KHRUSHCHEV- -A PERSONALITY SKETCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000100020010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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vll--)RIJCDF Document ID 8395,
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OCI No. 2391/61
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24
KHRUSHCHEV--A PERSONALITY SKETCH
One evening in November 1957, Nikita Khrushchev arrived
at a diplomatic reception in Moscow in a particularly buoyant
and garrulous mood. A few months earlier he had overcome the
challenge of the so-called antiparty group and he had just
stripped Marshal Zhukov of his military and political powers.
As Western newsmen clustered around him on that occasion,
Khrushchev related a fable which tells a great deal about the
man and his image of himself:
"Once upon a time," Khrushchev began, "there were three
men in prison: a social democrat, an anarchist, and a humble
little Jew--a half-educated little fellow named Pinya. They
decided to elect a cell leader to watch over distribution of
food, tea, and tobacco. The anarchist, a big, burly fellow,
was against such a lawful process as electing authority. To
show his contempt for law and order, he proposed that the
semi-educated Jew, Pinya, be elected. They elected Pinya.
"Things went well," Khrushchev continued, "and they de-
cided to escape. But they realized that the first man to go
through the tunnel would be shot at by the guard. They all
turned to the big, brave anarchist, but he was afraid to go.
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Suddenly poor little Pinya drew himself up and said, 'Comrades,
you elected me by democratic process as your leader. There-
fore, I will go first.'
"The moral of the story," Khrushchev explained, "is
that no matter how humble a man's beginning, he achieves the
stature of the office to which he is elected.
"That little Pinya," he concluded, "that's me,"
It is not clear whether the tale was meant as a parable
approximating actual events, but it did reveal much about
Khrushchev's mental reflexes: his consciousness of his hum-
ble origin, a frequently reiterated theme; his sense of per-
sonal accomplishment; confidence that his vigor, initiative,
and capacity are equal to his station; jealousy of the pre-
rogatives of that station; and a wry satisfaction with the
cunning which had enabled him to gain the upper hand over a
series of rivals who underrated him,
When Stalin died in 1953, Khrushchev was largely an
unknown quantity outside the Soviet Union, seemingly a
lesser-ranking figure than the better-known Molotov, Malenkov,
Beria and Mikoyan. In the year or so that ensued he edged
his way more and more onto the public stage but the picture
he presented to foreign observers was not impressive--from
all appearances he was an impetuous, obtuse, rough-talking
man, with something of the buffoon and a good deal of the
tosspot in him.
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Before long, however, events would show that there was
a great deal more to Khrushchev than the appearance suggested
and that behind the exterior lay a shrewd native intelligence,
an agile mind, drive, ambition, and ruthlessness. His own
colleagues probably sold him short initially, but they un-
doubtedly knew from experience that he could not have
escaped Stalin's murderous judgment if he had been witless
or f?olish.y' impulsive.
It now is clear that he had other qualities which had
had only limited opportunity for expression under Stalin--
resourcefulness, audacity, a good sense of political timing
and showmanship, and a touch of the gambler's instinct.
Humble Beginnings
Even without benefit of propaganda embroidery, the
story of Khrushchev's rise to the Soviet pinnacle makes a
model Communist success story. He was born in 1894 in the
small village of Kalinovka, not far from where Great.Russia
meets the Ukraine, the son of a miner not long removed from
the fields, His boyhood was spent in poverty and he recalls
with pride that he worked successively as a shepherd and as
a miner, He neither can nor wants to forget his humble be-
ginnings and his speech is larded with peasant proverbs and
even Biblical phrases which go back to that period. His
origin is both a political asset and a point of pride with
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him, Even to this day he is at his folksiest best in the
fields of a collective farm dispensing advice to the assem-
bled peasants on the best means of planting potatoes or corn.
His view of the world at large was probably formed
definitively during those early years in the fields and
mines--thereafter, he was more concerned with learning how
things were done in his particular world, which very soon
became a Soviet Communist world, and in finding ways to get
ahead in that world than in philosophical introspection.
He still alludes to the mines and their foreign ownership
and it was there that he probably formed life-long, unflinch-
ing prejudices about the West and capitalism.
