CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE 20 JANUARY 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000400050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1999
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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EV WIS .SINCE 20 January 1961
90 January 1961 'Thy American embassy in Moscow. reported
that "solidarity meetings" in Soviet
factories, as described by a n tuber of
press reports, featured pledge* of support
by Soviet trade union groups for the Cuban
.revolution. Accounts of these meetings
usually featured the "warning" that in
the event of a US attack on Cuba, the
Cuban people would have the support of
25X1D all peoples., ",.and first in. lime will be
the heroic working class of the Soviet
union."
25 January 1961
25X1 D
12 February .1961 In a speech given .at the. conclusion of a
meeting of technical advisers in Havana,
Fidel Castro savagely attacked the Kennedy
administration and then said: "As of today
Cuba is.going to dec.lase that if the Un#ed
States has the right to promote counter-
revolution in Cuba and Latin America, Cuba
has the right to encourage revolution in
Latin. America 'V ''me;, Guevara speAUing at
the same meeting, told the delegates: "You
must recall that we have already overcome
many. obstacles and'our responsibility extends
beyond the frontiers of Cuba. Each time
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we take a step ahead we are aiding the
liberation of all America from a savage
yoke," 25X1 D
22 February 1.961 Armed force minister Raul Castro, in an
address to a group of militiamen who were
graduating from. a training course, said
that when the Eisenhower administration
"threatened to attack Cuba, the Chinese
People's Republic sent Cuba hundreds of
machine guns for which the people of
Cuba did not have to pay a single centavo,
as a gift from the workers and farmers of
the CPR," This constitutes the only
25X1D occasion upon which a regime leader men-
d d
cone
irect Cnicom mall assistance
to Cuba.
G4~.614 UA --UV, bl.1 ti c:vntaanea ttie
announcement that 38 Cuban students were
going to the Soviet Union for nine months
of "aeronautical studies," and that they
d~
would specialize in cvh
an
hel
ese probably are the Cubans referred to
6 March 1961
13 March 1961
which they had been trained.
in an early May report from a Cuban defector
in West Berlin, who said that "30 Cubans"
arrived in Prague on l March and left the
next day for the USSR, where they were to
undergo "eight months of pilot training"
25X1D for an unspecified type of military air-
craft. The report added that the Cubans
would return to Cuba with the planes for
25X1 C
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14 March 1961 Fidel Castro referring to alleged US plans to
support an anti-Castro Cuban government-in-
exile, said- "Very well' Let the Yankees
name the government-in-exile when they want
to; we will name many governments-in.exile,
and to begin with, the government-in-exile
of Free Puerto Rico," 25X1 D
Mid-March 1961 A Salvadoran newspaper featured several two-
page spreads which reproduced documents
purportedly taken from secret Cuban embassy
files directly implicating embassy officials25X1D
and the Cuban foreign office in intervention
in Salvadoran internal affairs.
25X1 D
18 March 1961
25X1 D
22 March 1961
25X1 C
25X1 D
28 March 1961 The Panamanian government declared the Cuban
consul in Colon persona non grata, chargh.g
him with associating with subversive elements.
The Cuban representative had arrived in Pamiama
on 13 December but had never been issued an
exequatur by the Panamanian government, He
25X1D had replaced a consul expelled on s? ? r
charges on 3 December,
30 March 1961 The American embassy in Prague reported that
during a recent recruiting drive for specia-
lists to go to Cuba, a Czechoslovak official
noted that a special team of Czech experts
had already been sent to train Cubans in modern
police methods. The official, who was from
the Ministry of the Interior, stated that
Czechoslovakia was actively recruiting medical
specialists, party workers, propagandists, and
production engineers to go to Cuba for two-or-
three-year tours,
3
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4 April 1961
10 April 1961
On 19 May the embassy reported receiving
information from a Czech official that the
Interior Ministry had sent training teams to
Havana for all fields of police work,, with
particular emphasis on political police acti-
vity. Czechoslovakia was about to send a
Border Police team to Havana with its own dogs
in order to train Cuban do handlers, the
source reported
A Paris radio report said that 55 of the Cubans
sent to Czechoslovakia for a three-year train-
ing program had interrupted their stay and
returned to Havana "in view of the critical
situation in Cuba". The report did not speci-
fy the type of trainin the Cubans were re-
25X1Dceiving.
25X1 D
17 April 1961
25X1 D
18 April 1961 A Soviet government statement said that continu-
ation of the invasion of Cuba "may have the
gravest consequences for world peace," The
statement also declared that the USSR "re-
serves the right to take all measures, with all
states, to render the necessary assistance to
the Republic of Cuba if the armed interference
in the affairs of the Cuban peoples is not
stopped," it also expressed the hope that the
US government would understand that the inva-
sion of Cuba could "endanger the peaceful life
of the population of the United States itself."
25X1 D
22 April 1961 In his second letter to President Kennedy on
the subject of Cuba, Soviet Premier Khrushchev
sought to establish the impression that the
strong position taken by the USSR was a key fac-
tor in turning back the rebel effort to over-
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letter and the Soviet government statement of
18 April, Khrushchev carefully avoided commit-
ting the USSR to any specific measures in sup-
port of Castro. His reference to the US pre-
sence at Guantanamo "against the clearly ex-
pressed wish of the Cuban people and govern-
ent"apparently was intended to serve notice
that the USSR would strongly support a Cuban
demand that the US relinquish its Naval Base
25X1 D there. On the other hand, Khrushchev said.,
."We do not have any bases in Cuba and we do
not intend to establish any."
24 April 1961 The Honduran government of President Villeda
Morales became the eight Latin American govern-
Cuba. The action came as the result of ay mass
anti-Castro demonstration on 21 April which
evidently convinced the president that the ma-
25X1D jority of Hondurans desired to break with Cuba
until it submitted "to the norms and disci
of the inter-American system.,,
7 May 1961 In an address to 1,000 prospective members of
a new corps of "revolutionary instructors" for
the armed forces, Fidel Castro said that "poli-
tical and revolutionary awareness" was the
"most important thing" within the Cuban m1li.-
tary organization. He referred to Havana as
the primary target of a possible Invasion by
"US troops," and he declared that combat units
had to be prepared and fortifications made "im-
pregnable" so that the Cuban capital could be
25X1 D defended "in the same manner in which Soviet
soldiers defended Leningrad S d"
in World War II.
8 May 1961 The Cuban government initiated a program to
process about.3,500 men between the ages of 18
and 24 in order to select about 200 of the best
qualified candidates. for flight training, ac-
cording to a fairly reliable source. The govern-
ment reportedly hoped that 40 or 45 of the 200
would become qualified as pilots, with the re-
mainder then being assigned as members of flight
crews. No training site was mentioned in the
report, but assuming that adequate training
25X1 D facilities and personnel remain unavailable in
Cuba, the trainees presumably would o to the
Bloc for such Instruction, 9 May 1961 The Venezuelan government announced the sus-
pension of the activities of the Caracas
branch of Prensa Latina, the Castro regime's
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25X1D
21 May 1961
25X1 D
international propaganda agency. The
office was shut down because of the dis-
torted pro-Castro and anti-Betancourt
treatment given to political and economic
news items disseminated by Prensa La " na
within veneauela,
The Soviet merchant ship Bolshevik Sukhanov
delivered a cargo to the Cuban port of Marcel
on 21 or 22 May under circumstances suggest-
ing that this was the first major Bloc
22 May 1961 20 Cubans, estimated to be about 18 to 21
years old, were observed departing from a
Prague airport for the USSR. All wore
dark civilian clothes but carried Czech
Army insignia in their lapels, most of
which were identified as artillery insignia.
The Cubans.were almost certainly army per-
sonnel who were to receive military training
in the USSR,. some of whom may have received
preliminary training in Czechoslovakia. At
least 150 Cubans had previously been reported
25X1D to be receiving military training in
Czechoslovakia, as well as an undetermined
number in the USSR.
31 May 1961
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1 June 1961
15 June 1961.
25X1 D
Cuban Air Force sources reported that Soviet
jet bombers--presumably II-28's would be re=-
ceived in Cuba during June. A Cubana Airlines
pilot who defected at about the same time also
reported that Soviet-made "light bombers"
25X1D would arrive in June. The bombers, according
to this source, would be '"very similar to those
sold to Egypt by the USSR."
