observed that "absolutely no
views and activities aimed at splitting or usurping /The lead-
ership of7 the party can be allowed," and that opposition to
the principle of "putting politics in command" was found in
those who thought in terms of 'independent operations" or even
"Independent kingdoms." (These were very similar to the charges
against Kao and Jao in 1954-55.) Party members, "especially
high-ranking functionaries," who opposed the party's complete
domination of all non-party organizations / . g . the military
establishment, the government apparatus? would be led inevit-
ably on an "evil anti-party and anti-people's road." Liu con-
cluded with a sustained eulogy of Mao ("the most outstanding
Sanitized - Approved For RM ': CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReIe'CeR IA-RDP79S1O0427A000600110001-1
contemporary revolutionist, statesman, and theoretician of
Marxism-Leninism"), contending that Mao's guidance--in effect
the object of the rightists' attack--was essential to the suc-
cess of the revolution.
In the next two months, Mao played the role of a semi-
divine being whose revealed truths--with respect both to build-
ing Communism and to world Communist strategy--were furiously
defended against unbelievers at home and abroad. In what was
clearly meant to be a display of solidarity, every important
member of the politburo--except the purged Peng Te-huai, the
apparently shelved Chen Yun, and the probably shelved Chang
Wen-tien--appeared with at least one major article or speech
on some portion of Mao's gospel. Differences in emphasis
between party-machine leaders and others were less readily ap-
parent in this period than normally.
Upon Khrushchev's arrival in Peiping on 30 September--
fresh from his trip to the United States--the Chinese laid
down a barrage of articles in People's Daily and Red Flag,
some of them printed also in Soviet publications, cefendiing
Chinese domestic programs and attacking various features of
Khrushchev's strategy. The most important of these, by the
party--machine leaders Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, dis-
cussed both complexes of problems--building Communism, and world
Communist strategy. Li Fu-chun discussed only the former,
Chen Yi and Wang Chia-hsiang discussed only aspects of the
latter, Kang Sheng discussed the failure of the right oppor-
tunists to grasp Mao's "dialectical" approach, and Lin Piao
discussed the military's subordination to the party and Mao.*
As previously noted, the Chinese party in mid-August 1959
had contended that there could not be a meaningful "peaceful
coexistence" with the West; and had contended in mid-September
that appeasement of the West was harmful to the world Communist
cause and that the struggle should be waged more aggressively,
*It is of some interest that Chen Yun was kept out of Peiping
during Khrushchev's visit. Chen had represented the Chinese
party at the Warsaw Pact meeting in spring 1958 and had talked
with Khrushchev at the time; unlike Peng Te-huai, he had evi-
dently not solicited Soviet support for his positions, and thus,
presumably, need not have been kept away from Khrushchev on this
occasion; however, Chen spent the period of the visit in Shanghai.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIg;CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap oved For RAHRF. CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
inter alia through greater attention to local wars and libera-
tion wars. Chen Yi in his 1 October article stated a politely
derisive view of the prospects of negotiations. The 1 October
articles of Liu, Teng and Wang concentrated their fire on Soviet
policy toward the underdeveloped areas (both colonial and inde-
pendent), the areas in which they anticipated the greatest suc-
cesses for an aggressive program. They all contended that China
was a valid model for the underdeveloped countries, with respect
both to Communist seizure of power and the rapid construction
of socialism and Communism thereafter; and they emphasized the
importance of armed struggle and of Communist capture of lead-
ership in the early stages of revolution. Wang's article added
much detail on the unreliability of bourgeois nationalist govern-
ments.
The 1 October articles of Liu, Teng and Li Fu-chun all
defended the increased role of the party machine in China's
economic development, the principle of "politics in command,"
and the heavy reliance on mass movements. They all defended
the creative expression of these in the general line, the leap,
and the communes, praising the achievements of these programs
and minimizing their shortcomings. They all denounced the
rightists, exhorted strenous efforts in 1959 and in the years
thereafter, and had high praise for Mao personally.
Lin Piao, the new minister of defense, in his 1 October
article took the theme of the need for the party's absolute
domination of the military establishment. The military must
accept for its own good, Lin wrote, the system of party com-
mittees and political officers in the armed forces, the party's
decisions as to the share of national income to be allotted
the military and the related matter of the pace of moderniza-
tion, the massive employment of the armed forces in the "leap
forward" and commune programs* and the related militia program,
the party's formulation of military doctrine /e.g., its minimiz-
ing of the importance of nuclear weapons at the same time it
was working madly to get them7, its decisions as to tactics
in particular situations / .g. the fiasco in the Taiwan Strait
a year earlier/, the party's insistence on officers serving in
the ranks a month each year, and so on. In an unprecedented
*Lin conceded that the peasant soldiers might understandably
have doubts about the communes.
Sanitized - Approved For Re,I~er CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rd 'g T CIA-RDP7U00427A000600110001-1
declaration of allegiance, Lin pledged the "unconditional
loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the party and Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung." Hsiao Ching-kuang, commander of the navy,
published a much slighter but similar article at the same
time, as did the director of the political department of the
air force.
Some of these leaders appeared again in the following
five weeks, and all of the other leaders of important groups
(except Peng Te-huai and Chen Yun) declared themselves publicly
in the same period. Chou En-lai appeared again on 6 October,
with a long article on domestic policies and programs much like
his late August report and the 1 October articles of Liu, Teng,
and Li. Again Chou gave an impression, however, of greater
sophistication than the party machine leaders Liu and Teng;
he put more emphasis on the value of Soviet experience and
aid, and he observed that at best China's economic level could
not be high for a long time to come.
Tan Chen-lin spoke on or about 6 October, exhorting a
leap in agriculture, and Teng Tzu-hui spoke at the same time
of the favorable conditions for such a leap. Po I-po wrote
in mid-October on the need to carry out quickly the technical
transformation (mechanization) of agriculture, evidently de-
cided on at the August plenum; Mao was later said (by Tan Chen-
lin) to have declared in the spring of 1959 that it was essen-
tial to mechanize agriculture, and that this could be done in
ten years. Teng Tzu-hui appeared again on 18 October, defend-
ing the entire course of the party's agricultural policy, but
again in a more modest fashion than the party machine figures.
Several party leaders--Po I-po, Tan Chen-lin, Li Hsien-
nien, Li Fu-chun--spoke to a workers' conference in late October.
All of these speeches emphasized the success of mass movements
and the importance of a rapid modernization of agriculture.
Po's speech, which resurrected the concept of the "Mao Tse-tung
era," could not have been distinguished from that of any party-
machine figure. Li Fu-chun's was much the same.
On 1 November, Red Flag announced that the struggle against
right opportunism continued, and indeed was "very ferocious
and penetrating." The right opportunists were still the "main
danger," and the struggle must be carried "to the end."
Sanitized - Approved For Relef~L:zlCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A Wroved For F e~iease : CIA-RDP74S00427A000600110001-1
Peng Chen on 6 November became the last of the key figures--
the last, that is, of those remaining in favor--to associate
himself with the propositions of Mao and the dominant group
to which he himself belonged. He did so in a speech for October
Revolution Day in which he offered much praise of the Soviet
Union but went on to defend Chinese programs, and, anticipat-
ing two lines which were to get much emphasis in 1960, to praise
the November 1957 declaration of the Communist parties and to
denounce unnamed "revisionists."
Chen Po-ta, not a key figure in his own right but a con-
sistent spokesman for Mao, appeared in Red Flag in mid-November
with an article equating the "right opportunists" who opposed
Mao's domestic programs with the "modern revisionists" who op-
posed Mao's views on world Communist strategy. Although the
examples given of "revisionist" thinking were of Yugoslav rather
than Soviet positions (no party was named), Chen attributed
to Mao a proposition about revisionism which was to be used
repeatedly in 1960 in attacking Soviet positions:
The revisionists, or rightist-inclined op-
portunist elements, pay lip service to Marxism
and also attack "doctrinarism." But the real
targets of their attack in actuality are the
most fundamental propositions of Marxism...
The anti-rightist campaign was in effect closed in mid-
December 1959 with an article in Red Flag by Wang Tsung-wu,
a party-machine figure junior to Liu Lan-tao on the party's
control committee. Wang's theme was the need for "iron dis-
cipline" in the party, and he conceded the truth of the right-
ists' complaint that "they are not /now7 allowed to speak with-
in the party."
New Offensives, Early 1960
On New Year's Day of 1960, the Chinese party launched new
offensives with respect both to the building of Communism in
China and to the promotion of the world Communist cause. The
guiding principles for both campaigns were attributed to Mao;
the leading roles in publicizing the domestic programs were
given primarily to the economic specialists, supported by
party machine figures, while Mao and his theorists virtually
Sanitized - Approved For %~': CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rele'REDETCIA-RDP79r 00427A000600110001-1
monopolized the process of stating the party's positions on
world Communist strategy.
People's Daily on 1 January was aggressively optimistic
about the prospects for the regime's domestic and international
programs in the coming decade. Nevertheless, the party journal
found it necessary to defend China's domestic programs as con-
sistent with the decisions of the Moscow meeting of the Com-
munist parties in November 1957, decisions presented as reject-
ing "mechanical imitation of the policies and tactics of the
Communist parties of other countires." The party newspaper
also observed that these "new things" (programs) had met with
some "skepticism" which had been answered by the results of
1959, and it asserted that there would be a "continuous leap
forward" throughout the coming decade.
Li Fu-chun, writing in Red Flag on the same date, held
that the "tremendous leaps" of-1-915S-and 1959 had completely
vindicated the general line and the principles of reliance
on mass movements, leadership by the party machine, and
"politics in command". Although the situation in Chinese
agriculture had not yet reached the proportions of a crisis,
as it did in late 1960 and early 1961, Li emphasized the
regime's increased concern with the agricultural problem. He
cited Mao on the "extreme importance" of agriculture, and he
underlined the need to study Mao's thinking and to carry out
"Mao's policies." Even though Li went to some lengths to credit
Mao with having consistently advocated the need for "taking
agriculture as the foundation of the economy", he noted that
this formulation was "conspicuously a new thing in our planning
work as a whole...; it is a new objective in the 1960 national
plan to seriously and thoroughly carry out this policy." It
thus appeared that while Chinese domestic programs remained
theoretically marvellous, the problems inherent in the appli-
cation of the programs--particularly in agriculture--were
beginning to assert themselves.
"Yu Chao-li" also appeared in Red Flag on 1 January, to
attack some positions on world Communist strategy which Khru-
shchev had taken in a number of speeches in the USSR after re-
turning from Peiping the previous October. Yu's article ob-
served that Mao had pointed out two years earlier (November
1957) that the East Wind prevailed, but "not all people saw
this new situation clearly." Faced with the change in the
balance of power and the struggle of anti-imperialist forces,
Sanitized - Approved For Relg?,E,,CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For I09DNW : CIA-RDP7 600427A000600110001-1
the article went on, the West had taken up the banner of peace
in the hope of deceiving the simple. The article noted that
the American aim remained that of destroying the bloc, and it
concluded with a citation of Mao's dictum about not overesti-
mating the enemy or underestimating one's own forces.
During January, there was apparently a conference of party
leaders and provincial first secretaries in Shanghai, concerned
with the 1960 economic plan and related matters. While this
conference was going on, the regime on 22 January issued a
communique asserting that the 1959 production targets had been
overfulfilled, and that grain production was about 270 million
tons. This latter claim, of an increase of about eight per-
cent, even if accurate would have fallen short of the party's
own definition of the minimum requirement of a "leap" in agri-
culture (stated by Chou En-lai as a 10-to-20 percent increase);
and the true figure is estimated to have been about 190 mil-
lion tons. Nevertheless, the 1959 figures were presented as
demonstrating the "absolute correctness" of the general line
and the leap and commune programs, which were noted again to
have been proposed by Mao himself.
During January and February, the Chinese Communists were
giving further expression to their dispute with Moscow on Com-
munist strategy by clashing with Soviet representatives in the
world Communist front organizations--in the World Peace Coun-
cil in January, and in the International Union of Students
in February. In the same period, Kang Sheng, the Chinese ob-
server at a Warsaw Pact meeting, stated what was clearly a
minority position at the meeting, a position critical of So-
viet approaches to the United States and particularly critical
of Soviet positions on disarmament. Kang's speech, not re-
ported by bloc media outside China, was said to have been so
offensive in the original that Khrushchev was moved to rebut
it, criticizing a number of Chinese positions.
Party leaders in late February and March gave much atten-
tion to the importance of Mao's thought and to the need to
develop agriculture.* As in January, Li Fu-chun again attributed
*Muc ater in the year, Red Flag asserted that Mao at the
eighth plenum, in August 1959, had proposed placing agriculture
"in the position of foremost importance" among economic ques-
tions.
Sanitized - Approved For Re TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
SYURE
 Sanitized - Approved For ReF& "CIA-RDP7S 00427A000600110001-1
the "great achievements" of 1958 and 1959 to the strength of
mass movements under Mao's guidance, movements undertaken in
the spirit of 'uninterrupted revolution" and with "politics
in command." Qualifications of the sort associated with lead-
ers of the administrator-economist wing of the party were also
apparent, however, in Li's mention of the need for not ignor-
ing material incentives and the need to combine great enthu-
siasm with scientific analysis. The emphasis of the dominant
group was apparent in a Peop1e's Daily article at the same
time, which credited Mao with the 'discovery" that political
indoctrination was more important than material incentives.
The party-machine figure Liu Ning-i, in a longwinded speech
of early March exhorting a great "leap" in 1960, pointed out
that adherence to Mao's thought meant assurance of success,
whereas "should we once deviate from Mao Tse-tung's ideology,
we would most assuredly commit mistakes."
The party-machine figure Tan Chen-lin, writing in Red
Flag in mid-March, provided the first top-level endorsement
of the 10-year plan for the mechanization of agriculture ad-
vanced by Po I-po the previous October--a delay possibly ex-
plained by continuing debate on the plan. Tan insisted that
the plan could be achieved if the party adhered to the instruc-
tion of the central committee and Mao; he called for such
mechanization through a mass campaign, stimulating revolution-
ary enthusiasm, acting boldly, wiping out "rightist-inclined
conservative ideology," and so on. The party machine figure
Ko Ching-shih spoke later in the month, with less sloganeering
than had Tan, in support of a new campaign to stimulate techno-
logical innovations in all sectors of the economy.
The economic specialists Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien,
and the party-machine figure Tan Chen-lin, gave the principal
reports to the National People's Congress in late March and
early April. These reports praised the achievements of Mao's
thinking, spoke scornfully of the activities in 1959 of a "hand-
ful of right opportunists," called for a 23 percent increase
in the value of industrial and agricultural output in 1960 (an
increase of 31 percent was claimed for 1959), and exhorted the
campaign for technical innovations. These reports emphasized
the importance of developing agriculture, and the 1960 plan
and budget provided for a substantial increase in resources
to be allocated to this end. However, heavy industry was still
to get a much greater share of resources in 1960, and Tan's
speech gave a relatively modest target for agricultural production
Sanitized - Approved For ReIg?~REICIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
SECRET
as of 1967--about 375 million tons, or an annual increase of
about seven percent.*
Li Fu-chun's report revealed that urban communes were
being set up "in a big way" in China. The resumption of this
program, which had been postponed indefinitely by the party
plenum of December 1958, was perhaps the best indication of
the period that the thinking of Mao and the party-machine
leaders still dominated the party. However, Mao's thinking
had apparently changed in one important respect, as the national
agricultural development program published a few days later
called inter alia for popularizing birth control--a program
favored less in the past by Mao and the party-machine leaders
than by the administrators and economists.
Chou En-lai gave a minor report to the National People's
Congress, on the international situation. He stated some of
Mao's propositions on world Communist strategy--that the East
Wind prevailed, that peace was to be achieved by struggle, and
that American policies could not change--but he did so in a
non-polemical manner. He included a strong expression of grati-
tude for Soviet aid to China, and he spoke of the "sacred duty"
of proletarian internationalism.
There were only a few pronouncements by party leaders on
the party's domestic programs in the remainder of the spring
of 1960. Po I-po found occasion in May to describe the economic
situation as 'very good," with industrial production in the
first quarter of 1960 far above that of the same period in 1959,
and with the commune program developing well. Po and Li Hsien-
nien both gave considerable attention to the campaign for tech-
nical innovations; Li attributed the "lines" of this campaign
to Mao.
The most important development in Communist China--and
in the world Communist movement as well--i.r. the spring of
1960 was unquestionably the publication in April of the Lenin
Anniversary pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung and his theorists.
These constituted a systematic defense of Chinese positions
*Tan's displacement of Teng Tzu-hui was emphasized by this
appearance: the extremist Tan had been wrong, the rightist
Teng had been right, nevertheless it was Tan who was chosen
to state this more conservative line, as if he had been right
all along.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approvved For ReIeAW" IA-RDP79SbO427A000600110001-1
with respect to both domestic and foreign policy, and a com-
prehensive indictment of Soviet positions on world Communist
strategy. These pronouncements--which came in the form of
anonymous or pseudonymous articles in Red Flag and People's
Daily, plus a long speech by Lu Ting-i--were soon put n pam-
plet form and circulated by the Chinese party to other Com-
munist parties, thus carrying to the world Communist movement
the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the movement.
Virtually every point made in the Chinese party's pro-
nouncements during April 1960--with respect both to building
Communism and to world Communist strategy--had been made earlier
in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute on one or another
occasion by one or another spokesman. However, there had been
nothing on the scale of these April pronouncements, nothing
so scornful in tone, and nothing so clearly meant to represent
the views of Mao Tse-tung. The most important item in the col-
lection, the long article which appeared in the mid-April Red
Flag, was later described by an official Chinese source as one
o the great articles embodying the "glorious contributions"
of Mao to historical materialism (the others named being the
two long articles of 1956 on the "historical experience of the
proletariat" and the official version of Mao's "contradictions"
speech published in June 1957).
Comparatively small portions of the April pronouncements
were devoted to Chinese domestic programs. The pronouncements
did contain, however, spirited defenses of the general line,
the "leap," the commune program and related programs, and the
doctrinal concepts underlying all these policies and programs,
against the "modern revisionists" and "slanderers." The es-
sential argument was that Mao and his comrades, close students
and faithful followers of Lenin, had made creative contribu-
tions to Leninism which Lenin would surely have applauded, in
contrast to the behavior of certain contemporary Communists
who neither knew nor followed Lenin, were incapable of making
such contributions, and did not even have the wit to recognize
them.
By far the greatest part of each of the April pronounce-
ments was devoted to attacking Soviet positions on world Com-
munist strategy. The essentials of the Chinese case were
stated in each of the articles, and every point in the Chinese
case--as summarized below--was contained in the Red Flag article
later specified as embodying Mao's thought.
Sanitized - Approved For Releases-
tDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
ICKE
 Sanitized - Approved ved For Relg@~lA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1 'low
With respect to the basic assessment, the balance of power,
whereas Moscow conceded the West to be still militarily strong,
the Chinese Lenin anniversary pronouncements again disparaged
Western strength and insisted that the bloc's military superiority
would permit a much more aggressive world Communist program,
Whereas Moscow spoke of the disastrous consequences of a world
war for the world, Peiping emphasized the survival capabilities
of the bloc (especially of China) and its ability to build a
new world rapidly, and contended that fear of war was an ignoble
and unacceptable reason for failing to pursue an aggressive
program.
Further, whereas Moscow emphasized the possibility of
avoiding world war, Peiping emphasized American preparations
for war and the consequent need for the bloc to prepare its
people for that possibility. Whereas Moscow asserted the bloc's
increasing ability to deter the West from local wars as well,
and also emphasized the danger of the expansion of such wars,
Peiping contended that there was an increasing prospect of such
Western-initiated wars and that the opportunity to fight them
should be welcomed, and it minimized the danger of their ex-
pansion. Whereas Moscow promised to support "just" wars--both
Western-initiated local wars and Communist-sponsored-or-exploit-
ed "liberation" wars--Peiping contended scornfully that Moscow's
fear of world war was deterring it from giving adequate support
to "just" wars, the successful prosecution of which would be
greatly to the advantage of the world Communist movement.