As a youth Khrushchev had no formal education. He was
illiterate into his late 'teens. When the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion came he was 23, and he quickly found a promising avenue
in the Communist party. The party gave him the rudiments of
an education in an industrial school for workers--he must
have supplemented this with dogged homework. He rose there-
after through successive party echelons, won the patronage
of Lazar Kaganovich (whom he was to send into political
oblivion in 1957) and by 1935 was-chief of the Moscow party
organization. By 1939 he was party boss of the Ukraine and
a full member of the all-powerful Politburo. When Stalin
died Khrushchev was one of the half-dozen mast powerful men
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in the Soviet Union and was well entrenched in the stra-
tegic Secretariat, which then and now controls the party's
professional machinery.
Khrushchev met an occasional obstacle in his progress
to the top--in 1947, when he was still in the Ukraine, and
again in 1951 his career hit snags, if not serious setbacks.
In both cases his recovery was quick, however, and from these
circumstances he probably gathered new confidence and agil-
ity, sharpened his skill in the intricate maneuvers of Kremlin
politics, and learned the value of looking ahead to the next
battle rather than backward to the last reverse.
Practical Man Vs. Ideologist
Events were to prove that Khrushchev?s temperament and
training equipped him better for the post-Stalin power strug-
gle than his colleagues and rivals. He belonged to the middle
generation within the top Soviet leadership. Unlike Stalin,
Molotov or Voroshilov he had not been steeped in the aura of
the pre-Revolutionary party which was dominated by involuted
ideological discussions and the elaboration of dogmas and
slogans. Nor was he, like Malenkov and Beria, entirely a
product of Stalin?s central bureaucracy. From his years as
overlord of the Ukraine and from his wartime experience as
a political commissar on various military fronts he probably
developed a degree of independent judgment as well as a capac-
ity for personal leadership and initiative.
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This background probably, also, reinforced the strong
practical strain in Khrushchev. In this respect, he stood
midway between Malenkov, whose whole experience made him an
organizational manipulator, a puller of Stalin's strings,
and Molotov, whose long party career and stubborn mental
reflexes had made him a prisoner of dogma. Khrushchev
neglected neither the organizational play nor the dogma,
but was concerned with putting the two together to spell
political success. He has campaigned incessantly against
both the pure bureaucrat and the ivory-tower theorist.
Westerners who have seen the Khrushchev of today close-
up have come up with different ideas about what "makes him
tick." Some conclude that he is a pragmatic man through-
and-through, the practical man who spouts Communist doc-
trine from habit rather than from conviction. Others
have been shocked by the completeness of his commitment
to that doctrine and see his outlook as rigidly framed by
the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. He is, in fact, per-
fectly capable of tinkering with time-honored doctrines
which appear to him awkward or outmoded (e.g., Lenin's
doctrine on the inevitability of war), but he has, on the
other hand, told Westerners repeatedly, probably with con-
viction, that their grandchildren will live under a Commu-
nist system.
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Khrushchev is primarily a man of action rather than
a man of thought. Marxist doctrine is more than a conven-
ient instrument to him~-mhis actions and outlook are guided
by a system of thought which has enveloped him since early
manhood, and which he undoubtedly believes holds the key
.to his own and his country's success. Nevertheless, he is
plainly less doctrinaire than many of his fellow Communists
outside the USSR, some of whom have, in fact, charged that
he is a "practicist" who is allowing Marxist-Leninist theory
to stagnate. To this he has replied, paraphrasing Goethe:
"Theory, my friends is grey, but the eternal tree of life
is evergreen."
Khrushchev--ThePublic Figure
In the years since Khrushchev established clear title
to supremacy in the Soviet hierarchy both he and his propa-
gandists have labored to enlarge his image as a world figure.
As the "Khrushchev cult" has grown apace, Khrushchev has
himself perceptibly taken on a new sense of authority and
dignity. Partly for reason of health and partly for the
sake of appearances, he has given up his public drinking
bouts. His formal and informal statements and his public
demeanor--even allowing for his raucous performance at the
UN last fall--though still frequently blunt or intemperate
usually show the mark of calculation, in contrast to some
of his earlier headlong indiscretions,
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Khrushchev is well aware that he has arrived as the
Soviet Union's number-one man and a world figure, and he
resents being treated otherwise. His jealousy of Marshal
Zhukov's domestic popularity and world reputation undoubt-
edly figured in the disgrace of the famed military leader.