The Soviet merchant ship Partizan Bonivur a?-
rived at a Cuban port on or about this date,
carrying what is believed to have been a mili-
tary cargo. With the exception of a single po-
sition report on 18 May--when the ship was lo-
cated in the Mediterranean--the vessel had main-
tained communications silence since 23 April,
25X1D when it arrived at Odessa after a voyage from
Singapore. The lack of information about
its subsequent voyage, plus the absence of
periodic position reports, indicate the probable
milita cargo it delivered to
Cuba. wiffift
The transfer of the Cuban 0-2 secret Police
organization and other police and intelligence
organs to a new Ministry of the interior was
announced. Ramiro Valdes, chief of 0-2---
henceforth to be called the Department of State
Security--was named as head of the new ministry.
The Ministry of the Interior appears to have
25X1 D been modelled after the organizations respon-
sible for internal security In Bloc countries,
and its creation may presage a further increase
in the efficiency of the Castro regime?s
security apparatus.
25X1 D
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at San Antonio de los Banos airbase. On
30 June three of these'aircraft were positively
identified as MIG-15's. Also in mid-June a
16 June 1961
17 June 1961
21 June 1961
25X1 C
25X1 D
25X1 D
A Sind/Soviet Bloc diplomat in Czechoslovakia
reported that 100 Cubans were due to arrive
25X1 D in Czechoslovakia between 18 and 24 June for
pilot training
25X1 D
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22 June.1961
25X1 D
25 June 1961
27 June 1961 The Soviet merchant vessel Deputat Lutskiy took
on a cargo in the port of Leningrad which in-
cluded 24 cases containing AN-2 ("COLT") air-
craft, and 17 cases described only as contain-
ing aircraft. The shipment presumably was to
be delivered to Cuba on or about 15 July,
25X1D since the vessel was scheduled to load a sugar
cargo there during the 15-25 July period.
28 June 1961 The Cuban press warmly praised a number of
Czech pilots who had taken part in "exciting
25X1D aerobatic demonstrations" in Trener-Master
Z-326 aircraft 9t P nnhn RAt7eros airfield
28 June 1961
25X1 C
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25X1 C
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30 June 196.
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2 July 1961
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 SECRET SABRE
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MAJOR BLOC ARMS 8RIPME1 `S TO _: UBA
eptem er - June 1961)
These shipments comprised the bulk of Bloc arms deliveries to
Cuba and are .believed to have consisted largely of military hardware:
tanks, artillery, aircraft, ammunition, and small arms. Much of the
related. equipment, particularly motor vehicles, was delivered on other
ships. Satellite and nonbloc ships have delivered small quantities
of ammunition, small arms, and explosives to Cuba from Eastern Europe
and Communist China.
ETA Ship
1960
8 September
1 October
7 October
18 October
19 December
20 December
29 December
1961
6 January
12 January
18 January
23 January
17 February
18 March
10 April
23 May
Ilya Mechnikov
Sergei Kirov
Nikolai Burdenko
Atkarsk
Tsimlyanskges
Kislovodsk
Almetevsk
Berdyansk
Ivan Sechenov
Ilya Mechnikov
Volkhovges
Metallurg Baikov
Ivan Pavlov
Nikolai Burdenko
Bolshevik Sukhanov
Military Cargo
(approximate onnages)
4000 tons
3000 tons
3200 tons
2500 tons
3200 tons
4400 tons
4300 tons
3200 tons
2300 tons
1800 tons
2500 tons
1000 tons
2100 tons
unknown*
unknown
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ETA Ship Military Cargo
(approx ma a tonnates)
2 June
9 June
16 June
25X1
Partizan Bonivur
Labinsk
Leninsky Komsomol
Since that time precise tonnages usually are not avail-
able.
This delivery cannot be established with certainly.
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
11 July 1961
FOREIGN NATIONALS
SC No. 07595-61-D
Copy No.
Supplement to
THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA
A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE 20 JANUARY 1961
A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc
Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board
Approved by the United
States Intelligence Board
11 July 1961
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
/ its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
/ an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
O to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and
authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE infor-
mation; its security must be maintained in accordance with COM-
/ MUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
2
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advan-
tages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
11 July 1961
FOREIGN NATIONALS
OCI No. 2866-61-C
CONTINUED CONTROL
Copy No.
THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA
A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc
Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18,USC,SECTIONS 793 AND 794,THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Approved by the United
States Intelligence Board
11 July 1961
RETURN TO ARCHIVES Ft RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
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MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA
Table of Contents
PART I
Conclusions (SECRET)
PART II
Discussion (SECRET)
PART III
Chronology of Significant Events Since
20 January 1961 (SECRET NOFORN)
Annexes
Annex 1
Arms and Equipment of Cuban Army (SECRET)
Annex 2
Cuban Air Force Equipment (SECRET)
Annex 3
A General Map of Cuba Which Also Shows
Airfields 6,000 Feet or Longer
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 4
A List of Dates When Selected
Countries Recognized the Castro
Regime (UNCLASSIFIED)
Annex 5
A List of Dates When Countries
Broke or Suspended Relations
With Cuba (UNCLASSIFIED)
THE PROBLEM
To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military
collaboration with the Castro regime, and to examine in detail
the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power.
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I
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Soviet Bloc continues to extend considerable military
assistance to Cuba in the form of military equipment, training,
and technicians and advisers. Thus far, aircraft consisting of
MIG-type jets, some helicopters, light transports, piston
trainers, and a wide assortment of armaments ranging from small
arms through medium artillery and heavy tanks have been positively
identified. There are tenuous indications that Cuba may receive
some Soviet jet light bombers. An estimate of the total quantities
and types of equipment received thus far is shown in Annex es,l. and
2. Some military equipment--such as a few Soviet T-54 medium
tanks--which probably has been received in Cuba but that has not
been positively identified or enumerated is not included in Annex
1. There is no evidence that any nuclear weaoons or guided missiles
are now in Cuba. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is con-
tinuing and some probably have already returned for duty in Cuba.
Soviet Bloc military technicians and probably instructor pilots
are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been
identified as being in Cuba,
2. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country
has dispatched or is organizing a "volunteer" force for military
service in Cuba.
3. The Sino.-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way toward identify-
ing itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. The via-
bility of Cuba's economy has become dependent on continued Bloc
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assistance, The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with
all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and dis-
ruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has
given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the ex-
pense of other trading partners.
4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regime is
part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to
weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world.
The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations
for furthering their aims throughout Latin America. The Castro
regime has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc to-
ward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent,
among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world.
In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Govern-
ment can be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on
the Bloc is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist
control, provides a better base of operations for subversion and
propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever
had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of
Castro's serves their purposes well; it gives a native color to
Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide
reaction against outside Communist intervention.
5. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to
Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western
sources, have contributed substantially to a major buildup of
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ground and air forces there. As a result, the Cuban ground forces
are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin
American country. The Cuban military buildup is reflected in the
great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia
forces. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolu-
tionary Army of approximately 32,000, the Revolutionary National
Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at more than 200,000.
The combat effectiveness of the combat elements of the army and
the militia has greatly improved since November 1960 and together
they must now be considered as constituting one of the most
effective ground forces in Latin America. Present capabilities
of the Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selected portions
of the coast. The combat capability of the Cuban Air Force
is still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground
forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However,
with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloc-
trained personnel, the capability of the air force will be great-
ly enhanced over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft
of the civil airline, the Cuban Air Force has a fair troop and
cargo transport capability.
6. Initially, the purpose of Cuba's military buildup was
self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas were active in several
areas inside Cuba and exile groups had posed a constant invasion
threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all
the instruments of police state control suggest that the related
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motive of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not present-
ly the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which
is imposing a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country
at a faster pace than almost any other government in history, evi-
dently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only
through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state.
This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party
and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement.
7. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in
strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and
urban lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-
equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a
larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training.
Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried
out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with
a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a
whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military
discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it
contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Com-
munist influence in the militia is extensive. The militia has
proven an effective fighting force in the anti-guerrilla campaigns
in the Escambray mountains early this year and against the anti-
Castro force that landed on 17 April. The effectiveness of the
militia reflected an improved state of training, acceptable leader-
ship, and generally good morale as well as the regime's ability to
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mass large numbers of men in critical areas,
8, The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution
is the vanguard of "the anti-imperialist rebellion" that will in-
evitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging
and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolu-
tionary groups in other Latin American countries at every oppor-
tunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by
the Castro-subsidized international news agency that has close
working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and reflects
the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping. Cuban, diplomatic
missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and
labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance.
The arms buildup in Cuba permits the Cubans to supply weapons
to pro-Castro groups in other countries, Receipt of Bloc military
equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now
in their possession for this purpose.
9. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-sub-
sidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed
there to further political indoctrination and, according to fre-
quent reports, given military training. During the Havana meeting
in May and June 196.1 of the executive committee of the Communist-
front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba
plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American students for
study in Cuba.
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II
DISCUSSION
1. Following the seizure of power by the Castro regime in
January 1959, intermittent Cuban military contacts were made with
Sino-Soviet Bloc countries--notably Czechoslovakia--but these ap-
parently did not result in firm military aid commitments until
the early summer of 1960. As Cuba's efforts to purchase military
goods in the Free World became increasingly difficult throughout
1959 and early 1960, Cuban arms purchasing missions traveled to
the Bloc to investigate new sources of supply. Discussions re-
portedly covered a whole range of equipment from small arms to
modern jet aircraft.
2. These preliminary contacts may have crystallized during
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960, when
Moscow abandoned its policy of aloofness toward the Cuban revolution
and publicly announced its support of the Castro regime. Mikoyan's
visit signaled the beginning of a series of trade and,/or aid agree-
ments between Cuba and all countries of the Gino-Soviet Bloc. As po-
litical and economic contacts were established, it became apparent
that the Bloc intended to back up its propaganda support for Cuba
with a major campaign of material assistance,
3. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of
US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited during the spring of 1960
by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled
visit to the USSR. With the collapse of the summit in May and the
cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed
and the Bloc launched A .more intensive drive to expand.its influence
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over the Castro regime. In the post-summit period this campaign has
included public attacks on.the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and
assurances of Soviet support in the event of economic or military
measures that the US might undertake against Cuba. These assurances--
including the ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles--
have been phrased broadly enough to cover the supply of military equip-
ment and technical assistance without committing the USSR to specific
military action in support of Cuba.
4. Soon after the summit collapse in May 1960, Cuban military
negotiations were undertaken with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
Czech-Cuban talks in Havana during May and June were, immediately fol-
lowed up by a trip to Prague and Moscow by Cuban Minister of Armed
Forces Raul Castro. Presumably agreements were concluded during these
negotiations to provide for future deliveries of Bloc arms.
5. During the summer of 1960, probably in early July, at least
one partial cargo of Czech small arms and ammunition was delivered to
Cuba,along with five Mi-4 HOUND helicopters. Shortly thereafter,
about 60 Cuban military personnel were sent to Czechoslovakia to re-
ceive military training, including flight and artillery instruction.
By the .end of August nearly 150 Cubans were receiving military train-
ing in Czechoslovakia.
6. Further military talks during July and August probably were
held concerning detailed arrangements for the delivery of Soviet Bloc
arms, accompanied by military technicians to provide the necessary
training. Not until September 1960, however, did major shipments get
under way. Since 8 September 1960, there have been at least 16 ship-
ments of military material to Cuba.
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7. Because of the stringent security precautions surrounding
the off-loading of military cargoes in Cuba, information on the exact
total quantities of Bloc material is fragmentary. Shipments have
consisted of MIG-type aircraft, helicopters, piston trainers, light
transports, and a complete range of land armaments, including tanks,
field and antiaircraft artillery, military vehicles, and large
quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition, radar
and communications equipment have been delivered. Total estimated
value of these shipments is between $60,000,000 and $100,000,000.
Considering the type of equipment and estimated Bloc deliveries,
the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those
of any other Latin American country. They will probably experience
some initial difficulty in providing adequately trained maintenance
personnel for this equipment. Over the long run some spare parts
problems may arise. These estimated Bloc deliveries provide the
Castro regime with suitable armaments for defensive purposes
against external invasion by non-nuclear forces, as well as being
very useful for Cuban internal security needs.
8. MIG-15 jet fighters and trainers are being assembled and
checked out at San Antonio de los Banos Air Base. Unconfirmed
reports state that MIG-19s have also been assembled at this base
and are now being flown. More than 20 MIG-type aircraft, chiefly
MIG-15's, apparently were delivered to Cuba near the end of May.
In addition, on 15/16 June the Soviet ship Lenineky Komsomol
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delivered 23 crates to Cuba which probably contained aircraft.
The dimensions of these crates indicate that at least some of
them could have contained FARMER MIG-19 supersonic jet fighters.
There are indications that Cuba may receive some IL-28 jet light
bombers. from the USSR, but these reports cannot be confirmed at
present.
9. Bloc.-military deliveries to'Cuba thus far have significantly...
assisted the Castro regime in its attempts to develop a greater mili-
tary capability. The Cuban ground forces now have for the first
time an antiaircraft defense capability. and a greatly improved
artillery and armor capability. In addition, the considerable
quantities of modern ,Bloc small arms and ammunition have enabled
the regime to establish and maintain an expanding civilian
militia. There is no .evidsnoe that any nuclear Weapons or guided ..
missiles. are now in Cuba.
J.Q. Sevsral small wroups of Cuban military trainees. reportedly
were, sent to the Bloc prior to the summer of 1960, but no information
is available to confirm these' reports, In July and Augusts how--
ever, . two large groupFa of Cubans.wers ; sent to Czechoslovakia and
their mission probably involved military. instruction, including
artillery methods and training as. pilots and ground crews. Al-
together, between 150 and 200 Cubans have probably been receiving
military training in Czechoslovakia,
nd a small number in the USSR.
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At least some of these have probably returned. It appears likely
that cadets sent for pilot training in the Bloc had little previous
military experience. If so, some of these student pilots may have
received only preliminary flight instruction in Czechoslovakia
and they may receive jet transition training on Bloc aircraft in
Cuba.
11. Precise information is unavailable on the numbers and
activities of Bloc military technicians in Cuba. Based primarily
on Bloc military technical assistance to other non-Bloc countries
and the estimated arms shipments to Cuba thus far, it is believed
that over 300 Czech and Soviet technicians currently are working
in military capacities for the Cuban government. Other reports
have indicated that this number may be somewhat larger, but we
believe that most of these have tended to be exaggerated. No
Chinese Communist military personnel are believed to be in Cuba,
although the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.
12. Soon after the arrival of the first large Bloc arms
shipment in September 1960, Czech and Soviet technicians reportedly
were assisting the Cuban military in assembling equipment and in-
stalling such weapons as antiaircraft batteries. They are employed
also as instructors in military courses and as advisors to i
dividual military units and as maintenance personnel.
13. There is no evidence that Soviet Bloc or other nationals
re being trained in the Bloc for military duty in Cuba. There is
no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc cou
try has dispatched or is
organizing "volunteer" forces for military service in Cub
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14. The ground forces under Batista consisted of a 21,000-man
Army and a National Police Force of 7,600 who were relatively well-
trained and well-disciplined by Latin American standards. Following
Castro's victory, virtually all elements of Batista's ground forces
were gradually removed. About one-fifth of the present Revolutionary
Army of some 32,000 men were active in guerrilla operations against
Batista, and the remainder is composed of personnel who joined the
Revolutionary movement when its success had been assured. A similar
situation is believed to exist in the 9,000-.man Revolutionary National
Police organization, which in May 1961 was placed under the newly-
created Ministry of the Interior. Much of the Army effort since 1
January 1959 has been devoted to non-military activities; personnel
assigned to public works projects account for much of the troop
strength increase over Batista's army.