Further, whereas Moscow asserted that "peaceful coexist-
ence" was a long-term objective of the bloc, Peiping insisted
that this concept misrepresented any conceivable relationship
with the West, that appeasement of the West under this slogan
would gain nothing, that even a militant interpretation of the
concept impeded the world revolutionary struggle, and that the
struggle--struggle against a clearly-defined enemy--was far more
important than "peace." Whereas Moscow held that there were
"realistic" leaders in the West, that negotiations were worth-
while, and that disarmament was both a useful issue and a
feasible long-term goal, Peiping charged that Moscow was being
gulled by the West, that the emphasis should be on struggle
and not on talks, and that disarmament was neither possible
nor desirable.
Further, whereas Moscow asserted the desirability and in-
creasing possibility of Communist parties coming to power by
Sanitized - Approved For Re t TCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP 00427A000600110001-1
peaceful means, Peiping argued that violence was both necessary
and desirable and that Communists must have the courage to use
it. Similarly, whereas Moscow spoke of the decreasing import-
ance of armed struggle in colonial areas and encouraged coopera-
tion with bourgeois forces in such countries, Peiping emphasized
the importance of armed struggle in gaining independence and
the importance of seizing the leadership of the revolution in
the early stages. Whereas Moscow spoke of the usefulness to
the bloc of the independent countries and envisaged protracted
cooperation with the bourgeois nationalist leaders of them,
Peiping charged Moscow with exaggerating the importance of the
neutrals, emphasized the unreliability of their leaders, and
called for efforts to bring them down more rapidly. Whereas
Moscow called for a gradualist program for Communist parties
in developed Western countries, Peiping derided this program
as opportunist, asserted that civil wars in the West were in-
evitable, and called for the revolutionary overthrow of West-
ern governments. Finally, whereas Moscow pursued a flexible
policy in the world Communist fronts, aiming at enlisting the
maximum cooperation of non-Communists, Peiping called for a
more militant line at whatever the cost.
The Red Flag article later said to embody Mao's thought
was the most sustained polemic of the lot, and it included
several of the imprecations against "modern revisionists"
which Chinese spokesmen were soon to hurl at the Soviet party
in face-to-face encounters, e.g., that the modern,revisionists
tried to prove Lenin "outmoded," that there was "nominal op-
position to dogmatism which is actually opposition to Marxism-
Leninism," and that revisionism was the "main danger" to the
movement. Lu Ting-i made these same points and went so far
as to accuse the revisionists--in a context clearly aiming at
Khrushchev--of "revising, emasculating, and betraying" Marxism-
Leninism.
On 27 April, Defense Minister Lin Piao reaffirmed some
of Mao's propositions on military strategy. He emphasized
that, while Peiping recognized the "important role technology
plays in war," the Chinese were confident that they could
meet an American nuclear attack with a "people's war."
One of the articles cited above (People's Daily, 22 April)
had observed that "we see no substantial anger n American
policy on the eve of the summit meeting in Paris. In early
May, Peiping was much cheered by the U-2 incident. Mao was
Sanitized - Approved For ReJ CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 ~'ECCRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP74600427A000600110001-1
directly quoted on 14 May, citing the incident as "exposing"
the true character of U.S. imperialism and expressing the hope
that those who had held "illusions" about the U.S. "would be
awakened" by this development. Mao said further that, while
the Chinese supported summit talks, winning peace depended on
"resolute struggle," e.g. driving the United States out of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The party machine leaders Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen,
and the government leader Chou En-lai, spoke on 19 and 20 May
in support of some of Mao's propositions on world Communist
strategy. Peng and Chou, speaking at occasions for an Algerian
delegation, both praised the Algerian rebellion as an example
for other peoples and spoke of the revolutionary storm rising
throughout the world. Teng, in a speech endorsing Khrushchev's
action in breaking off the summit talks, reaffirmed that nego-
tiations were useful only to expose the imperialists and that
the emphasis must be on "struggle," and he too spoke of the
rising storm. There is no doubt that the failure of the summit
talks gave the Chinese added confidence in the righteousness
of their entire position on world Communist strategy.
The Soviet party is reliably reported to have proposed
to the Chinese party on 2 June that they meet in Bucharest
later in the month to discuss world Communist strategy in the
light of the summit failure. The Chinese are said to have
sought a postponement in order to prepare properly, but Khru-
shchev is said to have replied that the Bucharest meeting
would be merely preliminary, not a meeting seeking "defini-
tive solutions."
The Hard Summer, 1960
The emboldened Chinese party returned to the offensive,
on questions of world Communist strategy, at the meeting of
the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peiping in early June.
The party machine leaders at this time took up the leading
roles, which they have played ever since, in the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
In speeches immediately preceding and during the WFTU
meeting, Liu Shao-chi, Liu Ning-i, and Liu,Chang-sheng all
attacked Soviet positions in harsh terms, along the lines of
Sanitized - Approved For R916eT: CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A proved For R I T: CIA-RDP74900427A000600110001-1
the Chinese party's Lenin Anniversary pronouncements in April.
Also during the meeting, some of the Chinese leaders--including
Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Chou En-lai--had private meet-
ings with various of the delegates in which they lobbied against
Soviet positions.
The Soviet and Chinese parties exchanged insults in their
party journals in mid-June. The Soviet journals pointed to
"leftist sectarian" errors and "leftwing deviationism," and
criticized Chinese domestic programs as "revisionist." Chinese
journals derided the views Khrushchev had allegedly brought
to the summit talks, compared itself to the wise peasant who
had saved the naive schoolmaster (Khrushchev) from the wolf
(the U.S.), observed nastily that "the essence of modern revi-
sionism is capitulation in the name of peace," and denounced
those who accused the Chinese of "stiff dogmatism" while pre-
senting their own "shameful actions" as a "creative development
of Marxism-Leninism." At the same time, stopping in Moscow
on their way to the Bucharest conference, the Chinese reportedly
maintained their righteousness in discussions with Soviet repre-
sentatives and said that they would alter their views only if
they were "proved" wrong--in other words, that they would not
back down merely if outvoted in such meetings, a position which
they have maintained ever since.
Khrushchev spoke on the first day--21 June--of the Bucharest
meeting. He reaffirmed Soviet positions under attack by the
Chinese, and he described the opponents of his ideological in-
novations as persons who "act like children." On the same day,
25X1Casthe Soviet delegation reportedly began to meet with other dele-
gations to give them a systematic account of the vino-Soviet 25X1C
dispute
The Soviet delegation then took the initiative in draft-
ing a communique which was subsequently discussed by the dele-
gates. Before the Chinese spoke, at least 13 of the delega-
tions reportedly spoke in favor of the communique as drafted,
and were critical of the Chinese; the Indonesian delegate, however,
Sanitized - Approved For ReJ~aT CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A l,proved For I e~ease : CIA-RDP74WO0427A000600110001-1
was either non-commital or pro-Chinese. At this point Peng
Chen of the Chinese delegation spoke, complaining that much
of the criticism had been "unjust" and asking for more careful
consideration of the Chinese point of view; Peng defended
Chinese domestic and foreign policies at some length. Several
other delegates then spoke, with only the Albanians of this
group supporting the Chinese. Khrushchev then spoke in reply
to Peng's speech; he reviewed the charges in the Soviet party
letter of 21 June and reportedly made some fresh charges re-
lating to Chinese chauvinism, Chinese non-cooperation in So-
viet-proposed defense projects, the purge of Peng Te-huai for
agreeing with certain Soviet positions, the foolishness of
various Chinese domestic programs (including the "leap forward"
and the communes), and Mao's personal vanity. Peng Chen re-
portedly replied in kind, emphasizing that the Chinese party
would not tolerate a father-son relationship with the Soviet
party and asserting that it was the Soviet party which was
splitting the world movement by organizing meetings of this
type against the Chinese. Kang Sheng reportedly followed Peng
in criticizing aspects of Soviet strategy.
The Chinese did, however, sign the innocuous communique
published by the Bucharest conference. Immediately there-
after, the Soviet and Chinese press published editorials--in
which Moscow sought to give the false impression that it had
the support of the entire world Communist movement, while Pei-
ping emphasized the continuing danger of "revisionism." The
CPSU central committee met in plenum in mid-July and adopted
a resolution on the Bucharest conference; the resolution ac-
cused the Chinese, without naming them, of dogmatism, leftwing
sectarianism, and narrow nationalism.
The Chinese party apparently held a series of top-level
meetings (but not a plenum) in June and July. The meetings
were presumably concerned with both the Sino-Soviet dispute
and Chinese economic problems.
The changes in the commune program ordered in 1959 had
nominally transferred the main "ownership" from the commune
level to the production brigade, the smaller unit approximat-
ing the pre-commune collective farms. That is, the changes
were intended to return to the brigades most of the authority
for organizing production and distributing income, and to
ensure that the smallest farm unit, the production team, had
some voice in the actual field work. The commune was to
Sanitized - Approved For RiAl- : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appoved For ReIIR CIA-RDP79 OO427A000600110001-1
supervise the activities of its subordinate brigades but was
to stay out of the management of day-to-day farm activity.
The system was not operated in 1960 as promulgated in
1959, and this was in large part Peiping's own fault; discus-
sions of how authority was to be returned to the brigades had
been accompanied by insistence on the past and future import-
ance of the communes. Thus, in 1960, many or most communes
saw to it that politics remained "in command." Non-cultiva-
tion activities continued without regard to cost or usefulness,
private farming activities of the peasants were prohibited,
rural free markets were closed, arbitrary sowing plans and
production targets were imposed, and rural manpower was trans-
ferred arbitrarily from task to task. The bad effects of such
management practices were compounded by the reduced capabilities
of the overworked and underfed peasants. Moreover, a serious
shortage of farm labor developed. Some 10 million people were
diverted to expand collective hog-raising in the busy agricul-
tural month of May; many or most of the collectively-raised
hogs, poorly indoctrinated, died later in the year. The labor
force in commune industry was expanded from 5 million to 8
million by spring 1960, and most of the increment was used to
manufacture new and untested items of farm machinery; a much-
advertised mechanical rice transplanter was turned out by the
millions before it was found impractical. A great amount of
rural construction work was also done on irrigation projects,
roads, and hillside terracing; most of this proved to be of
little value.
The "leap forward" attitude had also prevailed in heavy
industry. The party had continued to emphasize all-out pro-
duction--the 1960 target for crude steel, for example, was
18.4 million tons, as compared with 13.5 million tons in 1959--
with little regard for quality, cost, and apportionment of
output. The campaign to encourage the masses to invent new
tools and devise new production methods itself reflected the
party's disregard of careful planning and scientific tech-
nology. By June 1960, the party was seeing the results: the
labor force was tired and machines were breaking down, while
unusable products and devices were piling up.
During June and July, while the party meetings were going
on, the party was struck two unexpected and heavy blows. The
first of these was a very poor wheat harvest, which, together
with the difficulties in the commune program noted above, moved
Sanitized - Approved For Re sT CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appr ed For Release : IA-RDP79SQ 27A000600110001-1
People's Daily in July to declare flatly that "agriculture
must a taken as the first task." It was only in October
1960 that the party press got around to crediting Mao person-
ally with having initiated this line, allegedly at the party
plenum of August 1959.
The second blow came in mid-July, when the Soviet Union
suddenly began the withdrawal of its technicians. It was ap-
parent that this Soviet move, as the Chinese reportedly pro-
tested to Moscow at once, would greatly retard the economic
development of Communist China. This damage, reflecting the loss
of the great technological contribution of the technicians,
could not possibly be repaired by any of the policies pursued
under the "general line." The Soviet move was thus an ideal
practical expression of Soviet criticism of the "general line."
The first response of the Chinese party to this latest
blow came in the 5 August number of the organ of CCP's Shanghai
committee, of which the party-machine figure Ko Ching-shih was
first secretary. Ko may have written, and in any case he ap-
proved, this editorial. The editorial discussed the need for
bitter struggle in the face of the problems posed by a back-
ward country, by the frank opposition of the imperialist
enemy, and by those who "call us fools who do not know our
limitations"; the editorial derided those who would "have us
merely stretch out our hands for aid," and it emphasized the
need for self-reliance. People's Daily a few days later re-
minded the party that Mao had 'a ways instructed us...to pre-
pare for the worst" while working for the best.
Li Fu-chun, the regime's principal economic planner, was
chosen to state more systematically--in the mid-August Red
Flag--the party's decisions of June and July and its attitude
toward the withdrawal of the technicians. Li reviewed the
"victory" of the general line, the "leap" and the commune pro-
gram, a victory which "aroused the hatred of domestic and
foreign reactionaries and modern revisionists." The party was
to proceed along the same lines, "to continue to develop to-
ward perfection." The aid of the "people" of the bloc had
been an important factor in Chinese victories. However, since
1958 imperialists, reactionaries, "modern revisionists and
Sanitized - Approved For FW@#py : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - AQproved For Re eeseT CIA-RDP77600427A000600110001-1
those who echo them" had engaged in 'anti-Chinese activity"
and had attempted to "isolate us," thus proving that "we are
real Marxist-Leninists." Li went on to state that the party
"must place agricultural production in the foremost position"
as a long-term policy and must immediately achieve an increase
in food crops. The immediate answer, Li wrote, was to econo-
mize manpower in all sectors in order to 'reinforce the agri-
cultural production front," while the long-range solution lay
in the mechanization of agriculture. The targets for all
sectors of economic planning, Li said, should be "both for-
ward-looking and reliable, leaving appropriate room for over-
fulfillment." The country was again to be taken as 'one co-
ordinated chess game," and capital construction was to be re-
duced appropriately. As for help from abroad, the Chinese
party's "long-term policy" was that of "self-reliance"; while
maximum help would be sought, "the party has consistently
held that we should mainly rely on our own efforts; this was
so in the past and will be even more so in the future." Li
called for a nationwide campaign to reindoctrinate both cadres
and masses in the concept of relying on one's own efforts
rather than upon others.
The Soviet party remained on the offensive in August.
Various Soviet journals, defending a range of Soviet positions
in the dispute, derided "dogmatists and sectarians," "publi-
cists" who selectively quoted Lenin, people who had made ab-
d d
rawn
25X1C solute departures" from Marxism-Leninism and ha
pletely absurd" conclusions. The Soviet press also warned the
the bloc
i
f
.
on
rom
Chinese of the consequences of iROJA
25X1 C
A further indication of a Chinese intention to stand firm
in the wino-Soviet dispute came in early September at the Viet
Minh party congress at Hanoi, where the Soviet and Chinese rep-
resentatives stated their opposing views at point-blank range.
Li Fu-chun,;expanding his role in party affairs, was the Chinese
spokesman, reaffirming Chinese positions and concluding with
the observation that "we must not take the struggle against
dogmatism as a pretext for departing from fundamental theoretical
positions of Marxism-Leninism, nor allow Marxism-Leninism to
Sanitized - Approved For RelegRigR IA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Reftft p CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
be replaced by revisionism." The Soviet delegate, angered,
struck back hard with a denunciation of the "divisive acti-
vities of the dogmatists and sectarians" (the Chinese) as a
25X1C "serious danger" to the movement.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 5X1 C
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RefeaseT: CIA-RDP79&00427A000600110001-1
25X1 C
25X1 C
Intransigence and Retreat, Autumn 1960
Throughout the autumn of 1960, the Chinese party remained
intransigent with respect to issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
while, under the pressure of its economic problems, it virtually
abandoned the economic policies introduced in the "leap forward"
years.
25X1 C
the party-machine leaders Teng Hsiao-ping and
Peng Chen went to Moscow as the Chinese delegates to the 26-
party preparatory meeting for the November conference. The
senior party-machine leader, Liu Shao-chi, was to return to
Moscow with them in November as chief of the delegation.
On 1 October, Communist China's National Day, the regime
began to distribute a fourth volume of Mao's collected works,
edited by the publications committee of the CCP central com-
mittee. This action, with subsequent commentary, made Mao
himself the principal spokesman for the party in this period.
In the speeches and articles surrounding National Day, Mao's
theorists, some lesser party-machine figures than those in
Moscow, some of the administrator-economist group, and some
of the military leaders, played supporting roles for Mao and
for Teng and Peng in Moscow.
Sanitized - Approved For Rg tq&G~: CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized. - Approved For RAW CIA-RDP74$00427A000600110001-1
Comment on Mao's fourth volume, his writings during the
1945-49 period of the civil war, was supplied by Peiping radio,
by editorials in People's Daily and Red Flag, and by the mili-
tary leaders Lin Piao Minister of Defense and Fu Chung (a
deputy director of the political department). The speeches
on National Day were given by the administrator-economist
leaders Chou En-lai and Chen Yi (both in Peiping), and by the
? party.machine figure Ko Ching-shih (in Shanghai). In another
display of unity, all of the leaders of the party-machine
group (except Teng and Peng, in Moscow) of the administrator-
economist group (including Chen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui), and of
the military group (except the purged Peng Te-huai), appeared
on the rostrum with Mao to view the National Day parade.*
These various Chinese pronouncements reaffirmed, in one
? place or another, virtually all of the points made in the Lenin
Anniversary articles of April and in the Chinese party letter
of 10 September, with respect to Chinese domestic programs and
(in much more detail) world Communist strategy, as well as
reiterating and enlarging on the party's views on "modern re-
visionism." On this latter question, some of the points made
were that Mao Tse-tung was the world's foremost Marxist-Lenin-
ist thinker, that Mao's line was contrary to all forms of "op-
portunism," and that to "equip our minds" with Mao's thinking
and "oppose modern revisionism in all its forms" was the party's
*Following National Day, Chen Yun, who had been out of the
news for six months prior to this appearance, disappeared from
the national news for three more months; however, the provincial
press revealed that he was in Anhwei in late October and early
November, and may have had a hand in the replacement of the
first secretary of the Shantung committee by the first secretary
from Anhwei. Teng Tzu-hui, absent for five months before this
occasion, disappeared again for seven months. Lin Piao was
also out of the news for several months after National Day,
but almost certainly owing to illness; Communist sources them-
selves described him as "physically weak," and he was reported
to be very ill again. All other leaders of the various groups
appeared frequently after National Day 1960, except for Peng
Te-huai, whose last appearance was as a member of a funeral
committee in May 1960, who was probably formally found guilty
of "anti-party activity" soon thereafter, and whose next
appearance may be at his own funeral.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele S ,91A-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R 6%%V CIA-RDP7900427A000600110001-1
"most important task at present." None of these pronouncements,
however, was nearly so ambitious as either the mid-April Red
Flag article or the 10 September letter, and none of them dis-
cussed issues between the Soviet and Chinese states such as
military and economic relations or the key issue between the
parties of whether the world Communist movement was to operate
on the principle of majority rule.
During the first three weeks of October, Teng Hsiao-ping
and Peng Chen headed the Chinese delegation to the Moscow meet-
ings of the preparatory committee for the November conference.
All the bloc countries and 14 non-bloc countries were represent-,
ed--a total of 26 delegations. Suslov and Kozlov headed the
Soviet delegation.
Looking forward to a declaration to be published by the
November conference, the preparatory committee in October was
given a Soviet draft declaration to consider. This was organized
on the scheme of the 6 December declaration of the parties.
The Chinese for their part reportedly circulated their 10
September letter.
With respect to matters of world Communist strategy and
of authority and discipline in the movement, Teng and Peng
reportedly stood on the positions taken in the Lenin Anniver-
sary pronouncements and in the 10 September letter. During
the three weeks, the committee managed to find acceptable lan-
guage for the draft declaration with respect to almost all
questions of strategy. It did this, as the 6 December declara-
tion was to make apparent, by stating both the Soviet and Chi-
nese positions on the issue or by offering evasive formulations.
The committee was unable to find acceptable language, however,
on several critical questions relating to authority and disci-
pline in the movement. In particular, the Chinese stood firm
in refusing to agree to any language which would imply that
Soviet party resolutions were binding on other parties or would
establish the principle of majority rule in the movement. The
draft was left uncompleted, for referral to the conference in
November.
