THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000400060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1961
• Content Type: PAPER

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
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MAINTENANCE OF BASIC PAPER
The basic paper, "The Arab-Israeli Situation." is under
continuous review to insure currency. Changes or additions
of importance are issued as soon as practicable. The entire
paper will be revised as developments require.
The date of issuance in the upper right hand corner of
a page is also the effective date of the information. Super-
seded pages should be destroyed in accordance with existing
security regulations.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
prepared by an
AD HOC WORKING GROUP
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
I. Political
A. Introduction
The problem of Arab-Israeli relations has two main
aspects: a) the unresolved conflict between the Arabs and
Israel, and b) the struggle for hegemony and the question of
power balance among the various rival Arab leaders. The key
to both of these is the policies followed by the UAR under
Nasir's guidance. Israel's arming is predicated primarily on
a felt need for defense against Nasir. Nasir's arming, on the
other hand, is motivated not only by a felt need for present de-
fense and an ultimate showdown with Israel, but importantly also
by a desire to win for the UAR a dominant position in the Arab
area and make the UAR a "power to be reckoned with" in Afro-
Asian and world affairs.. Arming by other Arab states is under-
taken at least as much for reasons of national prestige and
against the aspirations of Nasir as against any anticipated
danger from Israel. Qasim, King Husayn, and the Lebanese
Christians, for example, are well aware that UAR forces in
Syria could be employed against them as well as against the
Israelis.
It is unlikely, therefore, that any solution to the
problem of UAR-Israeli arms competition could be arrived at
through the avenue of disarmament or security guarantees.
While these probably would be acceptable to Israel under the
proper conditions, they would be unacceptable to Nasir since
they would hamper the attainment of his goals other than those
that are concerned with Israel.
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B. Arab Intentions Regarding Israel
Arab opinion in general agrees that Israel should
ultimately be destroyed. This, however, is an ideal that does
not necessarily reflect the actual intentions of any given
Arab government at any specific time. The burden of any Arab
attack on Israel would be borne initially and chiefly by the
UAR, and this is generally accepted by the other Arab peoples
and governments.
The UAR regards itself as being in a broad, un-
compromising struggle with Israel which will continue until
UAR supremacy is clearly established. There is no inclination
to accept Israel as an equal. The UAR sees the Israeli threat
as a total one that challenges the UAR politically, economically,
and militarily. The UAR feels itself militarily inferior to
Israel and hence accords top priority to its aim of achieving
at least parity with Israel. The UAR urgently seeks to augment
its armed strength not only for the purpose of being able to
make a creditable showing in the event of an ultimate showdown
with the Israelis, but also to prevent Israel from gaining such
a preponderant lead in military potential that it could proceed
with impunity to implement major economic and political plans
aimed at promoting Israel's growth and international prestige.
UAR arming also has the effect of obliging Israel to divert to
military uses financial and other resources that it could use to
strengthen its economic and political position.
President Nasir and the UAR leadership are particu-
larly concerned over Israel's development of a nuclear capability.
They may believe there is a real danger that Israel, with French
assistance, will in a few years be able to produce nuclear weapons,
thus reaching a stage at which it could virtually dictate terms to
the UAR. In the immediate future the UAR probably expects Israel
to continue to strengthen itself with US and West German aid and
with improved conventional weapons supplied by Western countries,
particularly France. Behind an increasingly effective military
shield Israel will be expected by the UAR to press forward on such
projects as diverting water from the Jordan River to the Negev,
absorbing a large number of new immigrants, and expanding trade
and political relations with the new countries of Africa. The
prospect of an increased number of military settlements in the
Negev is regarded by the UAR as a particular threat to its security.
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To counter the many aspects of the Israeli threat
which it perceives, the UAR depends heavily on the outside
political support it can solicit. It has recently sought to mend
its fences with the other Arab states and to secure their coop-
eration through the Arab League in developing means to counter
the threat from Israel.. However, there still exists among the
Arabs considerable suspicion and distrust as to each other's
true objectives.
The UAR relies to a great extent on the USSR as
a source of political support and on the Soviet bloc as the
major source of military equipment. While the USSR has made im-
pressive contributions to the UAR in both respects, the Wasir
regime now recognizes that Soviet backing is not without limits
or strings. The USSR has never indicated that it would back an
Arab attempt to destroy Israel and it is doubtful that it in-
tends to do so.
The UAR also counts on building up political sup-
port among the neutralist nations, particularly those in Africa.
Finally, despite its belief that the US is Israel's main support,
the UAR leadership probably looks to the US as well as the USSR
to help prevent Israel from successfully carrying out a major
military offensive.
The UAR's preliminary reaction to Israel's progress
in the nuclear field has been to threaten to obtain nuclear
weapons "at all costs" if the Israeli program appears to be
directed toward this end. Other than this threat, implying wil-
lingness to become fully aligned with the USSR in extreme circum-
stances, the UAR has increased its propaganda concerning its
own nuclear program, which is still a modest one without a mil-
itary potential. The UAR will probably continue to press the
USSR for improved conventional weapons such as the recent ship-
ment of MIG-19's with which it hopes to overcome its present dis-
advantage in fighter aircraft. It is unlikely, however, that the
USSR would supply nuclear weapons to the UAR.
Neither the UAR nor any other Arab government is
likely to initiate a military attack against Israel in present
circumstances, and the general Arab military posture continues to
be essentially defensive. However, because of their fears of
Israel's nuclear program, and of Israel's intention to divert
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Jordan water, the Arabs probably regard the next two years or so
as especially critical for them. Minor incidents during this
time may consequently develop more serious proportions than they
have in the recent past A
Israel vis-a-vis the Arabs
1, General
The only Arab state that Israel considers
important militarily is the UAR. For this reason Israel is
sensitive to any development suggestive of greater Arab unity
under the aegis of Nasir. Israel has done what it could to
support those Arab forces hostile to him. These measures have
included a conciliatory policy toward Lebanon and Jordan and
encouragement of anti-Nasir forces in the.Arab.states generally.
2. The Rationale of Israel's Security Position
vis-a-vis the UAR -
There is no evidence that Israel is currently
planning to annex Arab territory or contemplates an unprovoked
attack on the UAR or any. other Arab state, However, Israel
probably would exploit certain provocations by attempting to
occupy a strategic area or areas. While Israel is aware of gen-
eralized UAR threats against its existence, there is no evidence
that the Israelis believe that the UAR has any specific plan or
timetable for launching a general attack.
In the Israeli view, there are three solutions
to the problem of Israel's security vis-a-vis the UAR: 1) re-
gional disarmament, 2) a security guarantee from the US, and
3) military superiority. The main advantage of the first two
to Israel would be to relieve Israel of the increasingly serious
financial burden of its military establishment. However, the
first two would not necessarily free Israel from UAR harassing
action and they might well limit Israel's ability to counter it.