15. The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces have been in-
creasing steadily since the fall of 1960. Soviet Bloc arms deliveries
have provided Cuban ground forces with an armor, artillery, antiair-
craft and antitank potential hitherto largely lacking and unknown in
other countries of the Caribbean area. Intensive training of Army
and Militia units with new Bloc equipment, under the supervision of
Bloc advisors, has been conducted since the Fall of 1960. A modest
school system including armor, field and antiaircraft artillery,
infantry, guerrilla, medical and signal training has been instituted.
In May 1961, Castro instituted a course to train a new corps of
revolutionary instructors who will be assigned to troop units to
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.raise the morale and increase the "revolutionary awareness" of all
military. elements. Field and antiaircraft artillery and tank
firing exercises are conducted on a regular basis; unit firing
exercises have been conducted. It is estimated that the combat
elements of. the Army and Militia have completed basic and small
unit training and are capable of handling and firing all weapons
with which they are equipped. Level of training of infantry units
appears to vary widely. Armor units have probably achieved the
capability of platoon employment. Recent operations against in-
vading forces indicated that at least some combined arms training
has been conducted. While tactical communications continue to be
inadequate for modern combat, the delivery of large amounts of
Bloc military transport vehicles has greatly increased the mobility
of the Cuban ground forces as evidenced by the rapid deployment of
combat elements to the invasion area in April.
16. The civilian Revolutionary Militia represents the major
increase in the size and capability of Castro's ground forces over
those available to Batista. It is estimated to have more than
200,000 members. First appearing as early as November 1959,
loosely-organized units of students, workers, and farmers were
officially established in early January 1960. Training varied
widely from unit to unit and reflected the initiative and energy
of individual commanders. In general, however, militia training
has been more uniform and extensive than that conducted by the
Army. While a sizeable proportion of the militia are volunteers,
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there have been large numbers of young men and women pressured into
service'.in;the militia, and there are reports of a conscript pro-
gram having been initiated.
17-During 1960, militia units gradually assumed many duties
which formerly were exclusively performed by the Army and National
Police. They effectively performed crowd control duties, such as
at the time of the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion, and they
have acted as security forces in port areas while Soviet Bloc arms
shipments have been unloaded. In addition,they have effected the
takeover of intervened businesses and are used in guarding vital
industries and utilities against possible sabotage efforts. The
rapid reaction of the Cuban Militia in concert with the National
Police in establishing control of Cuban cities during the recent
invasion attempt was a clear demonstration of their effectiveness.
Recent reports indicate that the militia's role of controlling
the populace may be supplanted by the Ministry of the Interior,
which includes the Department of State Security, the National
Police, and the Maritime Police, and which controls the Committees
of Vigilance.
18. Beginning in November 1960, a reorganization was initiated
with the design of producing better organized, more closely controlled
battalions, commanded by Militia officers who were graduates of
rugged OCS-type training. Uniforms and modern Soviet Bloc small
arms are being issued all Militia units. Additionally, training
of the Militia units on hehvier Bloc equipment, and organization of
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Militia mortar and artillery units were started in early November.
Personnel in these units function as full-time active duty
militiamen; they are between 18 and 30 years of age and are volunteers
to the maximum possible extent. Their level of training is equal
to that of equivalent Cuban Army units. The combat effectiveness
of the Militia has been partially tested in counter-guerrilla
operations which have been successful in eliminating, at least for
the present, the guerrilla threat to the Castro regime. In the
Cochinos Bay operations, even though the Militia battalions initially
employed were not the elite of the Militia forces, they were success-
ful in containing the invaders until selected combat units arrived.
While neither of the two cited operations was against a modern
combat force it nonetheless must be concluded that by Latin American
standards the Cuban ground force combat elements are effective and
further that they could be defeated only by a modern substantial
combined-arms force.
19. The Cuban Navy with a personnel strength of about 4,000,
is composed of 5 PF (3 TACOMA class, 2 "184-foot PCE" class), 2 AG,
2 ATR, 9 YAG and 29 YP. Of these ships, at least 1 PI' is non-
operational due to the shortage of spare parts, the 2 ATR are 1
up, and only some 20 YP are operational. On the other hand, an
unknown number of private pleasure craft has been taken over by the
navy and armed with light machine guns for use as patrol craft.
The PGM BAIRE, sunk at Nueva Gerona on 17 April by rebel aircraft,
is being raised but it is expected that it will be many months
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before the ship is reconditioned. During the past two years the
Cuban Navy has unsuccessfully attempted to acquire patrol craft in
Western Europe. Recently there have been rumors that Cuba might
receive naval ships, including destroyers, from the Soviet Bloc.
As far as is known, no Cuban naval personnel have been sent to
the Bloc for training but the fact that the Chief of the Navy,
Lt. Julio Calderon, recently visited the USSR and Eastern Europe
supports the possibility that some naval craft might be transferred
in the future. There have been a few reports of the Navy receiving
Bloc equipment, mainly radar and sonar, but these have not been
confirmed. The only Bloc equipment known to be in use in the Navy
are anti-aircraft guns installed on at least one TACOMA class PF
and possibly on others.
20. Present capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited to the
patrol of selected portions of the coast. The larger ships (5 PF9
1 AG) maintain a patrol of both coasts of Havana and Pinar del Rio
provinces and the Isle of Pines. The remainder of the coast is
patroled by YP and other small craft. Combat effectiveness of the
Navy is negligible. Crews consist of naval, Maritime Police and
militia personnel, the latter manning anti-aircraft guns.
21. The combat capability of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force
(CRAF) is still low, but it can provide limited support to the
ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However,
with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloc-trained
personnel, the capability of the air force will be greatly enhanced
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over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil
airline, the Cuban air force has a fair troop and cargo transport
capability.
22. The total personnel strength of the Cuban Revolutionary
Air Force remains unknown. It is currently estimated that there
are about 25 experienced pilots in the air force and that
approximately 100 air force personnel are or have been undergoing
training in Soviet Bloc countries--primarily Czechoslovakia.
Possibly as many as half of these have been receiving pilot train-
ing, and probably some are now jet qualified. Some training is
probably being conducted in Cuba, but the types of training, in-
structors, and numbers participating are unidentified.
23. The total inventory of CRAF aircraft has increased since
1 January 1959, but there had been little change in the totals of
combat-type aircraft until the recent arrival of an estimated 30-
40 MIGs. The increase is reflected mainly in the MIGs, helicopters,
piston trainer, and transport aircraft, with the latter probably
representing expropriations of aircraft from private owners.
There is no information concerning the serviceability rate of
CRAF aircraft at the present time. (See Annex 2 for a breakdown
by type of Cuban military aircraft in 1958 and at the present
time.)
24. In Cuba there are 10 airfields, excluding the USN air-
field on the Guantanamo Naval Base, with hard-surface runways
6,000' or more. All of these fields have runways that are capable
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of supporting jet fighter operations. Parking and fuel facilities
are generally limited at most of the airfields. This air facility
system is more than adequate for the CRAF and would support a
major increase therein. (See map, Annex 3)
25. Since early 1960, the Castro regime has made a serious
effort to augment Cuban air facilities capabilities. Several new
airfields have been built and many of the already existing
facilities have been significantly improved. This construction is
summarized as follows:
a. Managua--At Managua (22-58N/082-16W), 13.3 nautical
miles SE of Havana, a new runway is under construction. Present
dimensions are approximately 4,800' x 150', and the surface-is
gravel.
b. Siguanea--Siguanea airfield (21-37N/082-55W), on the
Isle of Pines, has one runway which has recently been extended to
6,000'; its width is 1504. The surface is crushed marble over
marble base. Construction appe
rs to be temporarily suspended.
c. Cayo Largo--A natural-surface landing strip 3,090'
x 135' has recently been prepared at approximately 21-37N/081-33W,
d. Santa Clara International--a new airfield is under
construction at 22-29N/079-56W, about 8 nautical miles NNE of the
old Santa Clara airfield. Present dimensions of grading work are
estimated to be between 9300' and 9600' x 280'. Construction is
progressing slowly. The runway is not completed but a portion
is usuable for light aircraft.