During the course of the meetings, the Albanian delegation
reportedly gave strong support to the Chinese, and several
Asian delegations--bloc and non-bloc--reportedly supported the
Chinese on some important questions. It was apparent that
in the forthcoming November conference the Chinese party, while
opposed by the great majority of the parties, would not be
isolated.
- 43 -
Sanitized - Approved For R Je : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A roved For Reh.' TCIA-RDP7$W00427A000600110001-1
By October, the Chinese economy was clearly in even worse
trouble than it had been in June. The outlook for agricultural
production, the task publicly placed in the "foremost position"
two months earlier, was especially bleak. Despite the assur-
ance of some of the party journals in September that the situa-
tion was "quite favorable" and that there was a "bumper harvest"
ahead, food shortages had persisted through the summer without
any prospect of improvement in the winter. Drought, flood,
and insects had inflicted "serious losses" on much of the area
sown to grain.
During October and November there was apparently another
top-level meeting (not a plenum) of the Chinese party in Pei-
ping, which undertook the most extensive review of the rural
commund program since August 1959. The results of the review
were codified in a 12-point resolution issued on 3 November.
Although the directive was not published, its contents were
made fairly clear by discussions in the press and in develop-
ments in local areas. Whereas the changes ordered in 1959
had been compromised by the party's concurrent campaign against
the rightists, the November 1960 directive evidently made
clear that the party leadership was serious in wanting to re-
verse policy.
The evidence indicates that the November directive had
three principal aims: to reduce peasant resentment; to over-
haul finances and curtail wasteful investments; and to imcrove
farming methods and management practices.
Peasant unrest had reached serious proportions after three
years of overwork and two years of undereating. The new direc-
tive provided that the pace of work was to be eased, the peas-
ants were not be be maltreated, compensation was to be given
for property confiscated since 1958, wages were not to be with-
held in the form of forced deposits, and food rations were to
be increased (or at least some effort made to alleviate starva-
tion). Moreover, private plots were reinstituted, and the
peasants were given supplies of seed and fertilizer and time
off to work the plots. Further, rural trade fairs (limited
free markets) were reopened.
The new, relatively conservative financial rules for com-
munes and brigades were summarized by Red Flag as the "policy
of keeping less and distributing more and the policy of distri-
buting less by the free supply system than by the wage system."
Sanitized - Approved For Re ease:CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
SEC
 Sanitized - Approved For RejggggT CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
In a further retreat from the original concept of the commune,
the brigades were told to keep "free supply"--foodstuffs dis-
tributed communally through the messhalls --below 30 percent,
leaving a maximum amount to be distributed directly to the
peasants on the basis of workpoints. Moreover, the brigades
were told, when distributing gross income, to see that at
least 90 percent of commune members got an increase in income;
the proportion of gross income distributed for consumption
was to be 65 percent rather than 55-60 percent. Finally, tight
controls over production costs were reimposed, in order to
discourage reckless investments of the "leap forward" years.
Drastic changes also occurred in management policies af-
fecting all rural production, i.e. production in commune industry,
cultivation of crops, and other agricultural activities. These
changes were brought about by curtailing commune industry,
collective hog farms, and construction activities; reassigning
the labor released from these activities back to the produc-
tion teams to work in the fields, and transferring thousands
of officials downward to production teams; discontinuing almost
all of the superintensive farming methods introduced since
1958 (the "eight-point charter" which had been closely identi-
fied with Mao Tse-tung himself); and giving production team
officials more responsibility for deciding how to grow crops.
As for the latter, perhaps the most important feature of the
November directive, the brigade was to assign to its teams fixed
amounts of land, manpower, draft animals, and tools, and was
then to give the teams full authority over the use of these
resources for the duration of farming season.
It may have been in the October-November meeting--in any
case, not later--that the Chinese party decided to re-establish
its regional bureaus, dissolved in 1954 in the aftermath of
the Kao-Jao case. Because the Kao-Jao challenge to the party
leadership had been based in part on the regional organizations
built up by these two leaders, the party was presumably reluct-
ant to set up again these powerful complexes of political,
economic and military authority which by their nature present
the threat of "independent kingdoms." The decision to resur-
rect them--for Northwest China, North China, Northeast China,
Southwest China, Central-South China, and East China, with
jurisdictions probably much the same as those of the earlier
commands--reflected both a concern with popular discontent and
a recognized need for better coordination of economic activity
from the party center.
Sanitized - Approved For Rdgo&T CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RelggREZCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
Only one of the first secretaries of these regional bureaus
has been identified--Sung Jen-chiung of the Northeast bureau,
a longtime lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping, brought to Peiping
in 1955 to serve again as Teng's deputy and later named to head
the ministry believed responsible for developing atomic energy.
Most or all of these first secretaries will probably be found
to be party-machine figures--not merely men who have risen
through the party machine and occupy those key posts in it,
but men who have been closely associated in the past with the
party-machine leaders Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng
Chen. It also appears likely that these regional leaders will
be men more sensitive to and experienced in economic affairs
than is the case with most of the party machine figures. Two
party-machine figures who are also politburo members, Ko Ching-
shih and Li Ching-huan, have long been the regional leaders
in East China and Southwest China respectively, and would be
logical choices as the new first secretaries there. Similarly,
Tao Chu, a party-machine figure and a likely member of the
next politburo, long the most important iigure in the Central-
South area, would be the logical candidate for first secretary
there.* There seem several candidates for the Northwest and
North China posts.
At the same time, while the party machine leaders were
strengthening their positions in the structure of power with
the establishment of the great regional bureaus, the month of
November saw the first fall of an important party machine
figure since that of Jao Shu-shih in 1954.** Shu Tung, who
had been for years a lieutenant of Jao's but had survived his
fall and had taken over the important Shantung committee of
the party, apparently did not repeat Jao's mistake of attempt-
ing to displace his seniors; indeed, in the year before his
fall he had repeatedly and emphatically associated himself with
the propositions and programs of Mao and the party machine
leaders and had become a much-advertised exegete of Mao's
*Both Ko Ching-shih and Tao Chu have been noted in the past
as more practical and less dogmatic, in their comments on Mao's
economic policies, than other party machine figures.
**A lesser party-machine figure, a deputy of the man removed
in November 1959, had been removed in 1958.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A ,proved For Ft Ire s; : CIA-RDP77$00427A000600110001-1
thought, seeming to be a bright candidate for the next polit-
buro. Mao's programs, however, were particularly unsuccessful
in the chronically blighted province of Shantung. Although
in February 1959 Shu had suggested concern with the dangers
of building on the fake statistics encouraged by the exhorters
of the party machine, his later pronouncements suggested that
he had overcome his scruples on this point and had committed
himself to results he could not possibly achieve. He was re-
moved as first secretary of the Shantung committee in November
1960--pursued by an article by his temporary successor observ-
ing sourly that "all cadres should overcome high and mighty
bureaucratism and the habit of excusing themselves by plead-
ing special circumstances"--and has not appeared since.* The
"special circumstances" remained; economic conditions in
Shantung by spring 1961 were said to be so bad that the regime
permitted no visitors.
Liu Shao-chi was named to lead a powerful delegation to
the Moscow conference of the 81 Communist parties in November.
The other members were the party-machine leaders second and
third in importance, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, a- the
party-machine figures Li Ching-chuan (politburo member, first
secretary in Chengtu), Yang Shang-kun (of the secretariat),
Liu Ning-i (labor organizations), and Liu Hsiao (ambassador
in Moscow);** plus three of Mao's theorists and writers who
had played important roles in stating Chinese positions in
the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kang Sheng (politburo), Lu Ting-i
(politburo, and director of the propaganda department), and Hu
Chiao-mu (secretariat), and the unaligned Liao Cheng-chih (a
specialist in the fronts). There were no administrator-
economist figures or military figures in the delegation,
although several of the leaders of these groups saw the
delegation off.***
*The lst Secretary of the Tsingtao party committee and the
mayor of Tsinan were also removed.
**Liu Hsiao is a special case; perhaps reflecting his role
as an ambassador, his pronouncements have consistently seemed
designed to flatter and gratify the USSR.
***Peng Te-huai, Chen Yun, and Teng Tzu-hui were not among
those seeing the delegation off.
Sanitized - Approved For Re T CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For RefffjgT CIA-RDP7.%300427A000600110001-1
Liu Shao-chi in Moscow and the administrator-economist
leaders Chou En-lai and Chen Yi in Peiping all offered a num-
ber of agreeable remarks--on Soviet achievements and the im-
portance of the Sino-Soviet unity--on the occasion of the
October Revolution anniversary, the eve of the Moscow confer-
ence. At the same time, they all reaffirmed certain Chinese
positions in the dispute. Soviet spokesmen were doing the
same.
The Moscow Conference and After, Winter 1960-61
Most of the leaders of the world Communist movement gath-
ered in Moscow in November 1960 to discuss questions of world
Communist strategy and of authority and discipline in the move-
ment itself--and, if possible, to paper over the Sino-Soviet
dispute on the basis of the uncompleted draft declaration pre-
pared in October. There were delegations from 81 of the 87
Communist parties claimed to exist; they did not include Mao
Tse-tung or Kim Il-sung. 25X1C
25X1 C
The Soviet party began as it had at the Bucharest confer-
ence the previous June,
In so doing, the
Soviet party was making clear to everyone that it had not
abandoned or appreciably modified its positions: in other
words, the agreements reached in the draft declaration were
nominal agreements. Beyond this, the Soviet party was appar-
ently soliciting massive support for an effort to get at least
one hard agreement--on the principle of majority rule for the
world Communist movement, a principle which would oblige the
Chinese to refrain from public attacks on Soviet policy and
25X1C from lobbying with other parties.
25X1 C
Sanitized - Approved For ReaT CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rek%a Q CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
*IW "Vi
also done by Khrushchev himself, in a long speech on the first
day of the Moscow conference.* 25X10
25X1C With the benefit of some fragmentary reporting -
25X1C it is possible to reconstruct much
With respect to matters of world Communist strategy,
the balance
of power commended a bloc strategy of steady progress pri-
25X1C warily by non-military means, not a headlong and violent pro-
gram of the type the Chinese seemed to be exhorting; that
bloc strength was such that the West was increasingly deterred
from world war, but that the West was still militarily strong
(not a "paper tiger"), and, the consequences of a world war
being disastrous, the bloc itself should not accept serious
risks of a world war; that in building bloc strength to a posi-
tion of decisive superiority with which to speed the world
revolution, the Soviet model should be followed by other bloc
countries and Chinese economic planning should be better co-
ordinated with the bloc plan; that the West was increasingly
deterred from local wars as well as world war, and, because
local wars might easily expand, the bloc should try to deter
or halt such wars; that the bloc would give adequate support
to "liberation" wars--including "popular uprisings"--every-
where, but should be wary of actions risking Western interven-
tion; that "peaceful coexistence" remained the basis of So-
viet policy, and that Moscow would interpret this concept
with sufficient militancy; that the Soviet party remained
genuinely interested in complete or partial disarmament and
in negotiations with the West; that "armed struggle" in the
colonial areas was a less important means of attaining inde-
pendence than were other forms of action, and that Communist
parties should cooperate with the national bourgeoisie there;
that the newly-independent countries were useful to the bloc,
that bloc aid was important in ensuring their neutrality and
eventual seduction, and that "national democracy" was the mid-
dle-run objective; and that Communist parties in the West faced
difficult conditions and should pursue "democratic" goals at
this time. With respect to questions of authority and discipline
*T ese Soviet reaffirmations, clarifications, and amplifi-
cations were stated publicly by Khrushchev in his 6 January
report, in Moscow, on the November conference.
Sanitized - Approved For Release TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
25X1 C
 Sanitized - Approved For Rele Ef IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
11"W I%wl'
25X1 C
in the movement,
Chinese nationalism, dogmatism and sectarianism were dangerous
to the movement, and--the most important point--that the world
Communist movement should operate by majority rule.
25X1 C
Teng Hsiao-ping of the Chinese delegation reportedly re-
lied Khrushchev with a four-hour speech.
its behavior in the October meetings,
fragmentary reporting on the conference, and Peiping's subse-
quent presentation of the 6 December declaration, permit some
fairly confident conclusions as to what Teng said in his speech.
With respect to world Communist strategy, he evidently contended
that the balance of power favored a much more aggressive bloc
program; that the Soviet party was exaggerating Western strength,
and that a more aggressive program would not increase the risks
of war; that Soviet emphasis on, and exageration of the conse-
quences of, world war served to depress morale, and that the
Soviet emphasis on the possibility of avoiding a world war would
leave people unprepared for it if it came; that in building
bloc strength, the Chinese would persist in their present do-
mestic policies and would retain the aim of economic autarky;
that the West was if anything increasingly attracted to local
wars, that such wars could be contained and should be fought;
that the bloc should give stronger support to "liberation"
wars; that "peaceful coexistence" must not be allowed to retard
the world revolution; that disarmament was undesirable, and
even limited disarmament unlikely; that there was little to
be gained, and perhaps much to be lost, from negotiations with
Western leaders; that "armed struggle" in the colonial areas
was still of greatest importance in achieving independence,
and that Communist parties should attempt to seize leadership
in the early stages of the revolution; that the Soviet party
exaggerated the importance of the neutralists and of bloc aid
to them, that the concept of "national democracy" for the in-
dependent countries envisaged a program too cautious for the
existing opportunities, and that more pressure should be put
on bourgeois nationalist leaders; and that Communist parties
in those countries and in the West could come to power only
by violence. With respect to authority and discipline within
the movement, Teng evidently reaffirmed that revisionism was
the main danger, denied that the Chinese party was guilty of
nationalism, dogmatism or sectarianism, and--of greatest import-
ance--refused absolutely to accede to any formulation which
would establish the principle of majority rule.
Sanitized - Approved For Relea C"61A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For R$W : CIA-RDP74800427A000600110001-1
In the discussions which followed the speeches of Khru-
shchev and Teng--both of whom reportedly spoke again in these
discussions--the great majority of the delegations supported
Soviet positions on questions of strategy and/or authority
and discipline, either strongly or on balance. However, the
Chinese were not isolated: they were reportedly supported
strongly by the Albanians, supported on balance by the dele-
gations of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and
Malaya, and supported on various specific points by some other
Far Eastern parties (India, Japan, Thailand, Australia, New
Zealand) and by certain of the Latin American parties.
In the final days of the conference, Liu Shao-chi report-
edly negotiated with the Soviet delegation in an effort to find
acceptable language for certain critical points in the draft
declaration. The declaration that finally appeared--on 6 Dec-
ember--made clear that Liu won the most important point: the
declaration did not establish the principle of majority rule.
The 6 December declaration--the result of two months of
labor and discussion--was a curious document. Purporting to
set forth a program for the world Communist movement, it in
fact was a clumsy job of papering over the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. While it included a number of articles of faith of the
world Communist movement, some of these representing genuinely
agreed positions, for the most part it consisted of a mish-
mash of Soviet and Chinese positions.
With respect to the substantive issues in dispute, the
declaration represented, on balance, a Soviet victory: Soviet
propositions were given the greater weight, and were developed
at greater length. But with respect to questions of authority
and discipline in the movement, the declaration clearly repre-
sented a Chinese victory.
On the most important substantive issue, the definition
of the epoch (the central question being the assessment of the
balance of power), the declaration reflected primarily the
Soviet position that the bloc was "becoming" the decisive
factor in world affairs and could deter the West from military
forms of action, and that long-range economic competition would
be decisive. Soviet positions also prevailed in the declara-
tion's further discussion of the bloc, in that the USSR was
conceded to be far out in front in building Communism, and
Soviet economic principles were endorsed as well as the Soviet
call for better coordination of bloc economies.
Sanitized - Approved For R5: CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReI"TCIA-RDP7a800427A000600110001-1
The declaration again reflected Soviet positions primarily
on the question of world war, affirming the Soviet view on the
dreadful consequences of nuclear war and on the importance of
avoiding such a war. It was equivocal, however, on local wars,
asserting both the Chinese position that Western-initiated
local wars were likely and the Soviet position that the bloc
would usually be able to deter or quench them.
The declaration was equivocal on questions related to "peace-
ful coexistence." Communists were instructed not to underesti-
mate either the possibility of such coexistence or the possibility
of war, and it was contended that coexistence favored the strug-
gle while the struggle contributed to coexistence. The declara-
tion endorsed negotiated settlements of international problems,
but in a brief and slighting fashion. It reflected Ri-scow on
the importance of disarmament, but Peiping primarily on the
difficulties of achieving it.
In the discussion of the colonial areas, Soviet positions
were reflected in the emphasis on the importance of non-military
means of gaining independence and in the omission of a pledge
of greater support to "liberation" wars. Chinese positions
were reflected in the recognition of the importance of "armed
struggle" and liberation wars. The declaration was evasive
on the question of whether to be patient or impatient with the
national bourgeoisie.
With respect to the independent countries, the objectives
for united fronts in such countries were stated primarily in
Soviet terms. The declaration set forth the Soviet concept
of "national democracy" (a state like Cuba) as the transitional
form to socialism for independent countries. Communist parties
were given evasive instructions on the question of the degree
of their support for governments led by the national bourgeoisie.
The declaration reflected Soviet positions primarily in
its discussion of tactics for Communist parties in the West.
It had both the Soviet emphasis on the desirability and pos-
sibility of peaceful accession to power and the Chinese emphasis
on the possibility of violence, while it affirmed the Soviet
gradualist program for these parties.
The Chinese did very well indeed in the most important
section of the declaration, dealing with authority and disci-
pline in the movement. This section stated positions the Soviet
Sanitized - Approved For Rehja j, CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
SECRET Noe
and Chinese parties could appeal to equally in condemning re-
visionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism, in calling for adher-
ence to assessments worked out "jointly" at world Communist
conferences, in holding the parties responsible to the entire
Communist movement, and in providing for further conferences
and, in the interim, bilateral talks. However, the effect of
those provisions was to reduce the stature of the Soviet party,
and to increase that of the Chinese party, in the world move-
ment. The Soviet party had failed absolutely to establish the
principle of majority rule, while the Chinese had succeeded
in establishing positions which could be plausibly presented
as providing for unanimity to be reached before any world Com-
munist program could be presented.
The declaration seemed to indicate a Sino-Soviet agree-
ment to refrain for a time from polemics about bloc strategy,
but it also seemed to give additional force to certain pres-
sures on the Soviet party which the Chinese had been exerting--
to take a hard line in any talks with the West, to intervene
in any Western-initiated local wars, to give more substance
to professions of sympathy and support for "liberation" wars,
to put more pressure on bourgeois nationalist leaders of in-
dependent countries and so on.
The most significant development of the conference seemed
to be the success with which the Chinese had challenged Soviet
leadership of the movement, in that the conference provided
an official procedure for the challenge to continue. Given
the lack of clarity in the 6 December declaration, the number
of positions susceptible to differing interpretations, the
probable Soviet and Chinese persistence in differing interpre-
tations, and the existence of parties and factions within
parties sympathetic to Chinese rather than to Soviet interpre-
tations, it seemed quite likely that there would be a Sino-
Soviet contest for predominant influence in some of the parties.
Soviet and Chinese media began to offer tendentious in-
terpretations of the 6 December declaration within 24 hours
of its publication. By late January both Moscow and Peiping,
without resorting to polemics, had reaffirmed their positions
on virtually all of the issues which had been in dispute prior
to and during the Moscow conference. The principal role in
reaffirming, amplifying, and clarifying Soviet positions was
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
i
 Sanitized - Apprved For Release9RffA-RDP79SQ0427A000600110001-1
played by Khrushchev himself, in his 6 January report.* The
Chinese equivalent of Khrushchev's report, Teng Hsiao-ping's
report in mid-January, was withheld from publication, presum-
ably in the interest of bloc "unity." However, Chinese com-
mentaries in People's Daily and Red Flag soon amounted almost
to.a published equivalent to Khrushci rs report.
Peiping's attention in December and January was directed
primarily to preparations for a public retreat in its domestic
policies. Some observers have speculated that this retreat
represented an agreement concluded with the Soviet party at
the Moscow conference, but this view seems clearly mistaken.