It is doubtful that Israel expects to obtain either regional
disarmament or a security guarantee, and it is likely that they
have been put forth chiefly as bargaining counters. The problem
is thus reduced essentially to one of military superiority
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and some form of relief from the financial burden of military
costs, which in 1960-61 are estimated to be at least 26 per
cent ($236,000,000) of total Israeli government expenditures.
The Israelis are accustomed to present
their case in the context of a need to preserve an adequate
deterrent and defensive posture in the face of a generalized
threat of large-scale attack by the UAR. They ever,
in-
dicate the full extent of the measure. thnv h%va +aka?
counter such a threat
ermore, there is a considerable range of other and more
a. Jordan -- Jordan is a prime concern of Israel in
the context of the extension of Nasir's influence, since it
is along the armistice line with Jordan that Israel is most
vulnerable. Thus while Israel exhibited concern at the time
of Syria-Egyptian union, it exhibited more concern at Jordan-
Iraqi union in February 1958 and threatened to take military
action against Jordan if Iraqi troops entered the country, par-
ticularly the West Bank. It is probable that Israel would move
against the West Bank militarily if there were danger of its
being occupied by UAR forces.
b. Other Potential Ground Targets -- There are
other moves that, t en y t e -AR, might well bring Israeli
military counteraction. These include an attempt once again
to close the Strait of Tiran and a resumption of serious
fedayeen attacks. Israel probably would regard these as prov-
ocations to which it would be justified in replying militarily.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the Israelis feel
that the UAR has any definite plans to carry out such provoca-
tive acts. The Israelis are aware, on the other hand, that the
UAR has taken the lead in organizing an Arab project to divert
the waters of the tributaries of the Jordan River in Syrian
and Lebanese territory in order to sabotage the success of
Israel's plan to bring water from the upper Jordan basin to
the Negev by 1963. Should this Arab plan be carried out, it
immediate considerations that the Israelis do not stress but
which they must have in mind. Among these are:
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is possible that Israel might move to occupy at least the area
of the source of the Banyas River, which lies a short distance
over the armistice line-in Syrian territdryo
c. Air Among the various methods employed by
Israel to check on Arab intentions is that of conducting re
connais:sance--flights over neighboring Arab, particularly
Egyptian territory. UAR air parity or superiority could
seriously hinder these operations and would enhance UAR capa-
bilities to carry out similar flights over Israel.
D Points of. Recurrent Disputes
la The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones. The
General Armistice greemen s signed in 1 etween
Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria each
established a demilitarized zone, neutral zone or a no-man?:s
land along or near the frontier. These areas were created as
a temporary solution designed to facilitate acceptance of the
armistice agreements which.were themselves regarded by the UN
as a forerunner of an early permanent peace settlement.
as Israeli-S-rian Border. The Demilitarized
Zone (DZ) along the Israeli-Syrian border is divided into three
sectors: one southeast of Lake Tiberias, the second stretch-
ing between the"northern end of Lake Tiberias to and around the
southern tip of the former Lake Hula (drained by Israel in 1958),.
and the third a small area at the northernmost border point.
This DZ has been the scene of periodic violence since 1951.,
when Israel began,work on the Hula reclamation project. The con-
flict revolves around Israel?s attempts to develop and extend,
its sovereignty in the DZ and Syria?s resistance to these moves.
Contrary tothe provisions of the GAA, Israel claims sovereignty
over all land in the DZ,. In 1951 the Security Council authorized
Israel to resume the drainage work: on non-Arab-owned land in the
zone; moreover, the GAA did provide for the restoration of
civilian life therein. In compliance with this resolution Israel
has confined most of its activities in connection with the Hula
drainage to ,,lands.that,.?are .:not 'Arab-o*nedo As the drainage
project has progressed'Israel has established in the reclaimed
area close to the border, but outside the DZ, several settlements
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that have since become involved in incidents. The Hula area is
still a point of friction, but its importance as a trouble spot
has been reduced by the fact that major work has been completed
and the de-silting of the canals, the most likely present cause
of incidents, need be done only periodically. The areas more
prone to become the scene of friction between Israel and Syria
recently have been the areas of the DZ farther to the south.
The DZ area to the southeast of Lake
Tiberias has been the scene of most of the recent flareups.
Basically the question is Israel?s extension of sovereignty over
the entire DZ. The immediate problem is "the progressive ex-
tension of Israeli cultivation towards the east" (Annex 2 to
General Von Horn?s. report of February 25, 1960) in the area be-
tween the Israeli settlement of Beit Qatsir and the Arab village
of Tawafiq. Land ownership in the DZ is shared by Arabs and
Jews, with the land parcels running east and west between Beit
Qatsir and Tawafiq. Following the completion of a north-south
drainage ditch in 1958, the Israelis have opposed cultivation
by the Arabs of land west of the ditch. Violence continues to
flare periodically and 'is apt to become acute during planting
and harvesting seasons,
b, Jerusalem. The demilitarized areas of dis-
pute between Israel and Jordan are Mount Scopus and the Area
between the Lines (ABL) at Government House, both in Jerusalem.
The Mount Scopus neutral zone was established by an Arab-Jewish
Military Commander's Agreement of July 7, 1948, and includes
the inactive Jewish institutions of Hadassah Hospital and
Hebrew University patrolled by Israeli police, the Arab village
of Al-Isawiyah, and a Jordanian-occupied area around Augusta
Victoria Hospital. One problem is the delineation of the zone,
since the Agreement did not describe the zone but referred to
an attached map for boundaries (see Map VIII), Another problem
arises from the fact that the Israeli police control the major
access road to the Arab village and periodically force the
villagers to detour off the road and down the hillside. The
population limits of Al-Isawiyah are also a source of dispute,
since the agreement limits the number of inhabitants to those
living in the village when the agreement was signed and it is
not clear as to what their number was. Israeli patrolling in
the Ra's as Sullam or Gan Shlamit area has also been a source
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of controversy and has resulted in exchanges of fire between the
patrols and the Jordanians. From time to time the fortnightly
convoy that rotates the Israeli police complement and brings
supplies has been the cause of friction.
The situation in the Government House Zone
is less complex than that of Mount Scopus. The Government
House is the headquarters of the UNTSO and there are no
problems connected with it. The surrounding area, however,
is occupied by Jordanian Arabs and Israeli Jewish civilians.
The chief problem concerns Israeli attempts to convert a de
facto separation of Arabs and Jews into a boundary between the
w -
. In July 1957 the Israelis began preparations to plant
trees along the de facto line thus partitioning the zone.
Tension mounted Uetween Israel and Jordan over Israel?s uni-
lateral demarcation efforts and the case was referred to the
Security Council. In January 1958 the Council adopted a reso-
lution calling on Israel to halt its tree-planting activities.