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e. Playa Baracoa--The runway at Baracoa airfield,
23-02N/082-34W, formerly referred to as Domingo Rosillo, has been
extended to 5,450'.
f. Cienaga de Zapata--The landing strip at Sopliliar
Airfield at 22-17N/081-08W had been extended from 5,500' to
6,7001. Its surface has been reported as probably hard packed
.sand and gravel. Considerable clearing and excavation at the SW
end of the strip has been reported which could indicate pre-
liminary preparation for additional construction and enlargement.
A new airstrip is under construction near Jaguey Grande at
22-29N/081-.08W. Dimensions are. approximately 4,000' x 150',
And the surface appears to be packed sand or gravel, which is
ready for either macadam or concrete surfacing. A new airstrip
is under construction in the Playa Giron at 22-04N/081-02W, and Cayo
Ramona area at 22-09N/081-02W. Approximate dimensions are 4,100'
x 90'; surface is probably rolled and crushed rock. About 3
miles west of San Blas at 22-07N/08l-OOW, an unidentified in-
stallation is under construction which may be a possible HF/DF
site. The site consists of a circular depressed cleared area
approximately 3901 in diameter, which has four equally spaced
lines of approximately 1001 in length each. There are grading
and clearing activities in the general area. This area suggests
early stages of HF/DF construction.
g. Antonio Maceo airfield at 19-58.N/75--52W--Concrete
extensions have been completed at both ends of each runway. The
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length of the main runway is approximately 7,430', and the
secondary runway is approximately 4,485' long.
h. Jaime Gonzalez airfield at 22-1ON/080-24W--Concrete
extension is underway at both runways. The main runway is being
extended to approximately 4,400' and the secondary runway is
being extended to approximately 3,300'.
i. Jose Marti International--The runway is being extended
to 10,600 feet and grading is under way. The southwestern two-
thirds of the runway is being blacktopped. This extension is
probably intended for increased commercial operations and possibly
to include some military operations.
26. The principal objectives of the current military buildup
are self-defense, internal security, and to a lesser extent the
export of arms and trained men to other Latin American countries
for revolutionary and subversive purposes. Given the Cuban
emphasis on guerrilla warfare, a civilian militia, and subversion,
the arms the Cubans have been receiving--especially the large
quantities of small arms and automatic weapons--lend themselves
to use in connection with all of these objectives. The weapons
employed for defense against attack from abroad can be used
with equal facility against internal subversion and anti-Castro
rebel forces, to arm the militia, or to supply revolutionary
groups located in or moving into other Latin American countries.
27. Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military posture have
resulted, at least initially, from a genuine fear of foreign-based
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invasion. Various Cuban statements indicate that Castro views
another invasion of the island by anti-government Cubans,-supported
indirectly or covertly by the United States, as a probability.
28. In addition to reflecting a genuine fear of invasion,
the heated and continuing Cuban charges of a US-supported invasion
and their propaganda exploitation of the abortive 17 April landings
have been part of a major propaganda effort to villify the United
States. This effort is designed to enlist world sympathy for
the cause of the Cuban David against the US Goliath, and to draw
the attention of the Cuban people away from the economic
difficulties which they now face and to prepare them for further
sacrifices.
29. A well-equtpped military force (with special emphasis
on an elite, politically reliable hard core within the revolutionary
militia) serves two principal functions in maintaining order
within Cuba.. First, i enables the regime to deal effectively
with any anti-Castro rebels which might develop in Cuba. Second,
it provides Castro with a means of extending government control
over Cuban society--a policy which is presently considered at
least of equal importance to the objective of self-defense.
30. The current buildup in arms may now be directed
primarily toward extending the Castro government's control over
Cuban society and institutions. The major tool of control is
the Revolutionary Militia, which serves several purposes. It
provides the government with a substantial armed force through
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which the Cuban populace as a whole can be controlled, and it
promotes loyalty to Castro by subjecting a relatively large
number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrina-
tion under the leadership of people dedicated to the revolutionary
government. Finally, the militia offers the government an
organized work force for use in,-economic development and military
construction projects, and to reduce the high unemployment which
is plaguing the Castro regime.
31. Since Fidel Castro's assumption of power, Cuba has been
involved in several attempts to overthrow other Caribbean govern-
ments. During 1959, the Castro regime sponsored or gave indirect
support to invasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua and Haiti. The military buildup provides Cuba with an
increased ability to furnish military aid to Communist and pro-
Communist revolutionary groups in these or other Latin American
countries in the future. Soviet Bloc military equipment now in
Cuba permits the use of older, Western-made equipment which would
be difficult to trace, for these purposes.
32. Cuba has with heavy assistance from Communist funds
put.to work on its behalf a propaganda and subversive campaign
of unprecedented proportions in Latin America. Cuban leaders
and propaganda media repeatedly refer to the Cuban revolution
as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist revolution that will
"inevitably sweep" the rest of Latin America. Private statements
of Fidel Castro reveal his conviction that the United States is
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"finished" as a great power and that Cuba must therefore side
with the "socialist countries which will win the current
ideological struggle." During its present confused state,"
the United States must be kept on the defensive, Castro told an
old friend last September. The Castro regime has become an
effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in its drive to
weaken and eventually destroy US influence in Latin America as
well as in other underdeveloped and emerging nations.
33. The Castro government has made no secret of its
antipathy toward most of the governments of the other Latin
American republics, charging that these governments do not
represent the will of the people. It is clear that Cuba is
determined to export is revolution to the rest of the. hemisphere.
34. The Cuban government is engaged in organizing, financing,
and training of revolutionary movements. One facet of Cuban
assistance in the training of potential, revolutionaries against
other Latin American governments is the Castro regime's subsidiza-
tion of travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans for purposes
of ideological and military indoctrination. Numerous delegates
to the Latin American Youth Congress in Cuba last summer, for
instance, remained to participate in the international Communist--
financed "International Work Brigade." The week-long congress
of the youth section of the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist)
Party last April also brought delegates from a number of Latin
American countries, as did the ceremonies in March marking
the "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American
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Peoples." The latter event, sponsored by the Communist-controlled
labor arm of the Castro regime, ended with a manifesto calling
for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolu-
tion in all of Latin America." This manifesto did not include
any call for an open Communist revolution. During the Havana
meeting in May and June 1961 of the executive committee of the
Communist front International Union of Students, it was announced
that Cuba plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American
students for study in Cuba. It has frequently been reported that
Latin Americans from various countries have received military
training as well as political indoctrination in Cuba after
participating in these events. Also frequently reported are
instances where representatives of various Latin American Communist
and pro-Communist organizations who are sent to Sino-Soviet Bloc
countries for training spend a period of time in Cuba on the
outward or the homeward leg of their journeys.
35. A major effort to overthrow a Latin American government
was the attempt in June 1959 to oust the unpopular Trujillo dicta-
torship in the Dominican Republic. In this case the Cubans under-
estimated the strength of the Dominican regime. The two forces
which landed in the Dominican Republic from Cuba--one by air
and the other by sea--were trained and armed in Cuba and led into
battle by officers of Castro's army. The group that landed on
the Dominican coast was escorted th
re by units of the Cuban
Navy. The invading forces, primarily composed of Dominican
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exiles,. included a heavy sprinkling of Communists.
36. The abortive "invasions" of Panama in April 1959 and
of Haiti in August of the same year were by small groups from
Cuba who evidently did.-not have high-level Cuban official
support but in the Panamanian case, at least, the expedition's
preparations and departure Probably took place with the knowledge
and approval of some Cuban authorities. Of the numerous rebel
raids into Nicaragua, a few were equipped with weapons from Cuba
and led by Nicaraguans who had sought Cuban support for their
adventures. However, none of these efforts is believed to have
been directed or fully supported by Cuba. In fact, Cuban leaders
are known to have had difficulty with the highly factionalized
Nicaraguan exile groups that had sought support in Cuba. The
Cubans had difficulties in.deciding on a "trustworthy" Nicaraguan
group which at the same time had any significant revolutionary
capability. Several Nicaraguan, as well as at least one
Panamanian and one Haitian exile group, have been jailed in
Cuba as they were preparing "invasions," evidently either because
they were considered the "wrong" exiles or because their chances
of success were estimated to be nil.