Not only did the Chinese fiercely defend their past and cur-
rent policies in the Moscow meeting; they had substantially
modified the commune program before the November conference
began; and it was during the conference that it became clear
to them how far they would fall short of their 1960 agricul-
tural and industrial goals. It was in response to the imbal-
ances created in the economy by the "leap forward" policies
of the previous three years, to two successive years of poor
crop weather, and to the Soviet withdrawal of industrial tech-
nicians--and not in response to Soviet exhortation--that the
Chinese party made the more comprehensive shift at the ninth
plenum in January 1961.
The first Chinese announcements--in November and December--
of econadc achievements during 1960 made clear that agricul-
tural production had been a major disappointment. People's
Daily stated that China had been visited by the "most severe
natural calamities in 100 years," with no harvest at all in
some places. Although Peiping gave no figures, it seemed
likely that the 1960 grain crop would again, as in 1959,
total no more than 190 million tons, a shortfall of about
100 millions tons from the goal stated early in 1960. Even
with the same grain output as in 1958 and 1959, the food
situation had become much worse, because there were about 30
million more people to feed than in 1958.
*The anuary report, evidently a sanitized version of
Khrushchers speech on the first day of the November confer-
ence, served the same purpose as had the Soviet party letter
of early November--to make clear that the Soviet party had
not changed its mind on the issues, despite nominal agreements
reached in a multiparty statement.
Sanitized - Approved For Relgg8flE IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 SECRET
Sanitized - App ved For Release : CIA-RDP79SQ8427A000600110001-1
It was apparent in November and December that the party
would fail to achieve many of its goals in industrial produc-
tion as well. Although Peiping asserted that its 1960 targets
for steel, iron, coal, electric power, petroleum, machine tools
and tractors would be reached, again it provided no figures.
It was evident that light industry also would fall short.
Red Flag made clear on New Year's Day in 1961 that a major
reassessment of the party's domestic programs was underway.
It "estimated" that the principal industrial goals of 1960
had been achieved, but it could only praise the "heroic strug-
gle" against natural disasters on the agricultural front.
Showing little repentance for having rejected Soviet advice
on planning, the party journal observed that the party would
learn from the USSR but would take as the "first consideration"
the "actual conditions of our country." The journal went on
to concede that the party had not "completely understood the
objective laws" governing the economic development of China,
and it called for a more earnest effort to "sum up our experi-
ences," adopting a "realistic attitude," as Mao had "instructed
us from time to time."* The journal called upon the party
to learn from its failures as well as from its successes,
and it conceded that in its economic development China had
"taken only the first step." The journal emphasized that the
regime in 1961 must increase its efforts to accumulate funds
and labor power from other sources to reinforce the "agricul-
tural front."
The Sag Backward, Early 1961
The ninth plenum of the Chinese party's central committee
was held in Peiping for five days in mid-January. This was
the first announced plenum since August 1959, a delay reflect-
ing the reluctance of the party to admit the painful degree
to which its domestic programs had failed.
*That was exactly the case: Mao had called for a realistic
attitude "from time to time," i.e. when disaster had overtaken
programs conceived and executed in a manic state.
Sanitized - Approved For Rel,gLfECIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Relegig"'UIA-RDP79S&0427A000600110001-1
The communique of the plenum noted that the session
"heard and discussed" a report by Teng Hsiao-ping on the No-
vember conference of the Communist parties, and it expressed
"satisfaction" with work of the Chinese delegation headed by
Liu Shao-chi. It noted also that the plenum "fully approved"
the 6 December declaration issued by the conference, and it
called on the party and people to hold aloft this declaration
together with November 1957 declaration. The conference
being over, with at least a tacit agreement to refrain from
polemics for a time, the communique had nothing further to
say on this subject, while it had much to say about the party's
domestic programs.
The communique stated that the plenum had also "heard
and discussed" a report by Li ]Fu-chun* on the achievements
of the 1960 economic plan and on the main targets for the
1961 plan. Li's report was not published, and the communique
itself gave no figures for either 1960 achievements or 1961
targets--omissions indicating serious disappointment with
1960 and sharply reduced hopes for 1961. The communique in-
stead spoke in general terms of the achievements of the past
three-year period, offering what comfort it could in such
assertions as that China had risen to sixth place in the pro-
duction of steel and to second place in the production of
coal.
The communique admitted flatly that the agricultural plan
in 1960 "was not fulfilled," which it attributed to natural
calamities. It immediately pointed out that the organization
of the communes had "steadily improved," that water conservancy
had made "tremendous progress," that mechanization was proceed-
ing, and that the party's complex of agricultural policies
had been "enriched" in practice; it asserted that "all this"
had mitigated the loss from calamities and provided favorable
conditions for greater agricultural production in the future.
In sum, this portion of the communique declared, holding hard
to the slogans if not to the actual programs, the achievements
of the previous three years had demonstrated that the general
line, the leap forward, and the commune program "suit the
realities of China."
*It was Li who had sounded the first notes of a coming
policy of retrenchment in his Red Flag article in August 1960.
Sanitized - Approved For Release A-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App ed For Release : CIA-RDP79S9 427A000600110001-1
The communique went on to state that the nation's energies
in 1961 must be concentrated on the development of agriculture
in general and of grain production in particular. The process
of "consolidation" of the communes was to continue. Light in-
dustry was to try to overcome the shortage of materials and
to meet the people's needs "as far as possible." As for heavy
industry, in the light of its achievement of the goals origin-
ally scheduled for 1962,* capital construction in 1961 was to
be "appropriately reduced," the rate of development of industry
was to be "readjusted," and efforts were to be made "to improve
the quality of products, increase their variety, strengthen
the weak links in production, and continue to develop the mass
movement of technical innovations..."
The communique went on to admit, in effect, that the dis-
appointments of 1960 were caused by something more than natural
calamities--namely, popular opposition, and poor performance
by the party. This was done in terms of asserting that "more
than 90 percent' of the people supported the policies of the
party, that "more than 90 percent" of party and government
cadres worked conscientiously, and that among this great majority
there were "a few functionaries who, although good-willed and
well-intentioned,... lack understanding of the fundamental
policies of the party..." These "fundamental" policies were
specified as the policies embodying the various retreats forced
on the party since 1958; these mistaken cadres, in short, had
remained leftist when the party leadership was turning right.
In view of "all this," there was to be a nation-wide "rectifi-
cation" campaign among the cadres, with the emphasis evidently
to be on respecting "objective reality"** (two People's Daily
editorials in the next few days took up this theme
The communique went on to observe--in an unusual if not
unprecedented formulation in recent years--that the plenum
had "emphatically" pointed out that the tasks for 1961 were
*Western economists calculate that the rate of Chinese
industrial growth in 1960 was about 18 percent, as against
a planned rate of 29 percent.
**The emphasis in the 'rectification" of 1957 was very dif-
ferent, in effect a preparation for ignoring reality; in the
1961 campaign, little was said about "rectification," although
the theme of respecting reality remained.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap ved For R EW : CIA-RDP79900427A000600110001-1
"extraordinarily great and arduous." It called on the party
and people to persist in "going all-out and aiming high" (the
general line), but it refrained from invoking the principle
of "putting politics in command" and asked instead that they
"seek truth in facts" and work hard.
Finally, the communique noted that the plenum had "de-
cided" to set up six regional bureaus of the party--the
bureaus in fact set up some months earlier.
Whereas the eighth plenum in August 1959 had been held
"under the guidance" of Mao Tse-tung, the ninth plenum in
January 1961 was "presided over" by Mao. There seems no reason
to doubt that Mao was the ultimate arbiter for the ninth
plenum as well as for the eighth; in both cases, Mao did not
care to emphasize his association with a shift to the right.
Mao and the party-machine radicals, particularly Tan Chen-lin,
no doubt suffered some further loss of prestige in this shift
to the right, as they had in September and December of 1958
and in August 1959. However, Ko Ching-shih and Li Ching-chuan
of the party machine group had not been so firmly associated
with discredited policies as had others of this group.
With the new evidence of the failure of policies with
which Mao and the party-machine leaders had been most strongly
associated, the prestige of the administrator-economists
would be expected to rise. However, following the purge of
autumn 1959 and through most of 1960, the administrator-eco-
nomist leaders had contributed to the fostering of the "leap
forward" psychology appreciably more than they had in the
previous two years, and were thus in an even less favorable
position for gaining an advantage than they had been in
earlier periods of retreat. In any case, there was apparently
no advantage to be gained even by those who had stuck to
their guns; Chen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui, believed to be the
most conservative leaders of this group and with the best claim
to having been right, remained out of the news.
The communique of the ninth plenum provided some clues
as to the extent of the party purge in autumn 1959 and sub-
sequently; it stated that "83 members and 87 alternate members
of the central committee attended" the plenum. There had been
97 full members and 95 alternates after the elections of 1956.
Sanitized - Approved For ReAgase fi CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
CRE
 u CRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S&0427A000600110001-1
Of the 97 full members as of 1956, one had died (Lin Po-
chu), another was dying (Chen Keng), another had long been
ill in Moscow (Chen Shao-yu), and three others were believed
ill (Lin Piao, Teng Tai-yuan, Chang Yun-i), leaving eight full
? members to be accounted for, therefore possible victims of the
purge. Persons of questionable status included: Peng To-huai
and Huang Ko-cheng, who had very probably been purged; Chang
Wen-tien, who rarely appeared; Hsu Hai-tung, Chia To-fu, and
Yang Hsien-cheng, who had all disappeared after autumn 1959;
Shu Tung and Liu Ko-ping, who had been dismissed from their
posts in 1960 in disagreeable circumstances; and Wang Wei-chou,
Cheng Tzu-hua, Chien Ying, and Teng Hua, who had all been out
of the news for several months. However, it is likely that
some of these listed as possible purgees--especially among
those named last--were in fact sick or preoccupied.
Of the 95 alternate members as of 1956, as against 87
attending the January 1961 plenum, two had died (Chang Hsi
and Tsai Shu-fan), and two may have been purged in 1958 (Li
Tao and Chao Chien-min, previously noted), leaving four to
six alternate members to account for. There were about 20
candidates as possible purgees, i.e. alternate members who
had been associated with those figures believed purged and/or
had been out of the news for a long time, mainly military
figures and provincial secretaries, all of them identified
in earlier sections of this paper.
Thus the total bag, of the purge of autumn 1959 and after,
was fairly modest as of Jarluary 1961: evidently no more than
12, and probably not as many 12, of the 189 full and alter-
nate members of the central committee who were living when the
purge began. The number of those demoted or pushed aside
was probably much higher, but we have used the word "purge"
here as entailing dismissoal from the central committee and
sometimes imprisonment as well.
The new conservative line for industrial development,
stated in the communique of the ninth plenum, was taken up
by Po I-po in the 1 February Red Flag. Adopting the same
strategy of pointing to "tremeenncous developments" in the
period 1958-1960 rather than discussing the disappointing
achievements of 1960, Po went on to defend the concept of
"undulatory" development, a concept which must surely have
reminded many of his readers of the concept of 'U-shaped'
Sanitized - Approved For ReI-- CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Aoved For Release E'&IA-RDP79Sd0427A000600110001-1
development which the party had criticized severely in 1958.*
Undulatory development, Po wrote, was one of a very high rate
for several years, then of a "comparatively low" rate for
several years, after which it "might" be very high again for
several years. Further, rather than providing goals for 1961,
Po wrote of the coming period--clearly one of a trough--as
one of "consolidating, filling out, and raising standards."
This was to entail, first of all, strengthening support for
agriculture. Within heavy industry, emphasis was to be placed
on the mining industry. In capital construction, the emphasis
was to be on finishing the enterprises now underway (i.e. those
enterprises on which work stopped when the Soviet technicians
were withdrawn). Po followed the line of the communique in
endorsing the general line of "going all-out and aiming high"
without mentioning the principle of "politics in command."
Indeed, Po emphasized the need for getting the facts and for
not giving the job to irresponsible or ignorant people.
The Red Flag article of 1 February on not fearing ghosts
was in effect a summary of the party's position, on matters
of world Communist strategy and on domestic problems, as of
early 1961. The concept of "not fearing ghosts" was another
version of Mao's "paper tiger" concept. Ghosts were defined
as "imperialism, reactionaries, revisionism, and all kinds
of calamities..." Just as the party, when pushed to the wall,
had explained that paper tigers were also real tigers that
"can still bite" in the short run, so this Red Flag article
went on to explain that ghosts were real. It summed up the
matter this way:
...on the whole, ghosts are not to be
feared and can be completely defeated and
subdued by men. But in dealing with each
specific ghost, men must adopt a cautious
attitude and must use stratagems in order
to win ultimate victory.
It went on to define the 6 December declaration of the Com-
munist parties as a "fear no ghost" statement, and, inter
alia, it admitted that "internally, there are still great
*The party later was at pains to distinguish between the two.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele], lA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ROME: CIA-RDP79"" 00427A000600110001-1
difficulties." Possibly because the concept of real ghosts
was hard to present as a contribution to dialectical materi-
alism, Chinese media did not develop this concept.*
The Moscow conference of November 1960 was repeated in
little at the Albanian party congress in February 1961. The
line-up of the parties was similar to that of November, with
the Chinese and Albanian parties, in their pronouncements at
the conference, standing solidly together--supported, on
balance, by the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties,
and, apparently, by the delegates from the Indonesian, Burmese,
Malayan, Japanese and Thai parties.
The Quiet Spring, 1961
During the spring (March-June) of 1961, Chinese Communist
leaders were quiet. None of the party leaders made a major
speech or wrote an important article in this period. The
party's long-standing propositions on world Communist strategy
were reaffirmed (without polemics) in passing comments by
some of these leaders and in editorials and articles by lesser
figures; on one hand, the Chinese party approved the tougher
Soviet policies toward the West, while on the other hand it
continued to compete with Moscow for influence in the world
Communist movement. The Chinese party's relatively conserva-
tive domestic policies were amplified (with some dampness of
spirit) in minor pronouncements by party leaders and by party
organs; at the same time, Peiping continued to defend past and
present aspects of its programs offensive to Moscow, and the
USSR did not restore the program of aid to Peiping which existed
before mid-1960.
In mid-March, People's Daily and Red Flag published several
articles on the 90th anniversary of the Paris Commune. In
these articles the party reaffirmed a number of positions on
Communist strategy, especially on the need for armed struggle
*It is presume that this concept was just as offensive
to the Soviet party--and for the same reasons--as the "paper
tiger" concept and the concept of the "East Wind prevailing."
All three tend to minimize the strength of the enemy, and
all three are excessively literary for sober Marxist-Leninists.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele s&EcIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 T
Sanitized - Appired For ReleaSsECRIA-RDP79S S1427A000600110001-1
in gaining and keeping power. Some of these articles, like
many before them, implied the relevance of Chinese experience
for the parties of the underdeveloped countries. The articles
also explicitly reaffirmed the validity and importance of the
party's incendiary Lenin Anniversary articles of April 1960.
These mid-March articles at some points came close to polemics,
but were much more restrained than the 1960 articles had been.
During March and April, the continuing Sino-Soviet dis-
agreement on aspects of strategy was given practical expression
in disputes in the world Communist fronts. The Chinese insist-
ed that the fronts should openly charge the United States with
the prime responsibility for all current crises and should work
primarily to promote militant anti-imperialist, national lib-
eration struggles. They wished to de-emphasize those front
campaigns which promoted disarmament and which publicized the
benefits non-Communists might gain from peaceful coexistence.
They opposed concessions to the non-Communist left and to
"revisionists." Soviet and pro-Soviet participants in meet-
ings of these organizations tried to maintain moderation in
the language of resolutions, to avoid undue emphasis on anti-
American formulas, and to give priority to appeals for strug-
gles for disarmament and peaceful coexistence. However, the
Soviets gave greater attention than before to expressing
solidarity with anti-colonial and national liberation struggles
along lines long advocated by the Chinese. Soviet efforts to
conciliate the Chinese involved substantial concessions, par-
ticularly in resolutions adopted at New Delhi at the end of
March and the Afro-Asian Solidarity meeting in Bandung in April.
During April, in what was probably the Chinese action most
offensive to Moscow during the entire spring, Peiping gave a
handsome reward to Albania for its support in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Peiping granted a credit to Albania of $125 million,
roughly 80 percent of the aid Albania was seeking from all
sources for its Five Year Plan. The aid agreement involved
the dispatch of Chinese technicians and equipment for construc-
tion of 25 industrial projects, as well as foodstuffs (in the
face of starvation in China itself). Li Hsien-nien, who had
headed the Chinese delegation to the Albanian party congress
in February, headed the Chinese group in the April talks in
Peiping. Mao, Chou En-lai, and Teng Hsiao-ping all received
the senior Albanian representative (Kellezi). With the an-
nouncement of this agreement, dissident elements in the world
Sanitized - Approved For Releg.2itRA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For eese : CIA-RDP7 0427A000600110001-1
Communist parties could not fail to see that the Chinese were
willing to back such forces.*
During April, the Chinese party found cause for rejoicing
in the failure of the invasion of Cuba, Chinese comment pointed
out that the Chinese party had insisted all along that imperi-
alist strategy was increasingly attracted to local wars, that
the failure of the venture again showed the United States
be "outwardly strong but inwardly weak" (a paper tiger), to
the U.S. would learn nothing from this and would initiate
further such ventures, that local wars must be fought, that
they should be fought both by local forces and by the forces
of the bloc, and that engagement in such wars would make a
"tremendous" contribution to world peace.**
In the same period, Mao Tse-tung himself received a group
of Cubans, and, in his first public statement in ten months,
spoke of the common struggle against imperialism. A week
later, Mao told some Latin American visitors that the Cuban
venture showed that the "Kennedy administration is worse, not
better, than the Eisenhower administration." (This declaration
has been cited many times since by Peiping, but not by Moscow.)
Mao reaffirmed to some Afro-Asian visitors at the same time
._._*The Chinese party had earlier given new credits to two
other bloc states--North Korea and North Vietnam--which had
on balance been Chinese supporters at the Moscow conference.
The Chinese had given North Korea a credit of $105 million in
October 1960, which was followed by Soviet cancellation of
$190 million of North Korea's debt in November. After the
Soviet offer of a $112 million credit to North Vietnam in
December 1960, the Chinese had countered with a $157 million
credit.
**Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai teamed up in early May in
a letter to Castro stating that the Chinese "fully support"
Castro's warning against a new attack.
Sanitized - Approved For R%Ig@W CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Relea a A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
llwl1W
his proposition that revolutionaries who struggle will pre-
vail, no matter how small their forces at the beginning.*
In mid-May, Liu Shao-chi received an Algerian delegation.
Reaffirming the Chinese position on the importance of libera-
tion wars and on the proper conduct of negotiations with the
enemy, Liu praised the "heroic resistance" of the Algerian
rebels while not excluding the possibility of achieving inde-
pendence through negotiations in which the enemy would be
"exposed ceaselessly." Liu held up the Algerian struggle as
a "brilliant example for African peoples and oppressed nations
throughout the world."
Also in mid-May, the Chinese party stated a somewhat
grudging acquiescence in the forthcoming Kennedy-Khrushchev
meeting. Peiping expressed hope of "positive" results, while
observing that the Cuban venture had exposed the President as
a true imperialist; Chinese newsmen did not cover the meeting.
In early June, Soviet comment described the meeting as having
been a "good beginning," whereas Chinese comment failed to
concede that the talks had been useful.
In late May and early June, Peiping took pleasure in a
number of harsh Soviet articles and broadcasts criticizing
anti-Communist actions taken by the United Arab Republic.
This was another case in which the Chinese could argue that,
as the Cuban venture had proved with respect to local wars,
they had been right all along--i.e. they had` contended since
1959 that Nasser was a bad risk and that aid to him would harm
the cause of the Arab Communists, whom it was now time to
support. Peiping joined the fray in early June by publicizing
some of the Soviet charges, but, after Moscow and Cairo ex-
changed rebuttals in mid-June, both sides called off the fight.