The tension abated following the Security Council?s action,
and while Jordan complained of continued Israeli aggressions
in the area in September 1958 there have been no major incidents
in the Government House DZ recently.
In recent years Israel has alternated its
Independence Day military parade between Tel Aviv, Haifa and
Jerusalem, holding it on the Jewish calendar date which cor-
responds to 14 May 1948, when Israel attained its independence.
A dispute arises whenever Jerusalem is the scene because the
presence of tanks and other heavy equipment in the procession
violates restrictions in the armistice agreement. This was
the issue again this year in connection with Israel?s 13th
anniversary parade in Jerusalem on 20 April. The Israelis
were adamant about including their heavy equipment despite a
warning from the UN Security Council,
c. Al Awja.;. The Al Awja DZ established by the
Israel-Egypt GAA lies o he east of the international boundary
that was drawn between Palestine and Egypt in 1906. The zone
is important for its strategic location at the only inland route
crossing between Egypt and Palestine and for its water sources
in a desert region. The first armistice violation in the Al
Awja DZ to come to the attention of the UN was the Egyptian
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complaint in 1950 that the Israelis had expelled the Bedouin
living in the zone into Egyptian territory. By 1951 the MAC
had restored order at least temporarily in the situation.
Serious disturbances again took place in the DZ between 1953
and 1956, beginning with the harassment of Bedouin in the
zone about the end of June 1953. The following September
the Israelis established in the zone the first of a few
kibbutzim which the Egyptians alleged and the UN later agreed
were inhabited by military personnel. By 1955 Israel was in
full military occupation of the DZ. Countering the Egyptian
complaints that the Israeli settlements were military camps
were Israeli protests that Egyptians had crossed into the
zone and mined the roads, thereby causing Israeli casualities.
Incidents continued to occur in the zone until the Sinai in-
vasion at the end of October 1956; there have been no flareups
in the zone since that time.
2. Suez Canal Transit. On March 13, 1948 Egypt
declared a state of siege to-Fe-effective with the termina-
tion of the Palestine Mandate on May 15 and the procedures
for visit and search of vessels dealing with Israel began to
develop. Instructions were issued to provide for the in-
spection of ships destined directly or indirectly for Pales-
tine and their cargoes made subject to confiscation. A Prize
Court was established in Alexandria on July 8, 1948, A royal
decree of 1950 consolidated Egyptian regulations on searches
and seizure of contraband in connection with the Palestine
hostilities. In 1953 the list of contraband goods was re-
vised to include "foodstuffs and all other commodities"
likely to strengthen the Israeli "war potential," Moreover,
Egypt contends that there is a state of belligerency between
it and Israel which was not terminated by the signing of the
General Armistice Agreement.
The denial of Suez Canal transit to Israeli ships
and cargoes has been debated in the Security Council on four
occasions. One resolution, that of September 1, 1951, has
been adopted calling on Egypt to cease its blockade practices
in the Canal. Later Israeli complaints did not result in the
adoption of any resolutions because of a Soviet veto or threat
of veto.
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The only Israel-flag vessel ever to attempt trans-
iting the Canal was the Bat Galim seized at Suez on September 28,
1954. While the ship's crew was returned to Israel on January 1,
1955 under the auspices of the MAC, the ship remains in Egyptian
possession.
Egyptian practice with respect to vessels of
neutral flags has varied somewhat, but generally cargo ships
chartered by Israel or by firms in which Israelis have part
ownership are not allowed to transit the Canal; moreover,
cargoes of Israeli origin or known Israeli destination are
liable to be confiscated. Such cargoes are sold at public
auction "for the benefit of the Palestine Arabs," according to
Egyptian sources. Moreover, foreign vessels which have called
at Israeli ports are blacklisted, which means in general that
they are refused services and supplies during their transit
of the canal. Several cases have been given considerable
publicity, including the following.-
The Caetan Manolis, Liberian flag, arrived
at Port Said from Haifa February 2659 carrying potash and
cement bound for the Far East. The UAR suspected that the
ship was under Israel charter and the cargo Israel-owned. The
cargo was confiscated and the ship allowed to proceed.
The Inge Toft, Danish flag, arrived at
Port Said from Haifa May 21, 19M carrying potash and cement
bound for the Far East. It was not until February 1960, how-
ever, that the ship's owners allowed its cargo to be unloaded.
The cargo was sold at public auction June 18, 1960.
The Ast palea, Greek flag, arrived at Port
Said December 17, 1959 carry ng cement bound for the Far East.
The ship's detention by the UAR coincided with World Bank con-
sideration of a $56,000,000 loan to the UAR but did not prevent
the loan from being granted. In April 1960 the ship's owners
authorized its cargo to be discharged and the ship returned to
Greece.
In the spring of 1960 attention in the Suez
issue focussed briefly on the Cleopatra incident. On April 13
the UAR -f lag vessel Cleopatra arrived in New York and the local
Seaman's International nLion prevented the discharge of its
cargo in protest against UAR blacklisting of US-flag vessels.
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The International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions responded
with a boycott of US shipping in Arab ports. US-Arab relations
were further aggravated at the time by the passage of the
Hayes-Douglas Amendment, which directs the President in ad-
ministering foreign aid to take into consideration US support
for freedom of usage of international waterways. The incident
closed when the unions withdrew their pickets and allowed the
Cleopatra to begin discharging cargo on May 9.
3. Jordan River Development. Israel's water development
schemes, while a ma ter of concern to.all the neighboring Arab
states, are a source of potential trouble particularly between
Israel and the Syrian region of the UAR. Arab apprehension
that Israel will attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan at
Jisr Banat Yaqub has caused recurrent tension since 1953, when
the Israelis began work on such a project. Current information
indicates that Israel's water plan will be developed in three
stages ending respectively in 1963, 1966, and 1969. When the
last stage is completed water will be carried from the Jordan
River near Jisr Banat Yaqub to the Negev. In stage I. water
will be drawn from Lake Tiberias through an underground pumping
plant at Eshed Kinnerot (See Map VII), thereby circumventing
the UN Security Council prohibition against drawing water from
the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub. However, the Arabs are opposed
to all Israeli schemes to improve and develop the country and
are likely to become alarmed at any news or rumor of progress
in Israel's water development plans.
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UA R
The urge behind the Egyptian program of atomic
research appears to spring from a desire for prestige with-
in the Arab world, The 2 megawatt Soviet-supplied research
reactor now being completed poses no militarv eat. Since
the disclosure of Egyptian
press statements nave implied that future development might
be also of a military nature. However, it does not at this
time seem probably that Egypt will be in a position to build
or to operate a large reactor, either for power or for weap-
ons production, without substantial assistance from non-
Egyptian experts for some time to come.
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III. Military Situation (See Maps)
A. Israel
1. Ground: The average strength of the Israeli
Army is estimated a 29,500 but varies widely due to callups
of -reserve units, economic considerations and border tensions.
