SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000600010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1961
• Content Type: STUDY

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28 April 1961
OCI.No. 1803/61
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
25X1A
(Reference Title:
.THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE. ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CAA zNTE ".
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25X1A
This is a working paper. It traces chronologically the
development of aspects of Soviet policy toward colonial areas
and the countries regarded by Moscow as having achieved vari-
ous degrees of independence from "imperialism." The Sino-
Soviet Studies Grou would welcome comment on this paper,
addressed to who wrote the paper, or to the
acting coordinator o e group, in Room 2549 "1" Building
or at Ext. 8009.
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SUMMARY
Moscow's preoccupation in the period 1945-55 with the
task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incor-
poration of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with develop-
ments in Western Europe--the main focus of East-West fric-
tion--for a decade precluded a dynamic policy in peripheral
? areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Al-
though on numerous public occasions Lenin and Stalin had ex-
pressed great optimism over trends in colonial areas, Com-
munist agitation and Soviet action in these areas--until
World War II shattered the existing social structure in
large sections of Asia and speeded up the tempo of politi-
cal, economic, and social change on a world-wide scale--
had been singularly unsuccessful.
The USSR's failure in late 1945 to adopt a bold program
to capture or guide the anticolonialist movements which had
matured during the war reflected not only the Soviet Union's
desire not to embitter relations with the West on secondary
matters, but also uncertainty as to the reliability of non-
Communist leaders and movements and the general lack of a
Soviet "Presence." Stalin apparently evaluated the new gov-
ernments as transitory, soon to give way before popular pres-
sures in an inevitable evolution of political power to the
left. The worsening of Soviet relations with the West was
accompanied by a stiffening of Moscow's line in Asia. With
the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, moderation
toward non-Communists was repudiated conclusively--a deci-
sion which was reflected in 1948 in the widespread outbreak
of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebel-
lions not only in remaining colonial areas but also in the
newly independent states of Asia. The Kremlin apparently
believed that nothing further could be gained by Communist
restraint or conciliation, and this view was abetted by Com-
munist successes in China and by a consistent overevaluation
of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia. Asian Com-
munist parties, following Moscow's lead, began freely to pre-
scribe a "Chinese way" for the anticolonialist movement; in
essence this. meant the encouragement of peasant and workers'
armed revolts ~ as well as intensified political struggle.
The subsequent suppression of Communist-inspired revolts--
with the notable exception of Indo-China--with heavy losses
to Communist assets was a serious setback to Moscow's general
line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in Asia.
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The world-wide crisis touched off in June 1950 by the
Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSR
to mobilize world Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces
in support of its Korean policy, Moscow, however, was slow
in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and
"neutralism" could be turned against the West; even after
the war turned into a military and political stalemate and
the Soviet Union's general attitude toward Asian non-Com-
munist governments moderated, Stalin continued to rebuff
neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise.
At a September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Soviet
delegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics,
offered to help promote the economic development of Asian
countries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw ma-
terials. At the UN, the Soviet Union-':s consistent anti-
Westernism now was combined with limited overtures to non-
Western delegations, a change reflected also in Soviet
world-wide diplomatic activity--suggesting that Moscow had
upgraded the possibilities for expanding its influence
through traditional government-to-government channels. The
extensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference
(sponsored by the World Peace Council) in April 1952 sug-
gested that Stalin also looked to increased economic con-
tacts as a promising avenue for breaking out of the USSR's
semi-isolation. The year 1952 also featured a shift toward
greater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs
against Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists. Sta-
lin's last major theoretical pronouncements pointed toward a
greater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interest be-
tween the industrially developed Western powers and the weak-
ly developed or undeveloped "capitalist dependencies," but
his continued rejection of a settlement on Korea acted as a
powerful brake on Soviet efforts to get a friendship campaign
rolling.
Stalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discarded
his methods and attempted to bring about a limited improve-
ment in relations with the non-Communist world. The cumula-
tive effect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders in
the six months following Stalin's death made it apparent that
a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward under-
developed countries was in progress. For the first time the
Soviet Union announced its willingness--although qualified--
to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program, and
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Soviet Premier Malenkov declared a "good neighbor" policy and
"a new approach" on economic aid to Asian countries.
The USSR's subsequent economic overtures attempted to
play on local popular and governmental concern over export
markets and desires for rapid economic development. Mos-
cow's main attention in late 1953 and 1954 was to Asia, al-
though interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempo
of political, economic, and social change in the area. The
Soviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to Latin
America--a tacit admission that they were more or less ef-
fectively sealed off from its influence.
A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way
since 1950 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear of
atomic warfare and generate pressures against military or
political cooperation with the West, was intensified in 1954.
The USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support to coun-
tries involved in disputes with the West on territorial is-
sues and other matters and stepped up its efforts to introduce
detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asian
and Arab countries, The Soviet Union's tactical support for
nationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, and
Nasir was based on the expectation that their greater self-
assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of
reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting
Western leadership.
The USSR's intention to seek a closer working agreement
with Asian and Arab nationalist regimes was made clear by its
February 1955 agreement to help finance and construct a ma-
jor steel plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of its
efforts to identify itself with the views and objectives of
the neutralist-convened conference of Asian and African gov-
ernments at Bandung in April 1955. Moscow's attempts to ac-
commodate its public posture to neutralist-nationalist senti-
ment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June
visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; having form-
erly attacked him for his anti-Communist and "pro-imperialist"
policies, Moscow now praised him for his "spiritual" and po-
litical leadership of Asia.
On the eve of the 1955 Geneva summit conference, the
USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promise
of an improvement in East-West relations and a general
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reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but
throughout the world. Concurrent with conciliatory moves,
however, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of secret
arms negotiations with a group of Asian and Arab states de-
signed to offset pro-Western alliances in the area, a tactic
surfaced with the announcement that September of Cairo's arms
deal with the bloc.
The Bulganian-Khrushchev visit to Asia in November and
December 1955 was Moscow's first big chance to bid for sup-
port among Asian peoples. The two leaders dropped their
Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asian neutralism a more
anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian neutral-
ist aims and "peace" and the West with "colonialism" and in-
tervention. Agreements on increased trade, technical and
cultural exchanges, and credits reached during the tour laid
the groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of
Soviet influence in the area.
The Khrushchev-dominated 20th party congress in February
1956 sought to create the impression that a new era was open-
ing, bright with prospects of Communist victories. The new
formulations of the congress were intended to add credibility
to the Soviet Union's general line of "peaceful coexistence"
and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and
non-Communist countries. Khrushchev confirmed that aid to
Asian, African, and Latin American countries for their eco-
nomic, political, and cultural development was an important
plank in Soviet foreign policy, designed to provide "a ma-
jor stumbling block" to imperialism.
In the series of crises touched off by the collapse in
July 1956 of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic as-
sistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's swift na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouraged
Cairo to resist Western demands. The Soviet Union's diplo-
matic and propaganda footwork following the attack on Egypt
was intended to halt the fighting and embarrass the attack-
ing countries without committing the USSR to all-out support
of Nasir. After the cease-fire, Communist propagandists
feasted on this "evidence" of imperialist intervention and
magnified the Soviet role as protector of Arab interests.
Moscow's efforts in early 1957 to distract world at-
tention from bloc internal troubles centered on a campaign
to counter President Eisenhower's "Middle East Proposals"--
i.e., to frustrate the extension of pro-Western defense
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arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influence
in some of the Arab countries. The Soviet Union's own grow-
ing foreign economic program could point to increased diplo-
matic and economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arab
states, to dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist
countries, and to a generally enhanced impression that the
USSR was a serious economic as well as political competitor
with the West. Only a handful of countries, however, had
agreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and military
aid or of economic aid alone.
Following the frustration in June 1957 of efforts by
the "anti-party" group to break his control of the Soviet
government and party, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolder
foreign moves. Behind a facade of Soviet security interest
in Syrian developments and in the context of intense polit-
ical-psychological pressures following Soviet tests of an
intercontinental ballistic missile and claims of a new world
balance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactions
and Western resolution. After two months of efforts to in-
tensify and prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abrupt
reversal reflected apparent disappointment that it was the
Arab states--rather than the West--which buckled under East-
West pressures.
The USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations and subsequent
meetings of world Communist parties in November 1957 re-
flected an effort to make direct political and propaganda
capital out of changes wrought domestically and internation-
ally in the years of Soviet rule. The essence of the new
formal policy pronouncements was a call for an intensified
struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western
influence, with top priority to peace forces for a drive
against the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons.
The practical effect of the party discussions on Soviet pol-
icy was slight, with the USSR continuing to profess willing-
ness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and
to assist politically and economically in the development of
countries seeking to break away from dependence on the West.