Khrushchev craves the respect of the outside world.
On more than one occasion he has revealed an exaggerated
sensitivity to imagined personal slights or reflections on
his country's prestige, while, on the other side, he takes
delight in private conversation in dropping the names of
world stat'esmAn with whom he has corresponded or who have
sent him gifts. He angled for a long time for an invitation
to visit the US partly, of course, for political reasons,
but also because it would confer on him a new-mark of inter-
national recognition and respect, In one sense, he feels
that he himself and his nation, with which he has increas-
ingly identified his own person, have acquired a station
which entitle them to acceptance and respect, if not affec-
tion.
Although he must still balance and manipulate the some-
times divergent views and contending political influences
which exist even within the tightly controlled Soviet system,
Khrushchev has not had to reckon, since 1957, with the threat
of a serious challenge to his authority. Because of this
circumstance, Khrushchev has been able increasingly to move
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into the role of paramount Soviet statesman. A handful of
key lieutenants share among them many of his day-to-day
executive respons'.bilities, permitting him to take the
longer periods of rest which his health recommends (now
6'7, he has kidney and liver ailments and is grossly over-
weight). Ultimate authority is unquestionably his, however,
and in matters of crucial concern to him--as for example,
the current agricultural problem--he believes there is no
substitute for personal intervention and direct command,
A considerable turnover among important officials in the
party and government hierarchy during the past two years
provides evidence of Khrushchev's impatience with unsatis-
factory performance on the part of subordinates and of his
readiness and ability to take scalps. "Friendship is
friendship and work is work," Khrushchev publicly informed
a long-time political ally just before firing him in early
1960.
Until recently, Khruishchev's own people took him
rather lightly. His homely public manners, his frequent
excursions among the "masses," and his agricultural campaigns
invited numerous jokes about his peasant attributes. Khru-
shchev the "corn man," to a people long accustomed to
Stalin's regal reserve and cold, distant awesomeness, cut
a somewhat comic figure. He is still held in contempt by
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many members of the Russian intelligentsia, who are
offended by his bumptious manners and are well aware that
he has no use for pure intellectualism.
His practical streak tells him he must go on coddling
his scientists and technologists, and he has more recently
sought a kind of "cease-fire" with his sometimes fractious
artists, novelists, and poets; but he has repeatedly warned
them that they must "learn life" as the party views it or
face a severe discipline.
Two years ago, taking note of the fact that the
Hungarian revolution got its start among a small group of
intellectuals, he told a gathering of Soviet writers: "If
the Hungarian Government had shot a few writers it wouldn't
have run into that trouble.... I might remark that in a
similar case my hand would not tremble."
Despite such tough talk, Khrushchev pictures himself
as a genuine "man of the people" who leads through persua-
sion rather than terror, who knows what the people want,
and who will give them what he thinks necessary and possi-
ble. Without surrendering any of the essential elements
of personal dictatorship, Khrushchev has, through his
demagogic gifts and political perception, managed to develop
a fair degree of genuine popularity.
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Khrushchev--Face to Face
A strong urge to see for himself and to bring his own
personality to bear has made Khrushchev, in recent years,
one of the most widely-travelled and most-frequently met
of the world's leaders. From his countless meetings with
foreign statesmen and citizens he has acquired a reputation
as a formidable figure in face-to-face encounter. Eric
Johnston remarked after a long-private session with him:
"He is one of the fastest thinkers I have ever met."
Joseph Alsop concluded: "I thought him one of the most
intellectually powerful, tough, pragmatic, and energetic-
minded men I have ever run into."
There is no doubt that Khrushchev, in such circum-
stances, is capable of an impressive performance--supple,
acute and comprehensive. But out of a study of a great
number of these meetings certain other conclusion emerge.
There is almost universal agreement that Khrushchev is
unusually well-informed on a wide range of subjects. This
may be due, however, neither to a phenomenal memory nor
voracious reading. While he grasps essential facts quickly
and uses them effectively, he appears to rely heavily on
briefings. During his visit to the U.S. in 1959 these
were supplied to him by a group of personal assistants who
function as a private secretariat, speech-writing crew, and
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information channel. On that occasion the members of this
entourage included G. T. Shuisky, A. S. Shevchenko, Oleg
Troyanovsky, Khrushchev's interpreter, and Aleksey Adzhubey,
Khrushchev's son-in-law.