*At about-this time, Peiping issued an English-language edi-
tion of the fourth volume of Mao's works. A new paragraph in
the introduction repeated Lin Piao's assertion of October 1960,
when the Chinese-language edition was published, that the volume
was a "great event" not simply for China but for the world Com-
munist movement. The introduction pointed particularly to Mao's
propositions on the need for courage, the character of imperi-
alism as a paper tiger, the need for an anti-imperialist front,
and the inevitable victory of revolutionary forces no matter
how small their beginnings.
Sanitized - Approved For Release R'IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReIea8RE'1CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
*Awl 1*0
During June, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, Teng
Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen and others received an Indonesian Com-
munist party delegation led by the pro-Soviet Aidit, whom
Peiping tried hard to impress. This was not an occasion for
a public review of Chinese positions in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, as Sukarno was a guest in Peiping in the same period
and was received by Mao and Liu. At a banquet which both
Sukarno and Aidit attended, Liu gave a polite speech (appro-
priate to the audience) emphasizing common interests and aims.
Also in June, Peiping made much of North Vietnamese premier
Phan Van Dong, stopping on his way to Moscow.
Later in June, Mao, Liu, and Chou received a Japanese
Communist party delegation, in more favorable circumstances
for reaffirming Chinese positions. People's Daily during
their visit praised the Japanese party 's adership of mass
(violent) actions in the previous two years and reaffirmed
the Chinese party's positions also on the East Wind prevailing,
the unchanging nature of imperialism, and the American attrac-
tion to local wars. Matching Moscow's action in naming polit-
buro member Mukhitdinov as CPSU delegate to the JCP's scheduled
congress in July, Peiping named Peng Chen; but all foreign
Communists were refused visas.
In late June Peiping again affirmed the party's positions
on local wars and liberation wars. This was done in comment-
aries on the 11th anniversary of the opening of the Korean war--
which has consistently been Peiping's prize exhibit in the
case for daring to engage in local wars--and on the fighting
in Angola. The "armed struggle of the Angolan people" was
described as the'inost striking development of the continued
upsurge" of the national independence movement in Africa.
Throughout the spring of 1961, there were fragmentary in-
dications of Soviet and Chinese differences on the terms for
a settlement in Laos. However, Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi ap-
peared to have the common aims of a "neutralist" Laos, lean-
ing toward the bloc, and a common interest in frustrating plans
for effective international supervision, together with a com-
mon willingness to resume military action against the RLG if
their terms were not met. Things seemed to be going so well
in Laos for both Moscow and Peiping, in spring 1961, that
there was little to quarrel about.
Sanitized - Approved For ReiggER CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - ApIwoved For Relea~SeETCIA-RDP79680427A000600110001-1
Also throughout the spring, Khrushchev's challenge to the
structure of the UN pleased Peiping. Previously, Peiping had
not only failed to endorse Khrushchev's activities at the
UNGA but had chided him for getting pushed around by the United
States. Khrushchev's efforts during 1961 were described by
the Chinese as "fruitful" in exposing the aggressive nature
of imperialism, and Peiping supported the Soviet line in the
UN.
The Chinese in June were clearly pleased by two S:jviet
actions. The first of these was Moscow's release of a memo-
randum Khrushchev had given President Kennedy in which Khru-
shchev.had categorically set the end of 1961 as the deadline
for conclusion of a separate treaty with the East German regime,
and, subsequently, Khrushchev's pronouncements that force
would be met with force. The Chinese emphasized the militant
features of Khrushchev's statements, and in general suggested
a belief that Soviet policy on Berlin would be the testing-
ground for Soviet professions of militant leadership of the
world revolution.*
The Chinese in June also showed their pleasure in the So-
viet action in forcing the issue on a nuclear text ban agree-
ment. Chinese propaganda during the test ban talks had been
consistent with Soviet propaganda, and did not reflect any con-
cern about the possibility of agreements inconsistent with
Peiping's desire to have nuclear weapons. The Chinese followed
the Soviet lead in blaming the U.S. for the failure of the
talks.
With regard to the world Communist fronts, by June Moscow
and Peiping had apparently reached agreement on at least one
critical point, as virtually all the fronts, except the "peace"
fronts, had abandoned reserve in attacking the United States.
*Red Flag was soon to publish an article drawing conclusions
from what it depicted as the Kennedy administration's record
of "aggression" and "defeat" in Cuba and Laos. Alluding to
the "so-called Berlin crisis" as the most recent example of
the new administration's "adventurist" desire to undertake local
wars, Red Flag pointedly added that experience with the Kennedy
administration had shown that whenever it was met "head-on"
and dealt "powerful counterblows," it was "forced to retreat."
Sanitized - Approved For Relea!.RSA-L,&-1
 Sanitized - A oved For RNE aseT: CIA-RDP79600427A000600110001-1
However, the first Soviet and Chinese comment on the
latest draft program of the WFTU--adopted in late June--show-
ed differences in emphasis in treatment of the United States
and on other issues related to the use of the fronts. More-
over, there was evidence in organizational developments of
continuing Sino-Soviet differences. The Soviets seemed to be
moving to prevent the Chinese from gaining decisive influence
in any front organization body or project.
With respect to the sick Chinese economy, Peiping's pro-
nouncements during the spring of 1961 were very different
from those of spring 1958, similar in some respects to those
of spring 1959, and again different from those of spring 1960.
Whereas spring 1958 had been featured by exhortations to a
"leap," the profusion of unrealistic goals, and attacks on
the rightists, and spring 1960 had seen expressions of con-
fidence in a continuing "leap" and a commitment to still am-
bitious goals, the emphasis in spring 1961 was on the dif-
ficulties, on the need for caution, on the undulatory develop-
ment of the economy, and there was no public statement of any
goals at all.
During March, People's Daily and Red Flag carried a num-
ber of articles on such themes as the importance of Mao's
thought in all fields of activity ("the guide to all work"),
on Mao's humble spirit in making thorough and penetrating in-
vestigations, on the need to ask old peasants for advice, on
the need to combine the principle of "placing politics in com-
mand" with the principle of "adopting realistic and concrete
measures," and so on. The last-named article, in the 16 March
Red Flag, was the last gasp for some time of the slogan "politics
in command."
During April, there were many articles in the party jour-
nals similar to those of March: citing Mao on the need for
"all things" to go through a process of trial-and-error; in-
sisting on the need for a "realistic approach," and rejecting
the view that an emphasis on realism would dampen initiative
("this view is quite wrong") or the view that "respect for
objective conditions would hinder the display of man's conscious
activity" (this view was "not correct"); and so on. In the
same month, party journals called for commune industry to de-
vote itself to agriculture and the people's livelihood, and
for an improvement in the quality of light industrial products;
Mao was cited on the need to improve the people's livelihood
because livelihood affects production.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI"ftj CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - ApWved For ReI "Y-BIA-RDP79 427A000600110001-1
On 1 May, there was a long authoritative article in China
Youth, "On the Question of the Sustaining and Undulation of -
Great Leaps Forward." It was contended that "leaps" could be
sustained owing to the general laws of socialist economy,
favorable conditions since "liberation" (large population, huge
domestic market, vast territory and natural resources, bloc
support--especially "advanced experience"), and new factors
since 1957 (the results of rectification, overf ul f it lment of
the First Five Year Plan, the leadership of the party and Chair-
man Mao as embodied in the general line of pressing ahead con-
sistently for greater, faster, better, and more economical re-
sults). The increase in production would not be equally great
in every year; as "Comrade Liu Shao-chi taught us,"* the rate
of development would "undulate." The article went on to dis-
tinguish between "undulatory" development and "the 'U-shaped'
development which we criticized some time ago."** "Undulatory"
development, the article went on, reflected objective condi-
tions, whereas U-shaped development did not make the best of
objective conditions but instead reflected conservatism and
lack of enthusiasm. In other words, Mao and the party-machine
leaders would appropriate the 'good' concept of "undulatory"
development, while the conservatives would be stuck with the
'bad' concept of "U-shaped" development. The article went on
to observe that the concept of undulation involved alternat-
ing periods of "development" and "consolidation," the present
period being one of consolidation.
Many articles in the party journals in May took up the
question of working realistically. Although it was often
stated that party members must retain their "revolutionary
faith," the emphasis was on such matters as Mao's long-stand-
ing devotion to investigation and study, the need to solve
concrete problems "realistically," the importance of reporting
*Liu in his 1 October 1959 article in Problems of Peace
and Socialism had made the point that "the speed o eve op-
ment o t e national economy cannot possibly be the same every
year. It may be higher in one year and lower in another."
He had not presented this as the concept of "undulation,"
however, and the emphasis of his 1959 article was very dif-
ferent.
**At the party congress in May 1958, Liu Shao-chi and Tan
Chen-lin both had strongly criticized the concept of 'U-
shaped' development.
Sanitized - Approved For Releas j RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appoved For Reeaee: CIA-RDP79&00427A000600110001-1
accurately to party organs in order not to "mislead the lead-
ership and make it impossible for the leadership to arrive at
correct judgments," the need to recognize that situations
exist "independently of the human will," the advisability of
listening to different opinions before formulating policies
and so on.
The party journals in June continued to hammer on the
need for collecting evidence before making decisions. One
bad-tempered article in People's Daily, "Clarify the Situation
Before Jumping to Conclusions," an article which read as
if written by a rightist critic of Mao and the party-machine
leaders, was additionally remarkable for not even mentioning
Mao as the source of this new guidance. However, later articles
on this theme did again invoke Mao: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung
clearly told us...," etc.
Soviet spokesmen in the spring of 1960 carried on Khru-
shchev's criticism of the Chinese aim of autarky and specific
Chinese programs. For example, one spokesman recalled how
Lenin "resolutely opposed leaps forward, building castles in
the air." Another strongly emphasized Soviet experience as
the "general rule" for all countries building socialism, and
warned that no bloc country could develop according to its
"own, national laws." Soviet publications pointedly called
attention to the Chinese failure to meet export commitments
to the USSR last year and to Peiping's failure to fulfill its
agricultural plans for 1959 and 1960. Other commentaries made
clear that China's troubles derived less from bad weather
than from distortions of Marxism reflected in erroneous policies.
Throughout the spring, the Sino-Soviet economic relation-
ship seemed cool and correct. On one hand, Moscow was not
known to be taking any additional measures to contribute to
China's economic difficulties--it was apparently content with
the continuing damage done by the withdrawal of the technicians
in summer 1960. On the other hand, measured in terms of China's
needs and of Soviet ability to provide aid, the USSR took no
major steps to assist its hard-pressed ally--not even the step
of returning the technicians.
In early April, as the first result of talks begun in
February, a Sino-Soviet trade agreement was signed. The agree-
ment called for Soviet deliveries of heavy industrial machinery
and equipment, petroleum products, and similar exports, in
Sanitized - Approved For Red, tCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App oved For Release : CIA-RDP79W'0427A000600110001-1
return for Chinese raw materials and light industrial goods.
Moscow also agreed to "loan" Peiping some 500,000 tons of
sugar and to defer China's repayment of the trade deficit
accrued in 1960 (the debt was to be repaid in four install-
ments beginning in 1962). Talks continued on the question of
longer-range economic and technical aid.*
Reflecting the absence of Soviet technicians, the reduced
level of Chinese exports to the USSR, and the absence of large
new credits, shipments of machinery and equipment from the
USSR to China were declining sharply in spring 1961. It seemed
likely that in 1961 China's imports of machinery and equipment
would be no more than half the level maintained in 1959 and
1960. Similarly, the Chinese industrialization program--in
which the USSR had promised to supply China with the necessary
machinery, blueprints, and experts to build and equip 291 major
industrial plants by 1967, only half of which had been completed
when the technicians were withdrawn--was still disrupted.
This was especially true in the fields of military industry
and atomic energy, which were exceptionally dependent on the
services of the Soviet. technicians.**
A new Sino-Soviet economic and technical agreement was
signed on 19 June. The communique provided no details, sug-
gesting that Moscow still had not agreed to restore the former
schedule for the construction of large modern industrial
facilities or to return the technicians en masse. Soviet of-
ficials implied that the June agreement covered the same period--
1961-67--and would provide for Soviet technical aid on a smaller
scale and with a much smaller number of technicians.
As noted previously, none of the key figures of the Chi-
nese Communist leadership had much to say during the spring
of 1961. Mao appeared frequently, received visitors, was cred-
ited with oracular remarks, and was constantly cited as the
originator of Chinese positions in the dispute with the Soviet
*Peiping got more help from the free world than from the
bloc in meeting the problem of its critical food shortages;
by May, Peiping had arranged to buy about 10 million, tons of
grain from non-bloc countries.
**It also appeared that the USSR was supplying very little
military equipment to China in spring 1961, and that Chinese
weapons development and production programs had bogged down.
Sanitized - Approved For Relea"&44-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A ved For Release: CIA-RDP79SS427A000600110001-1
pp
party and as the authority for the shift to the right in
domestic policies. Liu Shao-chi played much the same type
of role in this period, but a lesser one.
Of the other party machine leaders, Teng Hsiao-ping and
Peng Chen also appeared frequently, and Peng made some passing
remarks reaffirming Chinese positions on world Communist
strategy. Ko Ching-shih appeared in the news occasionally,
in Shanghai; Tan Chen-lin was out of the news from March to
June, and Li Ching-chuan was out of it altogether.
Of the leaders of the group of administrators and eco-
nomists, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi continued to be very active
in a routine fashion, receiving people, making minor pronounce-
ments, giving interviews. Chen Yun made only a few appearances,
and said nothing. The economists Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien
and Po I-po were all active in minor matters; Po replaced Li
Fu-chun in May as director of the government's fourth staff
office, coordinating the work of ministries concerned with
industry and communications. Teng Tzu-hui was out of the
news until May, and appeared only rarely thereafter.
The only military figure on a level with the above lead-
ers, Lin Piao, made very few appearances. He almost certainly
continued to be ill--perhaps so ill that he could not be con-
sidered a leader of any kind.
None of the above figures seemed to be in serious trouble.
However, Tan Chen-lin had probably lost prestige with the
shift to the right, and Chen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui had appar-
ently not been fully forgiven for having been right.
The 40th Anniversary, July 1961
On 1 July 1961 the Chinese Communist party "celebrated"
its 40th anniversary. In contrast to the 30th anniversary,
on which occasion most of the Chinese Communist leaders had
delivered themselves of major articles on aspects of the
party's history or its current program and the party had pub-
lished its massive official history, the 40th anniversary was
allowed to depart after a modest speech by Liu Shao-chi and
two supporting editorials in party journals.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI - CIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseR''IA-RDP79S427A000600110001-1
Liu began his speech with a brief review of the party's
carrying out of the "democratic" revolution from 1921 to 1949
and of the "socialist" revolution since 1949. He noted the
party's "huge successes" in socialist construction, but also
its recognition that "much time is still required to build
China into a great socialist country" and an even "longer
historical period" to make the transition from socialism to
Communism.
Liu contended, as often before, that the party's history
exemplified the integration of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese
conditions. In every period of the party, Liu said, Mao Tse-
tung has proved to be the "most able" in effecting this inte-
gration. In citing the "serious" errors of the "right oppor-
tunist" Chinese leaders of 1927 and the "'left' dogmatist"
leaders of 1931-34, Liu did not make explicit that these lead-
ers had been following Soviet advice, but his audience knew
that this was his point.*
Liu went on to note that the party's cause had proceeded
"much more smoothly" after Mvlao's leadership of the party was
established in 1935. In the light of Peiping's present trou-
bles, however, Liu did not say, as he had often said before,
that the party had not made any mistakes in its line since
1935. Reviewing developments since 1935, Liu concluded that
the revolution had proceeded "comparatively rapidly and
smoothly."
Liu gave credit to Ilao and the central committee jointly
for having formulated the "general line" ("going all out, aim-
ing high," etc.), which was responsible for the "great leaps
forward" of 1958-60. In this period, Liu said mildly, the
people's communes had been formed by "agriculture cooperatives
joining together"--a formulation which, like the party's cur-
rent policies, put the emphasis on the collective farms rather
than on the communes.**
*Pravda omitted this part of Liu's speech.
**Liu's treatment of the commune in this speech was in amus-
ing contrast to his line in iris October 1959 article, in which
he had been at pains to show that the commune was very differ-
ent from the collective and that it would greatly speed the
advance to Conmiun ism .
Sanitized - Approved For Release,;et+RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rele fE IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
Liu went on to defend the general line, the leap forward,
and the commune program as "absolutely right and necessary."
He conceded that there had been "quite a few shortcomings" in
the party's work, but he contended that it would be "inconceiv-
able" for programs so ambitious to proceed without difficulties.
He expressed confidence that the Chinese people, under the
leadership of the party headed by Mao, would overcome the"tempo-
rary difficulties."
Liu specified that the "basic policy" of Chinese economic
development was "put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Under
this policy, "agriculture should be the foundation and industry
the guiding factor," i.e., problems in agriculture had to be
solved first. Liu did not give any production goals for either
agriculture or industry.
Stating that the party had more than 17 million members
(about 2.5 percent of the population), 70 percent of whom had
joined since 1953, Lau pointed out one of the party's abiding
problems: "many" of the newer members who had not gone through
long revolutionary struggles, were not yet politically reliable,
while the reliable old-timers had "not yet had adequate experi-
ence in socialist construction.'
Liu called for all party members to study socialist con-
struction. Mao had "consistently said," Liu went on, that
party members must 'make meticulous investigations and studies...
to derive from objective reality the inherent laws, and not
imaginary laws." As Mao had "pointed out long ago," Liu said,
victory depended on the "Chinese /sic7 comrades' understanding
of Chinese conditions"; policies must not be formulated "by
a handful of people in a room"; the Marxist-Leninist style
"advocated by Mao" meant "seeking truth from facts"; and earl-
ier leaders of the party had failed to adhere to these precepts.
Many in Liu's audience must have known that in recent years
it was precisely Mao and the party machine leaders around Liu
who had been most vulnerable to the charges--made by Soviet
leaders and by Mao's domestic opponents--of having been a small
group which had discovered specious principles and had devised
its policies in disregard of the facts; but who now, in the
light of modifications forced on them by circumstances, were
turning these charges against any possible objectors to their
continued domination of the party.
Sanitized - Approved For Rel~iE&' CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Apppoved For Rel a' CIA-RDP79 0427A000600110001-1
Liu went on to note that the party had received assist-
ance from the Soviet and the rest of the bloc, and "sympathy
and support" from workers and "progressive" forces everywhere.
In this perfunctory reference to Soviet aid, Liu implied that
such aid was neither of great importance in the past nor a
significant factor at present.
As for foreign policy, Liu began this part of his speech
by rejecting the Soviet party's "general line" of "peaceful
coexistence." For the first time publicly, Liu stated that
the Chinese party had its own "general line" in foreign policy--
the others
in which peaceful coexistence was only one element,
being the objectives of building the strength of the bloc and
providing support to revolutionary struggles everywhere.
Liu then made clear that the Chinese party's strategy
continued to envisage an unremitting struggle against a
clearly-defined enemy--the United States, which continued to
"occupy" Taiwan, to maintain military bases near China, and
to pursue a policy of "aggression and war." Liu reiterated
Mao's line (without crediting it) that the Kennedy administra-
tion was "more dangerous" than the Eisenhower administration.*
Liu also reiterated the proposition, offensive to Moscow,
that the East Wind was prevailing over the West Wind. He
cited the Moscow declaration of December 1960 in support of
this, and he praised the Moscow conference as having "further
strengthened the unity" of the bloc and the world movement.
He went on to approve the hard Soviet positions on disarmament,
a nuclear test ban, and conclusion of a German peace treaty.
And he hailed various developments in Asia, Africa and Latin
America as evidence of "ever deeper and wider revolutionary
struggles" against the West. He concluded with a call for a
"broad international united front", with the Communist states
and parties as its "core," in the struggle for peace and pro-
gress as defined above.
The 1 July People's Daily editorial ("Forty Great and
Glorious Years") and the 1 July Red Flag editorial ("Develop
the Fine Traditions of the Party" did not add much to Liu's
speech, although they were combined with the speech to make
*Pravda toned down this part of Liu's speech.