Moscow began 1958 riding the wave of optimism engendered
by World-wide reaction to its military and space achievements,
and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over a pe-
riod of years of the bloc's political, economic, and military
aid program--combined with people-to-people contacts, intensive
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propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation--to make a
growing number of the underdeveloped countries materially
dependent on the bloc and politically tractable. However,
Nasir's precipitous move toward a merger of Egypt and Syria
pointed up the Soviet problem of maintaining good state rela-
tions with nationalist governments while supporting the spread
of Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet Union
ended by grudgingly accepting the formation of the UAR--with
its disastrous effects on the Syrian Communist party--and
turned its attention to heading off any rapprochement between
Nasir and the West, on the one hand by increasing its eco-
nomic and military support to Cairo and on the other by con-
tinuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populace.
The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on 14
July 1958 and the subsequent American and British landings
in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these
moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive
against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. As in
the earlier Syrian cr.isJs, Moscow attempted to intensify the
air of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force an
immediate big-power conference to bring about a detente. The
Soviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations with
the new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effective
instrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs.
Anti-leftist coups in the fall of 1958 in Pakistan, Burma,
and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples and gov-
ernments of the underdeveloped countries a more resolute stand
against reactionary influences, both domestic and internation-
al.
At the 21st party congress in early 1959 Khrushchev per-
sonally spotlighted ideological and political differences
which had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and mili-
tary support of selected non-Communist countries--support'
based principally on parallel anti-Western interests rather
than on compatible ideologies or common.long-term goals.
Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for more con-
sistent support of Soviet foreign policy in exchange for So-
viet favors. The congress' endorsement of a more active line
in underdeveloped countries was reflected in signs of a broad-
ening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs
and of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and cultural
contacts with Latin American countries. The general strategy
outlined at the congress reflected the USSR's apparent belief
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NVol
that the stalemate in East-West relations facilitated rather
than hampered its policy of driving a wedge between the West-
ern and neutralist camps; support for the latter was justi-
fied on the basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed
them to be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward the
bloc.
In mid-1959, under the exigencies of its drive for detente
with the West and in reaction to unfavorable developments with-
in key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarily
set aside its activist line in favor of overtures for strength-
ening friendly government-to-government relations. Moscow ap-
parently hoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United States
would help build irresistible popular pressure for an early
summit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions. Khru-
shchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly ses-
sion in New York, which included the promise of vastly great-
er economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America from
both the bloc and the West once the arms race was over, was
a transparent bid for support for immediate talks on disarma-
ment.
In a different vein, Mikoyan's November 1959 visit to
Mexico pointed up the new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit
the economic difficulties of Latin American countries in the
direction of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc;
Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 reinforced this
tactic; at the same time it called attention to Moscow's ap-
praisal that Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedented
opportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin
America, Khrushchev's own highly publicized Asian trip in
February and March 1960 probably was intended to halt the
erosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had suffered
particularly as a result of friction between Peiping and oth-
er Far Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Soviet po-
sitions and prestige.
Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks in May 1960
apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming
of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major out-
standing international issues, prompted a major effort by
Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to con-
vince the world public that the United States alone was re-
sponsible. The U-2 incident was used as a pretext for a cam-
paign to frighten America's allies into restricting the use,
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and pressing for the evacuation, of American bases from their
territory under the threat of a Soviet strike in the event of
their use by any future invader of Soviet air space. Released
at least temporarily from inhibitions deriving from the de-
sire for negotiations with the US, the Soviet Government
adopted a bold line on Cuba which went well beyond any pre.vi.ous
Soviet move in Latin America, although Khrushchev's 9 July
threat to use rockets against the US in the event of "Pentagon"
inter'ention in Cuba was patently a bluff to impress non-Com-
munist Latin America with the might and daring of the Soviet
Union. The stronger line was also evident;. in Moscow's treat-
ment of the RB-47 incident and its breaking off disarmament
talks.
Moscow seized on the crisis in the Congo following its
achievement of independence on 30 June as a windfall to dis-
credit the West not only in the Congo but throughout Africa
and to establish a Soviet presence through heavy support to
Lumumba-controlled elements in the Leopoldville government.
Khrushchev's pledge of unilateral aid was implemented dramat-
ically in a fashion to undermine the UN program, which came
under heavy Soviet attack for "improperly" supporting colonial-
ist interests. Mobutu's 15 September order expelling all
bloc diplomats and technicians brought the USSR's Congo ex-
periment to an abrupt halt and forced the Soviet Union to
fall back on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the
continuing political, economic, and military chaos.
Khrushchev's performance at the 15th General Assembly
session in New York in September and October 1960, which man-
aged to keep the idea of a summit meeting at the forefront
of world public opinican at the same time that Moscow continued
to play up situations making an early meeting of Soviet and
American leaders seem imperative, was an effort to influence
the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America--
singly and in concert--to a heightened assault on colonialism.
Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct, and Soviet
maneuvers generally, added up to a major effort to impress
on the leaders of these countries that in the 15 years since
World War II there had been a fundamental change in the world
balance of power--a fact which had not yet been reflected
proportionately either in the policies of their individual
governments or in the structure and operations of the UN.
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In sum, the assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward
the underdeveloped countries--to which it has clung despite
heavy pressures from both inside and outside the bloc--is
that the world is passing through an interim period of un-
certain but fairly short duration, perhaps a decade, during
which political, economic, and ideological forces now in
motion will bring about a basically new world situation:
the predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian, Af-
rican, and Latin American countries will reflect the corre-
lation of world forces, resulting in a gradual elimination
of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West.
In this period, growing bloc economic and political support
to underdeveloped countries will help their governments main-
tain a neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc and in-
creasingly opposed to Western policies and interests.
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I> THE STALINIST LEGACY: August 1945 - February 1953
Moscow's preoccupation in the immediate postwar years
with the massive task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland,
with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and
with crucial developments in Western Europe--the principal
focus of East-West differences--precluded a dynamic policy
in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. Nevertheless, the extreme fluidity of the Asian
political scene aroused Moscow's revolutionary optimism and
called for an updating and clarification of its views on Com-
munist world prospects. Although Stalin at every party con-
gress since the early 1920s--as Lenin had before him--express-
ed official optimism over developments in "the colonial areas,"
Communist agitation and Soviet meddling in the affairs of non-
Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America had in fact been
singularly unsuccessful. World War II, by shattering the
existing social structure in large areas of Asia and speeding
up the tempo of political, economic, and social change through-
out most of the world, opened new vistas for the expansion of
Soviet influence.
Moscow's failure at the end of the war to step out imme-
diately with a clear-cut strategy to guide or capture anti-
colonial, anti-Western movements, reflected the USSR's desire
not to embitter relations with the West on matters which it
considered secondary to the overriding necessity of arranging
a suitable settlement in Europe. It turned also on uncer-
tainty in top Soviet circles whether to cooperate with non-
Communist leaders and movements--and on what terms--or to en-
courage local Communists to attempt to seize power. The scar-
city of solid information, the lack of a Soviet "presence,"
and a record studded with overenthusiastic appraisals of anti-
colonial developments all counseled caution. Although Lenin's
vaunted thesis that the capitalist chain could be broken at
its weakest line--the areas under "imperialist oppression"--
and Stalin's formula for overcoming imperialism by revolution-
izing its colonial "rear" were considered still valid, neither
served as a practical guide for Soviet policy in this period
of widespread revolutionary change.
Whatever Soviet intentions concerning exploitation of the
chaotic and near-chaotic conditions in South and Southeast Asia,
Moscow was stymied by the fact that relations between local
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Communist and non-Communist independence movements--seldom,
if ever, good--had been embittered in most areas over the
issue of wartime support for the Allies. Moscow's 1935 adop-
tion and subsequent concentration on Popular Front tactics
in Europe--which viewed fascism as a more pressing danger
than colonialism--had contributed to the estrangement of Com-
munists from incipient nationalist movements by committing
Moscow to collaboration with the Western colonial powers.
Stalin's pact with Hitler removed these inhibitions, but fol-
lowing Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the
virulent anticolonial campaign was suddenly moderated by the
requirements of the wartime alliance. With the Japanese de-
feat, the two-front struggle of Communists and nationalists
against the colonial powers--and each other--reached a new
peak of intensity.
Moscow, in no position to influence local developments
by effective material or political aid, directed a steady
stream of charges against British, French, and Dutch military
actions undertaken in an effort to maintain their colonial
positions, but its attitude toward non-Communist movements
coming to power in the new Asian states vacillated. Moscow
was publicly cool toward their leaders, and Soviet spokesmen
questioned the "genuineness" of their anticolonialism, in
light of the compromises which had made early independence pos-
sible. Well into the postwar period, Moscow continued to dis-
cuss Asian developments in terms of ever-deteriorating politi-
cal and economic conditions and openly predicted that exist-
ing governments and their programs would soon give way before
the inevitable evolution of political power to the left.
Stalin not only minimized the immediate prospects of Asian
nationalist movements, but he apparently also entertained
hopes that different views on colonialism, combined with anta-
gonistic economic self-interests, would lead to a serious rift
between the United States and its Western colleagues. As a
consequence of these views, Soviet propaganda downplayed the
American role in attempting to stabilize areas recently freed
from Japanese occupation, concentrating its attacks on other
Western powers active in Asia.