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Ex-President Arbenz of
Guatemala is in Cuba and inaugurated a regular radio program
beamed at Guatemala on 31 May 1961. Guatemalan Communist
leader Pellecer recently returned to Guatemala from Cuba and
Fortuny, former secretary general of the party, may also have
left Cuba for Guatemala. In the case of Guatemala, as with other
Latin American' countries, the Cubans maintain that a genuine
revolution can be achieved only after the regular armed forces
are destroyed and the "masses" are armed, as in Cuba. In his
frequent speeches in Cuba, Arbenz has repeatedly said that his
greatest mistake was in not arming the people--an omission
which permitted the "militarists," bought with "imperialist
money," eventually to seize power and destroy the revolution.
38. The government of Venezuelan President Betancourt is
another target for Cuban subversive action. Leftist Venezuelan
deputy Fabricio Ojeda, who has spent considerable time in Cuba in
recent months, is reported to have secured official Cuban support
for an armed revolt in Venezuela.
39. Castro agents, of both Cuban and foreign nationality,
are traveling from Cuba to Latin American countries to promote
revolutionary. .activities.. ` their obj?oc-tivos ?teirige: f ?om`?bOurfier
missions to organizing of student, labor, and revolutionary
groups and the carrying out of sabotage missions. Hector Aldama
Acosta, head of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico, is
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charged with the coordination of all revolutionary activities
in Central America. The use of Cuban ambassadors to control
these activities has been proven in a number of Latin American
countries.
40, Intensive Cuban propaganda is furthered by Cuban diplo-
matic missions which in numerous cases, such as in Mexico,
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Panama, have provided Communist-
oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and
financial support. Numerous reports connect the Cuban Embassy in
most Latin American countries with the distribution of anti-US
and pro.-Castro propaganda and financial support to local "Friends
of Cuba" societies and leftist organizations.
41. The Cuban revolutionary line is also spread throughout
Latin America through the facilities of the Castro-subsidized in-
ternational news agency Prensa Latina, which has close working
ties with the news agencies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This propaganda
organization which has offices established in many Latin American
countries disseminates the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping
throughout Latin America. It frequently has distorted news
stories so as to reflect unfavorably on the local government--a
course which has evoked protests from the officials of several
Latin American countries, including Mexico, Venezuela, and
Costa Rica. A powerful new radio station was inaugurated in Cuba
on 1 May to disseminate pro-Castro propaganda throughout the
hemisphere.
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42. The activities of Castro agents throughout the hemisphere
have frequently resulted in countermeasures being taken by security
and diplomatic authorities in many Latin American countries. In
a number of cases, blatant attempts to undermine the sovereign
rights of other Latin American governments have resulted in the
arrest of pro-Castro agents and the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic
personnel.
- 22 -
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III,
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE 20 January 1961
20 January 1961 The American embassy in Moscow reported
that "solidarity meetings" in Soviet
factories, as described by a number of
press reports, featured pledges of
support by Soviet trade union groups
for the Cuban revolution. Accounts of
these meetings usually featured the
"warning" that in the event of a US
attack on Cuba, the Cuban people would
have the support of all peoples, "and
first in line will be the heroic
working class of the Soviet Union."
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
25 January 1961
25X1 D
12 February 1961 In a speech given at the conclusion of
a meeting of technical advisers in Havana,
Fidel Castro savagely attacked the Kennedy
administration and then said: "As of
today Cuba is going to declare that if th
United States has the right to promote
counter-revolution in Cuba and Latin
America, Cuba has the right to encourage
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revolution in Latin America." Che Guevara,
speaking at the same meeting, told the
delegates: "You must recall that we have
already overcome many obstacles and our
responsibility extends beyond the frontiers
of Cuba. Each time we take a step ahead
we are aiding the liberation of all
America from a savage yoke." (UNCLASSIFIED)
22 February 1961 Armed force minister Raul Castro, in an
address to a group of militiamen who
were graduating from a training course,
said that when the Eisenhower administra-
tion "threatened to. attack Cuba, the
Chinese People's Republic sent Cuba
hundreds of machine guns for which the
people. of Cuba did not have to pay a
single centavo, As. a gift from the
workers and farmers of the CPR," This
constitutes the only? occasion upon which
a regime leader mentioned direct Chicom
military assistance to' Cuba.. (OFFICIAL
USE.ONLY)
1 March 1961 A Havana radio broadcast. contained the
announcement that 38 Cuban students.we.e
.going to-the Soviet Union for nine months
of "aeronautical studies," and that they
would specialize in "handling helicopters.."
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY.)
These probably are the Cubans referred to
in an early May report from a Cuban de-
fector in West Berlin, who said that 1130
Cubans" arrived in Prague on 1 March and
left the next day for the USSR, where they
were to undergo "eight months of pilot,
training" for an unspecified type of mill.
t.ary'aircraft. The report added that the
Cubans.would return to Cuba with the planee
for which they had been trained. (SECRET)
6 March 1961
25X1C
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13 March 1961 According to a Cuban national with
contacts in the Cuban Navy, the Soviet
Union was to loan, sell', or give two
"destroyers" to Cuba to be manned by
crews preponderantly made up of Soviet
seamen until Cubans had been trained to
take over. (SECRET)
14 March 1961 Fidel Castro referring to alleged US
plans to support an anti-Castro Cuban
government-in-exile, said: "Very well!
Let the Yankees name the government-in-
exile when they want to; we will name
many governments-in-exile, and to begin
with, the government-in-exile of Free
Puerto Rico." (UNCLASSIFIED)
Mid-March 1961 A Salvadoran newspaper featured several
two-page spreads which reproduced docu-
ments purportedly taken from secret
Cuban embassy files directly implicating
embassy officials and the Cuban foreign
office in intervention in Salvadoran
internal affairs. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
22 March 1961
25X1X
the Castro government had replaced all
Cuban employees of the microwave communi-
cations section of the Ministry of
Communications with Czech technicians,
the majority of whom were military men.
Previous reports had also stated that
Czech technicians were being employed in
the operation of the microwave network
in Cuba. (SECRET)
28 March 1961 The Panamanian government declared-the
Cuban consul in Colon persona non grata,
charging him with associating with sub-
versive elements. The Cuban representa-
tive had arrived in Panama on 13 December
but had never been issued an exequatur by
the Panamanian government. He had re-
placed a consul expelled on similar
charges on 3 December. (CONFIDENTIAL)
30 March 1961 The American embassy in Prague reported
that during a recent recruiting drive for
specialists to go to Cuba, a Czechoslovak
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official noted that a special team of
Czech experts had already been-sent to
train Cubans in modern police methods.
The official, who was from the Ministry
of the Interior., stated that Czechoslo-
vakia was actively recruiting medical
specialists, party workers, propagan-
dists, and production engineers to go
to Cuba for two- or three-year tours.
On 19 May the embassy reported
receiving information from a Czech of-
ficial that the Interior Ministry had
sent training teams to Havana for all
fields of police work, with particular
emphasis on political police activity.
Czechoslovakia was about to send a
Border Police team to Havana with its
own dogs in order to train Cuban dog
handlers, the source reported.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
4 April 1961 A Paris radio report said that 55 of
the Cubans sent to Czechoslovakia for a
three-year training program had inter-
rupted their stay and returned to Havana
"in view of the critical situation in
Cuba." The report did not specify the
type of training the Cubans were receiving.
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
18 April 1961 A Soviet government statement said that
continuation of the invasion of Cuba
"may have the gravest consequences for
world peace." The statement also de-
clared that the USSR "reserves the right
to take all measures, with all states, to
render the necessary assistance to the
Republic of Cuba if the armed interfer-
ence in the affairs of the Cuban peoples
is not stopped." It also expressed the
hope that
the
US government would under-.
stand that
the
invasion of Cuba could
"endanger
the
peaceful life of the popu-
lation of
the
United States itself."