Whatever his reliance on staff work, Khrushchev has not
always lived up to his reputation for factual grasp and
debating skill, particularly during his American tour. One
source who talked with Khrushchev at a dinner in Washington
at that time remarked: "When I talked to Khrushchev some
months ago, I thought he was one of the best informed men
I have ever met and I was greatly impressed by his sharp
answers to questions. At the dinner, however, it seemed
to me he handled questions very poorly." Similarly, one
of the people who was on hand for a meeting with Khrushchev
in Ambassador Harriman's New York residence reported: "He
gave the impression of being very tired. I found him less
alert than usual. Certainly, he was repeatedly fumbling for
words. Nor did he answer some of the questions put to him,
although there were rather limited in number and scope."
In the great majority of cases, however, Khrushchev
has appeared to be remarkably stimulated by a "give-and-
take" situation and even seems to gain satisfaction from
outlasting others in conversation. He is undoubtedly at
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his best extempore and can be roused to garrulity by a
responsive audience. He often takes obvious pleasure in
playing on a suitable audience'or vis-a-vis.
Without exception Americans who have interviewed
Khrushchev come away with distinct impressions of the man
even though they have dealt with him through interpreters.
This cannot be attributed to interpreter skill alone. Inter-
viewers invariably feel they are speaking directly to Khru-
shchev and that he seems to understand them before the
remarks are translated. Thus his personality has more
impact than his words.
There is an inclination to call Khrushchev an excel-
lent role player, which means, in psychological parlance,
that he can alter his behavior to fit many situations.
Actually, Khrushchev excels as a "character actor," for
his skill is not in adapting to meet new situations, but
in forcing situations to conform to the role he can play.
He has often achieved psychological advantage with this
technique. For instance, while preparing to film the pro-
gram, "Face the Nation," the CBS staff in Moscow was never
quite sure that Khrushchev would approve the program. As
a journalistic coup, the program was extremdly important
since it was to be the first "free press" conference with
Khrushchev. At the last moment, Khrushchev entered the
room and in effect said; "Shut everything off." He then
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launched into what was called a tirade against the methods
of the American press. Just when the production seemed
doomed, Khrushchev told the production crew to proceed and
became completely charming for the interview. Throughout
the program, the reporters, not Khrushchev, were on the
defensive.
This tactic, with variations, was used effectively
during his American visit. Putting other persons on the
defensive by forcing them to become unduly preoccupied with
their own role-playing, is one of his primary methods of
psychological manipulation. He has the uncanny ability of
making people depart evaluating their own performance
rather than describing his.
From all indications, Khrushchev is a person with
little capacity for detecting nuances and subtleties. He
is a man of action and decision when he can see issues
clearly, as black or white, but becomes confused and
hostile when confronted by shades of grey. He has the
self-confidence of a man who knows what is right and what
is wrong and is relatively invulnerable to subtle persua-
sion or moderately involved intellectual reasoning. It
is this quality that makes him appear dedicated to Commu-
nist ideology, when in reality he may be dedicated primar-
ily to Communist progress. His spontaneous reasoning
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always includes direct references to progress and produc-
tion and never to principle or ideology, except in the
most literal and catechnistic form. This may account for
the assumption that he subscribes to the principle that
the end justifies the means. Actually, he lacks the
philosophical sensitivity to understand such a principle.
In all probability, he regards himself as a man of good
intentions fighting for a just cause and, with his prag-
matic viewpoint, is completely incapable of preceiving
that any system which can produce such obvious "good"
could have evolved from an ideology that is "bad." In
short, his dedication to communism derives much more
from faith in the system than in an understanding of it.
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SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
A. CAREER CHRONOLOGY
1925-1929 Secretary, Petrovsko-Marinsky rayon (county) party com-
mittee Stalino Oblast (region), specializing in mining and
agriculture.
Head, organization department, Staling rayon party com-
mittee, Staling Oblast.
Held a number of "leading party positions" in Kiev.
1929-1931 Attended Moscow Industrial Academy (possibly graduated);
elected secretary of the Academy's party committee.
Born 17 April 1894, in the town of Kalinovka, Kursk Province, (near
.the Ukranian border); son of a Donbass miner.