Moscow's unsure diplomatic hand was reflected in disagree-
ment in top Soviet academic circles as to the meaning of the
changes brought about in the colonial world by war. Unanimous
only in their appraisals that "tremendous" and "revolutionary"
developments had taken and were taking place, Soviet scholars
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and publicists, in the absence of firm guidance from the top,
arrived at no consensus which would fit the needs of Soviet
policy.
Their considerable differences were underlined by the
controversy which sprang up over the September 1946 publica-
tion of Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting From
the Second or ar by Moscow's leading politico-economic
theoretician, Academician Eugene S. Varga. Varga's monumental
survey of the war's effects on world capitalism, including an
attempt to assess the "far-reaching changes in the relation-
ships between the colonies and the mother countries," concluded
that on the basis of industrial development and lessened fi-
nancial dependence, the war years irrevocably had reduced the
economic dependence of the majority of the colonies on their
metropolises. Varga, in company with other Soviet analysts,
cited the growth of an industrial proletariat in a whole series
of colonies and the supply of arms to colonial peoples during
the war--a part of which they were able to retain and use for
the creation of revolutionary armies--as factors facilitating
the development of Communist influence.
Although Varga's views found considerable support, the
implications of his favorable appraisal of economic develop-
ments in the capitalist world were increasingly unacceptable
as cold war tensions mounted. Public rebuttal of Varga's
views was considered necessary. Published discussions at a
joint conference of Economics Institute and Moscow University
theoreticians in May 1947 reflected Soviet hostility toward
both the Western powers and the Asian nationalist movements.
Varga's findings on the degree of economic independence at-
tained by certain colonies and "semi-colonies" (imperialist
"dependencies" such as the Latin American countries) were
challenged, and it was denied that a basis had been laid in
some colonies for independent economic development. Although
the regime-sponsored counterattack on Varga served notice that
the area for individual interpretation of world events had
narrowed considerably, both Varga supporters and Varga de-
tractors displayed uncertainty toward developments in Asia,
finding as much to condemn as to praise in the current scene.
The founding of the Cominform in September 1947 marked
the conclusive repudiation of moderation as a line to be fol-
lowed toward non-Communists. Zhdanov's keynote speech empha-
sized the extent to which Moscow was to commit itself to the
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doctrine of two antagonistic world systems, completely exclud-
ing the possibility of a third, or neutralist, position.
Zhdanov's speech and the early Cominform propaganda had little
to say about Asia and served to underline the fact that Moscow's
primary concern remained with securing a favorable settlement
of European issues. Asian Communist parties within a short
time began to reflect this harsher line and to adopt a more
vigorous assault on remaining Western colonial interests and
on non-Communist Asian nationalist parties. The year 1948
was marked by a widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike
violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in the re-
maining colonies, but also in the newly independent states.
Moscow's encouragement of such tactics apparently stemmed from
the belief that nothing further could be gained by Communist
restraint toward the West nor from additional attempts to con-
ciliate non-Communist Asian governments, a view abetted by
Communist successes in China and by consistent overevaluation
of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia.
An obvious effort was made to exploit Chinese prestige
which ballooned in Asia on the heels of the 1948 military vic-
tories. Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead, be-
gan freely to prescribe a "Chinese way" as proper anticoloni-
alist strategy for Asia. The content of this "Chinese way"
was not spelled out, but in essence it meant the encouragement
of armed revolts by peasants and workers, as well as intensi-
fied political struggle to draw additional elements of the
national bourgeoisie into the "anti-imperialist" struggle.
The foundering of this policy--as evidenced by the general sup-
pression of the Communist-inspired revolts with heavy and in
some places catastrophic losses to local Communist assets,
with the notable exception of Indochina--was a serious setback
to Moscow's general line that the'-time was ripe for revolution-
ary upheavals in Asia.
Post mortems on failures of the resort to open force--i.e.,
the editorial- in the April 1949 issue of Problems of His-
tory--attacked the degree of cooperation "expose-' etween
area governments and the "colonialists" and freely predicted
a general deterioration of the Asian political situation which
would give Communist parties another chance under more favor-
able circumstances. Soviet scholars were charged with con-
centrating their efforts on the support of Soviet and Commu-
nist goals in Asia by greater attention to present-day devel-
opments and to combatting the false theses of non-Communists.
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In April 1949 a three-day meeting of Pacific and Oriental In-
stitute specialists was held in Moscow to improve the content
of Soviet propaganda on Asian developments and in June there
was a joint conference of the Pacific and Economics Institutes.
The principal report at both meetings was delivered by the
director of the Pacific :Institute, Academician Eugene M. Zhukov,
since 1943 a top spokesman on Soviet Asian policy.
The proceedings of the two conferences point up the con-
siderable doctrinal backing and filling which was going on in
the Communist movement at this time. Having just suffered de-
feats at the hands of the bourgeoisie in many of the new Asian
states, Moscow was in no mood to examine dispassionately cur-
rent opportunities for playing up existing differences between
the new states and the West, and instead increased its isola-
tion from Asian nationalist movements by heaping abuse on their
leaders and ideologies. Zhukov, however, made it clear that
Moscow even then was less concerned with the social role of
various capitalist elements in the new Asian states than with
the "main question":
the progressiveness of one social movement or another,
the revolutionary nature or reactionary nature of one
party or another, is...determined by their relations
with the Soviet Union, with the camp of democracy and
socialism.
The conferees' exposition of an Asian strategy welding
anti-imperialist intellectuals, petit-bourgeois, and middle-
bourgeois elements with a militant.proletariat arid`peasantry
largely ignored recent defeats of Communist-led insurrections
and, because of "fundamental changes" caused by the war and
the "new alignment of political forces" in Asia resulting from
the Communist sweep of the Chinese mainland, considered Com-
munist chances in Asia bright enough for the continued advocacy
of violence. The general line continued that authoritatively
set by Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform in September
1947--aggressive Communist leadership of anti-imperialist
coalitions and across-the-board attack on all evidence of West-
ern influence. Area Communist parties were slow in coming
around to the Moscow-charted course; less caught up in inter-
national issues, they preferred to attack local class enemies.
The Communist party of India, the most important in non-Com-
munist Asia following the suicidal uprising of the Indonesian
party in 1948, was split into factions over the question whether
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to continue peasant guerrilla warfare, which had failed in
Telengana, or to retreat to more peaceful forms of politi-
cal agitation in an attempt to win over dissatisfied elements
in the Congress party. Cominform efforts to bring Asian
Communist parties into line were pointed up by an editorial
in its January 1950 journal attacking those Indian Commu-
nist party leaders who continued to question the direct ap-
plicability of the "Chinese experience" to their own strug-
gle for power, and the Japanese Communist party for advocat-
ing "peaceful revolution" for Asia.
On the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, Professor I.
I. Potekhin, long a principal spokesman on African affairs,
summarized the Stalinist position on "Colonial Revolution
and the National-Liberation Movement:"
Comrade Stalin warned, and the last quarter of a
century fully confirmed, that the complete and
final victory of the colonial revolution is pos-
sible only under the leadership of the proletariat.
Petit-bourgeois nationalist organizations and
parties have already proven their incapacity to
accomplish national liberation. They limit them-
selves to constitutional reforms and the achieve-
ment of formal, bourgeois democracy which do not
and cannot ensure a complete break from the system
of imperialism.
In Stalin's name, Potekhin went on to record "bourgeois be-
trayals" of the independence movement not only by the Chinese
bourgeoisie, but also by the big bourgeoisie of India, Indo-
nesia, the Philippines, and Egypt.
The Moscow-created crisis touched off by the invasion of
South Korea in June 1950, which quickly became a political
confrontation of the major powers, provided a new focus for
Soviet Asian policy and pre-empted attention from the other
areas. Stalin's Korean gambit showed him at least temporarily
willing to use Communist armed forces, at the very consider-
able risk of a general war, to achieve his political objec-
tives. The move obviously stemmed from a monumental miscal-
culation of the Western mood.
The war made academic further discussions within the Com-
munist world over hard or soft tactics to be followed in the
anticolonial struggle. What counted now was the success of
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local supporters in mobilizing Communist and non-Communist
"peace" forces in support of official positions. The war also
marked the final step in the evolution of Communist propaganda
toward singling out the United States as the principal "im-
perialist" enemy, not only of Communist interests but alleg-
edly of those of the independence movements as well. Presum-
ably the attack on South Korea was initiated as a result of
Moscow's estimate that a military shock bringing down one of
the weak Western-oriented states in Asia would trigger a chain
reaction of revolts elsewhere. By'the summer of 1951 it had
become obvious that the fighting would continue deadlocked un-
less one side or the other was willing to take much greater
risks.