The 5,000 man quasi-military NAHAL, which forms the first
line of defense on the frontier, is continuing its normal
activities.
Current military activities in Israel are
directed toward training with increased emphasis on armor,
modernization and standardization of weapons. There has
been-no discernible reduction in the level of French support.*
Israel will continue to press for additional arms aid from
the Western World in a effort to offset UAR gains resulting
from Soviet aid.
The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal
security and have the capability of defeating those of any
or all of Israel's Arab neighbors. Against a major power,
they could offer effective delaying action.
*The o owing table o the percentages of certain Israeli
ground equipment which are of French origin illustrates the
degree of French assistance:
Item
Percentage of
French Origin
Small arms and mortars
Some
Recoilless weapons
22%
Guided missiles (antitank)
100%
Light artillery
48%
Medium artillery
52%
Special purpose artillery
32%
Light tanks
85%
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2. Air: The Israel Defense Force Air Force (IDFAF)
is an effective and capable air force in spite of limited re-
sources and air facilities. The present vigor- of the IDFAF
stems from several factors: aggressive and dedicated personnel,
good leadership, good organization, an effective reserve system,
excellent training and high morale. In its combat aircraft
inventory Israel is presently estimated to have 162 jet fight-
ers--24 Vautours, 38 Super-Mysteres, 55 Mysteres, 19 Meteors,
26 Ouragans--30 F-51 piston fighters, and 10 Vautour jet light
bombers. Included in the combat jet fighter inventory are 10
Vautour and 5 Meteor all-weather models. It is believed that
approximately 80% of these aircraft are combat ready. Israel
is estimated to have. at least a 90-day level of POL stockpiled
for emergency use. The IDFAF is scheduled to receive up to
40 Mirage III supersonic jet fighters from France, beginning
in late 1961. The .Mirage III. should have a distinct edge in
performance characteristics over the FARMER (MIG-19), par-
ticularly in speed and combat ceiling.
Israel, when compared to the UAR, continues to
be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air
facilities are concerned; however, the deficiency in numbers
is counter-balanced by the superior quality of the Israeli air
staff, pilots and technicians. It is estimated that the IDFAF
could defeat the UAR Air Force, if an effective defense of
Israel's air facilities could be maintained. Any failure in
the normally efficient EW/GCI radar network would be disastrous
for the IDFAF because the proximity of the UAR air bases severely
limits scramble time even under favorable conditions. The IDFAF
is especially concerned at the present about the vulnerability
of its air defense system to jamming tactics. Efforts are being
made to acquire improved electronics gear which is less sus-
ceptible to electronic countermeasures than the present equip-
ment, In order to prevent total destruction on the ground in
case of a large-scale UARAF attack which the fighters and
antiaircraft defenses are unable to stop, semi-underground
revetments have been constructed at the 3 principal Israeli
military airfields to provide some protection against bombing
and strafing attacks. Israeli air defense doctrine also places
major emphasis on using offensive air operations to ease de-
fensive problems.
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6 April 1961
25X6
3. Navy: The Israeli Navy consists of two ex-
British destroyers-),,.;:two ex-British submarines (SS), one
patrol escort (pF), two ubmar-ine chasers (one PC and one SC),
.11 motor torpedo boats JPT), one auxiliary (AG), and about
17 amphibious and service craft. Most of the ,combatant ships
are in,excellent material condition and are normally main-
tained:in,actiye operatonal status. All ships are based at
Haifa except,3. PT and 7 ,:.service craft which are based at
Eilat (at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba). The Sea Commando
unit of the Navy is a specialized force of about 300 men
trained in underwater demolition, raiding, and commando-
assault type operations.,,, Most of these personnel are also
qualified parachutists. ..Inflatable rubber boats, face masks,
underwater breathing devices and possibly, underwater pro-
pulsion units have been acquired, principally from Italy, and
during the past 12 months emphasis-has been placed on uncon-
ventional forms of naval warfare training. On numerous occa-
sions PT have been observed with assault-type rubber boats on
their after decks and up to 40 Commando troops embarked.
It is believed that submarines have also been utilized during
training exercises for~transportingand debarking rubber
boats and troops.
The Israeli Navy is`a highly trained force
whose combat effectiveness and capabilities are superior to
those of neighboring Arab states' navies. The Israeli Navy
is capable of defending the coasts against an Arab naval or
amphibious attack and, with air support, is capable of
neutralizing an Arab blockade of Israeli ports. Leadership
is competent and forceful, morale and self-confidence are
high, and seamanship and shiphandling are excellen
Anti-
submarine (ASW) capabilities are currently limited due to
the lack of modern ASW equipment, but this type of training
is being emphasized, particularly since the acquisition of
submarines. The Israeli Navy places considerable reliance
on motor torpedo boats, not only as a defensive weapon, but
also as an offensive force to be utilized in conjunction with
underwater demolition and landing operations.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
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6 April 1961
B. Arab States
1. United Arab Republic (UAR)
a. General: The United Arab Republic armed
forces are dominated by 'Egyptians. They hold the key posts
in the high.;command and have permeated the Syrian forces to
the point where it is believed that Egyptians have-been
assigned as deputies to the Syrian comma ,nders-in practically
all units and installations. This influx, intended to extend
Egyptian control over the Syrian forces and remove them from
politics, particularly the Army, has stimulated Syrian dis-
content, but the presence of the better trained and more
experienced Egyptian officers should significantly improve
the quality of the forces. Further improvement in the stand-
ards of the forces of both regions can also be expected to
result-from continuing Soviet Bloc assistance in the supply
of arms and equipment, in training, both at home and abroad,
and assistance in reorganization.
The troops in both armies are highly motivated
against Israel. Their discipline is good and there are
reports indicating that rigorous training during the past
year and a half has made them hard and. confident.
The operational combining of the air forces
of both regs into a United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF)
provides a basis for the gstablishment of several important
advantages, although some jealousy, suspicion and lack of
strong leadership are factors militating against the success
of coordinated operations. First, Egypt can utilize Syrian
air bases, from which at least a portion of her fighters are
capable of mounting direct air strikes on Israel much easier
than if they had to operate from airfields in the Cairo area.
Secondly, BEAGLE (IL-28) jet light bombers are now capable
of flying turnabout one-way bombing missions over Israel,
shuttling back and forth between remote bases in both coun-
tries, taking advantage of the wider dispersal opportunity.
A third item of primary importance is the. UAR capa.bility
for mounting a surprise air attack on Israel. The UAR's
ability to obtain both personnel and training combat aircraft
from the USSR may result in its reaching a point where the
present qualitative superiority of the Israeli Air Force
would be offset by the rapidly expanding and improving UAR
air forces.