Childhood: First worked as a shepherd; then as a farm laborer.. Joined
father in Donbass and worked as apprentice metal worker. Later
worked in the Bosse factory in Yuzovka (now Stalin) as a metal
worker. Then worked with his father in the pits of a Donbass coal
mine.
1917 Mechanic in Donbass factory; took part in October Revolution.
1918 Joined Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik),
now the CPSU.
1919-1920 Active party worker in Donbass and. Ukraine; fought with the
Red. Army on southern front during Civil War.
1921-1922 Returned to Donbass as assistant manager of a mine.
1922 Entered "Workers' Faculty" at Donets Basin Industrial In-
stitute (college preparatory school with 3-4 years course).
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1931-1932 Secretary of the Bauman, and later, of the Krasnaya Presnya
rayon party committees in Moscow.
1932-1934 2nd Secretary, Moscow City party committee.
1934-present Member, Central Committee, CPSU (17th party congress).
1935-1938 1st Secretary, Moscow Oblast and City party committees.
Candidate Member, Presidium, All-Union Central Executive
Committee (predecessor to the Supreme Soviet)
1938-1939 Candidate member, Politburo (now Presidium), CC, CPSU.
1938-1946 Member, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet.
1938-Mar 1st Secretary, Ukranian party Central Committee. (In
1947; Dec
1947-1949 March 1947 Kaganovich, trouble-shooting for Stalin, took
over the duties of 1st secretary in the Ukraine, but was
recalled to Moscow in December 1947 and Khrushchev re-
gained the position of lst secretary in the Ukraine).
1938-1949 Member, Politburo, Ukrainian Party Central Committee.
1939-present Full member Politburo/Presidium, CC, CPSU.
1941-1943 Member of the Military Council, Kiev Military District,
then of the Stalingrad Front (1942-43)--Khrushchev himself
claims to have taken an active part in the defense of
Stalingrad--later a member of the Military Councils of
the Southwest and let Ukrainian fronts. In 1943 he served
as Maalenkov's subordinate for the Ukraine on the Committee
for Reconstruction of Liberated Areas. He organized partisan
warfare and underground activity in the Ukraine and for his
successes was promoted to Lt. General and awarded the Order
of Suvorov, one of the first Politburo members to be so
honored.
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i944-1946 Returned to the Ukraine to suppress resistance and re-
establish Soviet control; carried out a major purge of
leading Ukrainian officials.
1944-1947 Chairman, Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars (Council
of Ministers).
1945 Chairman of the Commission of Experts for the Restoration
of Warsaw.
1946-1953 First Secretary Moscow Oblast Party Committee.
1949-1953 Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU.
1950-present Member USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
1950-1951 Responsible for amalgamation drive which resulted in a
drastic reduction in the number of collective farms through
mergers; in early 1951 he advocated the consolidation of
small villages into larger villages (called Agrogorods)
but project was rejected by Stalin.
1953-present ist Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU.
1956-present Chairman, Bureau for RSFSR, CC, CPSU.
1958-present Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR.
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B. TRAVEL CHRONOLOGY
1945 March Warsaw First trip outside USSR, as
1954 9-18 Mar Poland
Chairman, Commission of Ex-
perts for Restoration of
Warsaw.
2nd Congress, Polish Communist
party.
9-17 June Prague 10th Congress, CP, Czecho-
slovakia.
29 Sept - Peiping 5th Anniversary, establish-
30 Oct
merit of the Chinese People's
Republic.
1955 20-26 Apr Warsaw 10th Anniversary, Soviet-Polish
Treaty of Friendship, Mutual
Assistance and Post-war Co-
operation.
26 May - Belgrade High-level meeting of Soviet-
3 June
Yugoslav officials to re-
establish friendly relations.
3-5 June Sofia and Visit
Bucharest
16-24 July Geneva Summit Conference
24-27 July Berlin Visit
21-26 Aug Bucharest 11th Anniversary, Liberation
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18 Nov New Delhi Khrushchev and Bulganin tour
1 Dec Rangoon Southeast Asia
10 Dec Kashmir
12 Dec New Delhi
18 Dec Kabul
21 Dec Moscow
1956 15-21 Mar Warsaw Funeral of Bierut
14-27 Apr England Khrushchev and Bulganin visit
19-27 Sept Yugoslavia "Vacation"
19-20 Oct Poland Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov,
and Kaganovich--return of
Gomulka to power.