With the drawing to a close of the military phase of the
war, Moscow began to back away from its previous line. The
clash of Korean policies had exposed considerable Asian es-
trangement from the West. Statements by Indian and Arab lead-
ers in particular, and voting records in the United Nations
not hostile to bloc positions, pointed up the considerable es-
trangement which had developed between the "peace" policies
of a number of Asian governments and'those of the principal
Western powers. In retrospect, Moscow, which had acted prompt-
ly to organize world-wide condemnation of the UN effort in
Korea, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar
sentiment and "neutralist" foreign policies of Asian non-Com-
munist governments could be turned against the West. To the
end, Stalin rebuffed neutralist efforts to bring about a com-
promise on Korea, a problem in which he was too personally and
emotionally involved to permit even the tacit admission of
error.
The transition to a more peaceful stage in Communist and
Soviet relations with the former colonies of Asia was gradual
and uneven. The year 1951 was marked by a considerable tail-
ing off of Communist-led guerrilla wars in Asia--except for
Indochina--and renewed emphasis on political agitation by the
local parties, but the changeover in tactics was not accom=panied by unmistakable public signs such as those oi`i their
adoption in mid-1947. Bolshevik in June 1951 commented favor-
ably on the newly adopted program of the Indian Communist party
which turned its back on further encouragement of peasant re-
volts and set the party's primary purpose as the creation of
a revolutionary bloc comprised not only of the working class
and the peasantry, but also progressive elements of the
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intelligentsia and of the Indian bourgeoisie. India has con-
sistently been treated as a special problem by Soviet tacti-
cians. If Moscow intended its endorsement of the Indian Com-
munist party's shift as a signal to Asian Communist parties
generally, the message was slow in taking effect, for it was
late summer 1952 before the last parties fell in line.
At the September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore the So-
viet delegates, in an abrupt reversal from their previous har-
rassment of participating Asian governments, offered to pro-
mote the economic development of their countries by the ex-
change of Soviet industrial machinery for local raw materials
--a move which had all the earmarks of a propaganda gambit
rather than a policy shift. Better evidence that Stalin's in-
ner circle of advisers had concluded there was little likeli-
hood of an early Communist victory in general Asian revolution,
thus calling for a major change in strategy, is presented in
the reports of discussions at a 12-day conference in November
1951 of Soviet Asian specialists of the Institute of Oriental
Studies and of the party Central Committee's Academy of Social
Sciences.
Zhukov again fulfilled the role of regime spokesman. The
burden of his argumentation was that Asian parties could not
count on coming to power everywhere through "revolutionary
armies," and that the main significance of the Chinese revolu-
tion for other Asian countries was its blending Of anti-imperi-
alist and anti-feudal elements into a single anti-imperialist
front struggling toward independence. Resort to arms as a
political tactic was not specifically disavowed, although it
was considerably downgraded by the conference majority. With
the pendulum now swinging in the direction of intensified
political agitation, the conferees struggled to give more pre-
cise content to the concept of a noncapitalist path of devel-
opment for Asian countries, reopening the debates of the early
1920s over the possibilities of organizing a "socialist" order
out of semi-feudal, semi-capitalist societies.
A desire to open a new stage in Soviet relations with non-
Communist Asia was apparent in Moscow's behavior in the United
Nations, where consistent anti-Westernism was combined with
limited overtures to the small-country delegations--an apparent
reflection of a worldwide upgrading of possibilities for ex-
panding Communist influence by manipulating traditional methods
of diplomacy. Greater Soviet attention to international and
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domestic developments having no immediate bearing on Soviet
security or on the main arenas of East-West conflict was re-
flected in the appearance of a symposium prepared by the In-
stitute of Economics on The Peoples of Latin America in the
Struggle Against American Imperialism, the first significant
monograph devoted to this subject in the postwar period. No
tour de force such as Varga's 1946 work, this book in defin-
ing the task at hand as the "unmasking of the economic, politi-
cal, military, and ideological expansion of American imperial-
sim" is typical of Soviet scholarship of the period: the sub-
stitution of quotations from the classics of Marx-Lenin-Stalin
for original analysis and heavy dependence on second-hand ac-
counts in the local Communist press. The January 1952 Lenin
anniversary speech of party theoretician Petr N. Pospelov,
surveying the current "crisis of the entire colonial system
of imperialism" in optimistic terms, claimed to see "hundreds
of millions of formerly backward and suppressed people" now
beginning to play an active political role, in fulfillment
of Lenin's predictions.
That Stalin looked to increased economic contacts. as one
of the promising avenues for breaking out of the semi-isola-
tion the USSR suffered as a result of its role in Korea is
suggested by the Soviet buildup for the April 1952 World Peace
Council- sponsored'Moscow..Economic.Coriference. Communist_par-
ties and peace council groups throughout the world attempted
to drum up invitees, individual businessmen who might serve
as future trade contacts or might serve as focuses for local
agitation against Western trade controls. Moscow sought to
stimulate interest in increased trade with the Soviet Union
by a few highly selective trade offers, overtures to establish
comprehensive economic relations, and limited offers of tech-
nical assistance. Although infrequent offers to exchange So-
viet industrial equipment and capital goods for raw materials
and foodstuffs produced in the former colonial areas had been
made previously, they had met with general skepticism in view
of Moscow's general hostility to non-Communist governments.
In seeking to expand trade and technical contacts, Moscow
was acting from manifestly economic as well as political objec-
tives. The USSR's desire to break the West's trade restrictions
and open up Asia and Africa, if not Latin America as well, as
sources of materials vital for Soviet strategic reserves and
to facilitate its breakneck industrial expansion were undoubt-
edly contributing factors. Despite heavy propaganda attention
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controls, asserting that the Soviet Union no longer had a need
for imports but could compete with the West on' the basis of its
own resources. Stalin heir-apparent Malenkov's report to the
19th party congress which followed in October 1952 cited the
general poverty of the peoples of "colonial and dependent"
areas and forecast a period of continued decline in the economy
of the underdeveloped countries which, in combination with a
general shrinking of world markets for Western manufactured
goods, would "drag down the economy of the capitalist world like
a dead weight." Stalin's short concluding speech to the con--
gress was devoted exclusively to problems of the world Commu-
nist movement, to exhorting more intense effort, and for reas-
suring the faithful that greater successes were in the offing.
Stalin and Malenkov's statements, in combination with Moscow's
stepped-up political and economic overtures to the Asian and
Arab states, suggested that the period of relative calm--and
neglect--had come to an end. For obvious reasons, Moscow did
not spell out its role in the intensifying troubles forecast
for the capitalist world, but by implication, Communists would
step up efforts to exploit political and economic differences
whenever and wherever they appeared. In the November 1952
General Assembly session, Moscow moderated its previous stand
on several minor measures involving a United Nations economic
assistance role. Stalin, in a Christmas "interview" with
James Reston, declared himself in favor of increasing economic
and political relations, particularly with the smaller coun-
tries. Stalin's continued rejection of Indian efforts to bring
about an East-West compromise on Korea, however, acted as a
powerful brake to Soviet efforts to get its friendship campaign
rolling. With the January 1953 discovery of the "doctors'
plot," Moscow's foreign countenance, mirroring its domestic
one, abruptly became more hostile.
Particularly during his last years, Stalin appeared to
exercise a "dead hand" on Soviet policy with his inherent sus-
piciousness of all forces which were not under his control.
Postwar changes in Moscow's line, as also post-Korea changes,
were made in the face of radically changed Asian circumstances
--which took place with little or no influence from Moscow--
which Stalin undertook with reluctance.
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II, COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: March 1953 - January 1955
Stalin's sudden demise shook the whole of Soviet society.
Since Stalin dominated all aspects of Soviet policy-making and
implementation, and since he had taken only rudimentary steps
to prepare for an orderly succession, his abrupt departure
left his successors as stunned a$ was the ordinary 'Soviet
citizen _;az-A,d on the ?, def ens ive ..' '.:. The unsteady coalition
which now assumed command turned first to a reduction of ten-
sion with the West in order to provide a breathing spell for
consolidating their collective authority as well as their in-
dividual positions.
First of all, the new leaders sought to dispel the black
clouds, domestic as well as international, generated during
the dictator's final two months of rule, and to revitalize the
moves made the preceding year toward a limited improvement in
relations with the non-Communist world. Molotov's funeral
oration attempted to affirm the new regime's dedication to
carrying out a "Stalinist peace-loving foreign policy," which
he interpreted as a desire for the development of "cooperation"
and "business ties" with all countries. Malenkov's speech to
the Supreme Soviet on 15 March 1953--just ten days after Sta-
lin's death--sought to reassure the Soviet people and empha-
sized his intent to pursue peace. By the end of March, Moscow
had initiated a series of minor moves and token, steps intended
to clear the air of the hostility engendered earlier in the
year and to support the genuineness of its professed desire
for improved relations with the West, A number of Soviet state-
ments culminating in Bulganin's May Day speech emphasized the
need for a reduction in the risk of war and called on the West
to respond to Soviet peace overtures by abandoning the arms
race and dismantling Western military bases close to Soviet
territory.