Sanitized - Approved For Released.4-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App oved For R t9T: CIA-RDP79W'0427A000600110001-1
a booklet for study throughout China. Both editorials speci-
fied, as Liu had not, that Mao had "creatively" developed
Marxism-Leninism, and Red Flag called on everyone to study
Marxism-Leninism, Mao' works, and Soviet and other bloc
experience (in that order). The Red Flag piece was devoted
in large part to the theme of the importance of the "mass
line" in the partjs work--a line which meant both that the
masses must liberate themselves* and that the party must un-
dertake careful investigation and study, soliciting their
opinions rather than simply organizing and exhorting them.**
Red Flag concluded with a call--more explicit than Liu's--for
the people to unite under the leadership of the central com-
mittee headed by Mao, and People's Daily concluded with a call--
not explicit in either Liu or Red Flag--for a valiant march
forward under the "banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking."
All three of these pronouncements on the 40th anniversary
implied a belief that Mao would continue indefinitely as the
party's chairman. It had been suggested in various POLO papers
since 1956, when the party set up the post of "honorary chair-
man," that the party's ninth congress in 1961 might coincide
with the 40th anniversary of the party and that Mao might take
that occasion to step aside, in favor of Liu Shao-chi, as the
active chairman. However, none of the material surrounding
the anniversary said a word about the ninth congress scheduled
for 1961, and none of it gave any hint that Mao was about to
step aside.
The message; of congratulation sent to the Chinese party
from the other Communist parties on the 40th anniversary re-
flected the unformalized and unpublicized division in the
world Communist movement which had been apparent at the Mos-
cow conference of November 1960. In general, the messages
from the Soviet party and those which had supported the Soviet
*This had an echo of the party's insistence, during the Sino-
Soviet dispute in 1960, that the Chinese must rely on themselves.
**In 1958-60, the opinions of the masses had been found by
Mao and the party-machine leaders to coincide marvellously
with their own; the party's policies of 1961 were of course
much closer to the real opinions of the masses.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI& TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appooved For ReleaECRE
Sse : 6IA-RDP79Q0427A000600110001-1
party at Moscow were cool; the messages from those which had
been Chinese supporters, either strongly or on balance, were
warm.*
The Soviet party's message offered "warm congratulations,"
observed that the Communist victory in China contributed
greatly to the change in the world balance of forces, and
noted the "enormous successes" of the Chinese in building
socialism. However, it reminded Peiping that its prospects
for constructing a socialist society depended on close rela-
tions with other bloc countries, it failed to mention any
of the Chinese "red banners" (the general line, the leap, the
commune program) or any Chinese role in foreign policy, and,
in contrast to anniversary messages to other parties this
year, it had no praise for the Chinese leader and did not
credit the Chinese party with fidelity to the aim of strength-
ening bloc unity. The Eastern European messages (except Al-
bania's) were of this general character, and most of them
pointed to Soviet primacy in the bloc. Most of the non-bloc
parties apparently failed to send messages; and most of those
received were perfunctory, reserved, or monitory.
The warmest message came from the Albanian party, Pei-
ping's only all-out supporter at Moscow, which praised Mao
personally, Chinese domestic programs and foreign policies,
and, especially, the Chinese party's struggle against "modern
revisionism." There were also warm messages from the North
Vietnamese, North Korean, Malayan, and Burmese parties, all
of which had been on balance Chinese supporters at Moscow,**
and from some of the parties which had reportedly supported
the Chinese on specific points or had been neutral at Moscow--
the parties of Australia, Japan, San Marino, Thailand, and
Venezuela.***
25X1A
**Although the Indonesian delegation, headed by a pro-Chinese,
had been on balance a Chinese supporter at Moscow, the Indonesian
party did not send so warm a message on this occasion; perhaps
the pro-Soviet leadership had asserted itself.
***There was also a fairly-warm message from the Outer Mongolian
party, which had not supported the Chinese at Moscow.
Sanitized - Approved For Relppp- - CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReI ECIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
*400, -Iwo,
Twelve of the 19 full members and four of the six alter-
nate members of the politburo attended the rally in Peiping,
on the 40th anniversary, at which Liu Shao-chi spoke. Two
other full members, Ko Ching-shih and Li Ching-chuan, appeared
respectively in Shanghai and Chengtu, where they are based,
and a third, Chen Yi, was in Geneva. The two other alternate
members, Ulanfu and Po I-po, appeared in Ulan Bator and Mukden.
Those unaccounted for, all full members, were vice-chairmen
of the party Chen Yun and Lin Piao, and Tan Chen-lin and Peng
Te-huai. This failure to appear was consistent with the strong
evidence that Peng had been purged and that Lin was ill, with
the fairly good evidence that Chen Yun had not been fully re-
turned to the inner circle, and with the plausible speculation
that Tan had lost prestige with the failures in agriculture.
Continued Caution, July-October 1961
Most of the Chinese Communist leaders remained silent
for the rest of the summer of 1961. They were out of Peiping
for long periods from the end of July to late September, and
were almost certainly meeting in secret sessions. With their
ninth party congress due in 1961 and the Soviet party congress
already scheduled for October, the Chinese leaders were pre-
sumably trying to decide whether to hold their congress and
attempting to work out an acceptable program, as well as pre-
paring a response to some unacceptable propositions in the
Soviet party's draft program. The Chinese party in this period
continued its practices of reaffirming lightly some of the
positions long disputed with Moscow and competing at least
selectively for influence in the movement, while at the same
time cooperating with the Soviets in most areas of foreign
policy and in the diminished economic and military relation-
ship.
The comparatively little comment in party journals on Chi-
nese domestic policies suggested that the party leaders con-
tinued to think in relatively conservative terms. Red Flag
on 1 July wrote at length on the principle of "proceeding
from reality," entailing continual investigation and the dis-
covery of "objective laws," and so on. The same journal on
1 August was conservative in tone throughout, and People's
Daily on 4 August, after several weeks of silence on domestic
policies, discussed the need to "Systematically Solve Problems
Sanitized - Approved For ReI1 CiEbIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - ApppQ.ved For Rele9 'FCTIA-RDP79SGe427A000600110001-1
One by One. Chen Yi, one of the few leaders to say anything
publicly, told a college audience on 10 August that emphasis
should now be given to the development of professional quali-
fications rather than to political activity. At the same time,
the dominant leaders made clear that they were not prepared
to concede that their earlier policies had been ill-conceived:
Peng Chen in July, and Teng Hsiao-ping in September, spoke
warmly of the "red banners" of the general line, the leap for-
ward, and the commune program, while noting temporary "diffi-
culties."
Neither industry nor agriculture had recovered. There
was little new construction in industry, and there were ap-
parently slowdowns throughout industry in order to rebuild
stockpiles of fuels and raw materials and to make major over-
hauls of equipment. No industrial goals were published, and
it seemed likely that there would be little or no increase in
heavy industrial production and a significant decline in light
industrial output. The 1961 harvest was expected to be poor,
with total grain production no higher than 1960. With an in-
creasing population, this would mean a further decline in public
health and in labor productivity, and an increase in popular
disaffection.
There was still no indication that the USSR was prepared
to undertake an economic aid program to ease either short-terns
or long-term difficulties in Communist China: Peiping con-
tinued to need help to resolve its food and financial crises.
A Soviet trade delegation came to Peiping in August, and on
26 August the two groups issued an ambiguous statement to the
effect that Sino-Soviet trade had been "satisfactory" in the
first half of 1961 and that measures would be taken to improve
it. There was some evidence of limited Soviet aid to Peiping
in developing some components of the armed forces.
The Red Flag and People's D,ily editorials on National
Day--1 October--illustrat ed the decision of the dominant Chi-
nese leaders to continue in a cautious course while maintain-
ing that their policies of the incautious days had been correct
and, indeed, to carry out a conservative program under some of
the slogans of the radical years. Both editorials, "Long
Live China's General Line for Building Socialism" and "Hold
Aloft the Great Banner of the General Line and Strive For
New Victories," praised the line adopted in 1958 ("go all-out,
aim high," etc.) the "great leap forward," and the commune
Sanitized - Approved For Relea%t6-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 C ECRE
Sanitized - Applied For Release : 6IA-RDP79SAG427A000600110001-1
program, while admitting that the "leap" was over, emphasizing
the cooperative rather than the commune, and failing even to
mention the urban communes. Loth adhered to the tactic of stat-
ing that most of the "principal" industrial goals (i.e. the
original goals) of the second Five Year Plan had been preful-
filled, rather than admitting that the fantastic goals for both
industry and agriculture set during the 'leap" had been aban-
doned.* Both admitted that total agricultural production had
been disappointing for the third year in a row, while one held
out a hope of a "slightly better' autumn harvest than 1960's;
neither gave any figures or reported on the progress of mech-
anization of agriculture.
The achievements of the past, People's Daily contended,
enabled the Chinese "to make full use" of the remaining two
years (1961-62) of the Second Five Year Plan to carry out the
policy set forth at the January 1961 plenum of the central com-
mittee, namely
the policy of readjusting, consolidating,
filling out, and raising standards; to concen-
trate our strength on making readjustments to
overcome the new discrepancy in the balance of
the national economy which appeared during its
great expansion; to consolidate the successes al-
ready achieved; to overcome the difficulties
created by natural calamities, to strive to restore
and develop our agricultural production; to en-
able backward departmcttts and backward links
in production to catch up; to make full use of
the productive power of new industries; and to
create good conditions for future expansion of
the national economy during the third five-year
plan.
Both editorials described the difficulties as "temporary,"
both attributed them primarily to natural calamities, and both
expressed confidence that they could be overcome--in particular,
said Red Flag, by constantly summing up experiences (i.e., in
this context, reconsidering policies in the light of developments)
*People's
Daily
said that 14 of the "main targets"
of
the
plan had been
met;
Peiping had claimed in March 1960
that
13
had been met
even
then; thus industry in 1960-61 had
made
vir-
tually no progress
over 1959.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI% i f IA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Releas'E6IA-RDP79WO427A000600110001-1
"so that our subjective understanding and the measures and
policies of our party may increasingly conform to realities."
Both editorials defended the "wass line" and the slogan
of "placing politics in command"--past appeals to which had
done much to ensure that the party's policies would not conform
to reality. In the most shameless and comical such maneuver
since spring 1961, when the dominant leaders had appropriated
the 'good' concept of "undulatory" development while sticking
the rightists with the 'bad' concept of "U-shaped" development,
the Red Flag editorial of 1 October contended that the purpose
of "placing politics in command"--the favorite slogan of the
party-machine exhorters--was precisely that of ensuring "greater
care and efforts in economic work."
People's Daily also made the point, as had other Chinese
media earlier, that Chinese policies would continue to be based
on the study of "fundamental Marxist-Leninist theory" and the
study of the past policies put forward by the central committee
and Mao Tse-tung, which in turn would "take into account" the
experience of other bloc states. Neither editorial said a word
about Soviet material aid, past, present, or future. (Ambas-
sador Liu Hsiao in Moscow expressed gratitude for past Soviet
aid.)
Peng Chen, making the National Day speech, emphasized the
"tremendous achievements'' of 1958-60, defended the general line,
leap forward, and commune program, called for continued reliance
on these three "resplendent red banners," and minimized diffi-
culties.
There were no systematic statements of Chinese positions
on world Communist strategy during this period. The dominant
impression was of Chinese encouragement of Moscow in a direction
in which the USSR was already proceeding. Throughout this
period, Chinese comment took common positions with Moscow on
developments in Laos and continued to show pleasure in militant
Soviet statements on Berlin. Peiping expressed much satis-
faction with the Soviet announcement in late August of a deci-
sion to resume nuclear testing, and the Chinese defended this
decision in a series of pronouncements.
The Chinese took various occasions in this period, how-
ever, to reaffirm many of the points on which they differed,
in substance or in emphasis, with the Soviet party. For example,
Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseR'IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 SECRET
Sanitized - Apoved For Release : CIA-RDP70427A000600110001-1
Peng Chen, at a dinner for Kim I1-sung ii,. early July, re-
affirmed the Chinese assertions that the United States was
the main enemy of the world, that the Kennedy administration
was "more cunning" than its predecessor, that the United
States was openly preparing for war (which Soviet media
were also saying), and that Washington was particularly active
in planning local wars (which some Soviet spokesmen were
likewise saying) and inciting reactionaries to launch "civil"
wars. Red Flag in August reiterated that the United States
was unabT to change its imperialist nature, was carrying
out policies of "war and agression," was emphasizing local
wars while preparing for general war, and was a "paper tiger."
While conceding that the paper tiger must be respected tacti-
cally, it was this editorial which argued that the United
States would retreat if struck heavy blows.
Teng Hsiao-ping, at the North Korean party congress in
mid-September, spoke at length of the Korean war as a contri-
bution to peace and repeated some of Red Flag's points on
the character and policies of the UnitecU States.
Chinese media in September, during the Belgrade confer-
ence of nonaligned countries, reaffirmed Chinese positions
on types of neutralism. Red Flag detailed the activities of
the "traitorous" Tito regine in the service of U.S. imperial-
ism. Other Chinese comment denounced Nehru for holding that
the issue of war or peace was of greater moment than the is-
sue of colonialism, and praised such leaders as Sukarno and
Nkrumah. Peiping put forward again, aiming immediately at
Nehru, a thesis aimed in 1960 at the Soviets and serving
as a reminder to Moscow now.
Those who use the threat of war created by
U.S. imperialism as an excuse to tie the hands
of the people of all countries, to prevent them
from waging a resolute struggle...,actually help
only to encourage the imperialist policies of ag-
gression and war.. .Peace can be won only be fight-
ing for it, not by begging...
Liu Shao-chi, at a dinner for Cuban president Dorticos
in late September, praised the Cuban leaders for having neither
illusions about nor fear of the United States and the Cuban
revolution as the "bright banner" for all Latin American peo-
pies. Peng Chen took the same line, in even stronger language,
Sanitized - Approved For ReIg CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Rele R lA-RDP79S0000427A000600110001-1
in a speech on 25 September. Chinese comment on President
Kennedy's speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September
rejected the speech in toto, describing as "particularly
nauseating" expressions of American sympathy for anticolonial-
ist forces.
The Red Flag and People's Daily editorials on National
Day, 1 October, were devoted primarily to internal policies
but found space to review the changing balance cf power and
the character and policies of American imperialism (the "most
vicious enemy of the people of the whole world"). One of
these, after citing American "war threats" related to Berlin,
urged a policy of "standing firm" against such threats, a
policy which would "prevent the outbreak of a world war."
Peng Chen in his National Day speech made some of the same
points, in rather stronger terms than used by Chou En-lai in
a minor speech at a reception.
As for influence in the world Communist movement, Sino-
Albanian relations continued to be warm, although there was
some evidence of Albanian disappointment with Chinese economic
support; leaders of all other Eastern European regimes continued
to give allegiance to the Soviet party. Peiping moved quickly
to match a Soviet initiative on North Korea; after the USSR
and North Korea concluded a mutual defense pact in early July,
the Chinese, in an apparently hasty decision, invited Kim Il-
sung to Peiping, gave him an extraordinary welcome, and signed
with him a mutual defense treaty virtually identical with the
Moscow-Pyongyang pact. While in Peiping, Kim joined the Chi-
nese in denouncing "modern revision"--an action aimed at So-
viet overtures to Yugoslavia. The Chinese sent the high-rank-
ing Teng Hsiao-ping to the Korean party congress in September;
the resolution passed by the congress showed strong Chinese
influence.
The Chinese apparently remained unable, however, to make
significant inroads into Soviet influence with the Western
European parties or in the few African parties. Moreover, So-
viet influence with the Latin American parties, long dominant,
apparently increased. Chinese influence apparently remained
dominant in some of the smaller Asian parties (Burma, Malaya,
Thailand), while the situation in the larger parties (India,
Indonekia, Japan) remained ambiguous.
Sanitized - Approved For Re1e*1A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReIgp~RE.ICIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
w
The most important public development in this period was
the publication of the CPSU's draft program on 30 July. The
Chinese party a month earlier had indicated that it expected
some objectionable propositions to be included in the draft
program and that it would not be bound by them. For example,
Chen Yi, in an interview broadcast in early July, had replied
to a question on the Sino-Soviet dispute this way:
Owing to differences in the concrete in-
ternal and external conditions of different
countries, each of the socialist countries
and Communist and workers' parties, under the
guidance of common principles of Marxism-Lenin-
ism, pursues its own internal and external
policies...
More sharply, Red Flag at the same time had quoted Lenin on
the "national" character of party programs. The journal also,
again turning the charge of "dogmatism" against critics of
Chinese programs, had defended at length Mao's application of
Marxist-Leninist theory to Chinese conditions, had explained
that it was precisely the dogmatists who ignored these condi-
tions, and had criticized those who--unlike Marx, Engels, and
Lenin--expressed opinions about a nation's problems without
having thoroughly studied those problems.
The draft program paid a little deference to "national
peculiarities," but the program as a whole was clearly meant
to reassert the proposition that Soviet experience is univer-
sally valid. The program was presented as a "constructive
generalization of experience of socialist construction," tak-
ing account of the experience of revolutionary movements through-
out the world, and determining the "main tasks and principal
stages of building Communism" without qualifications as to
time and place.
As for the internal policies of Communist states, the CPSU
draft program ignored "Mao's thought," reaffirmed the import-
ance of material incentives, and emphasized that the general
laws of socialist construction applicable to "every" socialist
country include the need to "continuously perfect the system
of international division of labor!' In other words, the Chinese
Sanitized - Approved For ReIiig&ETCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Appjved For Re1eRE6IA-RDP79O427A000600110001-1
general line, "leap forward," and commune program were all
ill-conceived, and the Chinese aim of autarky was inadmissible.*
With respect to world Communist strategy, the CPSU draft
program followed the 1961 pattern of standing firm on most of
the positions earlier disputed with Peiping while retreating
somewhat on others. The program reiterated the doctrine that
war can be excluded from the life of society even while capi-
talism still exists, while asserting also that Western leaders
"openly declare their mad plans" for making war on the bloc.
It repeated that a "part of the bourgeoisie" understands the
consequences of nuclear war, and it again advocated the solu-
tion of problems through negotiations. It described "peace-
ful coexistence" not quite as the general line of the party
but as the "general principle of foreign policy" of the Soviet
state. It again promised an unspecified degree of support to
"just wars of liberation", and it again promised to repel--by
unspecified means--imperialist intervention in revolutions.
In this connection', it returned to the practice--objectionable
to Peiping--of alluding with studied vagueness to "wars" in
general as unnecessary for revolution. The program again en-
dorsed the concept of "national democracy" as an intermediate
stage for underdeveloped countries on the way to Communist con-
trol; while conceding that the national bourgeoisie are unreli-
able, it stated that the "progressive" role of such leaders
is "not yet exhausted"; and it reiterated the thesis, not ac-
cepted by Peiping, that the nationalism of newly-independent
countries should always be supported by Communists. The pro-
gram also defended the strategy--criticized by Peiping--of
forming very broad alliances for "democratic" rather than
"socialist" goals in Western countries.
The CPSU's draft program reiterated Soviet warnings about
the danger of "nationalism" in the bloc. Repeating the warnings
*Khrushchev apparently would prefer Chinese development to
concentrate on economic areas which are labor-intensive and
technologically simple, such as agriculture, light industry,
and certain types of metallurgical, chemical and machine-build-
ing industries. Peiping would be expected, in this view, to
leave the technologically complex fields, such as delivery
systems for nuclear weapons, to the more advanced members of
the bloc.
Sanitized - Approved For ReleascIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReIEIA-RDP79S427A000600110001-1
which the Soviet party had given the Chinese party both before
and after the withdrawal of the technicians in July 1960, the
program noted--for the benefit of all bloc members--that any
country suffering from nationalism worked harm to the "common
interests" of bloc countries but damaged itself even more as
its "isolation from the socialist camp retards its development."
There was little doubt that the draft program indicated
Soviet preparations for new affirmations of Moscow's authority
at the party congress in October. The Chinese party just as
clearly indicated its reservations about the claims of univer-
sality in the program. Peiping printed the text of the program
but offered no comment whatever on it until mid-September, when
Teng Hsiao-ping at the Korean party congress referred briefly
to the Soviet program as outlining the "gigantic plan of the
Soviet /sic7 people for building Communism..."* Elsewhere in
the bloc, Albania did not join the other Eastern European re-
gimes in applauding the program, while North Vietnam and North
Korea were cautious in their approval.