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b. Egyptian Region
(1) Ground: The total strength of all
components of the UAR ground -forces in the Egyptian Region
is estimated at 100,000. Present dispositions are as fol-
lows: Northern Zone, 14,000; Central Zone, 42,000; Southern
Zone, 5,000; Canal Zone, 26,500; and Sinai, 12,500. The
Egyptians continue to improve their defenses of the Sinai
Peninsula. Total uniformed or active duty forces in Gaza
are currently estimated at 1,000 men and comprise two bat-
talions of the 107th Palestine Brigade, 225 Fedayeen, 125
Military Police and 150 civilian police. There are no in-
dications of any offensive action being initiated from the
Sinai.
The army in the Egyptian Region is loyal
to the regime and is capable of maintaining it in power
against internal opposition. While not yet able to chal-
lenge the Israeli forces in the field, it has surpassed the
level of efficiency prevailing before the 1956 hostilities
and is now believed capable of limited operations on a divi-
sional level. With adequate leadership the Army could offer
stubborn resistance in a static defense against an Israeli
attack. The leadership is believed to be adequate at the
small unit level, but the quality of the senior commanders
is questionable. This weakness results in generally poor
command and staff work and combined with the low level of
education and initiative of the average soldier is believed
to render the forces unable to cope with a mobile and rapid-
ly changing situation.
(2) Air: The Egyptian Region combat air-
craft inventory is estimed at about 146 jet fighters--20
FARMER/MIG-19's, 96 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 30 FAGOT/MIG-15's--
and 50 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Sixteen of the FRESCO
aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations. The UAR
received an estimated 20 FARMER/MIG-19's from the Soviet
Union in early 1961; an additional 20 are expected before
the end of the year. The FARMER is estimated to be slightly
superior in speed to the Israeli Super Mystere; the climb
rate and combat ceiling are about equal. Israeli pilot
proficiency may be able largely to offset any performance
advantages that the FARMER holds over the Super Mystere.
Egypt has one of the most modern airfield complexes in the
Middle East. The Egyptian air facilities can easily support
the combat aircraft which are presently in the UAR inventory.
It is estimated that Egypt has at least a 90-day supply of
POL stockpiled for emergencies.
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The combat capability of the Egyptian air
element has improved considerably since the 1956 Suez campaign,
particularly the air defense system. Soviet radar has gradually
replaced the French radars which have been in use since the
early 1950?s. Most Israeli overflights are now detected
quickly and aircraft are scrambled and vectored on an inter-
cept course. With the addition of the FARMERs to the UARAF
inventory, Israeli reconnaissance intruders will encounter
increased opposition in the near future. Despite the improve-
ments, however, the system is not deemed capable of coping with
a determined large-scale attack because of the low standards of
its operating personnel, and the lack of a defense against
jamming.. Offensive capabilities against fixed targets such as
airfields, military installations, and transportation facili-
ties are fair. With the offensive resources the UARAF has at
its command, there is little doubt that a devastating surprise
attack could be carried out against Israel if the UARAF staff
could plan and initiate such a move without Israeli detection.
(3) Navy: The Egyptian Navy is composed of
45 combatant ships, as- ollows:. four destroyers (DD) (two
ex-Soviet, two ex-British), nine ex-Soviet submarines (SS)
(eight long range, one coastal type), six ex-British patrol
escorts (PF), 18 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), four ex-
Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF), and four US-built coastal
minesweepers (old) MSC (0). There are in addition three auxil-
iaries (two former yachts, one former transport) and several
minor service craft. All are based at Alexandria except three
PT based at Port Said which operate in the Port Said--Suez
Canal--Red Sea area. The ex-Soviet ships are in fair material
condition. The submarines now spend increasing periods in
maintenance or overhaul. Of the ex-British ships, the DD are
in fair material condition, but as far as is known they still
lack main battery ammunition and torpedoes. Two patrol escorts
are in poor condition and are in reserve. The MSC (0), also in
reserve, are in poor material condition and are of little value.
The Navy possesses a stockpile of about 2,000 contact type mines
and unknown quantities of depth charges and torpedoes, nearly all
of Soviet origin. A number of underwater propulsion units,
plus a quantity of limpet mines, has been purchased from Italy
for use in underwater assault and demolition.
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Despite the increase in ship strength as
a result of Soviet aid during the past several years, combat
effectiveness remains low and, because of poor maintenance, the
over-all effectiveness of the ex-Soviet ships has declined
since they were acquired. Only with immediate outside assist-
ance could the Egyptian Navy hope to survive a concerted air
and naval attack by Israel. Although fairly well equipped. to
conduct small scale defensive and offensive operations, Egyp-
tian naval capabilities are restricted by lack of adequately
trained personnel, lack of logistic support, and a decisive
lack of initiative and coordinated teamwork. Capabilities are
limited, at the present time, to surface ship and submarine
patrols of short duration, motor torpedo boat operations against
enemy surface craft in Egyptian waters, and minelaying and
minesweeping operations of questionable effectiveness. The
submarine force represents a potential offensive strength, but
the future effectiveness of the submarines will depend to a
great extent on improved maintenance as well as on the aptitude
of personnel to advance with continued training. The emphasis
now being given to afloat training, particularly daily exer-
cises conducted by small task force groups, provides the
Egyptians with much needed operational experience.
.c. Syrian: Region
(1) Ground: The present strength of all
components of the Syrian Region ground forces is estimated at
62,900. The largest component is the First UAR Army with a
strength of 52,500. Present ground forces dispositions are
as follows: Southwestern Area (Israeli border), 17,200;
Central Area, 4,900; Northern Area 3,500; Coastal Area, 5,400;
Eastern Area, 2,900; Southern Area, 5,400; and Damascus Area,
23,600. The Syrian ground forces, during an emergency, are
believed capable of mobilizing from four to five reserve in-
fantry brigades upon short notice. The ground forces of the
Syrian Region are capable of maintaining internal security.
They are also capable of successfully defending the vital
areas of the country against attack by any one of their Arab
neighbors. They could, however, be defeated by Israel or
Turkey. The Syrian Region ground forces are incapable of
effective sustained offensive operations against any of its
neighbors except Lebanon.
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2050/61R
6 April 1961
(2) Air: There are an-estimated 50
FRESCO/MIG-17 jet fighters, including 6 equipped for all-
weather operations, based in the Syrian Region of the UAR.
Air capabilities, both defensive and offensive, are poor.
Although an EW/GCI network equipped with Soviet and Polish
radar exists,. the level of proficiency is low. Major stress
in the Syrian region'is believed to be on development of an
offensive capability, for strikes against fixed targets, such
as airfields, military installations, and transportation
facilities. Israel's principal port and its main petroleum
refinery and storage area are located within 100 nautical
miles of two-major Syrian airfields. Syria's complex of jet
law, airfields provide the UAR bomber force with a capability of
launching a two pronged attack on Israel. It is estimated
that Syria has enough POL to conduct air operations for 30
to 40 days.