1957 6-14 June Finland Khrushchev and Bulganin visit
9-16 July Prague Khrushchev and Bulganin visit
6-14 Aug ODR Khrushchev and Mikoyan visit
1-2 Aug Bucharest Khrushchev and Tito discussions,
1958 12-15 Jan Poland Talks with Gomulka
2-10 Apr Budapest Khrushchev and Kozlov visit
31 May - Bulgaria VII Congress, Bulgarian CP
9 June
8-11 July Berlin 5th Congress, SED party
31 July - Peiping Visit
3 Aug
1959 4-12 Mar Leipzig Industrial fair
25 May - Albania Visit
4 June
4-6 June Budapest Visit
14-23 July Poland 15th Anniversary, Polish Peo-
ple's Republic.
15-28 Sept U.S. Visit
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1960
29 Sept -. Peiping
4 Oct
19-25 Oct Rumania
29? Nov - Budapest
7 Dec
11 Feb New Delhi
16 Feb Rangoon
18 Feb Djakarta
1 Mar Calcutta
2 Mar Kabul
5 Mar Moscow
23 Mar - France
3 Apr
14+-19 May France
19-21 May East Berlin
18-27 June Bucharest
30 June - Austria
8 July
1-5 Sept Finland
19 Sept - New York
13 Oct
10th Anniversary, establiBhment
of Chinese People's Republic.
"Holiday"
VII Congress, Hungarian CP
"Summit" conference in Paris
Visit
Third Congress, Rumanian CP
Visit
Celebration of Finnish Presi-
dent Kekkonen's birthday.
Headed Soviet delegation to
UNGA session.
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C. FAMILY
Wife
Nina Petrovna 60 years old; married Khrushchev in Kiev
in 1924. Khrushchev? s first wife died in
a famine leaving him with two chiidredn,
Leonid and Yulia, age 8 and 6 at the time
of his second marriage. Nina Petrovna met
Khrushchev in Staiinov when she -went there
to -teach political economy. Speaks English
very well, a She accompanied Khrushchev on
his trips to the United States (Sept 59),
Hungary (Dec 59), France (March 60), and
Austria ('uly 6o)
Sergey
The elder son, Pilot in the Soviet Air Force;
shot down in the first days of World War Il;
recovered from injuries suffered in the
crash and went back to the front. Soon
after, shot down again and killed.
Leonid had two children.: a son, who vas
attending a military school in 1957 and who
is now married; and a daughter, Yulia, 21
years old, who is also married. One of these
recently made Khrushchev ? s a great-grandfather.
The younger son, now 26 years old. He grad-
uated fron an institute in 1958 as an engineer
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Sergey con?t.
Daughters
specializing in machine building and electronics.
He reportedly works in a technical job in Mos-
cow. He speaks English fairly well, although
he is shy about using it, and is described as
modest and unaffected with a good sense of
humor. He collects butterflies as a hobby.
Sergey accompanied. Khrushchev to England in
April 1956, and also to the United States
(Sept 59), Southeast Asia (Feb 60), and
France (Mar 60)
He married a Jewish girl, Galina, in 1958.
They have one son, Nikita, born in September
1959.
1.3 years old; married to V. P. Gontar, about
50, who is the director of the Kiev Opera and
Ballet Company. Although Yulia lives and
works in Kiev, she evidently spends much of
her time in Moscow. She accompanied Khrush-
chev to the United States (Sept 59), South-
east Asia (Feb 60), and France (Mar 60).
About 30 years old; the wife of Aleksey
Adzhubey, chief editor of Izvestiya. She
is a graduate of.both the department of bi-
ology and the department of Journalism at
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Moscow University, and is, employed in the edi-
torial office of a scientific journal in Mos-
cow. She accompanied Khrushchev and Adzhubey
to the United States (Sept 59), Southeast
Asia (Feb 60), and France (Mar 60).
The Adzhubeys have three sons: Nikita, 8;
Aleksey, 6; and Ivan, 2.
About 21 years old. She is a journalism stu-
dent at Moscow University. She accompanied
Khrushchev to Southeast Asia (Feb 60), France
(Mar 60), and Austria (July 60).
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