Most of the key figures of the Chinese party leadership
played much the same public roles in this period as they had
in the earlier months of 1961. Mao made several appearances,
received visitors, and was credited with some remarks; he con-
tinued to be treated as The Leader, then and for some time to
come. Liu Shao-chi was active in much the same way, and made
the only major speech (the 40th anniversary speech) by any
party leader in the period.
Of the other party machine leaders, Teng Hsiao-ping and
Peng Chen made a number of routine appearances; and Teng went
to Korea and made a speech, while Peng made at least three
minor speeches in Peiping. Ko Ching-chih appeared fairly often
in Shanghai and made a minor speech on the 40th anniversary;
Tan Chen-lin, who as previously noted had probably lost pres-
tige, appeared only twice; and Li Ching-chuan, after his ap-
pearance in Chengtu on 1 July, was again out of the news alto-
gether, possibly organizing the new Southwest bureau.
*Red Flag on 1 October went a bit further, in conceding that,
on the basis of the "relatively rich experience" of China it-
self, China could "absorb more" of Soviet experience to solve
complex economic problems.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI9 CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App paved For Rele A9R IA-RDP79Se427A000600110001-1
Of the leaders of the group of administrators and econom-
ists, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi were very active throughout the
period. Chen Yun, the senior of the presumed rightists, made
no appearance at all until National Day. Li Fu-chun and Li
Hsien-nien, apparently in good favor, made several appearances,
and Po I-po, presumed to be in favor, made two appearances.
Teng Tzu-hui, the other important rightist among these leaders
(Chang Wen-tien is regarded as a rightist but not as a leader)
remained out of the news until National Day.
Lin Piao, who had missed the 40th anniversary celebrations,
also remained out of the news until National Day, and it may
be that most of his duties were being discharged by Lo Jui-
ching, his senior deputy. No announcement was made of the dis-
position of the case of the purged Peng Te-huai.
On National Day, 1 October, the leadership put on another
deliberate display of unity, just as it had a year earlier.
All of the full members of the politburo--except the purged
Peng Te-huai and the regional leaders Ko Ching-shih and Li
Ching-chuan, who were at their home bases--were identified as
present at the celebrations in Peiping. (Of the alternate
members, Chang Wen-tien was missing.) Chen Yun appeared in
his proper place among the officers of the central committee,
and Teng Tzu-hui (non-politburo) appeared with his proper title,
in the company of party leaders. As was the case in the 40th
anniversary pronouncements on 1 July, the 1 October commentaries
gave no hint that Mao would soon step aside as party chairman
and said nothing about the party congress due in 1961.*
The leadership made less of an effort to display unity
below the national level. In the materials surrounding Na-
tional Day, it was revealed that, of the 26 first secretaries
of the party committees of provinces and autonomous regions,
four had been replaced during 1961 while four others were un-
accounted for. Those replaced were Wu Chih-pu of Honan (de-
moted to second secretary), Chang Chung-liang of Kansu, Kao
The party could elect new officers without waiting for a
congress; any central committee plenum could do it.
Sanitized - Approved For Releas g RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 SECRET
Sanitized - ApjWoved For Release : CIA-RDP79 0427A000600110001-1
Feng of Tsinghai, and Liu Chien-hsun of Kwangsi.* Those miss-
ing from accounts of the celebrations in their areas were Lin
Tieh of Hopei, Tao Lu-chia of Shensi, Chou Lin of Kweichow,
and Yang Ching-jen of Ninghsia.
Some of those replaced or missing may have been reassigned
to some of the party's regional bureaus not yet given publicity--
those of Northwest China, Southwest China, the Central-South,
and North China. This possibility was strengthened a bit by
the fact that there were no replacements or missing names among
the first secretaries in East China and the Northeast, in which
the regional bureaus and several of their secretaries have been
publicized for some months. It seemed very doubtful, however,
that reassignment to the regional bureaus explained more than
three or four of the eight cases.
The most interesting cases were those of Lin Tieh (missing)
Wu Chih-pu (demoted), and Tao Lu-chia (missing as first secre-
tary). All were about 55; all had backgrounds as political
officers; all had been secretaries in their provinces for 12
to 15 years, and first secretaries for several years (Lin be-
came first secretary in 1949, Wu in 1958, Tao in 1954); Lin
and Tieh had been elevated to the central committee in 1956,
Tao to an alternate membership in 1958; all had been repeatedly
and emphatically associated with the positions of Mao and the
party-machine leaders, on the matters of the general line, the
"leap", and the commune program in the period 1958-1960; two
(Lin and Wu) had been regarded as among the six or eight pro-
vincial secretaries with the best chance to be elevated to
the politburo at the next CCP congress.
The careers of Lin, Wu, and Tao had been very similar,
in fact, to that of Shu Tung, the first secretary in Shantung
who, as noted earlier, had been brought down in late 1960.
However, Shu had associated himself strongly with the policies of the leaders and later had been charged with pleading "special
circumstances" to explain failure to achieve expected goals.
*These four replacements bring to seven the number of known
replacements of provincial first secretaries since the "leap"
began in early 1958: the others were Pan Fu-sheng of Honan
(1958), Chou Hsiao-thou of Hunan (1959), and Shu Tung (1960).
Some of the missing persons will probably add to the list.
Sanitized - Approved For Releas rn .IA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - ApWoved For Release':TCIA-RDP79O0427AO00600110001-1
In Wu's case, the Honan press suggested that he had been de-
moted for lack of "realism"; i.e. not that he had retreated
to a rightist position, as Shu had, but that he had failed to
turn right sufficiently after the leadership had given the
signal. The same thing could have happened to Lin and Tao.
However, Wu was demoted only one grade--in Chinese Communist
usage, a 'leftist' mistake is always given in quotation marks,
signifying that it is less serious than a rightist error--and
Lin and Tao may not have been demoted at all. Lin last appeared
in public in Shanghai on 1 July, and was ambiguously identified
as a central committee member "now in Shanghai''--a formulation
which might have indicated either exile or assignment to the
East China bureau. And Tao appeared later in October, although
still without his title.
The other five first secretaries noted as replaced or miss-
ing were all from provinces with very serious economic problems--
like the secretaries noted above--and also with national minor-
ities. The fall of any of these figures could be plausibly
explained simply by failure. Chang Chung-liang (Kansu), Kao
Feng (Tsinghai), and Liu Chien-hsun (Kwangsi) were replaced
respectively by Wang Feng, Wang Chao, and Wei Kuo-ching, all
three of whom had backgrounds in public security work and at
least two of whom (Wang Feng and Wei) had long been concerned
with minority nationalities. Only one of the replaced secre-
taries, Liu, was regarded as a member of any group: in Liu's
case, the party-machine figures. And only one of the replace-
ments had seemed worth much attention; Wang Chao, who had been
for the previous seven years a deputy minister of public security
and who was of interest as a possible key figure in the group
concerned with public security and secret police work.
The other two missing secretaries, Chou Lin (Kweichow)
and Yang Ching-jen (Ninghsia), had been regarded as small
potatoes. Chou had been in Kweichow for at least ten years
and had been first secretary since 1955, but he had not been
named to the central committee in either 1956 or 1958 and was
only lightly associated with the policies of the dominant
leaders; he had been out of the news since spring 1960. Yang,
a specialist in nationalities work, had been first secretary
in Ninghsia for only a year or so, and had no public record.
Sanitized - Approved For ReI j IA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReI Eg1A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
V"01 -"a
Recapitulation, 1958-1961
Throughout the period 1958-1961, Mao Tse-tung continued
to dominate the Chinese Communist party, as he had since 1935.
However, his prestige, like his judgment, seemed to be deterio-
rating.
Mao's prestige had suffered in early 1957, with the ob-
vious failure of-his policy of encouraging outside criticism
of the party, at a time of "ebb" in China's economic develop-
ment, and in the midst of confusion in the bloc on Chinese at-
titudes toward problems of intrabloc relations. However, Mao
then went on the offensive, ending the experiment with liber-
alization and making the decisions to abandon the conservative
program of economic development in favor of a radical program,
to abandon the liberal line on intrabloc relations while resist-
ing Soviet efforts to tie China itself more tightly to the bloc,
and, at the same time, to incite the Soviet party to lead a
much more aggressive world Communist program.
During the first eight months of 1958, Mao was riding
high. It was almost certainly Mao who formulated the general
line and who ordered the transformation of the "upsurge" in
economic development into the "great leap forward." It was
Mao who designed (at least roughly) the commune program, and
Mao who initiated the campaign for mass production of iron and
steel. It was probably Mao who ordered the sustained Chinese
attacks on the Yugoslav party, putting pressure in this way
on Moscow, and it was apparently Mao, in the Peiping talks
in August, who was responsible for Khrushchev's abandonment
of plans for a summit meeting on Middle Eastern developments.
In the affairs of the party itself, it was Mao who gave the
main roles at the party congress to the party-machine leaders,
and who made the final decision to add to the politburo three
persons who were jointly proteges of himself and the party-
machine leaders.
Mao's prestige undoubtedly suffered in the late months
of 1958, the beginning of the period of retreats on all fronts,
and some observers speculated that his days of leadership would
soon be over. That Mao continued to dominate the party, however,
Sanitized - Approved For ReIemS E6IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App red For Release:EGIA-RDP79S?0427A000600110001-1
was made clear during the autumn, when Mao's compendium on
the "paper tiger" theme was used to explain away the failure
of the Taiwan Strait venture; and again in December, when, with
the formalization of the retreats with respect to both the
"leap" and the commune program, the party took the line that
Mao himself had corrected the excesses, that all along he had
charted the correct course between "right" and "left" opponents.
Although Mao's resignation from the government chairmanship
was seen by some observers as evidence of a fall, Mao's action
was almost certainly voluntary, not forced by other leaders;
the strongest of his lieutenants were those most closely iden-
tified with his policies.
In early 1959, still in the period of retreats, Mao seemed
to be above the battle, saying little, permitting the radical
party-machine leaders to contend publicly that they had been
right all along, while permitting (or perhaps encouraging) the
relatively conservative administrator-economists around Chou
En-lai to emphasize practical problems and to introduce the
conservative concept of economic planning as a "coordinated
chess-game." By spring 1959, Mao was clearly encouraging the
conservatives; his April speech and May letter both speeded
the process of downward revision of goals. However, Mao soon
made clear that he continued to favor as individuals the party-
machine leaders who served as his principal support: Mao pro-
vided the "guidance" for the August 1959 plenum which formalized
a further retreat in the commune program and made a drastic
reduction in the principal goals of the "leap" but which at
the same time repelled the "rightist" critics of the dominant
group, made clear to the conservatives the limits of criticism,
and prepared for a purge of the party. Mao unquestionably
approved, and perhaps directed in detail, the purge that fol-
lowed, the main effect of which was to make the military
establishment more responsive to him and his positions.
During the autumn of 1959, Mao cast himself in the role
of a semi-divine being whose propositions on the building of
Communism (despite the retreats) and on world Communist strate-
gy (despite Chinese weakness) were furiously defended against
unbelievers at home and abroad. Mao himself again played the
leading role in sending Khrushchev away from Peiping unhappy,
after the Soviet leader's stop there in October.
In early 1960, when the Chinese party launched new of-
fensives with respect both to building Communism in China and
to the promotion of the world Communist cause, the guiding
Sanitized - Approved For Release C -RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap oved For RAeSse : CIA-RDP79WO427A000600110001-1
25X1 C
25X1 C
principles for both campaigns were attributed to Mao. Mao in
that period gave the leading roles, in publicizing his princi-
ples and the derivative programs, to the economic specialists,
while Mao and his theorists stated his positions on world
strategy. The hubris characteristic of "Mao's thought" was
clearly evident during the spring of 1960, in speeches by his
lieutenants which praised him and which jeered at the "right
opportunists," which called for a substantial increase in out-
put over the grossly inflated claims for 1959 production, and
which asserted that urban communes were being set up in a "big
way." This hubris was also evident in the most important de-
velopment of the period, the systematic and scornful indictment
of Soviet positions on strategy in the Lenin Anniversary arti-
cles--the most comprehensive and derisive of which was implied
to have been written by Mao himself, and some parts of which
were stated by Mao at a reception in May.
In June 1960, it was Mao's positions on strategy, and to
a lesser extent on building Communism, which were strongly
asserted in clashes between 'Mao's lieutenants and Soviet rep-
resentatives at the WFTU conference and the Bucharest meet-
ing of the parties; Peng Chen at Bucharest also strongly de-
fended Mao personally against Khrushchev. Later in the summer,
after being struck two heavy blows by the poor wheat harvest
and the mass withdrawal of the Soviet technicians, Mao no
doubt approved the decisions--stated first by others--to take
the development of agriculture (lagging badly) as the party's
"first task," to retrench in all other sectors of economic
lanning, and to stand firm against Soviet pressure.
In this period, the be-
inese parties was increasingly
Ch~
havior of both the Soviet and
shaping the dispute into the form of the Soviet party versus
the Chinese party, or even Russia versus China, rather than
in terms of an alliance of realistic 'conservatives' in the
Soviet and Chinese parties against wild 'radicals' in the
Chinese party--thus reducing the pressure on Mao from those
Chinese leaders who personally tended to favor Soviet posi-
tions in the dispute.
25X1 C
25X1 C
Sanitized - Approved For Rele; .ErIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App,oved For Releli% 'E8IA-RDP79 427A000600110001-1
During autumn 1960, while the Chinese party on one hand
remained intransigent on issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute and
on the other hand virtually abandoned the domestic policies
introduced in the 'leap forward" years, Mao played a leading
role in the wino-Soviet relationship but no significant public
role in the domestic retreat. In the dispute, Mao became the
principal public spokesmen through the publication and explica-
tion (by others) of the fourth volume of his works, and it was
Mao who selected the tough Chinese delegation, headed by party-
machine figures, to the preparatory meeting in Moscow in October
for the conference of Communist parties. Also in October, Mao
almost certainly attended the top-level meeting of the Chinese
party which sought to make clear to the party as a whole, as
the August 1959 directives apparently had not made clear, that
the leadership was serious in wishing to reform the commune
program; however, as often before, Mao did not associate him-
self publicly with the retreat.
In November 1960, it was again Mao who selected the Chi-
nese delegation to the Moscow conference--several party-machine
leaders and some of Mao's own writers. .gain it was Mao's
positions which were defended by the Chinese delegates, who
won Mao a notable (if costly) victory on the issues of authority
and discipline debated at the conference.
In early 1961, Chinese Communist leaders continued to
stand together publicly, and perhaps privately, against the
Soviet party, but there must have been a growing realization
of the consequences of this position for Chinese economic and
military development, and it seems certain that at least some
of the administrator-economist and military leaders believed
that Mao was making a bad mistake. Moreover, Mao lost further
prestige with yet another retreat on the home front; although
the relatively conservative leaders who had all along been
critical of aspects of his "leap forward" policies presumably
were glad to see Mao adjust to reality, the fact remained
that it was primarily a recurrence of Mao's hubris, in early
1960, which had led the party to commit itself to goals for
1960 which it had humiliatingly failed to achieve. That Mao
contiqued as the leader was indicated by the fact that he
"presided over' the January plenum which conceded this failure,
and by the fact that, despite the failure, the plenum defended
the policies--the general line, the "leap," and the communes--
so intimately identified with Mao personally. Again Mao chose
not to emphasize his personal association with a shift to the
Sanitized - Approved For Release 1 IIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 "CRET
Sanitized - Ap,roved For Re~l~ease : CIA-RDP79%0427A000600110001-1
right, a shift which was stated by the administrator-economists
Li Fu-chun and Po I-po and in collective and anonymous pro-
nouncements in the early months of 1961.
During the spring of 1961, Mao, like other Chinese lead-
ers, remained rather quiet. Mao's positions on strategy were
reaffirmed without polemics by lesser figures. The party's
relatively conservative domestic policies--approved by Mao,
although painful to him--were reaffirmed by others throughout
the spring. Mao's continued leadership was evident in his
conduct in public appearances, in oracular remarks attributed
to him, and in the continual citation of him as the originator
of positions in dispute with the boviet party and as the
authority for the shift to the right in domestic policies.
Continuing the apparent process of gradually phasing out
as chairman of the party in Liu Shao-chi's favor, Mao chose
on the party's 40th anniversary (1 July 1961) to allow his
leadership to be reaffirmed through Liu. In Liu's speech (the
only major speech) on the occasion, Mao's 26-year leadership
was praised, he was credited with the successes achievedhuun-
der (or in spite of) the general line, the "leap," and t
commcne program; he was said to have directed that primary
attention be given to agriculture; he was cited as the source
thus
of the cautious principles now governing domestic policy,
pre-empting the charges that might reasonably be made against
him; and various of his positions and world strategy were re-
af f irmed as well.
Mao continued to be quiet, even more than other Chinese
leaders, through the rest of the summer of 1961 and into the
autumn. Fie almost certainly presided over the secret meetings
of the party in this period, looking toward the imminent 22nd
CPSU Congress and a Ninth CCP Congress. Mao's positions on
strategy were reaffirmed lightly in Chinese pronouncements,
and Mao presumably approved the policy of competing selectively
with Moscow for influence in the bloc and in the world move-
ment while generally cooperating in policy toward the West and
Various
in the diminished economic and military relationship.
pronouncements suggested that I'lao continued to favor cautious
domestic policies, while at the same time it was made clear
in various ways that Mao and his dominant lieutenants were not
prepared to concede that their earlier policies had been
poorly conceived. 1oreover, it was said from time to time
that Chinese policies would continue to be based on Marxist-
Sanitized - Approved For Relea,WRJA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap oved For Release:TCIA-RDP79000427A000600110001-1
Leninist theory as interpreted and developed by IvMao. Through-
out this period (summer-autumn 1961), Mao's leadership of the
party continued to be indicated by his conduct in personal
appearances, remarks attributed to him, and,the treatment
of him in the Chinese press--all of which suggested no expecta-
tion of his early retirement.
The Party-Machine Figures
Throughout the period 1953-1961, the party-machine figures
around Liu Shao-chi appeared still to constitute the most power-
ful group of Mao's lieutenants. However, other groups of lead-
ers, in the years 1958-1961, had been given much additional
reason to wish to see the party-machine leaders brought down.
The party-machine leaders had begun to ride especially
high, at the expense of the administrator-economist group, in
mid-1957, with the failure of the liberalization policy which
Chou En-lai had sponsored jointly with Iao, with the switch
to a much harder line on intrabloc relations than Chou had
publicized in the wintei of 1956-57, with the decision to un-
dertake a radical program of economic development very differ-
ent from the one with which Chou and others of that group had
been identified, and with the advocacy of a world Communist
program much more aggressive than the foreign policy which
Chou had played the main role in implementing.
The party-machine figures continued to ride very high,
along with Mao, in the first half of 1953. They played the
main roles in exhorting the "leap forward" and in promoting
the commune program in the countryside, and, with Mao, in
advocating the formation of urban communes. They played the
main roles at the party congress in spring 1958, giving all
three of the principal reports, and taking three of their (and
Mao's) proteges into the politburo, the only three persons
added in the 1957-1931 period. I.t the same time, they took
into Teng's secretariat two of the key figures of the adminis-
trator-economist group, Li Fu-chun and Li Isien-nien--an action
aimed at giving the secretariat greater competence in economic
work, and which had the secondary gain of reducing (although
not eliminating) the differences between the point of view of
certain of the key figures of the two groups.
Sanitized - Approved For Releas?,,;, A-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 u,, URET
Sanitized - App, oved For Release : CIA-RDP79IM0427A000600110001-1
After the failure of Mao's venture in the Taiwan Strait
in autumn 1958, party-machine figures played roles in the
effort to explain that Mao was not to blame; and in December
they took part in the effort to show that the retreat in the
"leap" and the commune programs was in fact a correct course
between extremes. As noted above, this strongest group of
Mao's lieutenants almost certainly was not responsible for
Mao's resignation from the government chairmanship at that
time.