(3) Navy: The Syrian Navy consists of
three ex-French submarine chasers (SC), 15 ex-Soviet motor
torpedo boats (PT), two ex-Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF),
and several minor amphibious vessels and service craft. Until
recently'all were based at Latakia but at the present time
some are based at Al Mina al Bayda. Integration of the Syrian
and Egyptian navies into a single UAR Navy has not yet been
fully implemented. Some limited joint exercises, however,
have taken place.
The Syrian Navy is capable of con-
ducting effective coastal patrol operations. It has also
recently developed limited minesweeping, anti-submarine and
torpedo boat capabilities. In the event of hostilities, the
Syrian PT would probably be used to augment the "strike"
capability of the Egyptian Navy.
2. Jordan
a. Ground: The Jordan Arab Army is currently
engaged in strengtiel- ni g and modernizing its armed forces with
the help of US-supplied equipment. The total strength of the
regular Army is 36,400; currently 17,300 thereof, supported by
about 9,000 lightly armed and poorly trained National Guards-
men stationed in border villages, guard Jordan's frontier with
Israel. The remainder of the Army is, deployed in East Jordan,
with the largest concentration being near the-capital, Amman.
21 -
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961
As long as the Bedouin remain cohesive and loyal
to King Husayn, the Jordan Arab Army is capable of maintaining
internal security. It is incapable of sustained offensive com-
bat. Defensively, it could.probably contain attacks by any one
neighboring Arab Army but could not defend west Jordan against
an Israeli attack for longer than six days. Because of the con-
cern over. possible Israeli attack and internal security, Jordan
cannot provide. significant forces for employment elsewhere.
b. Air: Jordan has 11 Hawker Hunter and 11 Vam-
pire jet fighters.---This air force has virtually no combat
capability with respect to Israel. Jordanian pilots are well-
trained for tactical-type missions and could effectively support
ground forces in suppressing an internal rebellion.
c. Navy: The Flotilla Force, a component of the
Army, operates 10 small naval craft (including two ex-British
assault landing craft (LCA)) on the Dead Sea and two small
aluminum-hulled patrol launches at Aqaba. Combat capabilities
are nonexistent.
3. Iraq
a. Ground: The strength of the Iraqi Army (ex-
cluding the organic air forces) is about 68,000 organized into
four infantry divisions, and one armored division. Soviet equip-
ment has been largely absorbed, resulting in some improvement in
effectiveness.
Logistical limitations and internal security
considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12,000-
15,000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-
Israel-Syria area.
The Army could probably resist invasion by
Iran or any one of Iraq's Arab neighbors; but against invasion
by large forces of a major power, the Army could offer only
minor harassing action. The Army is capable of maintaining
internal security.
b. Air: The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft
inventory is estimated to consist of 87 jet fighters--16
FARMER/MIG-19's, 40 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 12 Hawker Hunters, 11 Venoms,
8 Vampires--13 piston fighter-bombers, and 16 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet
light bombers. The 16 FARMERs were added to the inventory in
early 1961. Fourteen of the FRESCOS are equipped for all-weather
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operations. All programed equipment is believed to have arrived
from the Soviet Union except 3 CAVAN-10 transports. Soviet in-
structors and advisors continue to participate in the domestic
training program and a small number of Iraqi pilots are training
in the Soviet Union.
The IAF is currently capable of attacking
fixed targets such as airfields, military installations, and
transportation facilities. Air defense capabilities are re-
stricted to the Baghdad, Habbaniya, and Kirkuk areas. Radar
stations are presently operating at Baghdad and Kirkuk. A-
school for operators and technicians is being conducted in Iraq
and reportedly has graduated about 50 GCI controllers. No effec-
tive defense could be organized against an attack by a major air
force. Close support could not be provided for ground forces be-
cause of the lack of joint training. The IAF could furnish ef-
fective support during any internal disturbance short of civil
war, in which event political factionalism could render the air
force ineffective.
c. Navy: The Iraqi River Force is composed of
10 ex-Soviet motor--f-orpedo boats (PT), 4 river gunboats (PR),
1 yacht (PY), 2 ex-Soviet patrol vessels (YP), and 2 ex-Soviet
torpedo retrievers (YTR). Four of the PT arrived in January
1961 and are still being fitted out; the 2 YP and 2 YTR arrived
in November-1960. All craft are based at Basra except for 2 PT
and 1 PR, which are at Fao. The River Force is at present-a
specialized component of the Army, but may soon become at least
a semi-autonomous naval force.
The river gunboats (PR) have no combat
capability; they are utilized only to assist in maintaining in-
ternal security in southern Iraq. However, the recently ac-
quired motor torpedo boats (PT) represent a potential, but
limited, offensive and defensive capability against the Iranian
Navy. The PT, stationed on a rotating basis at Fao, exercise
regularly in the northern Persian Gulf. A small number of Iraqi
personnel are receiving naval training in the USSR, and Soviet
technicians at Basra are assisting the Iraqis in the maintenance
and operation of the PT.
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6 April 1961
4. Lebanon
a. Ground: The strength of the Lebanese ground
forces is 10,500; Ter r`e is a gendarmerie force of 2,800.
Given a political decision and orders to do so, the Army is
considered capable of maintaining internal security and of pro-
viding limited defense of land approaches to Beirut.
b. Air: Lebanon has 6 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vam-
pire jet fighters.-The air force has no capability to engage
effectively a foreign aggressor, but does possess a good capa-
bility to assist in quelling internal disturbances.
c, Navy:. The small Lebanese Navy, a specialized
component of the Lebanese Army, has no combat capabilities. It
is capable of conducting fairly effective coastal patrol opera-
tions.
5. Saudi Arabia
a. Ground: The total strength of the regular
Saudi Army is 13,6U; Tn addition, there is a "White Army"
of subsidized tribesmen which has an estimated strength of
16,000 loosely organized into at least three brigades. The
Saudi Arabian armed forces would be incapable of organized re-
sistance against a modern army, except for desert harassing
operations.
use or RSAF training, but under the control of the USAF
training mission.' The task of advising and training this ai
b. Air: The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) has
18 Vampire jet figh-Eers, but all are unserviceable. In addi-
tion, there are 11 F-86's, 9 T-33's and 4 T-34's in Saudi Arabia
d f
c. Navy: A Saudi Arabian naval force is in the
process of being established and one craft, a US Coast Guard
"95-foot" Class motor gunboat (PGM) purchased in the US, was
delivered in May 1960. A US Navy Training Mission operates a
seaman school at Dammam where about 50 enlisted personnel are
being given language training and classroom instruction in
naval subjects. On board training of the crew of the PGM began
recently using as a nucleus a group of Saudi personnel, who re-
ceived their naval training in Egypt.