As the new leadership became more confident of its au-
thority, the tempo of reform and improvisation in its foreign
relations increased. In succession Moscow succeeded in "nor-
malizing" relations with Greece, Israel, and Canada. Terri-
torial claims against Turkey were abandoned, and new efforts
were made to increase diplomatic and trade contacts, especially
with Asian and Arab states. The Soviet peace offensive brought
diplomacy and propaganda to bear in a combination unknown in
Stalin's day. In their handling of various international issues,
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the new leaders displayed a considerable flexibility and a
marked increase in sophistication as they sought by the very
number and variety of their moves, many of which were merely
the reversal of Stalin's gratuitous manifestations of ill will,
to create the impression of a major shift of Soviet policy in
the direction of detente. Soviet diplomats abroad undertook
a widespread demonstration of good fellowship for their West-
ern colleagues. The new leaders in Moscow, who stopped short
of openly rejecting Stalin's methods in reaffirming his goals,
dared privately to deplore "excesses" which had crept into
Soviet foreign relations as a result of Stalin's personal di-
rection of day-to-day diplomacy. The new more conciliatory
features of Soviet foreign policy were interpreted for the home
audience as testimony of the Soviet Union's growing self-as-
surance and strength. This synthetic official optimism was
not accompanied by any appreciable let-up in domestic propa-
ganda hostile to the West, however.
In addition to the peace offensive, which occupied Moscow's
primary attention, the regime stepped out in the direction of
increased economic contacts with the whole capitalist world.
At the Geneva meeting on East-West trade, Soviet officials
toned down their propaganda role and showed a marked business-
like approach to the discussions. A May:.1953 Kommunist review
of the major lines of Soviet economic policy pace Moscow
squarely on the side of "widening economic cooperation and nor-
mal trade relations with all countries" and for an over-all
increase in international trade. At the same time, the author,
A. Nikonov, a leading Soviet economist, reiterated the princi-
pal lines of Moscow's attack on Western trade policies, which
he held to be responsible for holding down the volume of trade,
and on Western strategic commodity controls, which he wanted
dropped in favor of the "re-establishment of a single inter-
national market." Stepped-up efforts through diplomatic chan-
nels showed that Moscow was looking toward an expanding exchange
of goods with the major capitalist countries as well as with
the independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In July it became apparent that the new regime was pre=
pared to carry its overtures to the underdeveloped capitalist
countries well beyond the limits implied in earlier overtures.
At the 15 July meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council,
Soviet delegate Arutyunyan announced Moscow's willingness for
the first time to contribute to the UN's technical assistance
program. While attacking the Western approach to technical
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assistance and repeating the standard Soviet position that
elimination of Western trade restrictions imposed on the
weaker capitalist countries and the development of "normal
trade" with all countries would do more to facilitate their
economic development than any likely UN program, Arutyunyan
nevertheless announced that the Soviet Union had set aside
four million rubles--supplemented later by token amounts from
the Ukraine and Belorussia--for the UN's technical assistance
program.* The impact of Moscow's offer was reduced by Arut-
yunyan's grudging endorsement--"it is better to let them
trade normally with other countries and get the money they
need that way that to render them so-called aid"--and by the
gradual realization that the "contribution" in effect could
be spent only within the USSR or for services of Soviet spec-
ialists abroad and did not conform to,the requirements of the
UN program. The initial four million rubles, as a result,
went unused. The statement issued on 25 July 1953, on the oc-
casion of the 50th Anniversary of Bolshevism, reflected the
considerable degree to which the regime was willing to link
belief in the possibility of a lasting coexistence with the
capitalist world to a drive for increased economic ties with
all countries.
The "good neighbor" policy which Malenkov advanced in his
8 August 1953 speech to the Supreme Soviet,
The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against
any state whatsoever..,. Differences in the social
and economic systemo,ocannot serve as an obstacle
to the strengthening of friendly relations,.,.
was intended to follow up Moscow's earlier overtures--such as
its well-publicized surrender of nuisance claims against Turkey
and Iran--and to pave the way for a bolder across-the-board
approach to the newly independent states of Asia and Africa.
Malenkov's remarks were keyed to a reassertion of Soviet strength,
which within two weeks were buttressed by public claims to pos-
session of the hydrogen bomb, as part of an effort to reinvigor-
ate the Communist movement, which had become somewhat lethargic
*Always constrained to show its policies as continuous
and unchanging, Moscow later attempted to cover up its years
of opposition to this program by falsely dating the inception
of this program as '11953-195411, instead of 1950, and alleged
the participation of the USSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia
from the beginning.
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in the absence of strong one-man leadership and under the
debilitating influence of the concerted effort to play down
outstanding differences between the two world power blocs.
The drive by Stalin's successors for "reducing inter-
national tension" had helped reduce the diplomatic semi-
isolation Moscow had suffered as a result of the Korean ven-
ture and had succeeded in part in reducing pressure on So-
viet positions both in Europe and in the Far East, but it
had failed to attract Western concessions. Moreover, the
peace offensive was not a suitable vehicle for helping to
create the impression of a USSR rapidly growing in interna-
tional prestige and authority--an impression which Communist
leaders from the early days of the revolution had recognized
as vitally necessary both to Moscow and to the world Commu-
nist movement. The new foreign policy course indicated by
Malenkov represented not so much a break with Stalinist poli-
cies as it did a rejection of Stalinist tactics and the
recognition that improved government-to-government relations
would place the USSR in a better position to conduct a strong
global policy. The cumulative effect of the minor moves un-
dertaken by Moscow over the preceding five months made it ap-
parent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics to-
ward the underdeveloped countries had been decided on.
The August 1953 appearance of academician Eugene Varga's
Basic Problems of the Economics and Politics of Imperialism
After the Second or ar, whit actor ing o t -e au or was
prepared in 48-1951 and elaborated on in 1952-1953 in light
of Stalin's Problems of Socialism and the 19th party congress
discussions, provic eed an authors .five summary of the world
views inherited by the regime. Varga's analysis harped on the
coming disintegration of Western imperialism through failure
to overcome internal and external "contradictions" and as-
signed no great role to built-in antagonism between newly in-
dependent Asian-African states and the West. Instead, he
dwelled on rivalries among imperialist powers for influence
and markets in colonial and formerly colonial areas and al-
leged that the principal goal of American foreign policy was
the economic and territorial redistribution of colonial ter-
ritories of the world to its own advantage--a process he con-
sidered well under way. Varga also repeated the standard
charge that "rotten compromises" between local bourgeois par-
ties and Western imperialist states had postponed the success-
ful conclusion of the "national-liberation" struggle over much
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of Asia. Varga's work did not reflect the evolution which had
begun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's policies toward
prevailing moods in the underdeveloped countries nor provide
a rationale for the new tack. It did, however, provide a focus
for a limited re-evaluation of Moscow's views on "colonial"
developments in the guise of scholarly criticism of Varga's
book carried out over the succeeding six months.
Following the September 1953 plenum of the central commit-
tee, which confirmed Khrushchev as party first secretary and
set off the offensive on the agricultural front, the decision
to step up the foreign economic program was endorsed publicly
in unmistakably official tones. Following up Moscow's grant
of one billion rubles for North Korean rehabilitation, Premier
Malenkov on 19 September called for "a new approach to solve
the question of constructive and effective aid" to Asian coun-
tries by "many states," implying Soviet willingness to assist
the economic development of friendly non-Communist Asian coun-
tries. Malenkov's cautious step was followed by diplomatic
efforts to spark mutually reinforcing drives for increased
trade and for the "exchange" of technical information and train-
ing.
Although the principal reason for Moscow's trade drive
probably was the need for greater imports of consumer goods
entailed in Malenkov's "new course" promises to raise consump-
tion levels in the USSR, Moscow made a major effort to exploit
its interest in increased trade as proof of its good will and
as a demonstration of Soviet economic progress. Newly express-
ed desires to import consumer goods were used as a peg for
further allegations of the ridiculousness of Western restric-
tions on trading with the bloc. Mikoyan's 17 October announce-
ment of a new program on retail trade and production of consum-
er goods underlined Moscow's interest in increased imports.
At the same time, Mikoyan's statement was especially noteworthy
for the lengths to which he went in attempting to justify the
new program--as well as to bid for added international prestige--
by referring to the USSR's postwar strides in economic recon-
struction and industrial development. Moscow hailed a growing
list of new and revised trade agreements as proof of the fruits
of its new program.
Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a five-year trade agree-
ment with India pointed up the rapid rapprochement which had
been developing between the two countries, speeded by the
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moderation of Moscow's Korean stand following the death of
Stalin. The agreement, looking toward increased exchange of
a wide range of goods, contained in addition a vague clause
concerning future Soviet technical aid. At about this time,
Moscow apparently made overtures to extend technical assist-
ance to Egypt and pressed similar negotiations with Afghanistan.