(UNCLASSIFIED)
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22 April.1961 in his second letter to President Kennedy
on the subject of Cuba, Soviet Premier
Khrushchev sought to establish the im-
pression that the strong position taken
by the USSR was a key factor in turning
back the rebel effort to overthrow the
Castro regime. As in his previous letter
and the Soviet government-s'ta~ ment of
18 April, Khrushchev carefully;oided
committing the USSR to any specific
measures in support of Castro. His
reference to the US presence at buantanamo
"against the clearly expressed wish of
the Cuban people and government" appar-
ently was intended to serve notice that the
USSR would strongly support a Cuban demand
that the US relinquish its Naval Base
there. On the other, hand, Khrushchev said,
"We do not have any bases in Cuba and we
do not intend to establish any." (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
24 April 1961 The Honduran government of President
Villeda Morales became the eighth Latin
American government to break off diploma-
tic relations with Cuba. The action came
as the result of a mass anti-Castro demon-
stration on 21 April which evidently con-
vinced the president that the majority of'
Hondurans desired to break with Cuba until
it submitted "to the norms and discipline
of the inter-American system," (CONFIDENTIAL)
7 May 1961 In an address to 1,000 prospective members
of a new corps of "revolutionary instructors"
for the armed forces, Fidel Castro said that
"political and revolutionary awareness" was
the "most important thing" within .the. Cuban
military organization. He referred to
Havana as the primary target of'a possible
invasion by "US troops," and he declared
that combat units had to be prepared and
fortifications made "impregnable" so that
the Cuban capital could be defended "in
the same manner in which Soviet soldiers
defended Leningrad and Stalingrad" in World
War II. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
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8 May 1961
25X1 C
9 May 1961
22 May 1961
The Cuban government initiated a program
to process about 3,500 men between the
ages of 18 and 24 in order to select
about 200 of the best qualified candidates
for flight ?training, 25X1 C
The government
reportedly hope a 40 or 45 of the 200
would become qualified as pilots, with
the remainder then being assigned as
members of flight crews. No training
site was mentioned in the report, but
assuming that adequate training facili-
ties and personnel remain unavailable in
Cuba, the trainees presumably would go
to the Bloc for such instruction. (SECRET
NOFORN)
The Venezuelan government announced the
suspension of the activities of the
Caracas branch of Prensa Latina, the
Castro regime's in eerrnnational propaganda
agency. The office was shut down because
of the distorted pro-Castro and anti-
Betancourt treatment given to political
and economic news items disseminated by
Prensa Latina within Venezuela.
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
20 Cubans, estimated to be about 18 to
21 years old, were observed departing
from a Prague airport for the USSR. All
wore dark civilian clothes but carried
Czech Army insignia in their lapels, most
of which were identified as artillery
insignia. The Cubans were almost certainly
army personnel who were to receive military
training in the USSR, some of whom may
have received preliminary training in
Czechoslovakia. At least 150 Cubans had
previously been reported to be receiving
military training in Czechoslovakia, as
well as an undetermined number in the
USSR. (SECRET)
Cuban Air Force sources reported that
Soviet jet bombers--presumably IL-28's--
would be received in C e.
A Cubana.Airli.ne pilot at 25X1X
about the same time also reported that
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7 June 1961
15 June 1961
25X1 C
25X1 C
Soviet-made "light bombers" would
arrive in Junes The bombers, accord-
ing to this source, would be "very
similar to those sold to Egypt by the
USSR." (CONFIDENTIAL)
The transfer of the Cuban G-2 secret
police organization and other police
and intelligence organs to a new Ministry
of the Interior was announced. Ramiro
Valdes, chief of G?2--henceforth to be
called the Department of State Security--
was named as head of the new ministry,
The Ministry of the Interior appears to
have been modelled after the organizations
responsible for internal security in Bloc
countries, and its creation may presage
a further increase in the efficiency
of the Castro regime's security apparatus,
(CONFIDENTIAL)
? 7
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.21 June 1961
25X1 D
A Sino/Soviet Bloc diplomat in Czechos-
slovakia reported that 100 Cubans were
due to arrive in Czechoslovakia between
18 and 24 June for pilot training.
(SECRET NOFORN)
28 June 1961 25X1C
25X1C at east six of a total of 18
MIG-15's had been assembled at San Antonio
de los Banos airbase under the direction
of 116 Soviet Air Force technicians, and
six MIG-19's had not yet been assembled.
The ex-air force mechanic added that 17
Soviet pilot instructors, three mobile
control towers, and three mobile radar
sets were also present at the base and
that 13 Cuban pilots who had been checked
out in T-33's and Sea Furies by the Soviets
would be trained to fl the MIG aircraft.
25X1 C n the
same day that there were a total of 26
MIGs of all models ready for service at
the base and that 43 Soviet technicians,
plus their assistants were continuing to
assemble more planes. 25X1C
25X1C 200 Soviets were assem-
bling aircraft at Finca Cuellar in
Guayabal, Havana Province, and that there
were 11 camouflaged MIGs parked near
the Granma base. (Mariel)
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28 June 1961
30 June 1961
2 July 1961
25X1 C
The Cuban press warmly praised a number of
Czech pilots who had taken part in "ex-
citing aerobatic demonstrations" in
Trener-Master Z-326 aircraft at Rancho
Boyeros airfield in Havana. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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ANNEX 1
ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF CUBAN ARMY
On:.Hand
l Jan .19 59
Received
from
Free World
Sources since
Bloc Delive-ti1ies
Total
~
1 Ja n 19 59
Identified 1/ Estimated 2/
~~ncar,~ e c es,
a Medium Tanks, 'T34
15
104
(Bloc)
b K Heavy Tanks, JS-2
15
21
(Bloc)
c, Assault Guns, SU-
19
50
100 (Bloc)
da Armored Personnel
150
Carriers, BTR-152
(Bloc)
e, Lt Tk, "3-man
8
Dutch" (US)
f. Lt T k M3A1 (US)
12
g. Med Tk M4A1
7
w/76--mm Gun(U5)
he Med'. Tk Comet
15
W/77-mm Gun (UK)
I. Scout Car, M3AX-,
19
White (US)
J. Armored Car, M8
20
(US)
. Motor Transport
a, Trucks, 1/4-T 700
4x4 (Bloc)
b a Trucks, 2-.T 600
4x4 (Bloc)
c. Trucks, 4 1/2-T 200
6x6 (Bloc)
da Trucks, 3.5-6T 100
6x6 (Bloc)
e, Trucks, 10-T 25
6x6 (Bloc)
fa Sedans (US) 175
Types and quan es reported an verifi
e
2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages,
25X1 C
types and quantities of meterial delivered by the Bloc to other countries,,
the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces,
and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order
of magnitude.
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 Approved For Rehw?e 200 QV-TCIA-RDP79SO0427A000400050001-0
Motor Transport
(Continued)
g? Jeeps (US)
h. Trucks (US)
i. Busses (US)
J. Ambulances (US)
k. Cmd Recon Car
3/4-T (US)
1? Motor Cycles (US)
i. Special Purpose
Vehicles (US)
n. Tractors, AT-S,
TPM (Bloc)
o. Tractors, AT-L,
TPM (Bloc)
p. Miscellaneous
wheeled Transport
(Bloc)
Yield r ery
a c 57-mm Anti Tank
Gun M1943 (Bloc)
b,, 76-mm Field Gun
M 1942 (Bloc)
c. 85-mm Field Gun
ID-44 (Bloc)
d. 122-mm Howitzer
M 1938 (Bloc)
e. 122-m Gun
M-1931/37
f. 25.-mm Hotchkiss 16
AA Gun (Fr)
g. 37-yam Gun M6 (US) 9
h. 57-mm Gun, Salute 6
Gun (UK)
i. 75-mm Pack Howitzer 8
(US)
j. 105?mm Howitzer.
Pack (It)
Received
from
Free World
Sources since
1 Jan 19 59
Identified 1/
Total
Estimated 2/
1/ Types and quantities reported and verified.25X1C
2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages,
types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries,
the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces,
nd reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order
of magnitude.
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 Item
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4?
Mortars
a,
82-mm
(Bloc)
by
120-mm
(Bloc)
c,
160-mm
(Bloc)
d.
