THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN PORTUGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000100060043-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: December 22, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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22 December
In e nation*
Lou
a
zat ions
The Political Uutlook in Po
UI
I. Attached is a short paper on the Portuguese
oiitical situation, responding to the request you
made on /1 December in connection with the impending
expiration of Radio Fres 'Europe's license to operate
In Portugal.
In brief, we feel that the Salazar regime is
likely to remain in control, at least for the next year
r so, and has even been temporarily strengthened at
home by the Goa crisis. The shock of Goa's loss, how-
ever, has produced strong resentment against Portugal's
allies and an atmosphere in which any 08 requests for
concessions will probably encounter vary rough going.
tiUNTINGTUR D. BIDELDUN
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
Dist: Orig and I - Addressee
1 - AD/CI
1 - SIDO
I - CD/West
I - CA/FJ
1- F-I1 rlf
2 - extras
25X1 (.1.1,/e747/-4/,/,/".?
State Dept. review completed
e
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THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN PORTUGAL
The Salazar regime in Portugal, despite the loss
of Goa, seems likely to remain in control at least for
the next year or so and has even been strengthened do-
mestically by the rallying of public support on patriotic
grounds. The emotional shock of the loss has resulted in
what one observer described as a quiet bitterness--di-
rected in part toward Portugal's allies--markedly differ-
ent from earlier resentment over Angola. In such an atmos-
phere, US requests to Lisbon for an extension of past con-
cessions are likely to encounter very rough going, even
though their objectives are consonant with Portugal's
policy and serve that nation's defense interests directly.
Over the past four years, opposition to Salazar has
become more evident, and some regime supporters have sought
to oust the 72-year-old premier on the grounds he has out-
lived his usefulness; but the armed forces and the secret
police (PIM?the regime's main prop?remain basically
loyal. More important, there seems to be no one opponent
who could command the allegiance of the military in effect-
ing a coup or could effectively rally the fragmented dem-
ocratic opposition,
However, new outbreaks in Angola or the initiation
of hostilities in Mozambique or Guinea would sap the re-
gime's strength and prestige. If prolonged hostilities
seem in prospect in Portuguese Africa, pressure for Sala-
zar's resignation might win sufficient support from influ-
ential civilians within the regime to bring about a change,
In such a situation, however, Salazar's replacement would
be unlikely to alter the regime's foreign or domestic pol-
icies substantially.
Goa is in a different category from the African prov-
inces both economically and psychologically. It made little
contribution to the national economy, Moreover, while some
Portuguese feel the regime's policies have been partly to
blame for the present situation in Angola, there appears
to be almost no feeling of guilt over the Portuguese rec-
ord in Goa.
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Indonesian hove to take over Timor would p
consolidate support for Salazar.
Domestic opposition to Salasar--beeides that of the
m 11, clandestine, but tightly organized Communist party..
comesfrom two principal sources. One comprises the vari-
ous democratic groups of Republican, Socialist, Catholic,
and Monarchist sympathies, which desire a constitutional
form of government and a program of political and socio-
economic reform ranging from moderate to radical. These
groups, which have no legal basis for existence and are
repressed by the police, backed General Humberto Delgado
in his unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in 1958,
but have since found no leader of stature.
Another source of opposition is the Revolutionary Di-
rectorate for Iberian Liberation (DRIL), Load* up largely
of exiles based in Latin America and dedicated to a cam-
paign of terrorism and sabotage in both Portugal and Spain.
Through ex-Captain Menrique Galva?, it participated in the
hijacking of the Santa Maria a year ago. Its membership,
however, is said to be wracked by dissension and a former
working relationship between Galva? and Delgado has appar-
ently ceased.
\An
bly further
Portuguese security forces have shown themselves ca-
pable of repressing the democratic opposition and of block-
ing the terroristic plans of the DR/L. Indeed their task
has been made easier by the former's repugnance for the
DRIL's methods for achieving a change of regime. Less cer-
tain 'multi be the PIDE's ability to prevent a determined
move by high-ranking military officers, based on substan-
tial, and fairly wide support from below, to oust Salazar.
Such a move, however, is not likely to be made unless the
armed forces are confronted with a hopeless military situa-
tion in the African provinces. The increasing drain on
manpower and the financial strains imposed by military ex-
penditures and economic losses in these provinces might
then enable these officers to secure sufficient support
from the army for a successful coup. Support of the dem-
ocratic opposition could perhaps be secured by promises
of more political liberty and some liberalization of eco-
nomic policy.
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Lisbon's attitude toward the US has become increas-
ingly bitter in the past year because of the American
position in the UN on the issue of colonialism; Portugal
also regards its NATO partners as unreliable allies on
this issue. Nigh-ranking Portuguese officials have re-
peatedly indicated in the past that the security of Por-
tugal's African holdings has precedence over its NATO
ties.
The onset of the Goa crisis greatly increased the
government's tendency to demand support from its NATO
partners as the price of continuing in the alliance. On
15 December 1901, when Goa had not yet been invaded, For-
eign Minister Franco Nogueira told Secretary Rusk there
could be a fundamental change in Portugal's foreign pol-
icy if the Indian enclave were lost. During the crisis,
Portuguese officials made bitter remarks to US represent-
atives to the effect that Communist powers at least sup-
ported their satellites against attacks; although such
remarks do not indicate any intention of actually revers-
ing alliances, they do reflect the government's emotional
state at the moment and suggest that it will be uncoop-
erative in relations with the United States at least for
the immediate future.
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