A handful of Soviet technicians had been sent to Kabul the_
preceding April in connection with planning for the construc-
tion of grain storage facilities, reviving a prewar tactic
which had led Stalin to enter into contracts for the construc-
tion of several industrial establishments in Turkey and Iran
and to "lend" technicians to friendly Afghanistan. The an-
nouncement on 21 December of the appointment of five new deputy
chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers--Saburov, Pervukhin,
Tevosyan, Malyshev, and Kosygin--foreshadowed a broad increase
in foreign as well as domestic economic activities. Malenkov,
in replying on 31 December to questions submitted by Kingsbury
Smith, renewed bids for expanded East-West trade as both a
means of expressing and of promoting peace and international
cooperation.
Moscow's economic overtures attempted to play on local
popular and governmental concern over export markets and the
problems of rapid economic development, accompanied by exten-
sive propaganda efforts to discredit Western economic and
political influence and to exacerbate commercial as well as
political friction between the little developed Asian, African,
and Latin American countries and the major Western powers.
Soviet spokesmen continued to reject the possibility of any
compromise with capitalist methods of economic development and
repeated standard allegations of the inevitable failure of
bourgeois efforts to industrialize the "East." The..first
serious post-Stalin study of the problems of economic growth
in the former colonies appeared in the November 1953 Problems
of Economics. The author, L. Fituni,, a specialist in nonbloc
economic Developments, continued Moscow's attacks on Western-
oriented economic policies but veered away from past Soviet
condemnation of foreign economic assistance per se, conceding
without elaborating the point that the extension of economic
aid under proper conditions "promotes" international under-
standing. A December review of the prospects of international
trade in the same journal asserted the "great possibilities"
bloc countries now had of developing trade "with all capitalist
countries desiring to do so under mutually advantageous terms,"
and linked the Soviet trade drive with Moscow's continuing
"peace" offensive and with moves to "aid the economic develop-
ment of backward countries."
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In response to the need for a thoroughgoing reassessment
of Soviet views on developments in the formerly colonial areas
and to explore the processes of economic change abroad, a
special conference of economists and orientalists of the Acade-
my of Sciences and of the party central committee's Academy of
Social Sciences was held in February 1954, ostensibly to dis-
cuss the theses of Varga's Basic Problems.... The conference
proceedings and lengthy critiques 'of thebook in both Kommunist
and Problems of Economics were intended to present an u_p-moo- -
date summary of o-scow current interpretation of such basic
problems as the short-run prospects of world capitalism and
of relations between the Western powers and their political
and economic "dependencies." Untenable, as undermining the
very bases of Communist evaluation of capitalist-world develop-
ments, were Varga's views "minimizing" the extent and the im-
minence of the "crisis" in world capitalism. Soviet economists
seized on signs of a general economic decline in 1953 as proof
that the standard thesis was not overdrawn. Reluctant to give
up a theme vital to their proselyting effort, they encouraged
the expectation that the troubles of the big powers would lead
to economic disaster in the underdeveloped areas.
At the same time, Varga was criticized for underestimat-
ing the strengthening of the position of "young capitalism"
in the former colonial areas, which was looked on as a favor-
able development because it increased economic and political
antagonisms within world capitalism. A concurrent review of
world capitalist developments in 1953 published in Kommunist
predicted that the 1953 economic downturn would lead the est
to step up its efforts to balance its shaky economies by "in-
tensifying the exploitation of backward countries and colonies"
--buying raw materials in these countries at lower prices and
selling them industrial products at more exhorbitant prices--
and foresaw only further reductions in the standards of living
of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries most affected.
Party Secretary and tIeoretician Pospelov's 21 January
1954 Lenin Anniversary speech--echoing his remarks on the same
occasion two years earlier--singled out Asia as the "most
vulnerable part of imperialism" and justified optimism among
his listeners by citing the continued growth of the "popular
resistance" movement throughout that continent. Although Mos-
cow's attentions to the Arab world had increased over the past
nine months, this to a considerable degree was a measure of
the increasing tempo of political, economic, and social change
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there as the Soviet leaders continued to be suspicious of the
revolutionary regime in Egypt. Moscow hailed Nasir's struggle
for "immediate withdrawal" of English forces as an essential
element in attaining "true independence," but attacked the
policies of Egypt's "ruling circles" for their repression of
Communists and other "progressives," for using force and meager
land reform to quiet peasant unrest, and for their pro-German
inclinations. The slight attention laid to non-Arab Africa
and Latin America was a tacit admission that these areas, part
of the "colonial reserve" of imperialism, were more or less
effectively sealed off from Soviet influence.
The conclusion on 28 January 1954 of a $3,500,000 credit
and technical assistance agreement with Afghanistan set off an
unprecedented propaganda campaign to convince underdeveloped
countries of the genuineness of Soviet overtures to initiate
trade and broad economic relations of a mutually advantageous,
apolitical nature. At the 10th ECAFE meeting in Colombo, So-
viet delegates again pressed Asian delegates for commercial
ties, for initiation of exchanges, and for acceptance of tech-
nical assistance. Moscow's numerous specific offers, public
and private, were intended to whet local interest which govern-
ments would find themselves unable to resists In March trade
agreements were negotiated with both Egypt and,Jsrael,a'-
The increase in economic overtures was more than equaled
by the increase in political and propaganda attention to Ameri-
can efforts to form Asian countries into an anti-Soviet coali-
tion. The decision to bring a rearmed Germany into the West-
ern alliance and to extend the anti-Communist defense structure
throughout Asia posed a direct challenge to Moscow's year-long
effort for a detente on its own terms. Moscow's public re-
action to real or rumored negotiations between Western govern-
ments and Asian states on defense pacts and possible military
aid reflected great sensitivity over these developments which
raised the prospect of transforming areas close to the USSR's
southern border into centers of pressure on that extended
flank. The USSR's series of diplomatic demarches backed up
by propaganda pyrotechnics proved ineffective in heading off
the projected alliances in the main, but it did succeed in
polarizing Asian and Arab government and popular sentiment
around this issue and making it the crucial test of Asian and
Arab government relations with one another and with both East
and West.
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First of all, Soviet political countermeasures featured
efforts to draw India into a strongly anti-Western, anti-
American position. Moscow has always accorded India great
interest and predicted Indian developments would play a vital
role in the struggle against "imperialism" in the East. The
sheer volume of material devoted to India in Soviet publica-
tions over the years has been impressive. Both the first edi-
tion of the "Bolshaya" encyclopedia, published in 1937, and
the second edition, published in 1953, gave almost 200 pages
to India, much of it highly propagandistic. If developments
flowing out of the Korean war had awakened Moscow to advan-
tages of a friendly Indian neutrality, these views were rein-
forced by Indian attitudes toward Indochina and concern lest
the conflict there become an even more sensitive focus of East-
West rivalry and engulf greater areas, possibly all of South
and Southeast Asia, in the hot war. Moscow's concern was to
encourage India and Nehru into an ever-stronger stand in favor
of the bloc's "peace" program, Kommunist in February 1954
.,.the important role of modern India in the world
arena, the positive contribution of the Indian peo-
ple in the matter of peaceful settlement of contro-
versial international problems, and India's attempts
to convert the United Nations into a genuine forum
for all the peoples of the world.
The principal. factor working for Soviet-Indian rapprochement,
however, was the deep-seated antipathy between India and Paki-
stan which prompted New Delhi's violently adverse reaction to
the gradual unfolding of an impending American military aid
program for Pakistan. In a solid note of approval for the
course of Indian foreign policy, Moscow welcomed the "vigi-
lance displayed by the Indian leaders in connection with at-
tempts of forces of aggression in Asia.
The unmistakable build-up of East-West tension as the re-
sult of developments in both Western Europe and Asia prompted
an intense policy debate in top Soviet circles revolving around
how far Moscow could go in antagonizing the West. Malenkov's
12 March 1954 "election speech" warning that atomic war might
mean the "destruction of world civilization"--rather than just
capitalist society--marked the high point in his efforts to
convince his colleagues of the necessity for an accomodation
with the West. His retreat the following month to the old
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formulation reflected his failure to carry the majority of
Soviet leaders along with him on this issue--and with it the
defeat of Malenkov"s efforts to dominate the ruling coalition.*
At the same time, Soviet propaganda reflected concern that
public statements of Western intentions in relation to inten-
sification of the fighting in Indochina gave rise to the pos-
sibility that the USSR and the United States might be drawn
into atomic war without either side really intending it.
Speeches by both Malenkov and Khrushchev at the April 1954
session of the Supreme Soviet tied bids for a reduction of
international tension and "coexistence" with assertions of
growing strength, implying no weakening of Soviet opposition
to the West nor any concession on its part. Moscow's diplo-
matic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes
with the West intensified. At the United Nations, Moscow
heightened its support for Syrian complaints growing out of
border clashes with Israel and over Israeli plans to divert
Jordan River water, making a play for general Arab favor by
demanding that "measures'"--unspecified--be taken against Israel.