60-mm M2 (US)
e,
81-mm
On Hand Received Bloc Deliveries
1 Jan 1959 from
Free World
Sources since Total
1 Jan 1959 Identified 1/ Estimated 2/
17
14 (US)
An a rcra r ery
a, Quad 12,7-mm
AAMG (Bloc)
b. Twin 30-mm AAA
M53 (Bloc)
c. 37 mm AAA Gun
M 1939 (Bloc)
d, 57-mm AAA Gun
(Bloc)
e, 85-mm AAA Gun
M 1939 (Bloc)
Rocket aunt ers
Gun,:
a, Launcher Rocket
RPG-2 (Bloc)
b. Launcher, Grenade
Cal 30 M7A3 (US)
c, Launcher, Grenade
M 8 (US)
d, Launcher, Rocket
3 , 540 M2
50
200
72
18
72 (It)
120
1,000
28 (US)
70 (It)
ec
o ess es
a,
b,
57-mm M 18 (US)
75-mm (US)
e
ac n
uns
a, 7,62 DP (Bloc)
bo ZB-37, 7,92mm
(Bloc)
c, Browning Cal. 30,
103
M1919A6 (US)
d, Browning Cal, 30
110
M 1917 (US)
e. Browning Cal, 50
90
M2 (US)
.f, Colt Cal, 30 (US)
69
g, Lewis, Cal. 30
6
Th
'
e fi~
ure in thi nn7e,n,,
^-
I! 1 I 500
50 200
aaaau veriliea, 25X1C
,.a
.. W+.~~ya~a vi. VUaaaaaeges,
ypes and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries,
he size and.composditForion and organization of the Cuban military forces,
fd magnitanreportsde~pperove d foKefe' ?sae? 2O~BfO eil lwd-'~[iI fgSDb4~ 000 O~k'eO
~
SECRET
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a. Rifles & sub-
machine guns
b. Thompson Cal 45
(US)
c, Steyr-Solothurn
9-mm (Aust)
d, Marck-English
9-mm
e 4 UZI FN 9--mm
k.
Rifle,
Cal4
30
Ml
Rifle9
Cal.
30
Springfield
1903
Rifle,
Cale
30
Mauser
Rifle,
Cal,
30
E
fi
ld
n
e
Rifle,
Sh iper,
Ca1930
M1903A4
Rifle,
Cal
22
Mossberg
1. Rifle, 7.62-mm
FN
(held:.: by Castro
forces)
Rif It, a sorted:
Rifle, Automatic
Browning, Cal.30
Rifle, Automatic
1,098
40
25
$700 (US) 12,000 (It)
[7$,400
1,000
7,800
27
6,000
or more)
(Beig)
6,000
Mossberg, Ca l a 22
Carbine, Cal, 30 3,9100
Ml (us)
17 Types and quan es repo r a and ver
2/ The Rigures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages,
types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries,
the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces,
and reports received from Cuba, The e0timated figures are a rough
order of magnitude,, -4-
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SECRET
Bloc Delivieries
 Approved For Rele a 2000/04/ -RDP79S004- A0004000500017
8 A. Rifles, Carbines
and Submachine Guns
(Continued)
q. Carbine, Cristobal
automatic, Cal. 30
(D.R,)
r. Carbine, Kragg
Cal. 30
Pistols Revolve
rs
a. Pistol, Colt
M1911A1, Colt 45
b. Pistol, Star
Cal. 45 (Sp)
c. Pistol, Remington
Cal. 45
d. Pistols, Assorted
e. Revolver, Colt
Cal. 45 (US)
f. Revolver, SW,
Cal. 45 (US)
g. Revolver, Colt
Cal. 38 (US)
h. Revolver, SW
Cal. 38
Revolver, Assorted
10. isce aneous
1/ Types and quantities reported
Free World
from
Received IL Bloc Deliveries
Sources Since
Total
l~
1 Jan 1959 Identified 1/ Estimated 21
and verified.25X1C
2/ The figures in this column are based on an analysis of tonnages, types
and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries,
the size and composition and organization of the Cuban military forces,
and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are a rough order
of magnitude.
3/ Not included in this listing are those items of military and military-
related equipment which may be assumed to have accompanied the military
shipments which have arrived in Cuba to date. Such equipment includes
ammunition, communications equipment, and engineering equipment.
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Omitted for purposes of this listing are those military
items--such as a few Soviet T-54 medium tanks--which probably have
been received in Cuba but have not been positively identified or
enumerated. In addition, there are suggestions that the Cubans
may have received 105-mm howitzers M18-40 and 240-mm guns M16.
Not positively identified or enumerated, these weapons are both
Czech modifications of World War II German guns.
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ANNEX 2
FIGHTER
F-47
F-51
Sea Fury
MIG-type
Lt Bmr
B-26
A.S.We
Transport
C-82
C-47
VC-53
CUBAN AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT
1958 1/ 1961
Prop
Prop
3
1
10
17
10
1
7
C-46
C-54.
Lockheed-Lodestar
AN-2 (Colt) USSR
Helicopter
H-19
1
HOUND (MI-4) USSR
12
HARE (MI-1) USSR
6**
H-13
9
UH-12
2
Sub Total
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SERET
1958 1961
Trainer & Mis-
cellaneous
PA-18
N-2S
T-33
T-6
T-7
Liaison Type
Cessna 310
PBY- 5A
C-45
L-20
ZLIN-326 Trener-
Master (Czech)
Prop
Jet
Prop
Jet
5
6
8
4
7
6
1
5
2
2
1
1
12
13
8
35
4
55
8
125
14
1/ Some non-Bloc aircraft were contracted for but not delivered until
after the fall of the Batista regime. Other non-Bloc aircraft on hand
in early 1958 were lost during the year. In addition, the Castro regime
acquired other non-Bloc aircraft during 1959 from unknown sources--
some through the expropriation of aircraft from private owners? Naval
aircraft were transferred from the naval air arm to the air force in
July 1960.
To date three MIG-15"s have been positively identified at San
Antonio de los Banos airbase, As many as 10 may actually now be
flyable. Other reports indicate that 30-40 MIG aircraft--possibly
including some MIG-19's--may have arrived.
** Possibly as many as 10 Mi-l's may have been delivered.
-2-
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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ANNEX 4
MAP SHOWING CUBAN AIRFIELDS
6000 FT. OR LONGER
CUBA 1 a.
OI MILES 100
-
BANAL e M? c on A
PINAR Arbmei 7 _ MATANZAS1J Isente
CAMPO LIBERTAD
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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400050001-0
CONFIDENTIAL
 UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Relc a 2000/04/17: CIA-RDP79SO04 A000400050001-0
ANNEX 4
Dates of Diplomatic Recognition of the Castro Regime by Selected
oun r es
United States ------------ January ?, 1959
United Kingdom ----------- January 7,
1959
France ------------------- January 7,
1959
Belgium ------------------ January 7, 1959
Canada ------------------- January 8,
1959
USSR --------------------- January 10,
1959
Czechoslovakia ----------- May 17,
1960*
Poland ------------------- June 15,
1960*
North Korea -------------- August 29, 1960*
Communist China ---------- September 28, 1960*
Bulgaria ----------------- October 8,
1960*
Rumania ------------------ October 26,
1960*
North Vietnam ------------ December 2,
1960*
Mongolia ----------------- December 7,
1960*
Albania ------------------ December 15, 1960*
Hungary ------------------ December 18, 1960*
*The dates given are those on which the respective Bloc countries
announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations with
Cuba<
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400050001-0
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
Rbproved For Relc"e 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79SO04&3A000400050001-0
Countries Which Have Suspended or Broken Diplomatic Relations with
the Castro Regime
Dominican Republic --------- relations broken June 26, 1959
Haiti ----------------------- relations suspended August 29, 1959
Guatemala ------------------ relations broken April 29, 1960
Nicaragua ------------------ relations suspended June 1, 1960
Paraguay ------------------- relations suspended December 5, 1960
Peru ---?---------------- ---- relations broken December 29, 1960
United States --------- ---- relations broken January 3, 1961
El Salvador ---------------- relations broken March 1, 1961
Honduras ---------------------relations suspended April 24, 1961
Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79SO0427A000400050001-0
UNCLASSIFIED