Recognizing that they had lost prestige and were under
criticism, the party-machine leaders were still in such a
strong position in early 1959 that they could contend publicly
that they, like Mao, had been right all along. Their position
seemed somewhat weaker in the spring, when the conservatives
were being encouraged by Mao, and the party-machine figures
were being indirectly criticized by some of the administrator-
economists. This criticism continued into the summer, and
some of the pronouncements of party-machine figures showed an
awareness that mistakes had been made. However, the same
August plenum which formal izec_3 a further retreat in actual
economic policies also attributed the successes of 1958-59
"precisely" to the increased role of the party machine and
its principles and methods of operation. This plenum, repell-
ing the most rightist of the critics of Mao and the party-
machine figures, had the effect of discouraging all criticism.
Chou En-lai himself, knowing that a purge was imminent, took
care not to attribute the mistakes of 1958-59 to the party-
machine group. The purge which followed the plenum did not
touch tiie party-machine figures, and one of these figures
was chosen to state publicly that there had indeed been a
purge; moreover, a party-machine figure became the new minister
of public security.
In the same period, party-machine figures played import-
ant roles in defending Mao's thought, especially with respect
to world Communist strategy. The most ambitious of the arti-
cles with which the Chinese party challenged Khrushchev, on
his visit in October, were written by Liu and Teng.
In the first five months of 1960 party-machine figures
played smaller public roles than had been customary, despite
the fact that the party was undertaking new offensives in both
domestic and foreign policies. Developments of the period did
not suggest, however, that Mao was replacing them as his
Sanitized - Approved For Rel%EclA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Ap'oved For Rel6ffie'TCIA-RDP79M0427A000600110001-1
favorites. The commitment to inflated production claims for
1959 and to substantial increases in 1960 over these claims,
the derision of the ''right opportunists, the assertion of
rapid progress in setting up urban communes, and, especially,
the content of the Lenin Anniversary pronouncements, all in-
dicated that the party-machine group was still riding high.
Of the party-machine leaders, Tan Chen-lin gave one of three
principal reports to the National People's Congress in the
spring, and Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen both spoke in May
in support of Mao's propositions on world Communist strategy.
In June 1960, at the ViFTU conference and the Bucharest
meeting of the parties, the party-machine leaders took up the
leading role, which they have played ever since, in confronta-
tions in the Nino-Soviet dispute. At the "'IFTU meeting, Liu
Shao-chi and two lesser party-machine figures attacked soviet
positions in harsh terms, and Liu and Teng Hisiao-ping lobbied
against Soviet positions in meetings with other delegates.
At the Bucharest meeting, Peng Chen was the principal Chinese
spokesman, clashing bitterly with Khrushchev and defending Mao.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in July, the organ
25X10 of Ko Ching-shih's Shanghai committee was the first Chinese 25X10
source to state Pciping's intention to stand firm.
During the autumn of 1960, while Peiping was virtually
abandoning the policies of the "leap forward" years, the party-
machine leaders were securing their prestige with Mao if not
with others by standing firm in confrontations with the soviet
party. Teng and Peng led the Chinese delegation tc the prepara-
tory meeting in October, while lesser party-machine figures
played supporting roles in Peiping. Liu went to Moscow (as
head of the CCP delegation) with Teng and Peng for the November
conference of the 81 parties. Tong was the principal spokes-
man during the first three weeks of the conference, again clash-
ing heatedly with Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen, while
Liu took over in the final week for bilateral talks with Khru-
shchev and forced the Soviet leader to back down on the key
issues of authority and discipline in the movement. There is
no doubt that Mao was much pleased with the performance of
the party-machine leaders in Moscow; but some of the adminis-
trator-economist and military leaders almost certainly believed
the party-machine figures to have gone too far, and the party-
Sanitized - Approved For Rele~E f IA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Apjoved For Release: CIA-RDP79900427A000600110001-1
machine leaders by their conduct had continued to give the
Soviet party almost the same interest in deposing them as in
deposing Mao.
During this period (autumn 1960), the party machine group
again strengthened its position in the structure of power,
t of the six great regional bureaus of
h
men
with the establis
the party, most if not all of which were to be headed by party-
machine figures. These bureaus were to reverse the trend to-
ward autonomy at the provincial and local levels, reimposing
strong controls at the regional level. In this period, a
provincial-level party-machine figure, the Shantung the policies
secretary, was brought down--not for having opposed
favored by Mao and the party-machine leaders but for having
fa..led to get results with them. This charge was of course
applicable to Mao and the party-machine leaders too--but, in
view of the purge of autumn 1959, no one seemed willing to
make it.
The prestige of the party-machine leaders, like that of
Mao, continued to decline in some quarters of the party in
early months of 1961, with the failure of the 1960 "leap,"
the poor prospects for 1961, and the growing realization of
the effects of Soviet sanctions. Although it was barely pos-
sible even to imply any criticism of the stand against the
Soviet party, the emphasis on respecting reality, in comment-
aries during 1961, was an indirect criticism of the earlier
positions of the party-machine figures on domestic programs.
And this group of leaders was inconspicuous in this period.
The party-machine leaders, like other leaders, remained
rather quiet in the spring of 1.961. The propositions which
they had defended in the clashes with the Soviet party were
reaffirmed lightly by various persons, while the domestic
policies with which they had been personally associated con-
tinued to recede. There was an effort in this period--comical
to Western observers, but reflecting a genuine concern for
prestige--to associate the party-machine figures with the
'good' concept of "undulatory" development of the Chinese
economy while stacking the conservatives (who had been right)
with the 'bad' concept of "U-shaped' development. The party-
machine leaders clearly remained in Mao's favor: Liu con-
tinued to play the public role of Mao's first lieutenant,
while Teng and Peng appeared frequently.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele p f4A-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For Releag1gaLc4A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
Liu's apparent status (since 1945) as Mao's choice as
his successor was indicated again on 1 July 1961, when Liu
made the party's 40th anniversary address. Liu continued in
this speech to identify himself as closely as possible with
Mao's policies of recent years. Liu also continued the process
of associating the party-machine figures with the current
cautious principles for economic development, in effect pre-
paring, with Mao, to turn against their opponents the charges
which could be made against them. All of the party-machine
figures at the politburo level except Tan Chen-lin--the most
extreme of the "leap" exhorters--were prominent in the 40th
anniversary celebrations.
In the period July-October 1961, while the party con-
tinued to reaffirm lightly the positions in dispute with Mos-
cow and to behave conservatively in economic matters, the
party-machine leaders continued to associate themselves with
both attitudes. Like Mao, however, they made clear that they
were not prepared to concede publicly that their earlier
policies for economic development had been mistaken. Their
continued high status was indicated clearly in the freedom
given them to distort the record; e.g. as a part of the
stratagem of carrying out a conservative program under cer-
tain of the earlier radical slogans, it was shamelessly con-
tended that the slogan of 'placing politics in command" had
aimed precisely at ensuring "greater care" in economic work.
Liu, Teng, Peng and other party-machine figures at the polit-
buro level remained active and conspicuous, except for Tan
Chen-lin, apparently in less favor, and Li Ching-chuan, prob-
ably busy in the southwest; Peng made the National Day speech.
Some of the provincial first secretaries who were demoted or
replaced in this period were party-machine figures--those who
had apparently failed to turn right sufficiently after tae
leadership had given the signal.
Throughout the period 1958-1961, the administrator-
economist figures around Chou En-lai continued to seem much
weaker as a group thaii the party-machine figures. Although
they had been more nearly right, on domestic matters, than
had the party-machine figures, they apparently derived no
advantage from their acuity. Indeed, those with the best
claim to having been right were the least rewarded.
Sanitized - Approved For Rele G. ' cTA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - A oved For R QW: CIA-RDP79$00427A000600110001-1
As noted previously, tiie administrator-economists around
Chou were displaced from leading roles during 1957, with the
decisions to adopt a complex of radical policies in both
ti domestic and foreign affairs. These relatively conservative
leaders continued to play small roles during the first half
of 1958, and were given back seats at the party congress in
that period. No persons associated with them were added to
the politburo; their only significant gain, the cooption of
two of them--Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien--into the policy-
implementing secretariat, was somewhat compromised by the
pressure on these leaders to adopt a new point of view closer
to that of the party-machine leaders.
In the summer and fall of 1958, the administrator-econom-
ists continued to play secondary roles. They were not promin-
ent in promoting either the rural or urban communes, and most
of them, especially Chen Yun, probably opposed the ill-fated
"backyard steel" campaign. In the Taiwan Strait venture of
that period, Chou En-lai was given a role in the retreating
phase of the venture and in explaining that Mao was not to
blame for its failure.
By the end of 1958, when it became necessary to announce
substantial modifications in the "leap forward" and commune
programs, it was obvious that Mao and the party-machine lead-
ers, not the administrator-economists, bore the main responsi-
bility for these embarrassments. However, most of the adminis-
trator-economists had been publicly drawn into these programs
sufficiently to be compromised. Even those whose hands seemed
to bL clean, e.g. Chen Yun and Teng Tzu-hui, were not strong
enough to press for a public vindication.
The relative weakness of the administrator-economists in
the structure of power continued to be illustrated in the
early months of 1959. Although these leaders were permitted
in their pronouncements to discuss practical problems and to
introduce the concept (perhaps Chen Yun's) of the "chess-
game," lines which constituted criticism of the party=machine
record, party-machine figures were permitted to argue, despite
abundant evidence to the contrary, that the party machine had
not been wrong. The position of the administrator-economists
seemed stronger during the spring and early summer, when Mao
was encouraging a rightist course, but developments in July
and August reflected Mao's decision to continue to favor the
party-machine leaders primarily. At the party meetings in
Sanitized - Approved For ReIe PIA-RDP79SO0427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App&pved For ReleiiCTIA-RDP79427A000600110001-1
that period which debated the issues and halted the rightist
trend, the leaders of the administrator-economist group
clearly did not carry their criticism as far as did those who
were purged, and were not suspected of taking their case out-
side the party, as the purgees had; but some of the lesser
figures of this group seem to have been included in the purge.
During autumn 1959, when the anti-rightist campaign and
the purge were underway and when party leaders of all groups
were offering a display of solidarity against both domestic
and foreign opponents, the administrator-economist leaders
played roles in defending Mao's propositions on building Com-
munism and on world Communist strategy. During Khrushchev's
visit in October, however, their roles were clearly secondary
to those of Mao and the party-machine figures; and Chen Yun,
the leader probably most responsive to Soviet principles of
economic development, was kept out of Peiping during the visit.
Continuing the process begun in autumn 1959, during the
new offensives in the early months of 1960 the distance between
Mao and the party-machine leaders on one hand and the adminis-
trator-economists on the other seemed to be diminishing. This
was particularly true of Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien, the
economic specialists who had been added to the secretariat in
1958. Li Fu-chun began the year with a 1 January article de-
fending the party machine and its principles of operation, and
thereafter Li and other administrator-economist figures played
the leading roles in publicizing Mao's thought on domestic
matters. The good standing of most of the administrator-eco-
nomist figures, especially the two Li's, was illustrated at
the National People's Congress in the spring, when these two
gave two of the three main reports, criticizing the "right
opportunists" and associating themselves with unreasonable
production goals for 1960 and with the urban commune program.
The administrator-economists did not, however, play significant
roles in the Chinese party's comprehensive indictment of So-
viet strategy in that period.
During summer 1960, when the Chinese party was principally
concerned with standing firm against the Soviet party, ad-
ministrator-economist leaders played supporting roles for Mao
and the party-machine leaders. Chou En-lai took part in lobby-
ing against Soviet positions at the WFTU meeting in June; and
Li Fu-chun in August, after the withdrawal of the technicians,
made the most systematic statement of the Chinese intention
Sanitized - Approved For Relea?26&~A-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - App ved For Release :'CIA-RDP799#i0427A000600110001-1
to rely on Chinese resources to whatever degree necessary,
appropriately reducing the development program. It was Li
again who was chosen, in September, to reaffirm Chinese in-
transigence in a clash with a Soviet politburo member at the
North Vietnamese party congress. Some of the administrator-
economist leaders probably contributed to the Chinese party
letter of 21 September.
In autumn 1960, a period of intransigence in the Sino-
Soviet dispute but further retreats in domestic programs, the
administrator-economist leaders continued to play supporting
roles for the party-machine leaders entrusted with the conduct
(in Moscow) of the dispute. The administrator-economists un-
doubtedly took part in the meetings (in China) which made
further modifications in the commune program. They apparently
did not benefit from the re-establishment of the party's
regional bureaus at that time, as no administrator-economist
figure was known or believed to head any of them.
By early 1961 it was apparent that the "leap forward"
psychology again fostered in 1960 had again failed to get
the anticipated results, but the administrator-economists
were still not strong enough to claim a triumph over the
party-machine leaders. This was in part their own fault:
following the purge of autumn 1959 and through most of 1960,
the administrator-economists had contributed to the "leap"
psychology appreciably more than they had in the two years
from mid-1957 to mid-1959. In any case, although they were
given the leading roles assigned to individuals in discussing
privately (Li Fu-chun) and publicly (Po I-po) the conserva-
tive policies which were to prevail in 1961, they were forced
to do this in a context of defense of the past programs.
The administrator-economist leaders, like Mao and the
party-machine leaders, were comparatively quiet during spring
1961, a period in which Mao's propositions on world Communist
strategy and the party's conservative thinking on domestic
policies were stated in minor pronouncements. Although these
domestic policies vindicated the earlier reservations of the
administrator-economists, the new concept of "undulatory"
development of the economy was presented as a vindication
primarily of the past positions of the party-machine exhorters;
indeed, the 'bad' concept of U-shaped development was said
to reflect conservatism and lack of enthusiasm, imputing to
the conservatives a favor for great sags in development rather
Sanitized - Approved For ReIgg fi1CIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 SECRET
Sanitized - Appr 'ed For Release : CIA-RDP79SU 27A000600110001-1
than, as was the case, steady development on the Soviet model.
The "undulatory" concept also implied, of course, a return of
the party-machine leaders to leadership of mass campaigns when
conditions were seen as favorable for another "leap." Most
of the administrator-economists apparently remained in good
favor during spring 1961, but their relative weakness in the
structure of power was evident in the manipulation of these
concepts.
In the 40th anniversary celebrations (1 July 1961), the
administrator-economists were shut out, as party-machine
leader Liu gave the only speech, and the speech itself was
a glorification of Mao, a defense of the past policies of Mao
and the party-machine figures, and a further effort to as-
sociate these persons with the current conservative policies
in such terms as to permit them (if necessary) to turn the
charges of the conservatives. Most of the administrator-
economists, however, were on view on the occasion.
In the period July-October 1961, the position of the
administrator-economist leaders seemed much the same, as
the pattern of the party's behavior was much the same: the
light reaffirmation of Chinese positions in the dispute
with Moscow, reaffirmation and explication of conservative
domestic policies, and further distortion of history to make
Mao and the party-machine leaders appear to have been right
all along. In this period, the public contention that the slo-
gans of the exhorters had in fact been aimed at ensuring more
careful planning was the equivalent of the earlier appropria-
tion by the party machine of the concept of "undulatory"
development. However, the administrator-economist leaders
almost certainly took part in the high-level party meetings
of the summer, and no proteges of these leaders were $nown
to have been involved in the removals and demotions at the
provincial level. Most of the administrator-economist leaders
were conspicuous in small affairs throughout the period; Chen
Yun and Teng Tzu-hui, apparently still not fully forgiven for
having been nearest right, were out of the news for months,
but appeared with the others in the display of unity on National
Day.
Sanitized - Approved For ReleasL ,--RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReleasaEiCIA-RDP79SO0,427AO006001 10001 -1
New
The Military
In the period 1958-1961, the military group around Peng
Te-huai conjectured in 1957 was broken up. By late 1961,
for several reasons, the military leaders did not seem to
constitute a group in the sense in which it was still possible
to speak meaningfully of party-machine figures or administra-
tor-economist figures in terms of groups.
The main public role of the military leaders in the latter
half of 1957--the period of adoption of a complex of radical
policies--had been in Mao's trip to Moscow in November. Peng
Te-huai and others participated in the apparent effort (un-
successful) to get a Soviet promise of nuclear weapons for
China.
An important divisive factor was introduced into the
military leadership in spring 1958, with the addition to the
politburo standing committee of Lin Piao, Mao's longtime
favorite, who was not on good terms with the then most im-
portant military figure, Minister of Defense Peng Te-huai.
The professional military leaders around Peng were struck
several other blows during 1958. One of these was the emphatic
reassertion of the party's authority over the military, which
softened up the military for other blows: the imposition of
"Mao's thought" from guerrilla days as the strategic doctrine
of the regime, in light of the failure to obtain nuclear wea-
pons; the assignment of the military to large roles in non-
military projects related to the "leap forward" and commune
programs; and the venture in the Taiwan Strait, in which the
military (especially the air force) was not properly prepared
for the role it had to play, and the failure of which cast
some discredit on the military despite the party's explanation
that it was really Moscow which was to blame.
Throughout the rest of 1958 and the early months of 1959,
the military establishment seemed simply the object of the
manipulation of Mao and the party-machine leaders. Although
Peng Te-huai had publicly expressed his acquiescence--indeed,
his delight--in the blows given the military noted above, his
private views were very different. He took his case to the
USSR in spring 1959, and disappeared from view shortly after
returning to Peiping in June. He is believed to have taken
part in the party meetings in July 1959 and to have stated
Sanitized - Approved For ReI@?IEDFITCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseRE IA-RDP790427A000600110001-1
strongly his opposition to the policies of the dominant lead-
ers, after which he became an "anti-party element."
The military was the main object of the purge of autumn
1959. Peng Te-huai and his chief-of-staff, Huang Ko-cheng,
were replaced by the two military leaders regarded as most
responsive to Mao personally, Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ching. Per-
haps as many as eight or ten of the regime's senior military
men, most of them members of the central committee, were
brought down in Peng's fall.
During the purge, the new military leaders, supported by
some of those who had survived, were on stage to proclaim the
necessity of the military's subordination to the party, with
all which that principle implied in the way of specific poli-
cies--a point which had been made clearly by the purge itself.
In Lin Piao's October 1959 article on this theme, he went so
far as to pledge the allegiance of the armed forces to Mao
personally.
Following the purge, as part of the effort to put the
military in its place and keep it there, individual military
leaders got very little publicity. This remained true through
most of 1960. However, Lin Piao appeared during the polemic
of spring 1960 with a defense of some of Mao's propositions
on world strategy, including the contention that China could
wage a successful "people's war" against an American nuclear
attack. Some of the military might have contributed to the
pronouncements on military matters in other Chinese state-
ments of the period and in the party letters (one of which
denounced Khrushchev's expressed support of Peng Te-huai), but
these discussions could just as well have been written by the
theorists and party-machine figures, and, indeed, sometimes
seemed not to have the benefit of a professional military view.
Lin Piao and some other leaders emerged again in autumn 1960,
playing supporting roles (in Peiping) for the party-machine
leaders engaged in the confrontations in Moscow.
The military establishment under Lin and Lo appeared to
be in moderately good favor during 1961, as the party held
the line against the Soviet party while retreating further
in its domestic programs. There was no evidence that further
purges of the military had been found necessary or desirable.
However, Chinese press attacks on the "purely military point-
of-view" were still going on in the autumn. Moreover, the
Sanitized - Approved For Relea;k;&16-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1
 Sanitized - Apbved For Refease TCIA-RDP79 0427A000600110001-1
principal military leader, Lin Piao, was sick, and the second-
in-command, Lo Jui-ching, was more of a security type than a
professional military man. Both were believed still responsive
primarily to Mao rather than to their military comrades. Finally,
the military establishment itself seemed sick, suffering from
the blows given it by the party and by the withdrawal or diminu-
tion of most types of Soviet aid. For all of these reasons,
the military figures did not seem to constitute a strong group,
although individual leaders may have been in positions to give
important assistance to others in any struggle for power.
Sanitized - Approved For ReIff%;jCIA-RDP79S00427A000600110001-1