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C. UN Forces: United Nations Emergency Forces on the
Israel-Sinai-order continue to act as a buffer between Israel
and the UAR, and have been successful in maintaining a rela-
tively quiet border.
UNEF strength stands at about 5,325. (See chart for
details). Although border crossings and minor incidents con-
tinue to be reported, the situation along the Gaza and Sinai
frontiers remains relatively quiet. Contributing nations con-
tinue periodic rotation of their troops. The Swedish battalion
which was withdrawn for a special mission in the Congo has been
replaced by another Swedish battalion.
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THJ ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
SUPPLEMENT
SOVIET BLOC ARMS HOLDINGS IN EGYPTIAN REGION (UAR)
SYRIAN REGION (UAR), IRAQ, AND YEMEN
Egyptian leaders have assumed since 1958 overall co-
ordination of military purchases from the Soviet Bloc by
both regions of the UAR. The total value of Bloc military
aid to the UAR is estimated to be more than 700 million
dollars.* In most instances the Arab States are believed
to have received discounts on their arms purchases from
the Bloc.
An estimated 225 Soviet Bloc military technicians and
advisors are in Egypt, where they are assisting the UAR in
reorganizing the Second Army (Egyptian). Egyptian air, army,
and navy personnel have been and are being trained in both
the use and maintenance of the equipment in Soviet Bloc coun-
tries. The number is unknown.
The number of Soviet Bloc military technicians and ad-
visors working with the First Army (Syrian) probably has
been reduced to about 150 since the formation of the United
Arab Republic. Many of the duties performed by the Soviets
have been taken over by Egyptian advisory personnel.
This figure, n addition to arms, includes the estimated
cost--prior to discount--of all military-related items sup-
plied by the Bloc.
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TO EGYPTIAN REGION (UAR)
Item
Estimated Minimum
Holdings
MIG 19 jet fighter 20
MIG 15/17 jet fighter 126
IL-28 light jet bomber 50
IL-14 twin engine transport 40
Trainer aircraft: Yak-11, Yak-18, U MIG-15
U IL-28 60
Helicopter 10
Radar EW/GCI 30
T-34 medium tank 275
JS-3 heavy tank 60
100mm SP assault gun SU-100 70
BTR-152 APC 350
85mm field gun D-44 50
100mm field gun M 1944 7
122mm gun M 1931/37 50
122mm howitzer M 1938 100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937 32
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round) 30
57mm AT gun M 1943 200
82mm recoiless gun B-10 200
14.0mm AA HMG (ZPU-2) 48
14o5mm AA HMG (ZPU-4) 48
37mm AA gun M 1939 112
85mm AA gun 72
100mm AA gun 12
82mm mortar 140
120mm mortar M 1943 36
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Destroyer
Submarine
2
9 (8 W-class
and 1 M-
class)
.Motor Torpedo boat 18
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper 4
Naval mines 2,000
Depth charges large quantity
Torpedoes large. gaant?ty-
TO SYRIAN REG10N,(UAR)
Item
Estimated Minimum
Holdings
r: I It
MIG-17 jet fighter 50
IL-14 6
Helicopter 4
T-34 medium tank 200
T-54 medium tank 85
100mm SP assault gun SU-100 54
BTR 152 APC 246
85mm field gun D44 40
122mm gun M 1931/37 32
122mm howitzer M 1938 100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937 24
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round) 32
57mm AT gun M 1943 100
82mm recoilless gun B-10 100
82mm recoilless gun T-21 some
14o5mm AA HMG (ZPU-2) 12
14,5mm AA HMG (ZPU-4) 12
37mm AA gun M 1939 104
85mm AA gun 50
100mm AA gun KS 19 12
82mm mortar 100
120mm mortar M 1943 100
Small arms some
Radar 15
Trucks 2,600
iii
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NAVAL
Motor Torpedo boat 15
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper 2
Naval mines, torpedoes, depth charges unknown quantity
IRAQ
25X1 B
In November 1958 Iraq concluded an arms agreement with
the Soviet Union in which the Soviets agreed to provide Iraq
There are now in Iraq about 220 Soviet military advisors
and technicians.
Item
Estimated Minimum
Quantities Delivered
AIR
MIG-19 jet fighter
16
MIG-15/17 jet fighter
and trainer
48
IL-28 jet light bomber
16
Helicopter
12
Radar EW/GCI
10-12
GROUND
T-34
medium tank
80
T-54
medium tank
160
100mm
SP assault gun SU-100
52
BTR-152 APC
60
BTR-40 APC
40
57mm AT gun M 1943
85mm field gun D-44
23
100
100mm field gun M 1944
60
122mm howitzer M 1938
50
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937
24
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GROUND
132mm rocket launcher BM-13 24
37mm AA gun M 1939 268
100mm AA gun KS 19 27
82mm mortar 54
120mm mortar M 1943 76
Trucks and other vehicles 4-5000
Motor torpedo boat 10
Patrol vessels 2
Torpedo recovery craft 2
Torpedoes some
YEMEN 25X16
Yemen concluded an arms deal with the Soviet T'1-- in
1956
At leas we ve shipments of Soviet Bloc arms arrived in
Yemen by sea beginning in October 1956, and it is believed
that all arms purchased by Yemen from the Bloc have been
delivered. The total value of Soviet Bloc arms thus far
received by Yemen may amount tows much as 30 million
dollars. The Yemenis have no technical competence to
operate and maintain the equipment received and require
extensive Soviet Bloc or other foreign assistance to use
it effectively. It is estimated that not more than 25 Bloc
military technicians remain in Yemen.
Item Estimated
Quantities
Delivered
AIR
IL-10 Piston ground attack aircraft 26
Piston trainer aircraft 5
Helicopter, MI-4 3
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SECRET
 SECRET
Approved For. ReleaseO00/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A00046Qp60001-9
THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961
GROUND
T-34 medium tank
30
100mm SP assault gun SU-100
61
BTR-40 APC
74
57mm
AT gun M 1943
62
76mm
field/AT gun M 1942
73
122mm
gun M 1931/37
31
152mm
gun-howitzer M 1937
3
37mm AA gun M 1939
106
85mm AA gun
26
AT rocket launcher
10
Small arms
some
Trucks (including 24 gasoline trucks)
223
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961
SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY'
SECRET
UAR EGYPT
UAR SYRIA
TOTAL UAR
IRAQ
JORDAN
333
177
860
385
161
121
282
479
156
1002
584
246
200
446
154
18
6763
92
465
433
898
363
120
69
114
1670
914
126
62
188
51
12
32
309
92
1400
143
.1543
203
459
97
1784
4096
56994
434
477
911
310
154
1813
1534
p
arr
ers
3 Includes 62 130mm rocket launchers (32 tube) in UAR and 24 132mm rocket launchers (16 tube) in Iraq
4 Includes 850 ss10,anti tank guided missiles
40
36
152
175
363
300
663
394
154
20
18
1279
383
ANTI-
TANK
MISC
ANTI -
TANK &
ARMORED
RECOILLESS
MORTARS
ASSAULT
VEHICLES
57-76
75.105
106-155
20-40
75.130
WEAPONS
81-120
GUNS
MM
MM
MM
MM
MM
MM
256
52
27
396
124
17
199
551
1355
338
453
1 Certain obsolete items have been- omitted
2 Includes armored cars, personnel and wea
ons c
i
STRENGTH OF FORCES'
DEPLOYED IN VICINITY OF ISRAELI BORDERS
TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARAB ARMIES
CURR
ENT M+48HRS
UAR EGYPT
100
000*
UAR EGYPT 16,
000 35,000
UAR SYRIA
,
62
900*
UAR SYRIA 19,
000 32,000
IRAQ
,
72
000*
JORDAN 26,
300 45,000
JORDAN
,
48
100*
LEBANON 2,
500 7,500
SAUDI ARABIA
,
13
600
TOTAL ARAB 63,
800 119, 500
LEBANON
,
10,.500
TOTAL
307,100
* Includes irregulars.
