DCI BRIEFING FOR 19 JUNE SRG MEETING ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A002100010019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 19, 1975
• Content Type: BRIEF

CONFIDENTIAL
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19 June 1975
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
19 JUNE SRG MEETING
ANGOLA
I. The current situation in Angola is highly un-
stable. Rivalry between contending nationalist
groups has featured increasing violence, with
each group trying to stake out territory and
gain military superiority before independence
on November 11.
A. The fighting over the past few months has
been between the two largest groups, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the
National Front for the Liberation of An-
gola led by Holden Roberto. A third group,
the National Union for the Total Independ-
ence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi, has
largely kept out of the fighting.
1. In action early this month_ Netols Popu-
lar Movement secured an advantage in
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some areas north and east of Luanda,
thus blocking the National Front's sup-
ply lines from northern Angola and Zaire
into the capital.
2. The Popular Movement already had impor-
tant tribal support in these areas dur-
ing the years of insurgency against the
Portuguese.
3. Neto's Popular Movement also has gained
an edge in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.
4. The two main groups remain in a standoff
position in Luanda itself.
5. Roberto's National Front still remains
strongly entrenched in northern Angola
where it has substantial tribal support.
In that area it seems well able to with-
stand any Popular Front attacks.
6. There have been some reports of new
clashes this week on other rural areas,
but it is not yet clear just what has
happened.
B. There are a number of factors that can cause
new fighting at any time:
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The continuing buildup of the military
forces of the three nationalist groups;
The introduction of heavier weapons --
mortars and bazookas -- into Angola;
The presence of armed and undisciplined
civilians in Luanda fight in behalf of
the Popular Movement;
The inability or unwillingness of either
major group to exercise effective control
over its own forces; and
Attempts by all three groups to seek con-
trol of areas of Angola yet untouched by
the fighting and where no single group
has an edge.
C. Cabinda remains a flashpoint. Despite the
MPLA's slight military edge in the territory,
but both other groups also have forces active
there.
1. All three groups want the enclave to re-
main a part of an independent Angola.
2. The picture is complicated by the pres-
ence of a separatist movement supported
by both Zaire and Congo.
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3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan in-
dependence, and any intensification of
the fighting there could bring outside
intervention.
II. The transitional government installed last January
has proved unworkable.
A. It is constructed on a system of checks and
balances, but in the current climate members
of the three liberation groups, as government
officials, work at odds with each other.
1. Portuguese officials are not effective,
because they are caught in the middle.
2. Above all, the liberation groups have
not honored their commitment to estab-
lish the integrated national army that
was called for in the independence ac-
cord.
B. As for the Portuguese military forces, the
24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept
in Luanda.
1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned
most of the countryside to the nation-
alists and are already crating some of
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their heavy equipment for shipment to
Lisbon.
2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to be-
gin withdrawal in October and are to be
totally removed by next February.
3. There is nothing in the independence ac-
cord to prevent the Portuguese from with-
drawing as fast as they can after October.
III. The role of outside powers in supplying military
assistance to the nationalist groups remains a
key factor.
A. The Soviet Union has been a long time sup-
porter of Neto's Popular Movement, providing
both arms and cash during the years of the
insurgency against the Portuguese.
1. We are unable to determine how much So-
viet military aid is now reaching the
Movement, but it seems to have enabled
the Movement to score some gains during
the recent fighting.
2. Most of the aid is being channeled through
the Congo.
B. Peking has had some association with all of
the liberation movements in the past, but
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the Chinese are most closely associated with
the National Front.
1. They have supplied military equipment
as well as some training. Some 100
Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire
working with the Front.
2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front
to establish its forces firmly in north-
ern Angola.
C. Roberto has had little success in finding
assistance elsewhere for the Front.
1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose
family ties with Roberto and has long
supported him. Recently, however,
Mobutu has cut back his assistance
to the Front because of his govern-
ment's serious financial problems.
a. Mobutu is also cooling toward Ro-
berto. He is alarmed over the
Front's recent setbacks and feels
Roberto's position has been dam-
aged because he has remained in
Zaire.
b. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi
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CONFIDENTIAL
of the National Union should be
the primary figure in an inde-
pendent Angolan government.
IV. The prospects for Angola between now and Novem-
ber are poor. Further violence is likely and
may edge the territory closer to civil war.
At best, Angola will lurch along and become
independent without a strong single leader.
A. Elections for a constituent assembly, sup-
posed to be held in October, may well be
postponed.
1. The assembly was to select a head of
government to assume office upon in-
dependence.
B. Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto have been meet-
ing this week in Kenya to try and dampen
tensions and thrash out some agreement on
who will assume what office upon independence.
1. The odds are greatly against any new and
fundamental understanding among the three.
2. At this point, it seems unlikely that
they will do much more than negotiate
an uncertain truce that might delay a
confrontation until after independence.
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BACKUP FOR
19 JUNE SRG MEETING
ZAIRE
19 June 1975
I. Zaire's declaration of Ambassador Hinton as persona
non grata followed several days of heavy anti-US
propaganda in the controlled media that included
an attack on Secretary Kissinger. The campaign
was highlighted by President Mobutu's speech to
a mass audience in Kinshasa yesterday.
A. The Zairian foreign minister told Hinton there
was clear evidence of US involvement in a coup
plot against Mobutu. A number of middle and
high-ranking military officers were recently
arrested for allegedly plotting an attempt on
Mobutu's life.
1. Two of the officers who were arrested
received training at Fort Leavenworth
and another had recently returned to
Kinshasa after serving as military attache
in Washington.
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II. At this point, Mobutu's motives remain a mystery.
Short-lived anti-US outbursts on his part are not
uncommon, but his fits of pique have never gone
to this extreme.
A. Mobutu has long tried to erase his pro-US
image now that he is securely in power. He
is also said to believe that the US is no
longer a dependable ally and may have decided
the time was ripe to assert his independence
more forcefully.
B. Mobutu/
Inlay be overreacting to any one of a
number of situations.
1. He is alarmed by the rising violence in
Angola and may feel his ability to influ-
ence developments there is slipping. He
has been unable to convince the US to take
a more active role there by supporting
Roberto 's Liberation Front.
2. He may feel frustrated because he has
serious financial problems and has had
almost no success in finding large-scale
foreign assistance.
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3. Inflation, shortages of consumer goods,
and other economic problems have produced
grumbling in the army, which has not been
a problem in the past few years. He may
have felt it necessary to invent a plot
to warn any potential conspirators.
III. Whatever point Mobutu is trying to make, he will
probably let the matter rest here. It seems most
unlikely that he will go to the extreme of breaking
relations.
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