At the Geneva Conference, Molotov"s attempt to champion "peo-
ples struggling for independence" was directed toward tying
Western hands in Asia. In asserting the "full right of Asian
peoples to settle their affairs themselves" and adopting the
stand that developments in colonial and formerly colonial areas
are "first and foremost their own business," Molotov sought
to build up pressure for big-power agreement to a hands-off
policy which would protect recent gains in Indochina. Moscow
used the Chou-Nehru talks to further the picture of close
Indian collaboration with the bloc and extracted the "Five
Principles of Coexistence"--the "Panch Shila"--expressed in
the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed 29
April as a charter for Asian-African neutralism, themes given
heavy support at the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin in
May.
*Because o the demoralizing effect of such a thesis on
Communists at home and abroad, Moscow could not publicly en-
dorse this line even if Soviet leaders themselves believed it,
Thus Malenkov"s aberration proved a handy club in the hands
of his rivals to help oust him, one year later, from the
premiership.
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The USSR's reaction to the June 1954 overthrow of Guate-
malan leftist "President Jacob. Arbenz, which it alleged to
be the result of "intervention organized by US monopolies from
Nicaraguan territory," was loud and bitter and attempted to
appeal to world sentiment hostile to outside "interference."
Soviet propaganda, besides reflecting Moscow's anger at the
turn of events and its impotence to reverse them, sought to
cover the Soviet Union's own role with this ''living proof" of
its charges concerning the nature of American imperialism.
Appointment of an ambassador to Indonesia in July culminated
a period of intense Soviet interest in developments in that
country arising out of Djakarta's unstable domestic political
and economic situation and, even more, Indonesia's complex in-
ternational troubles with the Netherlands and the United States.
Heavy propaganda support was afforded Indonesian anti-Western
moves, and the first order of business for the newly arrived
Soviet staff appeared to be to press Indonesia to accept Soviet
industrial equipment on easy-payment terms. Moscow's attitude
toward Burma also had become noticeably more friendly. If
events in Asia favored rapprochement with India, Indonesia,
and Burma, Soviet overtures for stepped-up economic contacts,
political demarches, and a succession of increasingly sharp
propaganda warnings to other Asian governments--notably Turkey,
Pakistan, and Thailand--concerning negotiations on area mutual
defense pacts proved to little avail.
Moscow pushed two logically contradictory but psychologi-
cally complementary courses. On the one hand, its high-power-
ed "peace" campaign was intended to exploit the universal fear
of atomic warfare by generating pressures against military pre-
paredness. It seized upon the Geneva Conference results as
confirmation of the correctness of its line that peace could
be achieved only through negotiations respecting the interests
of "both sides." On the other hand, a Moscow-produced or Mos-
cow-maintained climate of great East-West tension was essential
to its policies toward the underdeveloped countries. Moscow
aimed at persuading people that Western policies had brought
the world--and kept it at--the brink of devastating war, and
played on apprehensions arising out of the security pact nego-
tiations which allegedly put Asia-Africa on the "front line"
in any future conflict. The ineffectiveness of Moscow's ef-
forts to turn its sporadic diplomatic and propaganda support
and a modest expansion of economic relations to direct politi-
cal advantage was pointed up in October by Nasir's signature--
despite months of fervent Soviet efforts to dissuade him--of
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an agreement with Britain concerning the evacuation of troops
from the Suez Canal zone on terms permitting their return in
the event of a "third power" attack on the Middle East.
On the economic front, Moscow stepped up its; efforts to
capitalize on local desire for rapid economic development to
introduce pioneering detachments of Soviet specialists and
technicians under UN auspices and through direct bilateral
agreements. By ostensibly participating in UN-sponsored pro-
grams which enjoyed considerable popularity and esteem in the
underdeveloped countries, Moscow sought to broaden the impact
of its own as yet modest efforts and to introduce Soviet tech-
nicians and scientists into countries and fields otherwise
closed to it. Further, this contributed to the Soviet effort
to play up the growing stature of the USSR as an advanced in-
dustrial power and opened the way for undercutting Western--
and especially US--economic assistance programs on yet another
front. Moscow cited the lack of political stipulations on UN
aid and the "willingness of dozens of countries to go along
with the UN program," but alleged the United States alone holds
aloof for its own political and military motives. Soviet
publicists, still obliged to present developments in the capi-
talist world in terms of an imminent general economic crisis,
stressed increasingly more unfavorable terms of trade for the
underdeveloped countries. Varga, writing in the first (August
1954) issue of the new semi-scholarly monthly journal Inter-
national Affairs (International Life), pointed to two years
depressed pr ces for raw materials and food exports and to
repercussions of impending American economic crisis as compell-
ing reasons why underdeveloped as well as Western European
countries should turn to expanded trade with the bloc as a
solution to pressing economic problems.
The long-awaited Soviet textbook Political Economy, the
product of a group of writers including leading Ideologists
Dmitry Shepilov and Pavel Yudin, signed to the press on 26
August 1954, followed Stalin's two-camp approach to the in-
terpretation of world developments. The authors crudely as-
saulted economic relations of the Western powers with the
former colonies, alleging that foreign trade was "one of the
sources of economic enslavement of backward countries by de-
veloped bourgeois countries and (that it) widened the sphere
of capitalist countries." Political Economy claimed advances
for the "national-liberation movements"' n Indonesia and India
but spoke in terms of greater political roles allegedly being
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played by the "proletariat" and Communist parties, and the
"national bourgeoisie" continued to be attacked as "weak and
indecisive"--even in the struggle against imperialism. The
hostility shown to nationalist "conciliatory" policies marked
even independent India as a bourgeois entity and thus an enemy.
In this and other formulations, the authors showed themselves
hesitant to amend fundamental Communist theses to bring them
in line with tactics Moscow currently followed in its relations
with a number of Asian governments.
In the fall, important works were published on the two
areas of the world which to date had been generally beyond the
scope of Soviet influence and at best on the periphery of So-
viet interest. An imposing Institute of Ethnography symposium,
The Peoples of Africa, under the joint editorship of philolo-
g st B. Glderogge and ethnographer-political scientist I.
I. Potekhin attempted a thorough analysis of African cultural
achievements and political and economic developments area by
area. Their general thesis, and that of Soviet Africanists
generally, was that racial discrimination and economic exploi-
tation are the twin bases of Western policy and views on Africa.
To combat the West's views and to champion African peoples,
Soviet Africanists advanced an interpretation of African devel-
opments based on a "long and original path of historic devel-
ment," of a past golden age which was destroyed by Western po-
litical and economic intrusion, and in general attributing to
Western influence all negative features of African life.
Potekhin's summary views on the progress of "national libera-
tion" acknowledged the absence of Communist activity in most
of Africa, cited trade unions as the centers of anti-imperi-
alist agitation where there are no Communist parties, and payed
tribute to growing African participation in world "peace" and
other fronts. A less substantial survey of the Institute of
Economics by M. Grechev, The Imperialist Expansion of the US
in Latin America After Wor3-d War II, was devoted principally
To attacking postwar US Latinmerican policies and to reit-
erating a strategy for local Communist parties based on at-
tracting all antiforeign elements around "the working class
and its ally the peasantry," a united front on Communist terms
to
put an end to the yoke of foreign monopolies, to
give land to the peasants, to facilitate industrial
development, to improve living conditions of all
workers, and to carry Latin American countries on
the broad road of progress and independence.
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By the close of 1954, the "good neighbor" policy which
the Malenkov regime had followed--if at times.halfheartedly--
was no great success. The increase in Moscow's influence
among extremist nationalist elements had been in direct pro-
portion to the prevalence of virulent anti-Western sentiment
arising out of unresolved territorial and other political dis-
putes with the West and to a lesser extent to local frustra-
tions over the failure of political independence to solve press-
ing political, economic, and social problems overnight. So-
viet attitudes toward nationalist movements and. their leaders
--for example, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir--reflected only a
step in-the direction of tactical cooperation. Moscow's di-
lemma was that as nationalists these leaders had to be praised
to the extent they were "anti-imperialist" but as bourgeois
they had to be attacked for thbir commitment to capitalist
methods and ideology and for their opposition or suppression
of "progressive" elements. By the end of 1954 Moscow had
come to the point of supporting nationalist governments ob-
viously not in the Western camp, in the expectation that their
greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net
effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, dis-
crediting Western leadership. Any further concessions would
have led to a deterioration of the morale of local Communist
parties.
Moscow scored an impressive propaganda breakthrough with
the signing on 2 February 1955, after five months of negotia-
tions, of the agreement to help finance and construct a major
steel plant at Bhilai, India. This announcement foreshadowed
a Soviet economic assistance program of new dimensions and
gave a measure of concreteness to the image of two world eco-
nomic systems in competition for influence and favor in uncom-
mitted areas.