*This figure includes quasi-military
personnel on active duty.
SECRET
UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, EGYPT
(AS OF 1 MARCH 1961)
BRAZIL 636
CANADA 919
DENMARK 558
INDIA 1,246
NORWAY 609
SWEDEN 648
YUGOSLAVIA 708
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400060001-9
AIR FORCES
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961
FIGHTERS
Jet Piston
BOMBERS
Jet Piston
TRANSPORTS
Jet Piston
OTHER
Jet Piston
TOTAL
TOTAL AF
PERSONNEL
UAR EGYPT
146
50
46
30
130
402
4500
UAR SYRIA
50
7
6
21
84
3000
TOTAL UAR
196
50
53
36
151
486
7500
JORDAN
22
4
4
18
48
1242
SAUDI ARABIA
18
10
25
53
285
LEBANON
14
4
6
24
593
YEMEN
26
8
34
UNK
IRAQ
87
13
16
5
9
82
212
3807
TOTAL ARAB
337
39
66
72
53
290
857
13427
ISRAEL
162
30
10
24
11
119
356
4028
NAVAL FORCES
DESTROYERS
(DD)
PATROL
VESSELS
(PF PR PC
PY PGM SC)
MOTOR TORPEDO
BOATS (PT)
MINE CRAFT
(MSC) (MSF)
SUBS
(SS)
AMPHIB.
CRAFT
OTHER
TOTAL
NAVAL
PERSONNEL
UAR EGYPT
4
4(2)
18
4(4)
6(3)
9
7500
UAR SYRIA
3
6(9)
2
(3)
5
1000
TOTAL UAR
4
7(2)
24(9)
6(4)
6(3)
(3)
14
8500
IRAQ
5
6(4)
4
250
LEBANON
2
4
190
JORDAN
12
300
SAUDI ARABIA
1
80
TOTAL ARAB
4
13(2)
30(13)
6(4)
6(3)
2(3)
34
9320
Figures in parentheses indicate inactive ships (both nonoperational and those undergoing repairs).
*In addition there are 6-10 PT under construction in France and Italy, and three are being purchased from the UK.
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400060001-9
 .Approved For Release1*00/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400WD001-9
~mm
T ^~q~. 6TH
~i~i Qs~., aa+d~'
~ddedddG+~. UawGldV~al~C`~U
l-
~y
MAP I
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 ;Approved For Release O105112: CIA-RDP79SOO427AOOO4OWOO1-9
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961
ARAB-ISRAELI AIR FORCES
PRINCIPAL ARAB AIRFIELDS
PRINCIPAL ISRAELI AIRFIELDS
IRAQ
87 JET FIGHTERS
16 MIG-19
40 MIG-17
12 Hawker Hunters
11 Venoms
8 Vampires
13 PISTON FIGHTERS
16 IL-28 JET LIGHT BOMBERS
CYPRUS
(U. K.)
ISRAEL
162 JET FIGHTERS
38 Supermystere
55 Mystere
26 Ouragan
19 Meteor
24 Vautour
30 PISTON FIGHTERS
10 JET LIGHT BOMBERS
El Arish
Civil Airfield
Hatzor,A Ek*Fn
'Aret Naval Base
Naval Facility
MILES
SECRET
25
4(-)19
I
SAUDI _ l?'
ARABIA
asiriya
'1 i/lYOfPS ?
2 _'P
42
?,`? ?'`?..' ShaibahW? /, uoti
2 PT ?`~ ~, ,ado -
1 PR KUWAIT / iEYilrirr
? KUWAIT
'*'C??NEUTRAL ZON
MENT AT BASRA -
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 Approved For Release ilp00/05/12: CIA-RDP79S00427A00p 9 -ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961
as accepted by the United
Nations General Assembl
on 29 November 1947
Arab
Jewish
Armistice line
1949
ISRAELI?SYRIAN BORDER )
Defensive area
Demilitarized zone
Armistice line
A Approximate loatlon of
UN observation post;
designated by numeral
or letter.
SECRET
LEBANON 7
of Lake Hula -
drained in 1958
HULATAA
ISRAEL
The Israeli-Syrian Armistice
Agreement of 1949 left unresolved
the political status of the area
within the Demilitarized Zone.
Israel, however, claims sovereignty
over the zone and has assumed
effective control over most of it.
proposed diversion canal
(SEE PAGE 12)
ESHED KINNER 1
(PUMPING STATION UNDER CON NNiUCTION)
l
TI/iRI?
TI BERIAS `
There is also a UN OP at
Beit Qatsir "on demand. "
.C
(capable of
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79S00427A00040006000IP VII
 Approved For Release 200/05/12: CIA-RDP79S00427A00040w001-9
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961
V 0 L D
C I T Y
Church of Dome of
the Holy a the Rock
Sepulcher
Wailing
Well 1
1141, E..
t`
OLD HEBREW
UNIVERSITY
iHADASSAH
? HOSPITAL -*'
faiiiimiiiiiiiii
AREA BETWEEN HE LINES
MAP VIII
Sermon E
Ho-plc-L
NEUTRAL ZONE
.ISRAELI VERSION
ARMISTICE LINE
NO MANS LAND
DISPUTED TERRITORY
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1000 2000 3000 4000
FEET
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 J, 7"
.,_*Approved For ReleaseQp0/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A00040901
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
COPY NO.
DATE
6 April 1961
NO.
2050/61R
//4,F Sa
THE
ARAB-ISRAELI
SITUATION
THIS IS A WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY AN AD
HOC WORKING GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400060001-9
 Approved For Releash000/05/12: CIA-RDP79SO0427A0004 60001-9
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC,
SECS. 793 AND 794,THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION
OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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 Approved For Releas*,y000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A0004Q60001-9
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400060001-9