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III. A NEW POLICY TAKES SHAPE: February 1955 - December 1956
The demotion of Malenkov in February 1955 prompted Mos-
cow to step out with a bolder policy both in regard to the
Western powers and the politically uncommitted, economically
underdeveloped countries. This was done in part to shore up
domestic confidence, following the personnel shake-up, with
harsher assertions of an increased international authority.
Molotov's speech on 8 February to the Supreme Soviet apprais-
ed relations with the West wholly in cold war terms and pre-
sented an unusually clear rationale for Soviet cooperation
with Asian and African governments. Acknowledging that the
newly independent governments of Asia and Africa were still
economically dependent on the West, the Soviet foreign minis-
ter nevertheless found a basis for optimism in the fact that
in questions of international relations, "they show concern
for the maintenance of peace and the reduction of internation-
al tension" and so were worthy of Soviet support. As had
other Soviet leaders over the past year, Molotov singled out
for particular praise the "international authority" of India,
The Supreme Soviet resolution on foreign policy, which set
forth the principal guide lines of the subsequent Bulganin-
Khrushchev period, also called for the exchange of parliamen-
tary delegations, a tactic Moscow had introduced the previous
year by hosting several semiofficial parliamentary groups.
The acceleration of Soviet moves in Asia and the Middle
East reflected a recognition of the increased international
status of Asian and African states and of the likelihood that
their international role would continue to increase in import-
ance. At the same time, it was intended as a partial answer
to Western initiatives building up military and anti-Commu-
nist political pressures along the USSR's southern borders,
The regime's efforts to underscore Soviet military and econo-
mic might furthered the impression that the new leaders were
less disposed than Malenkov to seek accommodation with the
West; in any event, the West's firmness in Europe held out
the prospect that any Soviet probing there might lead to a
nuclear war.
Moscow's intention to seek a closer working agreement
with Asian and Arab countries was made clear in its diplomatic
and propaganda reaction to Middle East developments and in the
fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and
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objectives of the conference of 29 Asian and African coun-
tries--including Communist China but not the Soviet Union--
at Bandung, Indonesia. A statement by the Soviet Foreign
Ministry on 16 April 1955 presented detailed charges of "con-
siderable deterioration" of the Middle East situation, al-
leged that this was the direct result of Western efforts to
form anti-Communist military blocs there, and offered, in
terms more specific than ever before, official Soviet sup-
port to area governments opposing Western policies. At the
same time, Soviet propaganda hailed the prospects of Asian-
African cooperation, and Pravda threw Soviet support behind
any agreement which might Fe -reached by the Bandung powers
in the direction of a common effort against "pressure and
threat" from outside powers or in implementing individually
or collectively the Chou-Nehru declaration on the "five prin-
ciples of coexistence." Moscow's current appraisal apparently
stemmed from optimism that "parallel" short-term interests
of Asian-African states and the USSR, in combination with the
inherently weak political and economic positions of area coun-
tries, opened the way for a rapid increase in Soviet influence.
Further indications that a fundamental reorientation of
tactics was involved was the initiation of a wholesale shake-
up of Soviet interpretation of developments in non-Soviet Asia
and Africa. In late April 1955 there appeared the first issue
of Soviet Oriental Studies, the functions and responsibilities
of which were to tie research and Marxist-Leninist interpreta-
tion to the immediate needs of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda.
Kommunist in May kicked off a campaign to bring ideological
formulations more in line with the Soviet posture of friend-
ship toward the non-Communist countries represented at Bandung.
Kommunist admitted that erroneous interpretations had crept
into past Soviet assessments of anticolonial movements, and
it criticized Soviet scholars, and by implication Stalin and
those responsible for Moscow's foreign policy in the early
post-Stalin period, for underevaluating the anti-imperialist
significance of the nationalist movements. Foreshadowed in
these programatic statements were stepped-up efforts to in-
terpret the present and even the fairly remote past in anti-
Western terms and to dissociate the current Soviet regime in
the minds of the peoples of the neutralist countries from
those past Soviet words or deeds which impeded closer rela-
tions. Without providing clear new guide lines, Kommunist
nevertheless indicated that a more optimistic appraisal of
Asian-African developments was in order and that prosaic,
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mechanical applications of Communist theorems were to give way
to a flexibility which owed more to cold war requirements than
to the Communist classics.
Moscow's new accommodation to neutralist-nationalist sen-
timent was underlined dramatically in connection with the June
1955 visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru,
who had been described by Stalin's Asian spokesman Zhukov as
"a cunning servant of Britain and the United States and a
bloody strangler of progressive forces in India," now was prais-
ed on all counts for his spiritual and political leadership
of Asia and for championing progressive views on such major
issues as Korea, Indochina, military blocs, and the banning
of atomic weapons. A Russian translation of Nehru's Discovery
of India was published in connection with the visit--despite
passages scathingly attacking Communist tactics in India--and
long "reviews" of the book in Kommuthlst and Soviet Oriental
Studies used it as a point of departure in se ing forth the
new Soviet line on Asian and African developments. Apparently
encouraged by the prospects of this initial venture into the
realm of "personal diplomacy"--Nehru's visit having been in-
terpreted publicly as a "brilliant manifestation" of growing
friendly relations between the two countries--Moscow extended
invitations to the Shah of Iran and to Nasir. Efforts were
initiated on an unprecedented scale to flatter neutralist lead-
ers, the cultures of friendly countries, and Asian-African self-
importance. Synthetic Soviet commemorations of Asian and Af-
rican national holidays became a prominent feature of the new
program. Pravda editor Shepilov--newly named a party secretary--
was sent to Egypt in connection with Cairo's Liberation Day
celebrations as a personal emissary of Moscow's top leadership
to impress on Nasir the potentials of closer Soviet-Egyptian
cooperation.
Moscow's moves to exploit the "Bandung spirit" as the in-
ception of a coordinated Asian-African opposition to the West
was accompanied by a series of diplomatic and economic steps
--with appropriate propaganda orchestration--intended to build
up a "posture of peace" to improve its prospects at the upcom-
ing summit conference. Moscow's attitude appeared to hold out
the promise of a major improvement in East-West relations and
a general reduction of international tension, not just in Eu-
rope but throughout the world. The Soviet people themselves
were encouraged by the regime's propaganda to expect a grow-
ing "businesslike atmosphere" in international relations.
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Bulganin's 4 August report on the Geneva talks to a special
session of the Supreme Soviet balanced "Geneva spirit" gains--
a lessening of tension, increase in "mutual confidence," and
the initiation of personal contact among top world leaders--
with a rundown of major substantive international problems
outstanding.
Concurrent with Moscow's pre-Geneva conciliatory posture
to the West and Bulganin's sober appraisal of the results of
the conference, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of se-
cret negotiations designed not to further the possibility of
any mutual "hands off" policy in Asia-Africa, but to offset
the consolidating pro-Western coalitions with a group of Arab
states under its influence. Although Molotov's February 1955
foreign policy survey had been pessimistic on the Middle East,
We cannot say that the national-liberation movement
in the countries of the Arab East has attained the
strength and momentum which this movement achieved
in a number of other Asian countries...,
intensified Soviet overtures to Syria and Egypt in the months
following reflected a more hopeful view. Reports of various
credibility that Moscow had made offers to sell arms to Syria,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, and Afghanistan were confirmed in
essence by Nasir's 27 September announcement of his arms deal
with Czechoslovakia--obviously a dodge for a direct agreement
between Moscow and Cairo.
The supply of arms to a non-Communist government marked
a sharp departure in Soviet practice and was a challenge to
Western influence of a more intense and immediate nature than
Soviet economic overtures. Discussions with Nasir were well
advanced by the time of the Geneva talks, suggesting that Mos-
cow early had hedged its bet that a conciliatory posture and
such reasonableness as agreeing to the Austrian state treaty
would encourage significant Western concessions. Moscow's
immediate reaction to the surfacing of Nasir's agreement to
purchase bloc arms was predictably defensive, attributing the
Western uproar to a false interpretation of developments based
on the West's own "exploitative practices." It went on, how-
ever, to assert the "legitimate right" of all states to buy
weapons for their defense without outside interference. Mos-
cow's public and private follow-up was subdued, although the
"Geneva spirit" in its relations with the West had already
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Vow, W
largely dissipated. Kaganovich's October Revolution speech,
concurrent with the visit of Burmese Premier U Nu to Moscow
and a definite coolness at the foreign ministers' meeting in
Geneva, omitted any reference to a major shift in Soviet poli-
cy implicit in the offers and deliveries of trade and tech-
nical, economic, and now military assistance to Asian and Arab
countries.
Moscow continued the process of reappraising world devel-
ments in terms justifying the development of closer government-
to-government relations with Asian and Arab neutralists. Kom-
munist in August had made a pioneering attempt to cite ''objec-
ave consequences" of policies in the direction of peace, re-
duction of international tension, and opposition to colonial-
ism as a basis for singling out a category of politically in-
dependent though economically dependent states which were
worthy of support. K